EAST INDIA (ARMY IN INDIA COMMITTEE 1919-20)

REPORT

OF THE

mittee appointed by the Secretary of State for India to enquire into the administration and organisation of the Army in India.

(CHAIRMAN: LORD ESHER)

Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty.



LONDON
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1920

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TERMS OF REFERENCE.

1. To enquire into and report, with special reference to post-bellum c
upon the administration and, where necessary, the organisation of the Army
including its relations with the War Office and the India Office, and the rel
the two Offices to one another.

2. To consider the position of the Commander-in-Chief in his dual
head of the Army and member of the Executive Council, and *to make recon*

3. To consider and to report upon any other matters which they
are relevant to the enquiry.

TABLE OF CON

REPORT

OF THE

ARMY IN INDIA COMMITTEE, 1919 1920

To the Right Hon E S Montagu M P

Sir

In forwarding you the first part of our Report we desire to point out a difficulty with which we are confronted at the outset of our enquiry We cannot consider the administration of the Army in India otherwise than as *part of the total armed forces of the Empire* yet we have no indication of the form of organization which may be set up in the future for the control of other parts of those forces or of the whole

We have it is true been told that proposals for the higher direction of our Imperial forces are under consideration and we are aware of the circumstances under which an Imperial Cabinet was formed during the late war But the bases of permanent Imperial control over the organised forces of the Empire are as yet unlaid and we have therefore been obliged to take existing statutes and usage as the foundation of the proposals we have made in accordance with the terms of our reference The remedies which we shall venture to suggest for such defects in the Army in India as may be disclosed in the course of our enquiry will therefore be made subject to the limitations we have indicated

Novel political machinery created by the Peace Treaty has enhanced the importance of the Army of India relatively to the military forces in other parts of the Empire and more particularly to those of the British Isles *We feel bound to assume that Western Europe will no longer be* an armed camp containing national armies in a high state of preparation for war and we note that conflicts fraught with the gravest consequences to the belligerent nations cannot in future take place within a few days or weeks of an order to mobilise We realise and the evidence of Lord Allenby confirms our belief that the war has left Eastern Europe and what is commonly known as the Near and Middle East in a condition of grave unrest with consequences to India especially as regards her military and financial resources that we are unable to ignore

We are aware that during the war the necessary co-ordination of the fighting strength of the whole Empire brought into existence what has been called an Imperial Cabinet performing real functions of Imperial Government and accepted apparently without demur by the united peoples The evolution of this novel constitutional instrument is for the moment arrested If the principle of an Imperial Cabinet composed of the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and the Dominions becomes rooted in our institutions other changes connected with Imperial defence seem likely to follow

An Imperial General Staff an Imperial Naval and an Imperial Air Staff possibly an Imperial Foreign Office may become segregated under the leadership of the British Prime Minister of the day but controlled by a body that from the nature of the case cannot be wholly responsible to the Parliament at Westminster If India were again to be represented directly in a permanent Imperial Council or Cabinet such as that summoned *ad hoc* *during* the war the position of her Commander in Chief might assume a special aspect different from that which we have had to consider Desirable

and perhaps vital as such an evolution of our institut... 'erence to post-bell... ...nisation of the A... chances of its accomplishment are not immediate. We ... ...a Office, and t... accepted for the purpose of our Report the relations of Im... Britain and *to the Empire as they stand to-day.*

We desire also to mention that we have been requested, in consider... du... our recommendations, to avoid, if possible, framing them in such a manner as may hereafter prove inconsistent with the gradual approach of India towards a Dominion status; and we observe *that the Indian Constitutional* Reforms recently proposed have in view the relaxation of the control of the Secretary of State, as well as of Parliament, over the Government of India.

We are at the same time confronted with evidence of the continued reluctance of the India Office to relinquish into the hands of the Government of India greater freedom in the administration of the Army, even in cases where this could be done without compromising the administration of the Army at home or contravening the sound principle of uniformity in military policy. We are *strongly of opinion* that greater latitude should be allowed to the Governor-General in Council and to the Commander-in-Chief in India in matters affecting internal military administration, in order to secure greater efficiency, and especially the greater contentment of the Army in India.

At the same time we lay stress upon the importance of maintaining constant and intimate touch between the Commander-in-Chief in India and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London and between their general staff officers.

Taking, then, existing institutions and the present conditions in India as the basis on which to work, we consider that we shall be laying the foundations of a sound Imperial military system, if the plans we propose are consistent—

(1) with the control by the Government of India of Indian military affairs;
(2) with giving to the Government of India a voice in questions of Imperial defence, and
(3) with *allowing the Imperial General Staff through its Chief to exercise* a considered influence on the military policy of the Government of India.

Keeping these principles in mind, we *propose to submit* our Report to you in several parts, and to report on each separately. *Part I.* is forwarded herewith, and deals with matters upon which a great mass of evidence already exists in documents laid before us. We have therefore not thought it necessary to travel once more over ground investigated by numerous committees and commissions, and by eminent Viceroys and Commanders-in-Chief in past years.

We have limited our enquiry upon these *matters to obtaining* the views of distinguished soldiers of recent war experience, and we have found that their conclusions are in general agreement with the recorded opinions of Lord Lytton and Lord Kitchener.

At the outset of our inquiry it was necessary to decide whether formal evidence should be taken. After consideration we determined that it was undesirable to add to the mass of documentary evidence already available. We consequently decided to take counsel with high officers, military and civil, and certain independent persons whose views and experience could simplify our task, but not to record their evidence formally. We have thus obtained expressions of opinion given with complete freedom, and, coupled with the experience of the members of the committee, they have been of great value to us in forming our conclusions.

We desire to remind you that the subsequent Parts of our Report, dealing as they are bound to do with matters of administrative detail, would be largely influenced by the decision at which you may arrive to accept or reject the proposals we have made in Part I. So convinced are we of the desirability of obtaining a decision of His Majesty's Government on the principles laid down in Part I. before proceeding to the laborious examination

9 The War Book questions covered by our reference that we have thought planned with a view place Part I of our Report in your hands before the home on the outb oceeds to India It would facilitate the work of the committee Departments of render their complete report of greater value to His Majesty's of the Government and to the Government of India if we could obtain from you Depart an early date an indication of the advice you are likely to tender to His Majesty's Government upon the principal questions covered by Part I of our Report

We are
Sir
Your obedient Servants,

ESHER
M F O DWYER
H V COX Lieut Genl
CLAUD W JACOB Lieut Genl
J P Du CANE Lieut Genl
G FELL
WEBB GILLMAN Maj Genl

C M WAGSTAFF, Brig Genl *Secretary*
3rd November 1919

PART I

Section 1

The India Office

1 The relations between the India Office and the Government of India are presumably based upo control of Parliament as far as possible intact over In sound in itself in view of the bureaucratic form of g to be illusory in practice The business of Parliament is too great and too complex to enable any effective control to be exercised by the House of Commons over Indian expenditure in practice therefore the control of the India Office has been merely the control of one bureaucracy over another

The working of this system undoubtedly causes delay in dealing with military questions that frequently require rapid settlement both in the interests of efficiency and of the contentment of the Army in India We therefore recommend that greater latitude should be allowed to the Governor General in Council in deciding questions of a military character provided they do not influence by reflex action the administration of the British Army at home

2 From 1909 and particularly during the war the rule was relaxed under which all communications of a military nature between the Commander in Chief and the War Office passed through the India Office During the war the Commander in Chief in India communicated direct with the War Office We consider that this freedom of communication should now be established as a permanent right on a regular official basis but should be limited to communications between the Commander in Chief and the Imperial General Staff The Secretary of State for India should be kept fully informed of such communications

3 In order to facilitate what we consider of primary importance namely the free and intimate r of the Imperial Gen d also be fully infor imend that the Secre be an officer with Indian experience, of high military rank appointed on the recommendation of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff by the Secretary of State for India It would be convenient and desirable that this officer should be a Deputy Chief of the

Imperial General Staff in order that the Chief of the Imperial ...rence to pos
the benefit of experienced advice on Indian matters. Further...uisation of
the right of attending the meetings of the Army Council when ...s Office, a
India are discussed. Although we strongly advocate that questions of
regarding the Army in India should be mainly settled in India itself, and show
be referred to the India Office under the circumstances which we have pre
noted, we are of opinion that the Secretary in the Military Department of the
Office should have attached to his Department two officers specially conversan
"A" and "Q" questions, in so far as they affect India.

4. We are unable to see any advantage, from the point of view of India, in re
ing upon the India Council in London the services of an officer of high military r
It is undesirable that the Secretary of State for India should be left in any doubt a
the quarter from which military advice should be offered him. The principle u
which we think it important to insist is that the sole responsible military adviser
the Secretary of State should be the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. This adv
could be tendered either through his Deputy Chief established in the India Office,
directly by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff himself, who should be authorise
to attend any meeting of the Council of India at which military questions of fir
importance are to be discussed.

5. We recommend in Section III. that the Commander-in-Chief in India shall be
appointed with the concurrence of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and that
the Commander-in-Chief shall be the sole military adviser of the Government of India.
lf this system can be established, the chain of military responsibility for questions
f an Imperial character will be complete. On the one hand, the Commander-in-
hief will look to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff for supreme direction in all
uestions of Imperial military policy in which India is concerned; and, on the other
nd, the Governor-General will look to the Commander-in-Chief for military advice
on questions in which India only is concerned, and also upon questions of a wider
litary character with confidence that the Commander-in-Chief will be in a position
xpress upon the latter the considered views of the Chief of the Imperial General
f.

6. We believe that, under the plan thus proposed, the Government of India will
n its statutory control over the Army in India, that the Governor-General will
ssured of undivided counsel upon military questions, and that uniformity of
y policy will at last be established between Great Britain and India.

SECTION II.

Defence Committee.

Our attention has been called to the Committee of Defence set up in India by
ernor-General during the war. Its composition and functions follow those of
mittee of Imperial Defence in this country as they were understood to be
vas reconstituted on a new basis in 1902 and before the establishment of its
t secretariat in 1905.

Committee was consultative and not executive. It had no administrative
It could not prescribe a policy or give directions. Its duty was to advise.
ed with no existing authority. It possessed no fixed constitution, and the
mposing it were selected by the Prime Minister from among his colleagues
echnical assistants, with the addition of any person whose advice he might
tain upon the matters about to be discussed. The Committee, in short,
o *ex officio* member except the Prime Minister himself, and this flexibility,
ur pointed out at the time, gave it an advantage of first-rate importance
vith the manifold subjects that gather round the problem of national

we understand, was the body upon which the Governor-General modelled
ommittee in India, and we are firmly convinced that, taken in conjunction
nce of the War Book, which had been prepared in 1914, it contributed
unce towards bringing India into line with Great Britain during the
t should not be allowed to disappear.
nend that its Secretary should be a member of the Governor-General's
iat, and that he should have charge of the records and be responsibl
on and upkeep of the War Book.

9 The War Book designed by Sir Maurice Hankey some years before 1914 was planned with a view to the instant mobilisation of all government departments at home on the outbreak of war For the first time in this country the attention of all Departments of Government was drawn to the fact that war was not the sole business of the Admiralty and the War Office, but that it was the concern of practically every Department of State The Defence Committee by its composition and its method of working first suggested this somewhat novel conception of modern war, but the War Book stereotyped it and fixed it indelibly in the minds of the whole Civil Service

The War Book prepared in India in 1914 has been laid before us It is a work of such value that we strongly recommend that it should be constantly revised and kept up to date by the officer we have designated, who will at the same time be the Secretary of the Defence Committee

We would suggest that the Secretary of the Indian Defence Committee should be placed in direct touch with the Secretary of the Imperial Defence Committee in London, so that as far as possible the measures concerted by the latter should be applied by the Governor General in India, so far as they are appropriate to local conditions.

SECTION III

The High Command

10 The definition of the High Command in India in future requires a few preliminary words of explanation We have before observed that our attention has been drawn to the importance of keeping in view in any proposals we may make the gradual approach of the Government of India to a Dominion status We have also kept before our minds the possibility that in the near future Imperial control over the military policy of the Empire may take a form other than that which obtains at the present time, leading to the establishment of a real Imperial General Staff deriving its authority, not from the War Office and the British Parliament, but from an Imperial Council such as that contemplated in 1907 which materialised in the course of the late war, in what has been called an Imperial Cabinet

We have, however, felt ourselves obliged to base the recommendations we are about to make upon existing facts We are unable to admit any close resemblance between the principles which are applied to army administration in this country, governed as it is under democratic parliamentary institutions, and the conditions that obtain in India, where the government remains of a bureaucratic character with such parliamentary checks as are found to be possible No analogy exists between the Government of India and that of any European country It appears to us therefore, that army administration in India must conform to the principles laid down by the statutes upon which that Government is based, which place the control of the Army in India in the hands of the Governor General in Council

11 We have endeavoured to superimpose upon the existing fabric of Indian army administration the general staff idea In other words while leaving the control of the Army in India to the Governor General in Council we have tried to knit closer the relations between the high command in India and the high command as it now exists at the centre of the Empire We have considered and rejected the proposal to establish in India a civilian Member of the Executive Council responsible for the Army, and an Army Council with collective responsibilities as unsuited to Indian requirements at the present time Among the numerous recommendations that have been made in former years for the reconstitution of the War Department we have adopted that of Lord Lytton that the Commander in Chief should be himself the only military member of the Viceroy s Council, and we have not thought it conducive to good administration, that upon the Executive Council the Commander-in Chief should have any military colleague or competitor entitled to deal with the administration of army affairs

12 We recommend that in future the Army Department and the Headquarters Staff should be consolidated under one head and with a single secretariat which is not at present the case and that the Commander in Chief should be in that capacity considered to be the administrative, as well as the executive head of the Army, subject only to the Governor General in Council in whom the supreme control of the Army is vested by statute Every trace of the duality of functions resulting from the same officer being Commander in-Chief and Member in Charge of the Army Department should be swept away

13. We are of opinion that the financial responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief should not be divorced from his executive responsibilities, and that, while his purely military status should be in no way affected, it should be recognised that he possesses a personal and professional interest in and responsibility for the economical administration of Army funds. We are in agreement with the view that the Commander-in-Chief should be looked upon by all His Majesty's Indian subjects and feudatories in India as the depository and representative of a personal authority, second only to that of the Viceroy; and we are strongly of opinion that any change in the position of the Commander-in-Chief, which would have the effect of weakening that authority, is inadvisable.

14. We propose that a Military Council should be established, composed of high staff officers and others, to assist the Commander-in-Chief in the performance of his administrative functions. This body would have no collective responsibility. Its members, however, would be individually responsible for the branches they would be called upon to administer.

15. We hold the position of the Secretary to Government in the Army Department, as it is generally understood, to be inconvenient and undesirable, as rendering possible an interference with the sole right of the Commander-in-Chief to offer military advice to the Governor-General in Council.

16. We purpose to deal in Part II. of our Report with the personnel of the Military Council and their respective functions, responsibilities and powers.

17. We are in agreement with the General Staff view that the Commander-in-Chief in India should be more directly in touch with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, with a view to obtaining increased efficiency as regards the organisation, equipment and training of the Army in India, so as to develop the military resources of India in a manner suited to Imperial necessities. We have already stated that, in our view, the Commander-in-Chief in India should have the established right to communicate in peace with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London with regard to strategical plans, war organisation, training and the selection for commands and senior staff appointments. But we are not prepared to dogmatise as to whether the Government of India or the Imperial Government at Whitehall is to be responsible for the military safety of India. It is obvious that, if the gradual approach of India to a Dominion status is to be taken as an axiom, this question can be resolved only by the exercise of judgment, tact, and the principle of "give and take." We, however, are strongly of opinion that, while unity of administration is for the present out of the question, unity of conception on broad lines of military policy, such as those for which an Imperial General Staff should be responsible, is essential in the interests of India herself and of the Empire as a whole. For this reason we suggest that the Commander-in-Chief in India should be appointed by His Majesty's Government on the recommendation of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and that the same procedure should be observed in the appointment of the Chief of the General Staff in India. Should this recommendation be approved, given a close co-operation and correspondence between the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Commander-in-Chief in India, we believe that as much will have been done towards securing unity of military purpose as can be profitably accomplished at the present time.

18. We have said that, in our opinion, the Commander-in-Chief should be the sole military adviser of the Government of India. So important a function carries with it a necessity that the Commander-in-Chief shall be in the closest relation to the Governor-General in Council during the progress of hostilities and at all moments in peace when military questions of the first importance come under discussion. At the same time we cannot disregard the importance of personal inspection from time to time of the larger army formations by the Commander-in-Chief himself. During his absence from headquarters under peace conditions, we therefore recommend that he should delegate to his Chief of the General Staff such functions as he thinks may be properly exercised by that officer during his absence. We do not contemplate that under any circumstances the Commander-in-Chief should himself take the field in war. In our view the command of military operations, whether on a large or small scale, should always be entrusted to an officer specially selected for that purpose. We are too well aware of the inconvenience and danger created in 1914 by stripping the War Office of its most experienced advisers and administrators, to desire to see

a repetition in India of so unfortunate an incident To the personal influence of the recognised head of the Army of India especially over Indian troops we have already alluded and while we are anxious that it should not be supposed that we depreciate the value of his making himself thoroughly acquainted with the sentiments and requirements of officers and troops in all parts of India we desire to make clear that during moments of tension it would not be consistent with the efficient discharge of his highest duties to absent himself from the council table of the Governor General

19 We are convinced that the Commander in Chief as being an Extra ordinary Member of Council could be relieved of considerable technical responsibility There appears to us no sound and valid reason why his signature should be obtained to despatches from the Government of India upon questions which have no military significance or importance or that he should be required to study and record his opinion on cases which relate exclusively to the civil administration We are sure that a liberal interpretation of the necessities of Indian administration would lead to an appreciable reduction of his duties We therefore recommend that he should be excused attendance at the Executive and Legislative Councils except when the business under discussion affects military interests

20 We have refrained from exploring in detail the functions which in our view, should in future be imposed upon the Military Council which we have recommended We believe that this can best be done after the visit of the committee to India

21 The recommendations we have made in Part I of our Report are based upon general principles to which the whole committee have given their adherence upon a mass of documentary evidence that has been at their disposal and upon the conferences between the members of the committee and officers and others with profound experience of the working of army administration in India previous to the war during the war and since the armistice

We offer these recommendations to the Secretary of State for India in the hope that he will obtain for them the early sanction of His Majesty s Government in order that the labours of this committee may not like those of so many others, be thrown away

ESHER
M F O DWYER
H V COX Lieut Genl
CLAUD W JACOB Lieut Genl
J P Du CANE Lieut Genl
G FELL
WEBB GILLMAN Maj Genl

C M WAGSTAFF Brig Genl *Secretary*
3rd November 1919

To The Right Honourable E. S. Montagu, M.P.

Sir,

Throughout this Report, we have been guided by the consideration that the army in India, as in all civilised States, furnishes the ultimate sanction for the security of the people against external aggression and for the maintenance of internal tranquillity. We are impressed by the necessity of maintaining this instrument, placed as it always must and should be in the hands of the civil power, in the highest state of efficiency. Whatever form the future Government of India may take, however it may be democratised, and whatever advance may be made on the part of the various sections of the Indian community towards national and imperial unity, the army cannot fail to remain a vital attribute of government in the hands of the dominant authority.

The proposals made by us in Part I having been in the main approved by you, we have in Part II attempted to deal with the difficult question of Supply, to explain in detail the functions which, in our view, should be imposed upon the Military Council, the constitution of which we recommended in Part I, and to make certain proposals regarding Military Finance.

We propose that a Military Council should be constituted for the purpose of assisting the Commander-in-Chief, with a view to relieving him, not of his responsibility, but of manifold duties which, without impairing that responsibility, he can, and should, delegate to his staff officers at Army Headquarters. We desire to impress upon the Commander-in-Chief and upon the officers in question the absolute necessity of carrying out loyally and to the full this principle of delegation. All sound administration is based upon it. No administrator, however able and however conscientious, can interpret responsibility in the sense of giving personal attention and sanction to every act of administration, if the accomplishment of his task is to stand the test of efficiency.

In the constitution of the Military Council, in the functions we have allotted to its various members, and in the handling of this difficult question of military supply, we have all been guided by the supreme consideration of the efficiency of the army in war, coupled with a due regard to the best interests of the Indian tax-payer. We aim at establishing a system which, while it will work simply and economically in time of peace, will be adaptable, without undue friction and disturbance, to the conditions even of such a war as that in which the Empire has recently been engaged.

We lay stress upon the importance, as it appears to us, of organising in India a system of military administration which will establish a chain of responsibility from the Commander-in-Chief himself through his Military Council to the military commands, and so down to divisional units, in order that the test of war, whenever it is applied, shall find ready to hand a body of men expert in administration as well as in command, ready to meet its exigencies. While we are anxious to see officers from their youth up trained in administration as well as in general staff duties, we are conscious that, under a voluntary system such as ours, it is impossible to rely wholly for the administration of the army upon the soldier. There are certain spheres of administration into which a civilian element must not only be introduced, but should be cordially welcomed. This axiom especially applies to the region of provision and production of material, which is essential to the military needs of an army in peace time and in the field. The provisioning of an army with all that it requires, which is ordinarily covered by the term "supply," has been considered carefully by us in consultation with the most experienced authorities, both in India and at home. There has been much conflict of opinion and we have been furnished with advice in divers forms. Powerful arguments, supported by experience in war and by knowledge of Indian conditions, have been used in the course of our discussions in favour of various solutions of what is admitted to be a complicated problem.

The recommendations which we have made in Part II have been signed by us, but we regret that in regard to Section I a divergence of views has occurred

While detracting from the constructive value of our Report this divergence of opinion will not, we venture to hope, prove a serious obstacle in attempting to arrive at a decision upon the functions to be vested in the Commander-in Chief

We are all agreed in our recommendations regarding the composition and functions of the Military Council, except to the extent that the minority desire to see added to it a member, with the title of Surveyor-General of Supply, to whom they would entrust those functions of production and provision which the majority advocate placing under a separate Member of the Executive Council

We are,
Sir,
Your obedient Servants,

ESHER
M F O DWYER
H V COX, Lieut Gen
J P Du CANE, Lieut-Gen
CLAUD W JACOB Lieut-Gen
H HUDSON, Lieut Gen
G FELL
WEBB GILLMAN, Maj Gen
UMAR HAYAT
K G GUPTA

C M WAGSTAFF, Col, *Secretary*,
19th May 1920

PART II.

Section I

Production and Provision

The responsibility for provision and production is a question to which we have given the most earnest consideration and regarding which we have taken a great deal of evidence, both in England and in India We do not intend to enter into the arguments adduced in support of the various systems proposed for the home army since in the first place such matters are outside the scope of our enquiry and in the second place the problem of the most efficient method of supplying the army in India as it presents itself to us is different from that at home

2 The main factors which distinguish the two problems are these In the first place there is an essential difference between the systems under which the two armies are administered In the United Kingdom there is a civilian Secretary of State for War, responsible to Parliament who presides over the Army Council a body possessing collective responsibility for the administration of the army In India under the proposals put forward by us in Part I of this Report the sole responsibility to the Governor General in Council for command and administration will remain with the Commander in Chief assisted by a small military council possessing as such merely advisory powers In view of the very heavy burden of work which this arrangement will still leave upon the Commander in Chief who will also remain an extraordinary Member of the Viceroy s Executive Council we consider it desirable to relieve him of duties which can be performed by others

Secondly there can be no comparison between the industrial conditions of the United Kingdom and of India At home, provision and production are comparatively easy, since there are numbers of highly organised and efficient firms with whom orders can be placed to meet the army s requirements In India industrial development is in its infancy and reliance has to be placed on a number of specialised Government factories the administration of which presents considerable difficulties and calls for the exercise of business capacity

Thirdly, the demands of the army in India for munitions of all sorts closely affect industrial development, which it is now the policy of Government to stimulate. This factor does not exist in the United Kingdom, where army requirements in normal times represent only a fraction of the country's productive power.

While, therefore, we are in favour of assimilating, so far as practicable, the system of administration at Army Headquarters in India to that in force at the War Office, we are satisfied that the conditions in India differ so widely from those in the United Kingdom that the organisation for production and provision demands an independent examination, free from those considerations which have determined the issue at home.

3. Turning now to the Indian problem, we think it desirable to sketch briefly the past history of the arrangements for supply. Prior to 1906 there were two Members of the Executive Council, the Commander-in-Chief, who was responsible for command and executive work, and who had under him three principal staff officers the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, and the Principal Medical Officer—and the Military Member, also a soldier, who was responsible for the administrative work of the army, and who had under him the Director-General of Ordnance, the Director-General of Supply and Transport, and the Director-General of Military Works. This Member, therefore, combined the functions of administration and supply, besides being the authority to whom the Commander-in-Chief had to refer for sanction all such proposals as required the orders of Government. Under this arrangement the Government of India had two military advisers. This system was abandoned in 1906 in favour of an arrangement under which a department of Military Supply was created and placed in charge of another soldier, with the rank of major-general, who also had a seat on the Executive Council.

We do not think it necessary to enter into the merits of the controversy which resulted in this decision. In 1909 this department was abolished and the present system was introduced, under which all the work connected with the administration of the army, the formulation and execution of the military policy of the Government of India, the responsibility for maintaining every branch of the army, combatant and non-combatant, in a state of efficiency, and the supreme direction of any military operations based upon India, are centred in one authority, the Commander-in-Chief and Army Member.

4. We have already recommended, in Part I of this Report, that the Commander-in-Chief should have the sole right to offer military advice to the Governor-General in Council, and that he should have no military colleague upon the Executive Council. We consider, however, that recent experience and the changing conditions of India render it one of the first essentials of a sound organisation to relieve the Commander-in-Chief, as far as is consistent with his office, of the heavy burden which at present devolves upon him. As already stated, he now has the sole responsibility for the efficiency of the army in all its branches. He exercises command over a very large force in India, and he has, in addition, considerable administrative responsibilities for the large portion of the Indian Army now employed overseas. He is the sole adviser of the Governor-General in Council on all questions of military policy, and is in supreme direction of all operations based on India. As a Member of the Executive Council, he shares with his colleagues the responsibility for all the decisions of Government, whether on civil or military matters. We believe that certain proposals put forward in this part of our Report and in Part I will, if accepted, go some way towards affording the Commander-in-Chief relief, and we now proceed to consider how it is possible further to reduce his work and so set him free to devote his time to his various duties as Commander-in-Chief, as a Member of the Government, and as sole military adviser to the Governor-General in Council.

5. It is at this point that we regret to find a divergence of opinion among the members of the Committee. The majority, consisting of Sir Michael O'Dwyer, Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Cox, Lieutenant-General Sir Claud Jacob, Sir Godfrey Fell, Major-General Sir Webb Gillman, and Sir Krishna Gupta, for the reasons given in paragraphs 6–16, strongly incline to the view that production and provision and the administration of the Royal Indian Marine should be entrusted to a civilian Member of the Executive Council. The minority, composed of Lord Esher, Lieutenant-General Sir John Du Cane, Lieutenant-General Sir Havelock Hudson, and Major Sir Umar Hayat Khan, favour a solution, for the reasons given in paragraphs 17–23, which places production and provision under a civilian member of the Commander-in-Chief's Military Council, and the Royal Indian Marine directly under the Commander-in-Chief.

6. The majority hold that the necessary relief could not be afforded to the Commander-in-Chief by entrusting production and provision to a special civilian officer working directly under him as a member of the Military Council. It is claimed for this arrangement that, while relieving the Quartermaster-General of work which, having regard to his already heavy duties, he cannot conveniently perform, it would leave unimpaired the sole responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief for the efficiency of the army. They do not, however, recommend the adoption of this organisation, for the following reasons:—

In the first place, they do not consider that such an arrangement would afford the Commander-in-Chief sufficient relief to enable him to discharge the many functions entrusted

to him So long as the ultimate responsibility for production and *provision* remains with him he cannot divest himself of all the work connected therewith although he may delegate the administrative details to the special supply officer on his staff There is a limit, too to the extent to which, under any system of government large administrative questions can be left to the disposal of a subordinate officer Consequently all questions which owing to their financial importance, their contentious nature their intrinsic difficulty or their bearing on other departments of Government would be beyond the capacity of the supply officer to decide would have to be referred for the orders of the Commander in Chief thereby adding considerably to his labours Moreover, many questions relating to factory administration and supply are of such importance as to require discussion in the Executive Council *and it is* they consider, very desirable to relieve the Commander in Chief of the obligation to study and present to the Council cases which by reason of their technical nature and their unfamiliarity he can only master with considerable effort and at an expenditure of time which he can ill afford The indications are that these questions will be more numerous and more difficult in the near future Labour questions in India as elsewhere are daily becoming more complex and more insistent, as evidenced by the increased frequency of industrial strikes and will closely affect the working of the Government factories and indeed all sources of production The growth of trade unionism in India will also present difficult problems for solution They desire to relieve the Commander in Chief of the task of handling *these and many other related* subjects

Secondly, under the organisation which they propose, the Commander in Chief will still have the sole responsibility for the specifications and issue of all stores lethal and non lethal required by the army, for satisfying himself that the army's requirements are fully and promptly met for fixing scales of reserves and for holding all stores and reserves They do not consider that the transfer to another authority of the functions of production and provision contravenes the doctrine that the responsibility for the maintenance training and administration of the army should be concentrated under a single head For example under the existing system, the Commander in Chief though responsible for the efficiency of the army can have no responsibility for the production or provision of the large quantities of stores which have now to be procured from the United Kingdom They can see therefore no objection in principle to his being dependent upon an outside agency for supplies in India just as he is now dependent upon an outside agency for supply from the United Kingdom His position in relation to the supply agency in India will in fact be analogous to that of the War Office in relation to the great armament firms

Their view is that while the Commander in Chief should remain solely responsible for demanding what is required for the efficiency of the army and for seeing that his demands are met to the extent that they may have received the sanction of Government it is essential that he should be relieved of the administrati provision of supplies They go further and consider position to concern himself with the details of this worl duties and of his duties as a Member of the Governor General's Council which even with the limitations that have been proposed are fully sufficient to occupy his whole energies The arrangement which they advocate will in their opinion ensure this result and they hold strongly that the alternative arrangement under which production and provision would be entrusted to a member of the Military Council would fail to afford the necessary relief to the Commander in Chief

It has been suggested that if provision and production were placed under a civilian Member of the Military Council subordinate to the Commander in Chief this organisation could on the outbreak of a war of any magnitude be formed into a separate and independent department of Government under a Member of the Executive Council They do not consider that th *India which is peculiarly liable to* be plunged witho it consequence the bulk of the army has to be constantly for war Frontier operations now involve the employment of larger forces and of greater quantities of material than used to be the case They therefore hold that it would be wise to maintain in peace time an organisation for production and provision capable of rapid expansion without the dislocation entailed by the creation on the outbreak of war of a separate department of Government and the transfer to it of these functions

7 Other considerations which they hold tell in favour of entrusting supply to an agency outside Army Headquarters and under a civilian head are that as was recognised by His Majesty's Government in 1906 the duties connected with supply are essentially civil in character and are therefore in their opinion more likely to be efficiently and economically performed by a department the administration of army factori most entirely civilian Again the lieve a number of soldiers of worl ision to be carried out on the outbreak of war without the imposition of extra work and responsibility upon the Commander in Chief and his staff at a time of great stress

8 Holding then that it is a matter of primary importance to relieve the Commander in Chief of production and provision and entrust them to an agency outside Army Head quarters they turn to the question of the nature of this outside agency

9. Under the Indian system of government, every department of Government must be placed under a Member of the Executive Council. The head of the supply agency must, therefore, be either the Member in charge of one of the existing departments of Government or a Member specially appointed for this purpose. The evidence which has been taken on this subject in India shows that it would be impracticable to hand over the responsibility for production and provision for the army to any of the existing departments of Government, or to any of the departments as they may be reconstituted as a result of the Reforms Scheme. It follows that the supply department must be administered by a separate Member of the Executive Council appointed for this purpose.

10. It may be argued that the experience of 1906–09 showed that there would not be enough work to occupy a full time Member of Council. Whatever may have been the case in 1906–09 it can hardly be contended, in the light of the experience gained during the war, and of the increasing volume and complexity of the work of production and provision, that the task of supplying and equipping a large army, and of dealing with the administration of the many departments connected therewith, would not give sufficient occupation to a Member of Council. New standards have been created. Recent experience has shown the paramount necessity of rendering India more nearly self-supporting in the matter of munitions of all kinds, lethal and non-lethal, thus minimising the risks attendant upon dependence for essential stores upon the mother country, with which its sea communications may at any time be interrupted or severed. Men's eyes have been opened to the vastness of the requirements of modern warfare, to the necessity of organising the Empire's resources in peace time in such a way as to be capable, on the outbreak of war, of expansion with a rapidity and to an extent never contemplated before 1914. The need for stimulating local manufactures, and for placing the control of large purchasing operations, *e.g.*, for textiles, foodstuffs, &c., under expert management, has been emphasized. It was the recognition, at the instance of the present Commander-in-Chief in India, of the supreme importance of these matters that led to the creation of the Indian Munitions Board, that is, in effect, to the partial adoption, as a temporary war measure, of the separation of functions which they now recommend as a permanent measure. It would, they think, be a retrograde measure to replace permanently under the direct control of the Commander-in-Chief the multifarious activities which have, during the war, occupied the energies of the Indian Munitions Board and its large staff. These activities impinge at many points on the civil administration of the country, and can therefore be more appropriately discharged by a civil department of Government.

The situation has been altered greatly by the recent grant of free rations to the Indian Army, and the consequent necessity for making large wholesale purchases of foodstuffs and for arranging for distribution to the depôts under the control of the Quartermaster-General, and by the supply to the Indian Army of clothing in kind, in lieu of the previous system under which regiments made their own arrangements for clothing their men. In short, the problems of supply have become far larger and more important, from both the administrative and the financial standpoints, than they were in pre-war days.

11. The majority next turn to a wholly different consideration. One of the matters which were referred for the advice of the Committee is the administration and organisation of the Royal Indian Marine. It is proposed to deal with this question in greater detail in a later Part of this Report. For the present the issue concerns the position of this service in the scheme of Indian Government and the arrangements for its administrative control.

The Royal Indian Marine is at present administered by the Commander-in-Chief through the Secretary to the Government of India in the Army Department, an official who, under the proposals put forward in this part of this Report, will disappear. There has been ample evidence to show that this arrangement, as can readily be understood, is distasteful to the service, and also, it is understood, to the Admiralty, who are interested in its efficiency. For this reason, as well as on grounds of principle, they think it desirable to relieve the Commander-in-Chief and Army Headquarters of all responsibility for the administration of the marine service. They anticipate that the administrative work connected therewith is not likely to decrease in volume. There are many directions in which progress and development are needed in the interests of efficiency, and indeed are demanded by Indian public opinion. There is no existing department of Government to which the administration of the marine service could suitably be transferred; but they consider that it might [illegible] handed over to the proposed new department. Much of the work relates to tl[illegible] of the dockyards, which are large workshops for construction and repairs, and execute refitting work needed by the Royal Navy in Indian waters, in addition to their work for the Indian Government. The administration of the dockyards presents problems similar in character to those involved in the administration of the ordnance and other factories. They recommend, therefore, that the administration of the Royal Indian Marine should also form part of the duties of the proposed Member of Council.

12. Again, in view of the predominating importance of the army in India, to which reference has been made in paragraph 37 of this Part, they consider it desirable that it should have more than one representative in the Viceroy's Executive Council. The administration of the army will be one of the chief responsibilities, if not the most important, which will remain to the Government of India under the Reforms Scheme, and its cost at present absorbs nearly half the revenues reserved for imperial, as opposed to provincial,

purposes In other words the responsibility for the expenditure of nearly half of the total
on the shoulders of one man namely the
ie upkeep of the army has already aroused
It is not possible to indicate the exact share of the funds provided in the army budget which will under these proposals be administered by the new department, but the amount will certainly be considerably in excess of that administered by any of the other great spending departments of the Government of India and covers precisely those heads of army expenditure which afford the widest scope for economy They
for production an
economy, thus to
this scheme as affording the best guarantee that his interests are safeguarded With these considerations in view, they think it desirable that the Commander in Chief as head of the largest spending department in India should have the assistance of a civil colleague, who would share with him, in a clearly defined sphere the interest in and responsibility for the welfare and efficiency of the army and the expenditure connected therewith and assist him in demonstrating the necessity of such expenditure to the Council and the outside public

13 In arriving at their conclusions they have not overlooked various disadvantages which may be urged against the scheme which they advocate It has been suggested that the proposed organisation would deprive the Commander in Chief of the power on his own initiative to speed up production to suit the requirements of the moment They consider however, that production is more likely to be speeded up at a time of strain if it is under the administration of a department whose special function it will be to meet the requirements of the army, than under the present system which throws upon the Commander in Chief the whole responsibility for organising the means of increasing production at a time when his purely military duties should claim all his time and energies It has also been suggested that, having regard to the necessary limitation of funds available for the army there might be a risk of the civil Member pressing upon the collective Council the needs of his own department for more funds, and that his demands if accepted would reduce the sum available for other military measures which the Commander in Chief might perhaps regard as more urgent or important To this they would reply that they consider it necessary that the control of the military budget should remain in the hands of the Commander in Chief who would allot to the new department such portion of the funds at his disposal as will enable it on the basis of the ascertained cost of manufacture or purchase to meet the needs of the army as estimated by him They do not contemplate the possibility of the Government of India allocating to this department money which the Commander in Chief might need for other purposes in connection with the army

14 Lastly, apprehension may be felt that the Commander in Chief might find himself hampered at times in the execution of his office by differences of opinion between himself and his civil colleague They do not think however that there is any real danger of this occurring Under the Indian constitution no one Member of Council can overrule another in matters which are within the latter s purview Where differences of opinion occur between two Members of Council in matters which concern both their departments the procedure for adjusting these differences is clearly laid down and secures to the Commander in Chief the opportunity of laying his case fully and personally before the Council as a whole It works it is believed quite smoothly in practice in the case of other departments of Government the Members in charge of which must naturally at times view problems from different and possibly irreconcilable standpoints In the case of the two Members who would be chiefly concerned, under the proposed organisation with military matters it is reasonable to assume that their community of interest in and responsibility for the efficiency of the army, and the clear definition of their respective functions would tend to minimise if not to remove altogether opportunities for friction and disagreement Should such unfortunately occur they would be settled, as in the case of similar differences of opinion between other Members by the decision of the Viceroy and his collective Council

15 They therefore recommend the creation of a new department of Government to deal with the supply of the army and they consider it essential that the Member in charge should be a civilian in order that there may be no danger of a second military opinion on the Executive Council This provision meets in their opinion the principal objection which was taken to the organisation for military supply which was set up in 1906 They feel confident that the creation of the proposed department will result in increased efficiency and economy in the administration of the army and marine services

It is difficult to find a title which accurately defines the functions of the new department They suggest that it be called "the Department of Munitions and Marine

16 Under the organisation which they recommend the new department under a civilian Member of Council, would be responsible for meeting the demands of the Commander in Chief for supplies including foodstuffs and forage for stores of all kinds in bulk, and for the
well as of the Royal Indian Marine
nder the Commander in Chief, for the
cations and issue of all armaments

ammunition, provisions, forage, fuel, clothing, equipment, general stores and material; for fixing scales of reserves of the above to be held in depôts, garrisons, mobilisation stores and war reserve; and for local purchases of such supplies as are not provided in bulk by the new department. A table is attached outlining the organisation which they consider would be suitable for the proposed new department, though this may require amendment in the light of experience.

17. The minority of the Committee, composed of Lord Esher, Lieut.-Generals Sir H. Hudson and Sir J. Du Cane, and Major Sir Umar Hayat Khan, desire to record their disagreement with the arguments, and their dissent from the conclusions, contained in the foregoing paragraphs.

They feel obliged to challenge these conclusions and arguments on the ground that the proposal based on them, namely, the setting up of a separate department for production and provision under a Member of the Executive Council, is irreconcilable with the fundamental principle of concentrating the command and administration of the army in India under the Governor-General in Council in the hands of a single responsible authority.

They hold that the proposed creation of a separate Member of the Executive Council for the production and provision of military supply leads directly to that system of dual control which was abandoned in 1909. They are convinced that sooner or later friction between the Commander-in-Chief and the Member of Council for Production would be certain to arise, that economical use of the financial resources of the army would not be secured, and that the principle of sole responsibility for the welfare and efficiency of the army would be violated.

They are unable to assent to a proposal which disregards the first principles of sound financial administration and places a Member of Council in charge of a department of State in the anomalous position of being held responsible for the expenditure of funds forming a portion of the military budget, the estimates for which were not prepared and administered under his sole authority and control.

18. They hold that, while there are strong reasons why certain aspects of production and provision of military supply, namely, factory administration and contracts, should be under civilian control, especially under the conditions prevailing in India at the present time, this result can best be achieved by placing them under a civilian member of the Military Council of the Commander-in-Chief. They recommend that a civilian, who would be called the Surveyor-General of Supply, should be added to the Military Council as the head of a branch which will be provided with the technical officers required by military necessities. The Surveyor-General of Supply, as a member of the Military Council, would be in constant touch with his military colleagues, and would have ample opportunity of acquainting himself both with the requirements and the administration of the army. He would have no interests divergent from those of his colleagues, and, without circumlocution or undue delay, he would be in a position to associate himself with them in the economical use of army funds.

19. While they are anxious to relieve the Commander-in-Chief as far as possible from the burden that has evidently been imposed upon him of recent years, primarily owing to the special conditions that arose during the war, they are not convinced that the plan proposed by the majority is necessary to attain that result. They consider that the other means which have been recommended elsewhere in this Report should suffice to achieve this object. These other means are: the abolition of the "duality of functions resulting from the same officer being the Commander-in-Chief and Member in charge of the Army Department,"[1] the delegation of responsibility to the heads of branches who are members of the Military Council, the co-ordinating functions of the Secretary, and the considerable measure of relief it is proposed to afford to the Commander-in-Chief from attending the Executive and Legislative Councils.

As regards the last-named they consider that further relief could be afforded if the Secretary, Army Headquarters, or one of the members of the Military Council, were authorised to attend the meetings of the Executive Council, and were empowered, when the Commander-in-Chief is absent, or whenever summoned by the Governor-General, to explain questions of military administration which are under discussion. They also recommend that the Secretary, Army Headquarters, should be a Member of the Legislative Council, where, following the analogy of a Parliamentary Under Secretary in this country, he could represent the Commander-in-Chief, give explanations and take part in discussion.

20. They do not agree that the system proposed by the majority is necessary in order to ensure rapid expansion of the organisation for production on the outbreak of war. They hold that any peace system which is not extravagant in establishment must necessarily be profoundly modified for a great emergency such as the recent war. The primary duty of a War Department in peace is to organise and prepare for war, and in war to conduct war. In peace the War Department should be responsible for its own supply and for the accumulation of reserves. The mobilisation of industry and the concentration of national effort in a great emergency are outside its scope. The peace system should be adequate for the ordinary purposes for which the army in India is maintained and the normal contingencies that it may be expected to meet.

[1] *Vide* Part I., Section III, para. 12.

They further hold that under the system that they advocate the function of production in a great emergency should be separated from Army Headquarters and that this could be done without dislocation The branch under the suggested Surveyor General of Supply *plus* the necessary technical services should be detached and expanded A plan for this should form an important part of the mobilisation arrangements, and should be the special study of the Surveyor General of Supply

21 They also desire to draw attention to the fact that it has recently been decided not to establish a Ministry of Supply at home mainly on the ground that the unnecessary duplication of Government departments inevitably leads to uneconomical administration and is therefore unjustifiable

Without wishing to labour the point and while fully recognising that conditions in India *and at home are in many respects dissimilar,* they wish to emphasise the desirability, where possible, of assimilating the organisation in India and at home for the following reasons —

(*a*) The centre of gravity of probable military operations has shifted from West to East In the future we must contemplate the possibility of our armies operating in the Middle East based partially on India and partially on home It is essential that *the general headquarters of a field army should* be able to work smoothly and without confusion with both the Indian and home military authorities

(*b*) Differences in system make it difficult for officers to pick up their work quickly when interchanged and the importance of such interchange of officers between home and India has been frequently emphasised

[illegible] positions of the Secretary of State for War and [illegible] t this question What is desirable is that in [illegible] with similar subjects so that staff officers will know with whom they have to deal

22 They do not propose to reply at further length to the arguments used by their colleagues in support of the suggestion to place production and provision for the army under a separate Member of the Executive Council because they consider the whole field of objection to be covered by the comments upon the principle involved in that suggestion which they have made in the preceding paragraphs They are convinced that in the present circumstances of India and having in mind the complicated changes of government upon which India is now entering, their proposal to place supply under the Commander in Chief will conduce to the highest efficiency of the army as an instrument in the hands of the civil power by simplifying military administration and by securing unity of control They are of opinion that the Department for Military Production and Provision which the majority of their [illegible] proposed to place under a separate Member of the Executive Council can without [illegible] nch under the Commander in Chief in charge of a civilian [illegible] *This is the course (stated in para 18) which they strongly* [illegible] The organisation proposed is shown on the attached table

[illegible] of the Royal Indian Marine they see no reason why the [illegible] ara 11 for the Royal Air Force should not apply equally [illegible] they in any way conflict with the recommendations for the organisation of the Royal Indian Marine which are made later in Part VII of this Report

SECTION II.

Composition and Functions of the Military Council

24 In paragraph 14 of Part I of our Report we recommended the establishment of a Military Council, composed of high staff officers and others to assist the Commander in Chief in the performance of his administrative functions In making this recommendation we were influenced by the desire to lessen the burden of work which at present devolves upon him We now proceed to discuss the constitution of the Military Council and to define its functions

25 The Commander in Chief will be President and the Chief of the General Staff, Adjutant General Quartermaster General and Financial Adviser will in any case be members In the absence of the Commander in Chief the Chief of the General Staff will preside The remaining heads of branches *whose claims for membership* of the Military Council are now for consideration are the Director-General of Ordnance, Director General of Military Works and Director of Medical Services

26 Our attention has been called to the fact that in the recent war general *officers commanding* armies in the field had attached to their staffs senior officers of high military and *technical* qualifications such as the General Officer Commanding, Royal Artillery, the Engineer in-Chief &c who advised them on all questions in connection with the efficiency of their arm for war

27. We consider that Army Headquarters, India, would benefit by an analogous organization, and we recommend that senior officers of certain services should be affiliated to the General Staff, and that their functions should be to advise on all questions relating to their arm in war and on the training of their arm in peace and war.

Four of these officers, who should hold the rank either of major-general or of colonel on the staff, should be allotted to the following branches respectively:—cavalry, artillery, engineers and pioneers, and infantry. Suitable officers of lesser rank should, in addition to their other duties, advise the General Staff on questions concerning signals, machine-guns, tanks, gas and other armaments or equipments.

28. These officers should be the means by which the training of their arm is co-ordinated throughout the army in India, and should be the responsible advisers to subordinate commanders for this purpose. They should be the eyes and ears of the General Staff, and should be assisted by officers, possessing the necessary technical experience, to enable them to give advice, from the point of view of the military user, on the armament and equipment suitable for their branch of the service.

Though we propose that for the sake of convenience these officers should be designated Inspectors, we recommend that powers of independent inspection should not be given to them, and that any inspection of troops which they desire to carry out should only be done by arrangement with subordinate commanders.

29. Prior to the war, the functions of the Director-General of Ordnance included the provision and maintenance of approved scales of reserves of all arms, of all kinds of ammunition, of vehicles (other than transport) and of technical equipment of artillery and engineer units: provision of guns, machine guns, small arms ammunition, technical and ordnance stores and vehicles: and inspection of the same

He was assisted in the performance of these functions by the Directors of Artillery, of Ordnance Stores and of Ordnance Inspection, and by the Director of Ordnance Factories, who was located at Calcutta.

During the war these functions were curtailed by the appointment, under the Quartermaster-General, of a Director of Equipment and Ordnance Stores, a Major-General, who is responsible for the maintenance and issue of stores; and by the transfer to the Indian Munitions Board of the administrative control of the Ordnance factories.

Though in 1920 the Ordnance factories were handed back temporarily to the Director-General of Ordnance, we have recommended in Section I of Part II that they should, in common with all army factories, be placed under a civilian head, who would be either a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council or a member of the Commander-in-Chief's Military Council, and who would be responsible for the production and provision of army munitions and for administering army contracts.

We also consider that the maintenance of approved scales of reserves of armaments, ammunition and equipment, and their issue should devolve on the Quartermaster-General, who should also be responsible for seeing that the articles are of suitable quality.

30. If our proposals are accepted, the pre-war functions of the Director-General of Ordnance will be so curtailed that we consider the appointment in India of an officer of this status is no longer required.

The remaining functions are mainly technical, and we recommend that they should be performed by a Director of Armaments in the branch of the Quartermaster-General. This director would be responsible for inspection from the point of view of the purchaser, and would place his subordinate inspectors in the factories and contractors' works to watch the processes of manufacture on behalf of the purchasing department. He would also approve the finished article.

This inspection would, of course, be independent of any tests which the manufacturer may consider necessary from his point of view.

The inclusion of the Director-General of Ordnance in the Military Council consequently becomes no longer necessary.

31. The Director-General of Military Works is responsible for—

(1) The construction and upkeep of barracks and other military works in cantonments.

(2) Communications, including telephones, and defences.

(3) Mechanical plant for works purposes.

(4) Provision of accommodation other than as in (1).

His duties with reference to military engineering in connection with war have been negligible in the past

For this officer we propose to substitute—

(a) An Inspector of Engineers and Pioneers who should advise on all engineer operations in connection with war, the training of *engineer and pioneer* services both in peace and war and their technical equipment

(b) A Director of Military Works

In considering this latter officer's duties we are of opinion that though he should be responsible for plans specifications inspection and the financial questions involved in the construction and upkeep of barracks and other military works in cantonments including roads ranges &c the actual work of construction and upkeep could in many cases be carried out by a civilian agency as is suggested in our remarks on Engineer Services in Section IV of Part IV

As moreover the work in connection with telephones should devolve on the Inspector of Signals whose appointment is suggested elsewhere in this Report we consider that those duties of the Director of Military Works *which* cannot be performed by a civilian agency should be limited to —

(1) Specification of plans and scrutiny of estimates for accommodation and inspection of buildings &c

(2) Construction and repair of works of an important military character such as defences, and of those roads near the frontier the upkeep of which is necessitated mainly by military considerations

(3) The holding and distribution of engineering stores including electrical and mechanical plant

We consider that the Quartermaster General should be able to undertake the control of this directorate without being unduly overburdened since we recommend that he should be relieved of all responsibility for production and provision

Under the organisation now suggested the Director General of Military Works disappears and no question therefore arises as to his inclusion in the Military Council

32 With regard to the Director of Medical Services there are two alternatives — (a) to make him a full member of the Military Council (b) to place him under one of the principal staff officers who following the practice in force hitherto at home would be the Adjutant General

We recommend that the Director of Medical Services should not be a member of *the Military Council and that he should be placed under the Adjutant General* Our principal reasons for this conclusion are that it is difficult to ensure the proper co-ordination of work at Army Headquarters unless every branch of it is placed under one or other of the principal staff officers The number of such officers through whom the Commander in Chief has to work should be as few as possible

It is very desirable to put an end to the present system which permits of the Director of Medical Services in that capacity issuing orders in the name of the Commander in Chief without the knowledge or concurrence of the staff at Army *Headquarters*

We wish to add that the Adjutant General should make a point of having the Director of Medical Services with him at his periodical conferences with the Commander in Chief whenever the question for discussion is of a technical medical or sanitary character and the Commander in Chief will no doubt for his part send for and consult the Director of Medical Services whenever he wishes to ascertain his views on such matters first hand

33 We have now to consider the arrangements for the performance of the secretarial duties of the Military Council and of Army Headquarters and the status of the officer responsible for them

Under the existing organization there has been a high military officer holding the post of Secretary to the Government of India in the Army Department He is responsible to the Viceroy for the proper working of the Army Department All proposals requiring the orders of the Government of India have to be referred to him for that purpose and he is required to examine them from the administrative standpoint and with special reference to their bearing on the general civil administration It is his duty to see that the Rules of Business of the Government of India are observed He has the statutory right of access to the Viceroy whom he sees as a rule

every week, and to whom he takes army cases requiring His Excellency's orders. He has the statutory right also to submit cases at any stage to the Governor-General. His position is exactly analogous to that of the civil Secretaries to Government in other departments; but he has certain additional functions. For example, he is Secretary to the Government of India in the Marine Department and in this capacity administers, on behalf of the Government of India and under the direction of the Army Member, the Royal Indian Marine, the executive head of which is located at Bombay. He deals with questions relating to chaplains of all denominations in the field, and with questions affecting the pay and allowances of Roman Catholic and Wesleyan chaplains and other chaplains not on the establishment. He also controls a small section dealing with medals. He corresponds weekly with the Secretary Military Department at the India Office. He is also a Member of the Legislative Council. Finally, he is a member of the Commander-in-Chief's Advisory Council.

34. In paragraph 15 of Part I of our Report we have stated that we hold the position of the Secretary to Government in the Army Department, as it is generally understood, to be inconvenient and undesirable, as rendering possible an interference with the sole right of the Commander-in-Chief to offer military advice to the Governor-General in Council. We now recommend that this appointment should be abolished, not only on the above ground, but also because its existence conflicts with our recommendation (paragraph 14 of Part I of our Report) that the members of the Military Council should be individually responsible for the branches which they are called upon to administer. We consider that this object would be secured by providing that the Commander-in-Chief should delegate to them such executive powers as he may decide; and that each member of the Military Council should, in respect of the subjects pertaining to his particular branch, exercise the power of disposing of cases on behalf of the Government of India analogous to that possessed by the civil Secretaries to the Government of India, to the extent to which the Commander-in-Chief, by special or general order, may delegate such powers, and subject to the observance of financial rules. They should have the power of making unofficial references to other departments of the Government of India. They should not, however, be Secretaries or Joint Secretaries to the Government of India; orders in the name of the Government of India should not issue over their signature; nor should they have the statutory right of access to the Viceroy which is conferred on Secretaries by rules 5 and 6 of the Rules of Business of the Government of India. But we consider that, if the Viceroy desires detailed information regarding any particular case, the Commander-in-Chief should depute the head of the branch concerned to take the papers and explain them to His Excellency.

35. At the same time, it is clearly necessary to provide for the maintenance of close liaison between Army Headquarters on the one hand and with the civil departments of the Government of India and with Local Governments on the other hand, and to ensure that the Rules of Business of the Government of India are observed. We also think it desirable to afford Army Headquarters assistance in connection with cases involving legislation, and in the preparation of despatches to the Secretary of State.

36. For the performance of all these duties we propose that there should be a Secretary Army Headquarters, whose functions should be—

(1) To sign and issue letters, conveying the orders of the Government of India, which have been prepared by heads of branches. The case dealing with the subject matter must be sent to the Secretary Army Headquarters, at the same time as the draft letter or orders.

(2) To issue Army Orders, Army Instructions (India), and Gazette Notifications.

(3) To maintain liaison with the civil administration; to satisfy himself that the Rules of Business of the Government of India are observed, especially with reference to the necessity for consulting such other departments of Government as may be concerned with the measure under discussion; and to call the attention of the head of the branch to any departure from these rules.

Note.—In connection with the issue of letters or orders, the branch concerned should be responsible for the policy and wording, but it should be open to the Secretary Army Headquarters to suggest, to the head of the branch responsible for the subject matter, any points in which the wording might be more fully or clearly expressed.

(4) To arrange for and control the secretarial work of the Military Council
(5) To control the entire clerical and subordinate establishments of Army Headquarters
(6) To render assistance in the preparation of despatches to the Secretary of State

All communications intended for Army Headquarters will be addressed to the Secretary Army Headquarters who will distribute them to the appropriate branch or branches

7 In view of the predominating importance of the part which the army in India plays in the administration of the country of the large share which it absorbs of the public revenue and of the numerous ways in which its welfare contentment and efficiency react upon the whole body politic, we consider that the Secretary Army Headquarters should be an official of high status and wide administrative experience We also recommend that he should be a civilian It would not in our opinion meet the administrative requirements of the case to make him merely the Secretary to the Military Council and as such subordinate in a sense to the high staff officers who constitute that Council We therefore propose that he should be a member of the Military Council and that his full designation should be Civil Member and Secretary Army Headquarters He should be appointed by the Viceroy in consultation with the Commander in Chief He should not have the statutory right of access to the Viceroy but we anticipate that the Viceroy will desire to see him at regular intervals in order that he may keep His Excellency in touch with those aspects of army administration which affect the general civil administration and the relations between the army and the various Local Governments We consider that this procedure has many advantages and that it is open to none of the objections of principle which can be urged against the present system under which the Secretary in the Army Department himself a soldier of high rank has the statutory right to take army cases to the Viceroy and to tender advice on them which may not be in consonance with the views of the Army Member

38 Our recommendations regarding the future administration of the Royal Indian Marine will be found in Part VII of this Report The other non secretarial duties hitherto performed by the Secretary in the Army Department should we consider be reallotted by the Commander in Chief among the Army Headquarters Staff

39 We have thus arrived at the following as the composition of the Military Council —

President	The Commander in Chief
Members	The Chief of the General Staff The Adjutant General The Quartermaster General The Financial Adviser The Civil Member and Secretary Army Headquarters

If the proposal made in paragraphs 17 to 23 of this Part is accepted it will of course involve the inclusion of a Surveyor General of Supply in the Military Council

40 *Functions of the Military Council* —The Council can have no collective responsibility We consider that with reference to the duty of assisting the Commander in Chief in the performance of his administrative functions the following classes of cases should be referred for discussion by the Military Council —

(*i*) All important cases which require the sanction or orders of the Secretary of State except cases which only require such sanction or orders under financial rules
(*ii*) All cases which by reason of their intrinsic importance or their bearing on the general administration of the country are likely to necessitate consideration eventually by the Governor General in Council
(*iii*) All cases which the Commander in Chief may decide should be brought before the Military Council

In addition it should be one of the principal duties of the Military Council to watch the progress of military expenditure with a view to securing the economical use of army funds to prepare and maintain up to date a comprehensive programme of schemes for the welfare and improvement of the army and to advise regarding the order in which these schemes should be financed with reference to the funds available

The functions of the present Advisory Council will be merged in those of the Military Council as now outlined.

41. We have not hitherto dealt with the position at Army Headquarters of the Military Secretary and of the Air Officer Commanding the Royal Air Force in India. We consider that the Military Secretary should not in future be a personal staff officer of the Commander-in-Chief, who should. however, have an Assistant Military Secretary in lieu of one of his existing A.D.C.'s. We recommend that the Military Secretary should be the head of a separate branch, should work directly under the Commander-in-Chief and should not be a Member of the Military Council. We note that he is now *ex officio* secretary to the recently instituted Selection Board, and we consider that this should always be one of his functions. He should also maintain the list and records of officers qualified for staff appointments.

We recommend that the Air Officer Commanding the Royal Air Force should have direct relations with the Commander-in-Chief, to whom he should be responsible, as he is now, for the efficiency of the Air Force in India. He should administer the budget of the Air Force, subject to the general control of the Commander-in-Chief. He should be permitted to correspond direct with the Royal Air Force authorities in England on technical subjects, including the supply of technical stores for which provision has been made in his budget, or for which special sanction has been obtained.

If hereafter the strength of the Royal Air Force in India increases to a degree which is likely to render this arrangement unsuitable, the position of the Air Force and its commander will require reconsideration.

As regards the Royal Indian Marine, it will be seen that the minority recommend that it should be administered directly under the Commander-in-Chief. If, on the other hand the view of the majority prevails, the Royal Indian Marine will be placed under the proposed new Member of Council.

Section III.

Military Finance.

42. *Financial Advice and Control at Army Headquarters.*—We have examined the system now obtaining in India, under which financial advice is given and control is exercised by an officer of the Finance Department, situated at Army Headquarters and acting in the dual capacity of representative of the Finance Member and of Financial Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief. We have also compared it with the system in force at the War Office, under which responsibility for the compilation of accounts, for audit (other than Treasury audit), and for financial control, is centred in the Assistant Financial Secretary, who is an officer of the War Office and not of the Treasury. The evidence which we have received indicates that the system in force in India, which was adopted on the recommendation of Lord Kitchener, is well suited to the conditions of Indian army administration. We agree, and recommend its continuance.

We do so the more readily because we understand, firstly, that the Financial Adviser considers himself, and is regarded by the military heads of branches, as a colleague and not as a hostile critic; secondly, that he abstains from offering advice on the purely military aspects of matters with which he has to deal; and, thirdly, that in cases where the Financial Adviser finds himself unable, on financial grounds, to advise the acceptance of a proposal put forward by the military authorities, the Commander-in-Chief has the final opportunity of considering the grounds of the Financial Adviser's objection, and of stating his own views, before the case is submitted to the Finance Member. Subject to this second condition, we consider that the more closely he is kept in touch with the daily work of Army Headquarters and the policy of the Commander-in-Chief the greater will be his usefulness.

If our proposals for the creation of a Military Council are accepted, we recommend that the Financial Adviser should be a member of that Council.

43. *Financial assistance to branches at Army Headquarters.*—During the war financial officers were posted to certain branches at Army Headquarters with the object of assisting the military authorities in the financial side of their work. This arrangement was not altogether satisfactory, since it was not obligatory on the military authorities to consult their attached financial officers. The financial officers, too, had no definite powers or responsibility, and were merely required to offer advice in cases which were referred to them for that purpose.

44 We recommend that there should be in each of the principal spending branches at Army Headquarters, a financial officer who should have definite *functions and* responsibilities assigned to him These officers should be subordinate to the Financial Adviser and work in close co operation with him and the Military Accountant General They should have the title of Deputy Financial Adviser There should be *one* such officer, with a suitable staff in the Adjutant General's branch and two in the Quartermaster General's branch of whom one should deal solely with Military Works This latter appointment will entail the abolition of the special appointment of Examiner Military Works Accounts and a complete reorganization which we think very desirable of the expenditure and accounts procedure of the Military Works Services.

It will be the duty of these Deputy Financial Advisers to help the executive in the administration of the grants placed under their control (regarding which we make certain recommendations later) and for this purpose they will have to maintain the necessary statistics For example the Deputy Financial Adviser in the Adjutant-General's branch will require prompt information regarding the progress of expenditure on the pay and allowances of regimental units and other formations and regarding variations in the strength of troops in India Every month he should place before the Adjutant General a statement showing whether apart from any new measures for which provision was not made in the budget the progress of expenditure and the strength of troops actually on duty in India indicate the probability of an excess over the budget grant or a saving in it If there is an excess it will be his duty to bring it promptly to notice with a view to an additional grant being obtained from Government if it cannot be met by reappropriation In the event of a saving the *money* will be available for reallotment on fresh expenditure according as the Commander in Chief with the advice of the Military Council may decide For example it may be utilised to meet excesses under other grant heads or to finance *new schemes which have been approved and for which no provision exists in the* budget

The Deputy Financial Adviser in the Quartermaster General's branch will require efficient assistants termed Assistant Financial Advisers *to watch the expenditure* of the various Directors under the Quartermaster General These assistants should also be in charge of the expenditure on grass farms and dairy farms and on mechanical transport workshops and will be responsible for seeing that cost accounts are properly maintained In the same way there should be a Deputy Financial Adviser attached to the Royal Air Force who should also be responsible for seeing that cost accounts are maintained in its manufacturing establishments Each of these Deputy Financial Advisers will also be responsible for assisting the head of the branch in framing his budget estimate

45 *Financial arrangements in connection with Production and Provision*.—It will be seen from Section I of this Part that alternative arrangements have been suggested for the administrative control of the army factories of contracts for purchases of supplies of all kinds in bulk and of the Royal Indian Marine Whichever of the two systems be adopted we recommend that there should be a separate Controller at the headquarters of Government who will maintain the accounts of ordnance factory expenditure and will also function as a Deputy Financial Adviser and will render assistance to the executive in the financial administration of the factories He should pay special attention to the proper maintenance of cost accounts A second Controller with similar duties may be required in connection with the clothing factories though it may be found possible for one Controller to exercise his functions in respect of both groups of factories

A system was introduced *with effect from the* 1st *April* 1919, under which separate finance and accounting offices were established in each of the ordnance factories with a central office attached to the headquarters of the Director of Ordnance Factories The function of these offices was to maintain cost accounts to furnish statistics connected with these accounts to the factory superintendents and to the Director of Ordnance Factories in such a manner as would be of the greatest assistance to the administration and to help the administration in the preparation of estimates and with all financial work ge [illegible] are satisfactory and should be extend [illegible]

With regard to [illegible] lies of all kinds we recommend that the accounts and audit should be concentrated under a Controller at headquarters whose financial advice should be at the disposal of the authority responsible for making the contracts

As regards the Royal Indian Marine, under whatever Member of Council the supreme control may be placed, the greater part of the administrative work will be in the hands of the Director, whose headquarters will be at Bombay. He will require financial assistance, and we recommend that he should have attached to his office a Controller, who should not only maintain the marine accounts, including those relating to the dockyards, but should also discharge the duties of a Deputy Financial Adviser.

46. *Financial advice in Commands and Divisions.*—At present financial advice in Commands and Divisions is given by the Deputy Military Auditors-General. who are located at the headquarters of the Commands, and by the Divisional Controllers of Military Accounts respectively. If it be found possible hereafter to delegate to the commanders of these formations wider administrative powers, it may be found necessary to appoint whole-time financial advisers to assist them in the exercise of these powers. For the present, however, we do not consider this necessary, since there would not be sufficient work to occupy fully officers who had no other duties to perform. We recognise that it is possibly open to objection to combine the functions of accounts and audit with those of financial advice, and that officers of the Military Accounts Department have hitherto had no opportunities for obtaining higher financial training, and for this reason cannot be altogether satisfactory in their capacity as Financial Advisers. We consider, however, that the arrangements which we have mentioned for attaching Deputy Financial Advisers and Assistant Financial Advisers to the several branches of Army Headquarters will afford the necessary training to a considerable number of officers of the Military Accounts Department, who will thus be well equipped in the future to render financial assistance to commands and divisions.

47. *The Military Accountant-General.*—We do not propose any change in the present arrangements under which the Military Accountant-General works under the Financial Adviser at Army Headquarters and in the closest co-operation with him. The Military Accountant-General's main function, apart from administering the department of which he is the head, should be to see that the estimates are prepared, and the accounts maintained, in such a form as will be of the greatest help to the military authorities and to the Finance Department of the Government of India.

We have carefully considered whether the Military Accountant-General and his department should not come directly under the control of the Comptroller and Auditor-General, who would thus have the same administrative relations with this department as he now has with the Indian Finance Department. We think, however, that the balance of advantage lies in retaining the present system, which ensures that the Financial Adviser is kept closely in touch with, and exercises, under the Finance Member, a certain measure of control over, the department which deals with the pay and audit arrangements of the army in India. This system enables the Commander-in-Chief to obtain information without delay regarding defects in these arrangements which react unfavourably on the contentment and efficiency of the army, and to ensure that action is taken to remedy such defects. This would prove more difficult if the responsibility for the work of the Military Accounts Department were removed from the Financial Adviser, and placed under the Comptroller and Auditor-General, who is not so easily accessible, and in fact does not accompany the Government of India and Army Headquarters to Simla during the summer months.

Moreover, to divorce the Financial Adviser from all responsibility for the work of the Military Accounts Department would result in a weakening of his control over military expenditure. The evils of such an arrangement have been apparent during the last few years in respect to Military Works expenditure, which has been brought to account by an officer directly subordinate to the Comptroller and Auditor-General, and not subordinate to the Financial Adviser.

We are, however, impressed by the desirability of securing that the Comptroller and Auditor-General shall exercise more definite authority over the audit staff of the Military Accounts Department. At present he has no direct relations with the personnel of the Military Accounts Department, even those employed on purely audit duties. We understand that the question of the method by which the Comptroller and Auditor-General should exercise his responsibility for the audit of all public expenditure in India is at present under consideration by the Government, and we have no desire to anticipate or prejudge the conclusions at which they may arrive. But, even though no fundamental changes may result from this examination of the matter, we consider that the Comptroller and Auditor-General should at least have a voice in the selection and posting of the Military Deputy Auditors-General, and should have under his direct administrative control a sufficient number of senior audit officers, whether

military or civil to enable him to satisfy himself by test audits regarding the correctness and completeness of the audit of military expenditure

48 *Preparation of the military budget* —The rules which govern the preparation of the budget estimates are contained in paragraphs 28 to 36 of Army Regulations India, Volume III We consider that the present procedure is not satisfactory The chief defect in the system is that the bulk of the work of preparing the estimates devolves either upon the Controllers of Military Accounts in divisions e g, in respect to pay charges ecclesiastical charges, miscellaneous services conveyance by road river sea and rail, rewards for military services pensions and receipt grants or upon the departmental officers at divisional headquarters e g upon the Assistant Directors of Supply and Transport of Divisions in respect to supplies of food and forage transport and compensation for dearness of food and upon the Deputy Directors of Medical Services of Divisions in respect of medical services The heads of branches at Army Headquarters are only responsible for preparing so much of the budget estimates as refer to the personnel of their own branches and, in the case of the Quartermaster General the cantonment budget Certain Directors prepare their own estimates, but though several of them work directly under the Quartermaster General he is not responsible for scrutinizing the consolidated budget of the departments and services which he administers

49 Another defect is that although in the budget the grants are shown as at the disposal of various military authorities in practice the latter do not really administer the grants thus allotted to them For example the grant for the pay charges of troops is shown in the budget as under the control of general officers commanding divisions and independent brigades In practice these officers have no power to administer this grant nor to utilize savings in pay charges to meet other expenditure The budget is to this extent misleading and fails to represent the facts correctly

A third defect is that estimates are not prepared with sufficient accuracy and frequently fail to take into account consequential expenditure in other directions For instance it sometimes happens that a scheme for administrative reorganization placed before Government by the branch concerned ignores the expenditure which will result from the provision of the necessary buildings

50 The present form too of the military accounts renders it impossible to ascertain readily what is the cost of a particular arm of the service or of a particular formation For instance it is not possible to say what is the total cost to Government of the mechanical transport service since all charges on account of stores and equipment and food, etc are lumped together under the prescribed grant heads of the supplying departments (Supply and Transport Clothing Ordnance etc) and these grant heads do not indicate how much of the provision refers to the supply of stores and equipment to the mechanical transport

51 We recommend that the heads of the principal departments of the army should prepare their own budgets for all the services and departments which they administer receiving for this purpose assistance from the Deputy Financial Advisers who we have proposed should be attached to their branches

52 Not only do we wish to impose upon the heads of branches the responsibility for the preparation of their budget estimates but we also desire to make them directly responsible under the Commander in Chief for the administration of the grants allotted to them The budget grants should be definitely allotted to the authorities responsible for the various services Portions of the grants should be reallotted, under the general control of the head of the branch to the various Directors. For example the grant for mechanical transport should be administered under the Quartermaster General, by the Director of Mechanical Transport the grant for the purchase of animals by the Director of Remounts, etc The budget should be so framed as to show clearly the amount of grant at the disposal of each officer

53 The military budget ordinarily offers little scope for reappropriation of funds During the war, a large sum of money was provided annually as a reserve to meet unforeseen expenditure other than that entailed by active operations We do not recommend the continuance of this system, which weakens the control of the Commander in Chief over military expenditure and affords less incentive to the spending authorities to keep their expenditure within their grants We consider that greater elasticity will result if our proposal is adopted to make the heads of branches responsible for administering their own grants It will be their duty to watch the progress of expenditure of these grants with a view to effecting savings, which can then be utilised under the orders of the Commander in Chief, to meet excesses under other grant heads

or to finance new schemes. In order that full advantage may result from this system, it is essential that the accounts shall be maintained in such a form as will afford prompt and regular information regarding the progress of expenditure. At present the military accounts system is defective in this respect, but we understand that steps are being taken to improve it.

54. We also consider it very desirable that information should be promptly and readily afforded to the Government of India regarding the progress of expenditure at home in connection with indents for stores, etc. Great inconvenience is caused by the fact that such information is not furnished until towards the close of the financial year, and then only in such a condensed form as to afford little assistance.

55. We also recommend that there should be a "block vote" for each arm of the service, fighting and ancillary. For example, in the case of regimental units, there should be a "block vote" for their pay, food and forage, clothing and equipment. Similarly, in the case of the Royal Air Force or of the mechanical transport, there should be a "block vote" for pay, food, clothing, equipment and stores. After these "block votes" have been settled, the sums should be distributed among the prescribed budget heads; *e.g.*, the various sums allotted for food and forage should be brought together under the appropriate grant head, *viz.*, "Grant 4—Supply and Transport," and all the sums allotted for clothing should be brought together under "Grant 6—Clothing." There should, however, be an appendix to the budget, showing under one head the total sum of money allotted for each arm of the service under the various heads.

56. With regard to purely manufacturing concerns, such as the ordnance and army clothing factories, the procedure to be adopted in allotting budget grants should, we consider, be as follows. Each administrative authority at Army Headquarters who requires stores from the factories, *e.g.*, the Quartermaster-General in respect of clothing and equipment, and the Air Officer Commanding in respect of the service under his control, will allot an appropriate portion of his "block vote" to the authority which supplies the articles required. The aggregate of these allotments will, in the budget, be placed at the disposal of that authority, who will arrange his programme of manufacture accordingly and will reallot the necessary sums to the various factories. Any additional indent on a factory, or the cancellation of any indent already passed on to it, will be accounted for by a simultaneous addition to, or reduction in, the funds placed at the disposal of the factory.

57. We suggest that it might afford a direct incentive to the economic administration of the factories if savings (within certain defined limits) effected in the "on-costs" during the course of the financial year (but not savings due to unforeseen reductions in the cost of raw materials, etc.) should be available for expenditure, during that year or within a reasonable period after its close, on the improvement of their working and efficiency. We attach great importance to this recommendation, and we consider that, if it is adopted and if cost accounting is efficient, it will result in considerable economies in manufacturing costs. It will also benefit the army, as the lower "on-costs" of manufacture of an article effected in any year will reduce the price charged to the army for that article in the following year. If at any time a factory is unable to use the savings resulting from economical management, the money will be available for reallotment. The rate of "on-costs" to be provided in the budget in respect of all articles manufactured in ordnance or army clothing factories should contain a reasonable allowance, on a percentage basis, for depreciation of machinery and plant; and this sum should be at the disposal of the factory authorities to expend at their discretion on repairs and replacements.

We think that a similar system, under which savings in "on-costs" should be available for expenditure on improvements, should also be applied to grass and dairy farms.

We understand that many of the proposals outlined in the preceding paragraphs have already received the approval of the Government of India, and we think that they should be introduced at an early date.

58. If it be decided to adopt the proposal to entrust production and provision, and the administration of the Royal Indian Marine, to a separate Member of Council, we recommend that the spheres of financial responsibility of this Member and of the Commander-in-Chief respectively should be defined as follows. When the military estimates for the following year are being prepared, the Commander-in-Chief will furnish his colleague with an estimate of the quantity of munitions, stores, clothing, foodstuffs and forage which the army will require, indicating where possible the

approximate dates at which delivery should be made The Member in charge of the Department of Munitions and Marine will then inform the Commander in Chief of the estimated cost of these various supplies He will base his estimates on the ascertained cost of manufacture during the current year modified if necessary with reference to such factors as probable alterations in the cost of raw materials, etc and in the case of purchased articles by the anticipated trend of market prices These estimates will be incorporated under the appropriate grant heads in the military budget estimates When the budget estimates are finally accepted and passed, the Commander in Chief will transfer to the Member for Munitions and Marine the whole sum included in the budget for production and provision, and this amount will be administered by that Member subject to the usual control of the Finance Department

If in the course of the financial year it is found that savings (other than those referred to in paragraph 57) can be effected—for example, through an unforeseen fall in prices of foodstuffs or a reduction in the quantities of food or other articles required by the army—these savings will be replaced at the disposal of the Commander in Chief for expenditure on other objects If, on the other hand, an unforeseen rise in the price of purchased articles or of raw materials, such as textiles, appears likely to cause an excess over the sum allotted to the Member for Munitions and Marine for the purpose of supplying the army's requirements, the latter will report the circumstance to the Commander in Chief, who, unless he is prepared to meet the deficiency from savings under other grants, will, with the assistance of his colleague approach the Government of India for an additional grant If the Commander in Chief in the course of the year finds that he requires larger quantities of supplies [illegible] be necessary for him to obtain, either by reappropria[illegible] Government, the requisite funds and to place them a[illegible] his colleague's disposal

59 If the administration of the Royal Indian Marine is transferred to the proposed Department of Munitions and Marine we recommend that the Marine budget should be entirely separated from the Military budget, and be solely administered by the Member in charge of that department

60 We recommend that the Financial Adviser at Army Headquarters should also be the Financial Adviser to the proposed Department of Munitions and Marine in which he will be represented by a competent Deputy Financial Adviser This arrangement, which we have ascertained will be practicable, will secure the closest liaison in matters of finance between Army Headquarters and the new Department and will enable the Financial Adviser to exercise general control over the whole military and marine expenditure, and to ensure that the necessary adjustments, to which reference has been made, are carried out without friction or delay

61 *Pay arrangements*—We have received [illegible] faction at present exists with regard to the [illegible] officers and men of the army in India We re[illegible] due to a partial break down of the system under the abnormal strain of war conditions the shortage of accounts establishments and the employment of a large body of untrained officers and clerks But the inevitable delays incidental to the war do not wholly account for the universal feeling of dissatisfaction which prevails at present We consider that the main defect of the present system is that the accounts of officers and men are prepared as a rule, at a great distance from the station at which they are serving This inevitably causes delay and gives rise to misunderstandings which could be promptly and easily removed if there were closer relations between the individuals concerned and the disbursing authorities We have learnt with satisfaction that the Government of India propose to make a radical change in the system under which accounts are prepared In future there will, we understand be trained military accounts clerks attached to each unit and formation These clerks will prepare the pay accounts of the officers and men, which will thereafter be sent to a disbursing centre for the issue of a cheque This cheque will be issued without waiting for audit of the claims, the audit being taken up after payment, and any overpayments or short payments adjusted in the next bill The clerks of the Military Accounts Department will also assist the regimental authorities in the maintenance of proper accounts of regimental stores and equipment The proposed arrangements appear to us to be a great improvement on the existing system, and will have the further advantage of relieving regimental officers of much office work and correspondence, which now take up time which should be spent in training the men We consider that staff officers should prepare their own salary bills, which, after payment by the disbursing office, should be subjected to audit in the ordinary course

We understand that the arrangements sketched above for the disbursement of pay will not affect the system under which pay is drawn in the field in the form of advances, and the accounts are maintained at the base; and we hope that, in so far as may be practicable, efforts will be made to ensure that any divergence between the peace and the war systems will not involve the risk of dislocation and breakdown on the outbreak of war.

62. *Audit of pay and allowances.*—We have also received numerous complaints regarding the minuteness and rigidity of audit, and we consider that there is considerable justification for these complaints. It must, however, be remembered that the primary duty of an auditor is to apply the strict letter of the regulations to all claims with which he has to deal; and although it must be admitted that the audit by the Military Accounts Department has, especially prior to the war, been unduly narrow, and has perhaps sometimes exceeded its proper functions, we consider that the principal reason why so many disputes occur between the audit authorities and the individuals whose claims come under their review is that the Army Regulations, India, dealing with pay, allowances, leave, pensions, etc., are hopelessly complex, bristle with anomalies, and are often obscure, if not positively contradictory. We hope that certain recommendations, contained in other parts of this Report, will render possible a considerable simplification of these regulations; and we recommend that, if our proposals are accepted, the task of revising them be taken up without delay.

63. *Revision of Regulations.*—We go further, and recommend that the revised regulations should be framed on different lines and in a different spirit. In our opinion, one of the main defects of the existing regulations on these subjects is that they attempt to provide by rule for every contingency which may occur. We consider that the method to be followed in revising them should be that the regulations should, in addition to showing clearly the rates of pay, etc., and the conditions of service, lay down broad principles and leave their application to exceptional cases to be decided, on the merits, by competent financial authority. We recognise that it is impossible to make the Army Regulations, India, as brief and simple as the corresponding regulations at home. The causes which lead to the volume and complexity of the regulations in India are that there are both British and Indian troops serving under different conditions as regards pay, promotion, etc.; that there are various services which are manned partly by officers belonging to Home establishments and partly by officers belonging to Indian departments; and that Indian service, unlike service at home, renders long periods of furlough necessary, and these in turn necessitate elaborate rules governing furlough allowances and the acting arrangements in place of officers absent on leave.

With regard to the spirit in which the regulations should be conceived, we consider that the fault of the present system is that, generally speaking, the regulations appear to be framed on the assumption that every individual will endeavour to take advantage, whenever possible, of the Government which he serves, and that the regulations must therefore be so rigidly worded and must contain so many safeguards as to defeat this object. This spirit of distrust on the part of the Government has, perhaps inevitably, led to a regrettable tendency on the part of officers to put forward claims and demands in excess of their dues, in the hope that they will be passed. Thus the relations between the Government and a large body of its servants are, in this respect, most unsatisfactory. We consider that serious disciplinary notice should be taken of any attempt to evade the rules or to take unfair advantage of them. But we believe that far better results will be obtained if the regulations are framed in a spirit of trust, and on the assumption that the individuals whose pay and allowances and privileges are governed by them are honourable men who will not attempt to obtain more than is their just due.

64. *Summary of recommendations.*—It will be convenient to summarise the recommendations put forward on the subject of military finance. They are :—

(*a.*) That the system under which financial control is exercised at Army Headquarters should be continued.

(*b.*) That the Financial Adviser should be a Member of the Military Council.

(*c.*) That there should be a Deputy Financial Adviser in each of the principal spending branches of Army Headquarters and in the Royal Air Force, with functions as described.

(*d.*) That, whatever arrangement is made for production and provision, there should be at headquarters a Controller of Ordnance Factory Accounts, who would also act as Deputy Financial Adviser to the authority responsible for administration. This

Controller's functions might extend to the clothing factories, but, if this is not found practicable there should be a separate Controller for the latter

(e) *That the system under which separate finance and accounting offices are attached to the ordnance factories should be extended to the clothing factories*

(f) That the accounts and audit relating to contracts *should be concentrated* under a Contr [illegible] who should also act as Deputy Financial Adviser to [illegible]

[illegible] be attached to the office *of the Director Royal* Indian Marine, at Bombay to maintain the marine accounts and to act as Deputy Financial Adviser to the Director

(h) That *for the* present no change should be made in the arrangements under which financial assistance and advice are given in commands and divisions

(i) That no change should be made in the status and duties of the Military Accountant General

(j) That the Comptroller and Auditor General should exercise more definite authority over the audit staff of the Military Accounts Department

(k) *That the responsibility for preparing their estimates and administering their* grants should be definitely placed on the heads of branches at Army Headquarters and on the officer commanding the Royal Air Force

(l) That the military accounts should be maintained in such a form as will enable the heads of branches to watch the progress of expenditure with a view to savings being made available for other objects

(m) That prompt information should be afforded to the Government of India regarding the progress of expenditure at home on stores etc

(n) That there should be a block vote for each arm of the service and for the Royal Air Force

(o) That savings effected in the 'on costs' of factories should be available for expenditure on the improvement of the factories

(p) That the spheres of financial responsibility of the Commander in Chief and the Member for Munitions and Marine (if this department is formed) should be defined on the lines indicated

(q) That the Financial Adviser at Army Headquarters should also be the Financial Adviser to the proposed Department of Munitions and Marine

(r) That a radical change on the lines proposed by the Government of India, should be made in the system under which pay is disbursed

(s) That the regulations dealing with pay allowances leave pensions etc should be revised

ESHER
M F O DWYER
H V COX, Lieut Gen
CLAUD W JACOB Lieut Gen
H HUDSON Lieut Gen
G FELL
WEBB GILLMAN Maj Gen
UMAR HAYAT
K G GUPTA

I agree with my colleagues except that I consider that the Financial Adviser should be an official of Army Headquarters and not of the *Finance Department* and that, if a separate Department is set up for Supply the same official should not act as Financial Adviser to the Commander in Chief and the Supply Member

J P Du CANE Lieut Gen

C M WAGSTAFF Colonel Secretary
19th May, 1920

DISTRIBUTION OF DUTIES AT ARMY HEADQUARTERS.

Commander-in-Chief.

Chief of the General Staff.*

Military policy.

Operations of war.

Policy in respect of scales of armament and equipment.

Allotment of military resources.

War establishments.

Intelligence and censorship.

Training and education.

International law.

Administration of the General Staff branch, and of grants for above services.

Affiliated to the General Staff

Inspector of Cavalry.

Inspector of Artillery.

Inspector of Engineers and Pioneers.

Inspector of Infantry.

Inspector of Signals.

Commandant Machine Gun Centre.

Adviser on Tanks and Armoured Cars.

Chief Instructor Gas Services.

Advice on training, organization, scale and design of equipment.

Co-ordination of training.

Assistance in preparation of training manuals.

Inspection of training schools and depôts.

Liaison with research and invention.

Adjutant-General.*

Organizing, recruiting, maintaining and mobilizing the military forces and their reserves.

Furlough and leave.

Pay and pensions.

Discipline; military and martial law.

Medical services and sanitation.

Auxiliary forces.

Ceremonial, salutes and precedence.

Regimental records.

War medals.

Administration of the Adjutant-General's branch, and of grants for above services.

Affiliated to the Adjutant-General's Department.

Judge Advocate-General.

Quartermaster-General.*

Specification, inspection, maintenance and issue of provisions, forage, fuel, clothing, armaments, ammunition, equipment, general stores and material, and reserves for the above.

Services responsible for Transportation and Movements, Supply and Transport including Farms, Armaments, Military Works, Equipment and Ordnance Stores, Remount, Veterinary, Cantonment Magistrates, and Accommodation.

Purchase of minor supplies not provided in bulk by the Civilian Member responsible for production and provision.

Administration of the Quartermaster-General's branch, and of grants for the above services.

Secretary, Army Headquarters.*

Correspondence of Army Headquarters.

Central registry.

Control of procedure at Army Headquarters.

Secretarial work of the Military Council.

Liaison with other Departments of the Government of India and with Local Governments.

Editing of Indian Army List and of all Army Regulations, India.

Issue of orders of the Government of India, Army Orders, Army Instructions (India), and Gazette Notifications.

Control of clerical and subordinate staff at Army Headquarters.

Administration of grants for above services.

Financial Adviser.*

Advice on financial matters.

Air Officer Commanding Royal Air Force.

Administration of the Royal Air Force and of the grants for it.

Military Secretary.

Appointments, promotions and retirements of officers.


Confidential reports.

Compilation of the staff list, and custody of records of staff officers.

Honours, rewards, decorations, and patronage.


Secretary to Selection Board.

DISTRIBUTION OF DUTIES OF MEMBER FOR MUNITIONS AND MARINE



Administration of Army Factories Contracts and the Royal Indian Marine
Responsibility for meeting army demands in bulk for provisions forage fuel clothing armaments ammunition general stores and material
Administration of grants allotted to him by the Commander in Chief for the above services

,TRIBUTION OF DUTIES IN THE CASE OF THE APPOINTMENT OF A SURVEYOI GENERAL OF SUPPLY UNDER THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF



The duties of the Surveyor General of Supply would be the same as those of the Member for Munitions and Marine with the exception of the administration of the Royal Indian Marine

r of the Military Council

To the Right Hon. E. S. Montagu, P.C.

Sir,

We beg now to forward to you the further and concluding Parts (III–IX) of our Report. The enquiry upon which these portions of our Report are based was mainly conducted in India, although our recommendations have been fully discussed and finally settled after the return of the Committee to this country.

These portions of our Report deal mainly with questions of administration, and with certain specific questions of organisation with which we have been asked to deal. Although our terms of reference include the words "where necessary the organisation of the Army in India," we have not conceived it to be part of our duty to enquire into or to submit recommendations regarding the numbers and composition of the Army in India, nor the specific purposes for which that army is required in view of the greater responsibilities assumed by the British Empire in consequence of the Treaties of Peace recently concluded. We have made recommendations, at your request, in regard to the formation of a Territorial Force in India, but we were not invited to express an opinion upon the ratio of British to Indian troops.

Parts III to IX cover a wide field. They deal with matters of administration vitally affecting the contentment of the Army in India. We hope and believe that the suggestions which we have made will contribute to the well-being of the British and Indian soldiers under the control of the Government of India.

In the concluding Part of the Report we have drawn attention to the effects upon Indian finance of the recommendations which we have made. It is impossible for us to form even an approximate estimate of the cost to the Indian tax payer, but we are convinced of the necessity of raising the standard of living for British and Indian soldiers of all ranks, if the spirit of both is to be maintained at the high level which the interests of the Indian Empire demand.

One of our Indian colleagues, Sir Krishna Gupta, has reminded us, in a note appended to this Report, of the momentous declaration of policy made in August 1917, with a view of placing India on the road to the attainment of a Dominion status. That we had not overlooked this Proclamation was made clear in the letter which we addressed to you in connection with Part I of our Report. A Dominion status implies responsibilities as well as privileges, and this obvious reflection has been borne in mind by us throughout the whole of our enquiry and the recommendations which we have based upon it.

Another of our colleagues, Sir Umar Hayat Khan, holds strong opinions on the subject of the conditions of enlistment in the Indian Army, and views with grave apprehension any suggestion to convert it into a short-service army on the lines of some continental armies. We understand that, though there is no intention of proceeding so far as this, still in order to secure an effective reserve to cover wastage in the field it may be necessary to shorten the period of service with the colours. We hope that any change in this direction will be introduced with caution, since we hold that every unit of a voluntary army should contain a considerable proportion of well-trained and seasoned men.

We have endeavoured not to trench, more than was absolutely necessary, upon matters which clearly lie within the sphere of the General Staff. Where we have done so, it has been at the request of Army Headquarters.

Our recommendations have been made with the view of enabling the Government of India and yourself to form practical conclusions upon a series of problems that have given rise to some controversy in the past, and to place them in a light which may minimise controversy in the future and lead to their easy solution.

As the detailed recommendations in regard to actual increases of pay to the army will be the subject of discussion between the Secretary of State in Council and the Government of India, we have judged it to be more convenient to include them in an Appendix* to this Report.

We desire gratefully to acknowledge the assistance which you have rendered us, which has been afforded to us by the officials of the India Office under your control, by the Viceroy, the Commander-in-Chief and officers of every rank and degree in India, as well as the valuable services which have been rendered to us by our secretaries, Colonel C. M. Wagstaff and Major T. W. Lloyd.

* Not printed.

Our colleague, Lieut General Sir John DuCane, Master General of the Ordnance, has asked to be excused from signing Parts III–IX, on the grounds that he was prevented from going to India with the Committee, and that owing to his heavy official duties he has been unable to attend regularly the meetings that have taken place since the Committee returned We appreciate the reasons which have actuated him

It is a matter of deep regret that we have not had the advantage of the presence, during the later stages of our discussions of our colleague, Lieut -General Sir Claud Jacob, who was unavoidably detained in India, but our conclusions have been submitted to him, and it is a matter of satisfaction to us to feel that they meet with his general approval

We are,
Sir,
Your obedient servants,

ESHER
M F ODWYER
H V COX, Lt Gen
H HUDSON, Lt Gen
G FELL
WEBB, GILLMAN, Maj -Gen
UMAR HAYAT
K G GUPTA

C M WAGSTAFF, Colonel
Secretary

22*nd June*, 1920

PART III.

Decentralisation and Liaison

In Part II of this Report we have shown that it is necessary to relieve the Commander in Chief and promote the more rapid conduct of business One method of effecting this is to secure decentralisation at Army Headquarters from the Commander-in Chief to his principal staff officers, and from them to their directors or assistants We consider further that the same principles of devolution and decentralisation should be extended so as to include the whole of the army organization in India

Before making any definite suggestions on these points it will be convenient to review the evolution of the present systems of command and staff in India

The System of Command in India

2 The "Command" system in India was first introduced in 1895, on the abolition of the old Bengal, Bombay and Madras armies Four Commands were formed in that year, viz, Punjab, Bengal, Madras and Bombay, each under a lieutenant general, who was responsible for the administration as well as for the training of troops in his command

3 In 1904, as a consequence of Lord Kitchener's redistribution and reorganization, the Madras Command was abolished, and the army was divided into three Commands—Northern, Eastern and Western, corresponding to the Punjab, Bengal and Bombay Commands

4. In 1907, on the delegation of administrative powers to divisional commanders, Lord Kitchener considered that the retention of similar powers by the lieutenant-generals of Commands merely led to delay in the despatch of business. The Command system was therefore abolished, and India was divided into two armies—Northern and Southern—each under a general officer, who was charged with command, inspection and training, but was not accorded any administrative responsibility.

5. It appears that Lord Kitchener, in drawing up his reorganization and redistribution scheme in 1903, intended that the army should be organized in divisional areas, each to include one or more definite war formations, together with the garrison troops necessary for the internal security of the area in war; in other words, each divisional area was to be self-contained and self-administered.

This system was based on the assumption that the necessary concentration of troops would actually be carried into effect and that divisional commanders would be able to exercise close control. This concentration, which was dependent on the entire readjustment of accommodation, involved a large and very expensive building scheme, and was never completed. Thus, in practice, it was the exception rather than the rule for the whole of the troops of war formations to be located in peace within their own divisional areas under their divisional commanders; while internal security troops, when required, had in many cases to be brought into these areas from outside. The tendency was therefore towards an increased dispersion rather than concentration.

Further, for purposes of internal security, India was divided into a number of smaller areas within the divisional spheres. It was intended in 1904 that brigade commanders should be provided for such areas, and also, in order to secure continuity of command and administration, that the general officers, with their staffs, should continue to perform their normal duties on and after the mobilization of the field army. These brigade commands were never created. With the abolition of the three Commands in 1907, the means for securing in time of war continuity of command and administration disappeared. In practice, therefore, the command of an internal security area fell, on the mobilization of the field army, to the senior regimental commanding officer in that area. The result was that, when the divisional commander and his staff went on service, an improvised staff had to assume responsibility for administration and internal security.

6. This system proved unsatisfactory both in peace and on mobilization for war. We have been told that in peace divisional commanders were overwhelmed by the large administrative responsibilities imposed on them, and that their staffs were insufficient to meet the immediate requirements of administration or to provide for continuity on mobilization. Also, owing to the dispersal of troops in their areas, commanders were unable to exercise any degree of close control or to devote sufficient attention to their primary duty, viz., the training of troops for war.

At the same time, the elimination of administrative responsibilities from the higher command of armies entailed an additional burden on Army Headquarters, where the administrative machine was clogged by a mass of minor detail. Floating in the background, in a somewhat nebulous atmosphere, were the two army commanders, whose duties were confined to questions of training, discipline and efficiency of units, and, to a limited extent, to the appointment and promotion of officers, but who were without any responsibility whatever for administration.

7. Such was the system at the outbreak of the great war.

Early in the war both army commanders took the field, and in 1916 a successor was appointed to command the Northern Army, and in 1917 a successor to the Southern Army Commander was appointed, but the Quetta, Lucknow and Burma Divisions remained directly under the Commander-in-Chief. The duties of these army commanders remained as before, but a major-general in charge of administration with a small staff was added, to enable them more effectively to undertake the inspection of administrative units and services. They still remained, however, without actual administrative responsibilities.

8. In 1918 financial powers were given to these army commanders, and they were also authorised to deal with all administrative questions, except those involving matters of policy or of new principle, or those relating to the war. To assist them their staffs were again increased.

The Staff System in India

9 The essential difference between the staff systems —

(a) as laid down in King's Regulations
(b) as laid down in Field Service Regulations, and
(c) as now practised in India

lies in the degree of division between the functions of command and administration

10 Under the staff system as laid down in King's Regulations each general officer commanding in chief has on his staff a general officer in charge of administration, to whom he delegates powers to deal with all administrative matters not involving questions of policy or principle He is thus relieved of all responsibility in such matters

The general officer in charge of administration —

(i) Corresponds direct with the War Office
(ii) Exercises the financial powers of a general officer commanding in chief
(iii) Has the power to delegate his financial authority, within certain limits
(iv) Is responsible to the Army Council for the proper expenditure of money
(v) Deals direct with local heads of services and departments

The result is that all administrative responsibility rests on him, he issues orders to the heads of services and departments, who in their turn give their orders to their subordinate representatives leaving subordinate commanders to formulate their requirements but relieving them of the responsibility for meeting such requirements

11 Under the staff system as laid down in Field Service Regulations there is no general officer in charge of administration The responsibility for providing the requirements of the forces in the field rests with the various directors or heads of administrative services and departments subject to the general control and supervision of the three principal staff officers The latter are responsible for the issue of all orders of the commander to the various services These in their turn are responsible for the provision of administrative requirements

12 Under the staff system as now practised in India the responsibility for administration rests on army and subordinate commanders who have representatives of the administrative services to advise and assist them These representatives carry out the orders transmitted to them by the commander through his staff

13 In the Commands and in some divisions in India general officers in charge of administration were appointed during the war but were not given the same powers or [illegible] in charge of administration in the United Kingdom [illegible] of the adjutant general's and quartermaster general's [illegible] heir commanders but not directly to Army Headquarters, the channel of correspondence except on technical matters peculiar to a particular service, being through the Command or division They are in fact senior staff officers who co ordinate administrative work and who in virtue of their position and experience relieve the general officer commanding of all detail though not of responsibility

14 The staff system now obtaining in India appears to us well suited to local conditions.

Proposals for organisation of Commands

15 The military conditions and requirements in India are not analogous to those either of the United Kingdom or of an expeditionary force In India the areas of [illegible] External [illegible] any time [illegible] bution of subordinate commands, with commanders fully acquainted with local conditions ready to grapple with any situation and armed with adequate powers We consider that this can best be effected not merely by increasing the responsibilities of a few high staff officers at Army Headquarters but also by widening the powers of subordinate officers, in other words, by large and real decentralisation

16 In establishing a system of command in India regard must be had to the following considerations —

(a) The distance to be covered and the paucity of communications which limit the size of an area that can be controlled from one centre

(b) The desirability of making the boundaries of military districts coincide with those of civil administrations.
(c) The necessity of limiting the numbers of subordinate commanders to be dealt with by superior authority.
(d) The limitations imposed by considerations of accommodation, and by the necessity for providing internal security garrisons. Financial stringency is an obstacle to the provision of new accommodation, so long as barracks or lines remain unoccupied. Consequently, the distribution of troops must be governed rather by existing accommodation than by existing military requirements. These factors necessitate a large measure of dispersion in peace.

17. We have examined a paper, prepared by the General Staff, in which it is proposed that India should be divided into fourteen separate areas, to be called "districts."

It is evident that if Army Headquarters is to exercise effective control, and is not to be overloaded with work, some link must be introduced between Army Headquarters and Districts, in order to avoid a return to the state of affairs which existed before the war. The General Staff consider that for this purpose four Commands should be formed, each under an Army Commander, graded as a general officer commanding-in-chief, with an adequate staff. These Commands, will comprise districts, each containing a certain number of brigade commands. Burma should form an independent district. Districts should be classified as first or second class, according to their importance.

18. If this plan is adopted, the army and district commanders should be responsible for the command and administration of the troops in their areas, as well as for internal security. The boundaries of each command and district should, usually, coincide with those of civil administrations. In those districts in which war formations are located, the general officer commanding the district should also command the war formation. But in order to ensure continuity of administration on the war formations proceeding on service, the staffs in peace should be so constituted that a proportion, including the general officer in charge of administration, would remain behind to administer the district.

19. Some further decentralisation will be effected by the system of grouping Indian units which it is proposed to introduce.

20. These proposals appear to us generally suitable, and likely to promote the policy of decentralisation which we have in view.

Internal Security and Liaison between the Military and Civil Authorities.

21. The functions of the army are to repel external aggression and to maintain internal security. For the proper discharge of the latter duty, it must keep close and constant touch with the civil authorities, who share the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order. They should therefore be kept regularly informed of such military matters as :—

(a) An unhealthy spirit among the troops.
(b) Attempts from without or within to tamper with the troops, to excite disaffection, or to spread political propaganda.
(c) Ill-feeling between the troops and the local civil population.

22. It appears that, at present, there is no regular system of communicating information on such points between the army and the civil authorities.

It is true that, since the outbreak of the war, the civil administration of each province prepares and forwards for the information of the Government of India a fortnightly report on the general political situation in its area, and copies of these reports are furnished to Army Headquarters, to the Commands, to divisions, and in some cases to brigades. In addition, a weekly summary of the political situation in India as a whole is drawn up by the Director of Central Intelligence and circulated to heads of provinces and certain military authorities. On the other hand, the army furnishes no corresponding information to the civil authorities. Cases have been mentioned to us in which the civil Government was seriously embarrassed by the absence of information as to seditious influences at work in particular units, as to the results of enquiries into cases of mutiny and sedition within

the army, and as to the return to civil life of men discharged from the army on suspicion of seditious tendencies or of communicating with the enemy

23 We understand that the General Staff are now considering measures for remedying these defects, and establishing close and regular liaison with provincial Governments The point has been kept in view in the new scheme of Commands each of which will comprise and deal with one or more complete civil administrations in matters of internal security, hitherto centralised at Army Headquarters

24 *But it is not enough to establish a system of liaison* between the superior military and civil authorities To be really effective, the system must be extended to the local civil and military officers, on whom arrangements for internal security must ultimately devolve

With this object we make the following general suggestions —

(*a*) Periodical summaries of military external and internal intelligence likely to have a bearing on the internal situation should be furnished by Army Headquarters to provincial Governments which should be responsible for communicating such items as they consider necessary to the local officers concerned

(*b*) Periodical conferences should be held between the local civil and military officers for the discussion of matters of common interest

(*c*) There should be closer relations and more regular correspondence between different provinces on matters which are likely to affect the internal security of more than one province

(*d*) As a large portion of the Indian Army is now employed overseas in Egypt Palestine, Mesopotamia Persia &c, where movements and influences hostile to the British Government in India may be at work it is desirable that these areas also should be brought within the sphere of the Indian *military and civil intelligence agencies so that information* bearing *on the* Indian Army, or on political movements likely to affect India, may be made promptly available in India

(*e*) As in recent years many seditious and revolutionary movements in India have *been initiated and organised in Europe, America, Africa, and the Far East* and one object common to all of them is to tamper with the loyalty of the Indian Army, information from those areas should also be obtained by the Government of India, and promptly transmitted, as far as necessary to the civil and military authorities concerned

(*f*) The intelligence collected under the above heads should be collated and disseminated by one responsible authority in India

Propaganda

25 In the foregoing paragraphs we have endeavoured to outline the steps that should be taken to ensure co operation between civil and military authorities in obtaining indications *of local feeling, and the earliest information of attempts to spread* disaffection We think, however that these in themselves will be inadequate unless suitable measures are taken to bring before the army and the classes from which it is drawn, in clear and simple language, correct information as to the progress of events and the policy of Government We consider that *there should be a central bureau* at the headquarters of the Government of India in close touch with local Governments and with the authority referred to in paragraph 24 (*f*) and that this agency should be responsible for the collection and timely dissemination of such information

We are also led to believe that there have been *in* some cases *friction and misunderstanding* between the press and Army Headquarters owing to the fact that information upon matters affecting the army has not been freely communicated to the press The value of the press in India as a medium for information appears to us to have been neglected in the past *We earnestly commend to the notice of the* Government of India the importance of keeping the army and the public adequately informed of the trend of current events, through the press and other channels

PART IV.

Closer Relations between the British and Indian Armies.

1. A question to which we have devoted much attention is the possibility of establishing closer relations between the British and Indian Armies. The subject is a wide one, and we propose to divide it into appropriate sections.

The first section relates to the British officers of the cavalry and infantry. We then proceed to examine, in Section II, the question of the administrative services, namely, the Supply and Transport Corps, and the Ordnance, Veterinary and Signal Services.

Next, we devote separate sections to the Medical and Engineer Services. The last two sections relate to closer co-operation in training and military education, and to the distribution of certain high appointments in India between the British service and the Indian Army.

SECTION I.

Regimental Officers.

2. At the request of the Committee, Army Headquarters circulated to units of the Indian Army the following scheme for producing closer relations between British officers of the British and Indian Armies.

In the covering letter, in which remarks were invited, it was explained that the scheme was purely tentative, and that it did not commit the military authorities or the Government of India in any way.

Scheme for producing Closer Relations between British Officers of the British and Indian Armies.

1. It is not necessary to labour the point that something in the direction of fusion of the British officers' cadre of the Indian Army with that of the British Army is much to be desired.

2. It may be noted, however, that any system of fusion must provide that Indian regiments shall always have in their senior ranks officers with a thorough knowledge of Indian soldiers and Indian conditions.

3. The advantages claimed for fusion, as a principle, are:—

(*i*) That it would go far to prevent the deterioration, mental and physical, which sometimes sets in when officers have served continuously in India.

(*ii*) It would prevent the final decision as to prolonged service in India having to be made by officers when still very junior.

(*iii*) It would produce officers well fitted by experience to serve either with British or Indian troops.

(*iv*) Officers who have done a tour of service with Indian troops might be earmarked as a first reserve in case of necessity for the officers' cadre of the Indian Army. This would go far to solve an existing difficulty.

(*v*) Fusion in any degree must tend towards the removal of a feeling of inequality between the services.

(*vi*) Uniformity of discipline, training and ideals would be produced.

4. It would appear, at first sight, that the more complete the fusion the better; but further consideration shows that the condition mentioned in paragraph 2 militates against the adoption of one cadre throughout, and that, while the two services continue to be regulated on systems so different as regimental promotion in one case and promotion by a time-scale in the other case, the limitations to the application of the one cadre principle become considerable.

It is impossible to say, especially at present, what chance there is of either service changing its system of promotion.

Examination of the matter seems to show that while it would not be wise at the present time to put forward proposals which could not be carried out without the subversion of one or the other systems, a great step towards fusion is possible without disturbing existing conditions.

5. The scheme given below ensures fusion by putting all the British officers of the two greater parts of the Imperial Army (*i.e.*, the British and Indian Armies) on to one list up to 12 years' service, and again after command of an Indian unit (or 26 years' service if not in command), while the condition mentioned in paragraph 2 is satisfied by the retention of the Indian cadre for what may be termed the "central period" of an officer's service.

6. The following are the proposals in detail:—

(*a*.) Before leaving Sandhurst, all cadets will be given the option of electing for a term of service with Indian troops. Vacancies on the Indian establishment will be allotted according to place on the Sandhurst exit list (except to King's India Cadets). If accepted, the young

officer will be posted to a British regiment which has a battalion in India and to that battalion Urdu should be ta ght to all and + + S n

After one year if well repor
an Indian regiment with
probation During the fir
five years service he will be reposted to the home battalion of his British regiment Should there be no battalion of his regiment at home he will be attached as supernumerary to another battalion

(b) On completing six years service he will be given the opt on of either remaining with his British regiment or of volunteering for a second term of four years with Indian troops (if possible with the same Indian group as before) If he so volunteers and is accepted by the Government of India he will be again seconded in his British regiment

It will also be permissible for an officer of the British service of six years service who has never served with Indian troops to volunteer for a tour of four years service with them and on its completion to come under the condition of sub paragraph (c) below

(c) On completion of ten years service he will return for two years service with his British regiment at home or with some other regiment as provided in paragraph 6 (a) On the expiry of this period he must elect either to remain with his British regiment or to join the Indian cadre for further service with Indian troops In the latter case and if accepted by the Government of India he will remain with Indian troops until he either completes command of his Indian unit or is reported unfit for it On complet on of command he will either be placed on the list of those selected for promotion to substantive colonel or will be retired If unfit he will unless the War Office or the Government of India wish to retain his services be retired These principles will be applied *mutatis mutandis* to officers in departmental and staff employ

(d) On completion of command of his Indian regiment and promotion to colonel or if n t in command on attainment of 26 years service an officer s name will be br ught on t the general list of officers of the British service and he will be eligible for staff or other employment equally with others whether in India or elsewhere

(e) During his third term of service with Indian troops the officer will return home for service with his British regiment (his former one if possible) to which he will be attached as supernumerary for one year This year should commence not less than a year before as far as can be foreseen he comes up for consideration for second in command of his regiment

(f) An officer who at 12 years service elects and is accepted for a third term t serv c with Indian troops will cease to have any claim to return to his Brit sh regiment except under paragraph 6 (c)

(g) All officers of the British service who have done a tour of service with Indian troops and who have not elected to join the Indian cadre under sub paragraph (c) but who are reported on as fit for employment with Indian troops and who have qualified in Urdu should be noted in records and shown in the British and Indian army lists as qualified for employment with the Ind an Army in case of need

7 It will be seen that when this scheme is in full working promotion by a time scale will only be necessary after an officer has 12 years service So long as promotion to captain is by t me scale it will be necessary to make temporary adjustments between the two services by the grant of local rank in India The following arrangement is propo e l —

So long as an officer is borne on the cadre of his British regiment his promotion will in the ordinary course be governed by vacancies in that reg ment but when under the time scale in force for the time being in the Indian Army he would be eligible for promotion before it falls due in his British regiment he will be given local rank while serving with Indian troops But on returning to h s Br t sh regiment he w ll t ke the rank t h ch h s place on the cadre of that regiment entitles
k than he has held under the time scale
a further and final term of Ind an s rv ce
t to the Ind an time scale and will remain
subject to it until h s term on the Indian list is complete

Further fusion than that outlined above although probably desirable is only possible if both armies adopt one system of promotion

8 The above scheme appears to be applicable to the cavalry branch of the Indian Army with slight modification It will sometimes be necessary in the cavalry to attach the officer during the periods of duty at home as supernumerary to a reg ment which is not the one on whose rolls his name is borne *vide* paragraph 6 (a) His rank would be regulated by his place in the latter

9 The scheme does not appear to present any difficulties as regards the filling of staff appo nt ments The matter can be considered separately but the claims of officers on the Indian cadre t their fair share of staff appointments should be secured

10 *Pay* —A comparison has been made of the emoluments drawn by—

(a) Officers of the British Army serving at home
(b) Officers of the British Army serving with British troops in India
(c) British officers serving with the Indian Army

But it seems clear that Government
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remembered, however, that these periodic terms of service with British troops at home will largely take the place of the old expensive spells of furlough out of India. In the past these furloughs have frequently absorbed the whole of an officer's savings, and have even left him in debt.

As all the above transfers are on duty, officers and their families would *receive free passage and* transport to and fro.

It is not considered that any absence from India, other than as above laid down, is necessary during the first twelve years of service, except on accumulated privilege leave, the rules for which might stand as at present. Sick leave is of course excepted. It is thought that, during the first ten years, any sick leave from India exceeding nine months, except as the result of wounds or illness contracted on service, should involve return to the officer's British regiment at home. This return would not debar an officer from volunteering for a second tour of service with the Indian Army when qualified for it. English pay should be drawn on sick leave.

During what has been called the "central period" of an officer's service, viz., when he is serving on the Indian cadre, the period of attachment spent at home will not prejudice his eligibility for furlough under the rules for the time being in force. During such furlough an officer should draw the pay and allowances of a British service officer of corresponding rank at home, in lieu of the existing furlough pay of the Indian Army.

11. *Pensions.*—It is not considered that the first two tours of service in India should entitle an officer to any participation in the possible benefits of Indian pension, but any subsequent service with the Indian Army should entitle an officer to the benefits of an Indian pension, such benefits in this case to be calculated for the present on his whole service.

12. *Safeguarding rights of officers already substantive in the Indian Army.*—It is impossible to deprive these officers of the right to continue on their existing terms of service. They should, however, be permitted, and encouraged, to proceed home on duty for a year's attachment to British troops after five years' service, for two years after ten years' service, and for one year before promotion to second-in-command.

Officers who have accepted the scheme, and who proceed home for a period or periods of attachment to a British regiment, should draw during such periods the British pay and allowances of their rank They will also be permitted to draw British pay and allowances during any subsequent furlough at home.

Officers who do not accept the scheme will draw, while on furlough, the furlough pay in force for the time being for the officers of the Indian Army. Exchanges should be permitted between the services, under suitable safeguards.

3. The replies from units, which reached the Committee a short time before they left India for England, show that the objects of the scheme are generally approved, but that important questions, requiring prolonged consideration, have arisen as to how they can best be attained.

4. The most important suggestion that has emerged from the enquiries relates to the affiliation of British with Indian regiments. It is evident that it is only in conference with the War Office that this suggestion can be properly examined, and we have already had some informal discussions on the subject with its representatives.

5. It is equally evident that, with the best will on both sides, affiliation of units alone may not furnish a complete solution of the whole problem. We therefore mention the following suggested modifications of the original scheme, which, in our opinion, go a long way towards establishing closer relationship between units and officers of both services, and cannot fail to be of benefit to the officers of the Indian Army:—

Cadets whilst at Sandhurst would elect, as at present, for appointment on probation to the Indian Army, would be sent out to India on the Unattached List, and would be posted to a British unit serving in India. After a year's service with that unit they would be posted for a probationary term to an Indian unit and, after 4 years in the Indian Army, would have to elect for either the British service or the Indian Army. If admitted to the Indian Army, an officer would be required to spend one more year in the rank of lieutenant, and one year in each of the ranks of captain and major, with a British battalion (or unit of a group), allied for the purpose to his Indian Army unit. These periods of attachment should be at home;* and during them the officer would be either on the establishment or supernumerary, as may be decided. Under this proposal, an officer would throughout the whole of his service in the Indian Army keep up his connection with the British unit to which his Indian unit is allied. If it can be arranged that officers of the British service be permitted to take the place of officers of the Indian Army so attached, we consider that both services would benefit.

An example may make the scheme clearer. It is assumed that the 6th Jats is allied to the Border Regiment. A gentleman cadet elects, at Sandhurst, for the Indian Army. He is placed on the Unattached List on leaving the College, and subsequently joins the 2/Worcestershire Regiment in India as an attached officer. He serves for a year with this battalion, and is then transferred to the 6th Jats. At the

* NOTE.—Such tours of duty would, of course, include free passage for the officer and his family both ways.

end of 5 years total service he elects and is accepted for the Indian Army After, say 6 years' service his turn comes for a tour of duty with British troops at home, he then goes not to his original British battalion the Worcesters but to the battalion to which the 6th Jats (his Indian Army unit) is allied *i e* the Border Regiment Similarly during his service in the ranks of captain and major he spends his tours of duty with British troops at home with the Border Regiment

6 To investigate thoroughly the whole matter would take a considerable time We do not consider our Committee to be well suited for the detailed examination of such a matter, and we cannot delay the presentation of our Report in order to undertake prolonged enquiry into it *We therefore recommend that the matter should be further examined, in the light of these remarks by a combined committee of War Office and India Office representatives to whom, we hope the information we have collected and tabulated may be useful*

SECTION II

Closer Relations between Departments

7 In our view the war has shown the necessity for assimilating so far as practicable [illegible] those services which are concerned with [illegible] h the holding and issue of stores with [illegible] signalling We show later why in our opinion, the problem of medical administration in India presents peculiar difficulties For this reason, we omit *the medical services from consideration in the present connection* and confine ourselves to examining the question of the extent to which it is practicable and desirable to amalgamate or at least to establish closer relations between the following services, namely *the Royal Army Service Corps and the Supply and Transport Corps, the Royal Army Veterinary Corps and the Army Veterinary Service in India the Royal Army Ordnance Corps and the Stores Section of the Indian Ordnance Department and the Signal Corps at home and in India*

8 India has now been admitted into partnership with the Empire and the Indian Army has fought, alongside troops from other parts of the Empire in every theatre of war Its responsibilities have thus been greatly widened and *it can no longer be regarded as a local force whose sphere of activity is limited to India and the surrounding frontier territories It must rather be treated as a part of an Imperial army ready to serve in any part of the world* It follows that the organization of its auxiliary services should if confusion is to be avoided conform closely to that of the rest of the forces of the Empire

9 Apart from the advantages of *uniformity in* administrative methods we consider that nothing but good can result from establishing close relations between the superior personnel, which will afford officers opportunities for the interchange of ideas for studying the local conditions prevailing in different parts of the Empire and for widening their administrative experience There is reason to believe that certain Indian services have suffered in efficiency *owing to the necessarily restricted character of their activities* They have tended to become narrow in outlook and to adhere to practices which have been abandoned elsewhere in favour of more up to date methods These divergences of system led to inconvenience during the war when Indian services were serving alongside the corresponding British services in the same theatre

10 We have endeavoured in framing our detailed recommendations *to apply certain* general principles which in our opinion should govern the reorganization of the personnel of these services These may be stated as follows —

(1) To secure the presence in the Indian services of a sufficient number of British officers and subordinate personnel possessing an adequate knowledge of the country, its customs and languages

(2) To assimilate administrative methods so far as practicable in the home and Indian services

(3) To adopt a common basis for determining throughout these services the pay of British officers serving on tours of duty in India in order to remove existing anomalies and secure uniformity of system and simplification of accounts

(4) To ensure the regular interchange of British personnel between home and India

11. We consider that the services in India should, generally speaking, consist of—

(a) British personnel, maintained by the War Office and sent out to India for tours of duty; and

(b) Indian personnel, enlisted in India for service with Indian formations, and employed to replace British personnel, as far as is compatible with efficiency.

The whole, while in India, must be administered by the Government of India.

12. In our recommendations for closer relations between these services we have made suggestions under which certain personnel of the Indian Unattached List* will be permitted to transfer to the British service. We realise that this may interfere with the prospects of those on this list who may decide not to elect for transfer. We suggest that it may be necessary in their case to substitute a time scale of promotion.

Royal Army Service Corps and Supply and Transport Corps.

13. Before considering the possibility of amalgamation of these two corps it is necessary to compare the conditions which obtain in each.

(a) *Recruitment.*—The Royal Army Service Corps is recruited wholly from the British service, and the Supply and Transport Corps wholly from the Indian Army.

(b) *System of Promotion, &c.*—In the Royal Army Service Corps, officers are promoted to fill vacancies in the fixed establishment of the corps. In the Supply and Transport Corps, officers are promoted according to the time scale of the Indian Army, irrespective of appointments or ranks required for units; they are also graded departmentally in 6 classes, partly by length of commissioned service and partly by length of departmental service; advancement up to Class 4 is by the former and thereafter by length of service in each class.

(c) *Comparison of Service.*—The following table compares the army service of officers of the Royal Army Service Corps list and that of officers of similar service and rank on the Supply and Transport Corps list. It is of interest as showing how equally the two systems of promotion in rank have worked in practice:—

	Army Service (in years).	
	R.A.S.C.	S. & T.C.
Senior Colonel	34	32
Junior Colonel	27	32
Senior Lieutenant-Colonel...	27	32
17th Lieutenant-Colonel	26	31
Junior Lieutenant-Colonel	25	26
Senior Major	25	25
30th Major	19	21
50th Major	19	19
100th Major	17	18
Junior Major	15	15
Senior Captain	15	14
20th Captain	13	12
Junior Captain	5	4

The Royal Army Service Corps is likely to be blocked by peace conditions, while in the Supply and Transport Corps promotion in rank is being slowed down gradually to the pre-war scale of the Indian Army. The effect cannot be accurately foreseen, but the two services are never likely to be nearer together in this respect than now.

(d) *Comparison of Pay.*—The Supply and Transport Corps pay is much better than that of the Royal Army Service Corps. In the ranks of lieutenant-colonel, major and captain, the former is almost double the latter. In the rank of lieutenant, the Supply and Transport Corps pay is nearly 50 per cent. better than that of the Royal Army Service Corps.

14. We have considered the extent to which, having regard to the factors mentioned above, it is possible to apply the general principles advocated at the beginning of this Section.

* A list containing all British other ranks of departments serving continuously in India.

It is not practicable to effect complete fusion of the officer cadres of the two services at the present time owing to (*a*) the much higher rates of pay of the Supply and Transport Corps and (*b*) the necessity of safeguarding existing rights of officers who are permanent in that corps

15 But though complete fusion is not yet practicable we think it desirable to move in the direction of a unification of the two corps in view of the necessity for assimilation to be as complete as possible in the services of supply and transport With this object we put forward the following recommendations —

(i) *Method of unification* —The officers cadre of the two corps should be unified into *one* Indian establishment by stopping recruitment for the Supply and Transport Corps [illegible] rmy Service Corps personnel to the vacancies as they [illegible] ier list

[illegible] designation ' Supply and Transport Corps should disappear and be replaced by ArmyService Corps India This corps should include those of the existing Supply and Transport Corps personnel whose names will be borne on a special Indian list

(iii) *Maintenance and control of the Corps* —The War Office should maintain up to strength in India the Royal Army Service Corps personnel as fixed by the Government of India but the latter should exercise administrative and financial control over them in India

(iv) *Entry into the Corps* —British officers and other ranks whether employed in India or at home should be borne on the list of the Royal Army Service Corps with the exception noted in sub paragraph (vii) below but in the future officers of the Indian Army should be permitted to enter the Royal Army Service Corps for continuous service in India Such officers should be borne permanently on the establishment of the Army Service Corps India and shown in italics on the home list of the Royal Army Service Corps Their promotion should be regulated by vacancies in the latter corps and they should be entitled to the pensions and other benefits of the Indian Army

Except as provided for above British officers and other ranks should be able to join the Royal Army Service Corps from any regular unit British or Indian at home or abroad on the same conditions as before the war

(v) *Special Indian conditions of service* —Officers should not serve more than five years in India without a period of at least one year on duty at home All officers of the Royal Army Service Corps posted to India for the first time for a tour of service should pass an examination (to include a language test) which would entitle them to a special Indian allowance while serving in India To qualify for command of a unit in India an officer of the Royal Army Service Corps must have completed at least one tour of Indian service

(vi) *Pay* —In view of the fact that the officers of the present Supply and Transport Corps are called upon to spend the whole of their service in India it cannot be reasonably claimed that the rates of pay for the officers of the Royal Army Service Corps under this scheme should be identical with the present rates of the Supply and Transport Corps Their pay should be arranged on the following basis —

(i) British pay of rank, as for the British service in India (*vide* paragraph 24 of Part V)

(ii) Corps pay at English rates expressed in rupees

(iii) Allowance for special qualifications (see sub paragraph (v) above)

(vii) *Transfers of Supply and Transport Corps Officers* —On the introduction of this scheme all officers who are permanently in the Supply and Transport Corps should be permitted within a fixed period to transfer to the Royal Army Service Corps under the following conditions —

(*a*) They will take their place on the Royal Army Service Corps regimental list according to army service

(*b*) They must unconditionally accept the regulations regarding pay promotion service and pensions of the Royal Army Service Corps

Officers of the Supply and Transport Corps who transfer to the Royal Army Service Corps and who on transfer have served more than five years in India (that period being the ordinary tour of foreign service for Royal Army Service Corps officers) should be permitted to reckon their time in India as a tour of foreign service for purposes of the foreign service roster

Officers of the Supply and Transport Corps who do not transfer to the Royal Army Service Corps should be placed on a "special Indian list," and should continue to serve under the present conditions of the Supply and Transport Corps. No fresh admissions should be made to this list, which would gradually disappear.

It is important that the proposed arrangements should not penalise officers of the present cadre of the Supply and Transport Corps in their claims to succeed to the higher appointments of their own corps.

(viii) *Pensions.*—Pensions (except for officers of the Supply and Transport Corps who do not transfer) should be on the British scale.

(ix) *British Subordinate Staff, Supply and Transport Corps.*—The subordinate staff of the Supply and Transport Corps should be placed on a "special list, India," and continue to serve on as non-commissioned officers or warrant officers, Supply and Transport Corps, till the end of their service. No further admissions should be made into this part of the Corps, which will disappear in time. The duties at present carried out by the subordinate staff of the Supply and Transport Corps will be gradually taken over by personnel serving on ordinary Royal Army Service Corps engagements, and receiving a special allowance based on principles similar to that alluded to in sub-paragraph (v).

(x) The Indian establishment of the Supply and Transport Corps should continue to be a local service, forming part of the Army Service Corps, India. Indian officers with the Viceroy's commission might suitably be employed on supply duties.

(xi) It is to be noted that, as all ranks of the Royal Army Service Corps in India will be on their own list and under their own rules, promotion will be by vacancy and not by time, except in cases of lieutenants of 11 years' service.

(xii) The question of a reserve of officers for the Army Service Corps, India, is dealt with in Part VIII of this Report.

Veterinary Service.

16. Before the war, the duties of the Army Veterinary Service in India were limited to the care of animals of the British and non-silladar units. It also supervised generally the arrangements for the care and treatment of all other units. Its control was no doubt extended as the war progressed.

17. The service contained (*a*) a fixed establishment of officers of the Royal Army Veterinary Corps, detailed by the War Office, as in the case of the Royal Army Medical Corps, for tours of service in India; (*b*) a few warrant and non-commissioned officers of the unattached list, *i.e.*, men taken, not from the Royal Army Veterinary Corps, but from mounted units in India who had elected for permanent service in India; and (*c*) a few Indian subordinates; making in all about 90 other ranks. The actual number required even for the limited veterinary services of the Army in peace time amounted to 1,562, and the difference was made good by detailing subordinate personnel from various regimental or corps units.

Such a scheme has the following obvious disadvantages :—

(*a*) Subordinate personnel, *i.e.*, shoeing-smiths (British), syces, line orderlies and transport dressers, detailed for duty in veterinary hospitals, belonged to regimental or corps establishments, and were thus counted as effective twice over. They were not permanently under the veterinary authorities for training or discipline.

(*b*) On mobilization, field veterinary units had to be improvised from such material as might be available. During the war it was found necessary to take men for this purpose with but few qualifications and no training.

18. We have seen a scheme, which is now under the consideration of the Government of India, for the reorganization of the veterinary services in India on the following lines :—

(*a*) One self-contained Army Veterinary Corps to be formed in India, responsible for the veterinary services of the army in India, including the Remount Department, but excluding horse-breeding operations.

(*b*) This Corps to be termed the Army Veterinary Corps, India, and to include both British and Indian personnel, the whole of the latter being enlisted for service in the Army Veterinary Corps, India.

(*c*) This Corps to form the nucleus for expansion on mobilization, and in war to undertake the whole of the veterinary services in the field.

(*d*) The British personnel to be found from the home establishment, and be detailed for service in India on conditions similar to those obtaining in other corps The present continuous service unattached list personnel would be allowed to die out or be absorbed into the Royal Army Veterinary Corps As an alternative it has been suggested that within a fixed establishment, other ranks of the Royal Army Veterinary Corps might be allowed to elect for continuous service in India in which case the absorption of the present unattached list men would be unnecessary

(*e*) Depots for the Army Veterinary Corps, India to be formed for the training of all personnel excepting veterinary assistants who are graduates of veterinary colleges in India, and to perform also all duties connected with recruitment and records

(*f*) The provision of all veterinary medicines necessaries and equipment to be withdrawn from the Indian Medical Service, and with the budget provision, to be controlled by the Veterinary Service alone

The scheme, as outlined above, seems to us to be suitable

19 We consider that the question of the admission of a certain number of duly qualified Indians to commissions in the Veterinary Service in India should not be overlooked The scheme to which we have referred aims at extending the present functions of the Royal Army Veterinary Corps in India so as to provide a trained veterinary service for Indian cavalry and transport corps Such an extension, highly desirable in itself affords an additional reason for opening the superior service in India to Indians possessing the necessary qualifications Moreover the opening out of fresh opportunities should stimulate interest in veterinary work and help to attract educated Indians to a profession for which there is much scope in India

It is understood that the charter of the Royal Army Veterinary Corps like that of the Royal Army Medical Corps provides that only persons of pure European descent can hold officers commissions in the Corps We recommend that the question of removing this restriction be considered, and that Indians, who obtain the necessary professional qualifications by passing successfully through the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons should be allowed to compete on equal terms for admission to the Royal Army Veterinary Corps It would probably be desirable in this case to arrange that Indians thus admitted, should be ear marked for continuous service in India

In any case we recommend that a certain number of appointments in the Army Veterinary Corps India should be reserved for Indians so qualified under conditions similar to those obtaining for Indian officers with the Kings commission serving in the army If in any year the number of Indian applicants for employment in this Corps is in excess of vacancies the appointments should be filled by competition *inter se*

Ordnance Services

20 We recommend that army ordnance duties in India should be performed by British personnel belonging to the Royal Army Ordnance Corps assisted by locally enlisted Indian personnel We suggest that this joint service should be designated the Army Ordnance Corps India

21 The British personnel, both officers and other ranks required for duty in India should be maintained by the War Office and be sent out on tours of duty While in India this personnel would be administered by the Government of India

22 The officers and other ranks now belonging to the Indian Ordnance Department should be permitted to transfer to the Royal Army Ordnance Corps but those who do not transfer should be borne on a special list for promotion

British officers belonging to the Indian Army should, if qualified, be eligible for transfer to the Royal Army Ordnance Corps, but if so transferred they should forfeit all claim to Indian Army allowances and pensions

We consider that the same rules as regards granting commissions from the ranks to British personnel should be in force in India and at home

23 We recommend that pay should be arranged on the following lines —

(*a*) British pay, as for the British service in India

(*b*) Extra pay calculated on a rupee basis, at rates similar to those laid down for corresponding appointments at home

(*c*) A special allowance to officers warrant officers and senior non commissioned officers who have passed an examination including a language test

24. Pensions for British personnel, except in the case of those belonging to the Indian Ordnance Department who do not transfer, should be on the British scale.

Corps of Signals.

25. Under the existing system, the Signal Service in India is maintained by attaching to it, from both British and Indian units, such personnel as are required. These men, however, remain on the strength of their original units.

We consider that this system is unsatisfactory, and that the Corps of Signals in India should correspond as nearly as possible to the Corps of Signals at home, and that personnel should be definitely posted to the Corps.

26. We recommend that this Corps should be constituted on the following general lines:—

(*a*) The Signal Service in India should form a separate Corps and be designated the Corps of Signals, India. It should be composed partly of British and partly of Indian personnel, and should be under an Inspector of Signals, who should be the technical adviser to the General Staff. The corps will require a depôt organization in India.

(*b*) The designation, organization, and where possible the equipment, should be the same for all signal units with both home and Indian formations.

(*c*) There should be a signal training centre or centres in India for the purpose of training officers and other ranks of the Corps of Signals, India, and of assimilating British and Indian methods of training. These centres could function as depôts, and could also undertake the training of instructors and assistant instructors for units other than those belonging to the Corps of Signals.

(*d*) The establishment of British personnel should be maintained by the War Office.

(*e*) Officers, whether belonging to the British service or the Indian Army, should be eligible for tours of duty with the Corps of Signals, India, under the same conditions as are laid down for the Corps of Signals at home. British officers, whilst serving in the corps either at home or in India and belonging to either the British service or the Indian Army, should be allowed to interchange for periods of service. A cadre of officers for permanent service in the Corps of Signals, India, should be maintained.

(*f*) British other ranks should be borne on a fixed establishment and should be sent out to India for duty in the same way as other British troops.

We suggest that promotions up to, but exclusive of, the rank of serjeant should be made within the Indian establishment.

27. The Corps in India should be diluted with Indian personnel, as far as is compatible with efficiency.

28. Appointments to units, as well as higher appointments, should be distributed proportionately amongst officers of the British service and the Indian Army.

An officer of the British service should not, however, get command of a unit unless he has served a previous tour with the Corps of Signals, India, possesses a knowledge of Indian conditions and has passed a language test.

29. Pay should be made up as under:—

(*a*) British pay of rank, as for British officers and other ranks in India.

(*b*) Corps pay, calculated on a rupee basis, at rates similar to those laid down for similar appointments at home.

(c) A special allowance to British service officers, warrant officers and senior non-commissioned officers who have passed an examination, which will include a language test.

(*d*) Indian Army officers should continue to draw the Indian Army allowance.

Telegraph Personnel.

30. The telegraphs in India are managed by the telegraph branch of the Department of Posts and Telegraphs, assisted by 600 military telegraph operators and 100 wireless operators, who, before the war, were attached from British units in India. We recommend that in the future these operators should belong to the Corps of Signals, India, which should be augmented for this purpose.

In the war these 700 operators became available for use by the army in the field, and were under the orders of the Chief Signal Officer a system which proved satisfactory

31 Detailed arrangements concerning depots of stores and personnel limits of responsibility, &c should be worked out in peace time so that officers men transport and stores may be in readiness to move as required at short notice

In order to fulfil these requirements we recommend that one or more suitably organized line of communication battalions should be formed consisting of the military telegraph wireless personnel referred to as well as of selected civilian personnel belonging to the Indian Telegraph Department

We suggest that in peace time military operators should draw from army sources their military rates of pay and corps pay and should receive additional pay from the Telegraph Department according to the nature of their duties

When employed on active service all telegraph personnel should be placed definitely under the orders of the commander in the field

SECTION III

THE MEDICAL SERVICES

3' ... viz the Royal Army Medical (... edical Service which is not onl ... erever employed but also prov ... mpire presents great difficulties

33 If the two services were purely military their unification could be carried out on the lines suggested for services such as the Royal Army Service Corps and the Supply and Transport Corps or the Royal Army Ordnance Corps and the Indian Ordnance Department But the Indian Medical Service though primarily a military service is also the channel of recruitment for the civil medical service The latter contains over 60 per cent of the total personnel of the Indian Medical Service all of whom are liable to recall to military duty It is this double role that has given rise to the serious practical difficulties which have blocked the various attempts made in the past to create a unified service

34 In connection with the general question of a closer union between the British and Indian Armies it has been represented to us by the Secretary of State that the question is nowhere more acute than it is in the case of the Indian Medical Service and the Royal Army Medical Corps but that there are two very great difficulties both of which require earnest consideration The one is that in any Indian medical service there must be room for the growing number of efficient Indian doctors The second is that a military career in India in itself is not sufficient to attract the best doctors and that it is very difficult from the medical point of view to separate the needs of the civil official population from the needs of the army

The first difficulty can be easily solved The proportion of Indians in the Indian Medical Service which was only 7 per cent before the war has steadily risen in recent years and now amounts to over 10 per cent excluding a large number of temporary appointments—some 900 At present permanent recruitment is being carried out in the ratio of one third Indian and two thirds British and there should be no difficulty in maintaining this or some similar ratio of Indians in future

The second difficulty is however more serious

35 The desirability of unification was prominently brought to notice in the recent war when officers trained in two separate organizations had to work in the field side by side Accordingly in January 1919 at the instance of the Secretary of State the Government of India appointed a committee presided over by Sir H Verney Lovett "to examine and report on the question of the reorganization of the medical services in India both civil and military from the standpoint that it is desirable that there should be unified medical service for India

36 At this stage it is desirable to make it clear that the expression unification of the medical services is used in two senses —

(a) By the Government of India the Verney Lovett Committee and the Secretary of State as meaning the unification of the superior military and civil medical services

(*b*.) By the military authorities and the heads of the Royal Army Medical Corps, who are concerned only with the army, as meaning the unification of the two military medical services only.

37. The Verney Lovett Committee proposed the creation of a unified service, to be known as the Indian Medical Corps, which would be responsible for all medical services in India, both civil and military, and would be composed of:—

(*a*) The present Indian Medical Service, supplemented *at the start* by volunteers from the Royal Army Medical Corps.
(*b*) Men selected by the Secretary of State from the present temporary officers of the Indian Medical Service and Royal Army Medical Corps.
(*c*) Candidates from the medical schools in the United Kingdom, to be selected by a half-yearly competitive examination, separate from that for the Royal Army Medical Corps, in which Indian candidates with Indian qualifications would be given special facilities to compete.

This unified service was to displace the Royal Army Medical Corps; and a large portion of the cadre, as in the case of the Indian Medical Service at present, was to be employed in peace time on civil duties under Local Governments. These officers were to be divided into—

(*a*) An ordinary war reserve } both liable to recall to military duty.
(*b*) A special war reserve }
(*c*) All others, who would be liable to recall only in a national emergency, and then only to hold certain posts as specialists or consultants.

Under this scheme, the military and the civil branches of the proposed Indian Medical Corps were to be administered, under the Commander-in-Chief and certain civil departments of the Government of India respectively, by two separate Directors appointed from the Corps. Promotion was to follow the rules in force for the Royal Army Medical Corps, including selection for the post of lieutenant-colonel; and on attaining that rank an officer was to choose finally between (*a*) medical administration (military), (*b*) medical specialisation, (*c*) permanent civil employ.

38. The Verney Lovett Committee recognised that the proposed scheme could not be accepted unless it commended itself not only to the Government of India, but also to the War Office, which is concerned with the proposals in so far as they affect British troops in India and involve the elimination of the Royal Army Medical Corps.

39. Before we discuss the proposals of the Verney Lovett Committee, we must refer to two other schemes. The first, which is advocated by a large body of military opinion as well as by senior officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps, is that the latter should take over medical charge of the whole army in India, leaving the medical care of the civil population to a separate civil medical service.

This scheme is also favoured by a large section of Indian opinion, which desires that the civil medical service should have an entirely separate organization, though it might draw a small portion of its personnel from the military service and its civil members might be made liable for military duty in case of serious emergency. This point of view has been summarized as follows:—

(*a*) Steps should be taken to institute a civil medical service, which would absorb all the civil posts at present held by the Indian Medical Service, and would be recruited from the independent medical profession, the civil medical officers (other than Indian Medical Service), and the Indian Medical Service, the last being restricted to 10 per cent. of the cadre.
(*b*) The Indian Medical Service, which would then be exclusively military, should be recruited by simultaneous competitive examinations, or by separate competitive examinations in India.

This summary expresses the views of those who object to the civil medical services of India being an adjunct of a military service—all the civil personnel being liable to recall in time of war, thereby disorganizing the entire civil medical organization—and who also resent the so-called monopoly of the most highly-paid civil appointments by a service which is primarily military. They see no objection to all the military medical work being taken over by the Royal Army Medical Corps, provided that a certain proportion of Indians are admitted to the latter.

40. But while a unified military and a separate civil medical service are advocated, though for different reasons, both by a large body of military opinion and by certain

Indian politicians, there is we believe on the other hand an important section of Indian opinion which is strongly opposed to the breaking up of the present Indian Medical Service This section advocates a third scheme under which the Indian Medical Service would be retained on the military as well as on the civil side with a personnel of 40 per cent Indians and 60 per cent British officers of the Royal Army Medical *Corps would be attached to the Indian Medical Service* if and when they came on tours of service in India and the present liability of Indian Medical Service officers in civil employ to revert to military duty for which they should keep themselves duly qualified, would be retained

41 An important factor in the problem is the declining popularity of the Indian Medical Service which began in 1909, and which has been more marked in recent years and may be attributed to the following causes —

(*a*) Recent constitutional changes in India which will place the civil medical services in the provinces under the control of Indian Ministers

(*b*) The increased cost of living in India combined with the decrease of opportunities for private practice owing to frequent transfers to the increasing competition of private practitioners and to the regulations restricting fees (which have however recently been relaxed)

(*c*) The difficulty in obtaining leave owing to war conditions and to the service being below strength

(*d*) The paucity of war honours and rewards to Indian Medical Service officers as compared with the sister service This undoubtedly has had a depressing effect on the service, and we believe affords a reasonable ground for complaint

(*e*) General uneasiness as regards prospects

The cumulative result has been a steadily increasing difficulty in obtaining recruits of the right stamp from the medical schools of the United Kingdom This was apparent even before the war but it has been aggravated by the shortage of qualified medical men caused by the war

The Royal Army Medical Corps has apparently been able to supply its own immediate deficiency by selecting for permanent appointment officers who had obtained temporary commissions and done well during the war The Indian Medical Service for one reason or another has been less successful in obtaining British recruits in this manner, and we understand that there is or soon will be (when those whose pension is due are allowed to retire) a shortage of nearly 200 officers in a total cadre of 775 *In fact the Indian Medical Service may now be said to be at the nadir of its* reputation as the Royal Army Medical Corps was some twenty years ago and just as in 1897 the War Office (paragraph 7 Verney Lovett Report) proposed that the duties of the Royal Army Medical Corps in India should be permanently taken over by the military side of the Indian Medical Service the cadre being expanded accordingly so we now find a strong body of opinion advocating the converse proposal that the Royal Army Medical Corps should absorb the military side of the Indian Medical Service, thus securing a unified military service and leading up to the complete severance of the civil medical service

42 The question of the future organization of the Indian Medical Service involves therefore not only military but also *administrative issues of much importance* and requires close examination in both its military and civil aspects

43 We have shown that three separate schemes have been put forward —

(1) That of the Verney Lovett Committee viz the elimination of the Royal Army Medical Corps from India and the creation of a unified Indian Medical Corps to serve both the army and the civil population

(2) The proposal to entrust the medical charge of the Indian Army, as well as of the British Army to the Royal Army Medical Corps thus making the Indian Medical Service a purely civil medical service

(3) The proposal to retain both the Royal Army Medical Corps and the Indian Medical Service, but to split the latter up into *two separate services, the one serving* the Indian Army and the other the civil population

44 We now proceed to discuss these three schemes in their order

We consider that the Verney Lovett Report puts forward the only feasible scheme for a unified military and civil medical service, but we feel unable to support that scheme because it would, after the first selection had been made, *permanently* exclude

the Royal Army Medical Corps from India. Such exclusion would, we believe, adversely affect, especially at the present time, both the large body of British troops in India, whose health has hitherto been so admirably safeguarded by the Royal Army Medical Corps, and the service itself, which would be shut out from the wide field of medical experience that India affords. Moreover, even if those objections were not considered fatal to the Verney Lovett scheme, we believe that the proposed Indian Medical Corps would, certainly for some years to come, find it impossible to provide the full establishment of officers required for British as well as for Indian troops, since it cannot now attract sufficient candidates even for existing needs from the medical schools, and it is most unlikely that under present conditions it would obtain any large numbers of volunteers from the Royal Army Medical Corps.

The other proposals of the Verney Lovett Committee for assimilating the conditions of promotion, study leave, special training, &c., for the two services seem to us generally suitable, and have been adopted in our final recommendations.

45. As regards the second scheme, looking at the problem as purely a military one, there would seem to be no objection in principle, and obvious advantages in practice, in having the same medical organization for the *whole* army in India as for the rest of the Imperial forces. Officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps would, as at present, come to India for tours of duty; but their number in India, now only 320, would have to be increased to over 1,000. It would probably be advisable, in order to encourage the necessary knowledge of Indian languages, customs and conditions, to allow a certain proportion to elect for continuous service, or at least successive tours of service, which in the case of the British element should entitle them to higher rates of pension.

If this scheme were adopted, it would be an essential condition that the Royal Army Medical Corps should be opened to Indians and arrangements made for the admission of a reasonable proportion of Indians.

At the start, officers of the Indian Medical Service, whether civil or military, could doubtless be given the option of joining this expanded Royal Army Medical Corps and of retaining their existing rates of pay, pensions, &c.

46. We cannot, however, recommend this scheme, because, even if the War Office were prepared to allow the admission of Indians to the Royal Army Medical Corps, we see two very serious objections, (*a*) the complete separation of the civil from the military medical service, with the undesirable consequences referred to later. and (*b*) the loss of a reserve of 300 to 400 medical officers, with military training and holding the King's commission, whom the Local Governments would furnish from the civil side in an emergency.

With regard to the latter point, we do not consider that an equally well-qualified reserve could be supplied from the United Kingdom, or from the civil medical services of the provinces, or from a special reserve to be formed from the existing temporary Indian Medical Service officers. We believe that it would be unwise to count on any substantial assistance from the United Kingdom. Expert opinion, too, is doubtful as to the readiness of private practitioners, or of members of the civil medical services in India, to come forward, even if liable by the terms of their engagement; while out of the 900 or more temporary Indian Medical Service officers employed in the war, we understand that only a small proportion have proved themselves so fit for active service as to justify selection for permanent appointments. Nor are we satisfied that under present conditions the Royal Army Medical Corps could provide the 775 British and 300 Indian medical officers estimated to be required for the peace establishment. Finally, such a solution would be unfavourably criticised, unless the present rule restricting admission to the Royal Army Medical Corps to candidates of pure European parentage were abrogated and facilities given for the admission of Indians in reasonable numbers to the Royal Army Medical Corps.

47. Military opinion, as represented to us by many witnesses of high authority and recent experience in the field, was practically unanimous in holding that the Royal Army Medical Corps, owing to its superior organization and military training in peace time, its skilled subordinate personnel (which the Indian Medical Service still lacks), and its capacity for rapid expansion in war, had proved itself on the administrative side more efficient in the field than the Indian Medical Service. It was maintained that the officers of the latter service lacked the necessary training for work in the field, though quite as efficient professionally as the Royal Army Medical Corps in the wards, and also as specialists and consultants. This defect is attributed to their inferior military

training under the antiquated regimental hospital system (now abolished) their ignorance of the principles of military administration in the field and their lack of familiarity with the latest developments of military hygiene of preventive medicine, and of military medical science

48 We believe that the above criticism is generally accurate The responsibility, however does not rest entirely with the Indian Medical Service On its behalf it is urged that its military side has suffered in the past from the fact that the Director of Medical Services in India has always belonged to the sister service and has not been sufficiently alive to the medical needs of the Indian Army or has not pressed them successfully on the Government of India

It is admitted by some of its senior officers that the Indian Medical Service has not in the past received adequate military training and that such defects as came to light on active service were due partly to that cause and partly to the fact that men recalled from civil employ were often employed without reference to their aptitudes and capacity However this may be, it is clear that though in theory a military service the outlook of the Indian Medical Service in the past has been mainly civil and that the best officers have secured civil appointments as early as possible and have lost touch with the military side of their profession They are consequently at a disadvantage when recalled on the outbreak of war or reverted towards the end of their service to hold military administrative appointments We shall endeavour to suggest later how this defect can be remedied

49 As regards the third scheme, namely the organization of a separate military medical service for the Indian Army (the Royal Army Medical Corps being retained for the British Army) and a separate medical service for civil requirements we agree with the Verney Lovett Committee (para 54) that it presents few advantages while it has all the disadvantages consequent upon the separation of the civil medical service from the military medical service It appears that such a division of the Indian Medical Service into two separate services was carried out twice before but on both occasions it was found to be unworkable in practice and the two services were speedily reunited Though such a division might now find favour with a section of Indian opinion we do not think that it merits serious consideration This Corps would be working side by side with the Royal Army Medical Corps an arrangement which would perpetuate all the disadvantages of the present system with little corresponding gain

50 We have referred to the undesirability of forming a separate civil medical service Our view is based on the following considerations —

(1) The separation would probably entail a large increase of expenditure because —

(a) It would be necessary to maintain a larger military cadre in the absence of a trained military reserve

(b) Officers in military employ would have to be paid higher salaries owing to the loss of opportunities on the civil side

(c) Officers on the civil side would have to be paid higher salaries owing to the loss of military rank and of the prestige and protection which it affords

(2) A purely civil medical service would inevitably under the new conditions in India tend to become provincial and would thereby deteriorate in quality

(3) A purely military medical service would probably suffer in efficiency from the lack of the wide experience afforded by civil practice

(4 It would be increasingly difficult to obtain a reasonable proportion of well qualified Europeans in such a service though a strong European element is essential—

(a) For medical attendance on the European servants of Government and their families, who have been led to expect that they will be treated by men of their own race, and whose expectations it is particularly desirable not to disappoint at the present time

(b) For the maintenance of western standards of research efficiency and discipline in the civil medical services of Government

(5) It would be unwise to break up a service which has such fine traditions and has rendered such services to India as the Indian Medical Service

(6) As far as we are in possession of their views both the Government of India and Local Governments are opposed to the creation of a separate civil medical service

51 We have now completed our examination of the three schemes which have been put forward for the reorganization of the medical services in India and have shown

why, in our opinion, none of them is altogether suited to the requirements of the army on the one side and of the civil population on the other.

We have explained that the Verney Lovett scheme for a unified military and civil medical service cannot be recommended, because it involves the exclusion from India (where one-third of the British Army is usually quartered) of the Royal Army Medical Corps; and that the absorption of the military side of the Indian Medical Service by the Royal Army Medical Corps is equally undesirable, because, in addition to many practical difficulties and probable political objections, it would involve the deterioration, and eventually the disappearance, of the Indian Medical Service as an all-India service. We have also indicated grave objections to the third scheme.

52. Having started with the hope of devising a scheme for the amalgamation of the two services into one, we have been reluctantly forced to the conclusion that such amalgamation is impracticable—at least, in present conditions. In connection with the even wider question of the relations between the British and Indian Armies, while aiming at closer liaison, at assimilation of conditions, uniformity of ideals and interchange of officers, we have not thought it desirable, in view of the present and probable future status of India in the Empire, to aim at complete unification or amalgamation.

53. As long as there are separate British and Indian Armies, we see no objection to the continuance of separate medical services for the two armies; but it is essential to eliminate friction and jealousy and to secure as nearly as possible uniformity of training, of methods and of ideals.

54. We hold that in India there is ample scope both for the up-to-date technical training, wide administrative experience and close contact with the latest medical developments which the Royal Army Medical Corps is in a position to supply, and for the special knowledge of Indian epidemics and diseases and the familiarity with local conditions which the Indian Medical Service has peculiar facilities to acquire.

55. We consider that the following proposals, if accepted, will maintain the Indian Medical Service in its position as the premier civil medical service in India, will improve its efficiency as a military service, and will secure more harmonious working and closer co-operation between it and the Royal Army Medical Corps:—

(1) There should be a joint examination, as was formerly the case, for both services in medicine and surgery, the subjects common to both. Candidates for the Indian Medical Service should take in addition the extra subjects, indicated in the syllabus to the Verney Lovett report, which are considered necessary for that service.

(2) The commissions for successful candidates should in both cases bear the same date, which might be that either of their joining, or passing out from, the Royal Army Medical Corps College, Millbank.

(3) There should be joint preliminary training, as at present, at Millbank; but Indian Medical Service Officers between five and ten years' service should, like Royal Army Medical Corps officers, return to Millbank for subsequent courses, till such time as adequate facilities for such training are provided in India. We agree with the Verney Lovett Committee as to the need of providing such facilities.

(4) The rules and the periods of service for promotion up to the rank of major should be similar for both services.

(5) No Indian Medical Service officer should be eligible for civil employ till he has completed at least two years' service on the military side, and has been certified by the Director Medical Services as fully qualified on that side.

(6) The selection of officers for civil employ should be made by a Board, consisting of the Director-General Indian Medical Service as President, the Director Medical Services, and not more than two lay members to be nominated by the Government of India.

(7) An Indian Medical Service officer should select finally between military and civil employ in his 16th year of service; and if he elects for, and is finally posted to, civil employ, he should be debarred from further military employ, except as in (9) (*c*) below, and from higher rank than that of lieutenant-colonel, to which he would rise automatically under the time-scale for the time being in force.

(8) Promotion to lieutenant-colonel for Indian Medical Service officers in military employ should be subject to selection, as in the case of the Royal Army Medical Corps.

(9) Officers in civil employ shall be classified as:—

(*a*) Ordinary war reserve—up to ten years' total service.
(*b*) Special war reserve—up to sixteen years' total service.
(*c*) All others.

Officers in category (*a*) would be liable to recall to military duty in an ordinary emergency, and those in (*b*) only in a greater emergency

Officers in category (*a*) and (*b*) should be required to keep up their military training by periodical return to duty with troops, a period of three months every three years is suggested Officers in class (*c*) should only be recalled in a very serious emergency, for work as specialists and consultants, subject to the sanction of the administrations under which they are serving and to the extent agreed upon They should, on recall be given suitable temporary rank on the analogy of the private practitioners employed by the War Office during the war

(10) Officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps should be posted to India in the various grades for tours of duty as at present, and should be entitled to a reasonable share in the higher military administrative appointments

(11) In view of the fact that the Director Medical Services is the head of both the military medical services the post should be held by an officer of the Army Medical Service and the In[illegible]

(12) Exchang[illegible] Medical Corps and the Indian Medical Service sh[illegible]

(13) Interchange of duties between officers of both services, *e g*, charge of British and Indian station hospitals field ambulances on manœuvres, &c should be encouraged

(14) If a fixed proportion of Indians be recruited for the Indian Medical Service, that proportion should be *maintained in the military* and civil branches

(15) On the analogy of other Indian services, the pay of the Indian Medical Service should be substantially higher than that of the Royal Army Medical Corps when employed in India This is necessary in order to attract recruits to the Indian Medical Service Similarly, the Indian Medical Service pensions should be on a higher scale

SECTION IV

Engineer Services

A —Functions

56 In India the Director General of Military Works is responsible for all duties in connection with the Military Works Services He is also *ex officio* inspector of engineer units and of pioneer battalions as regards their technical training It is doubtful, however, whether even before the war he had the time, or a sufficiently intimate knowledge of details to perform the functions of an inspecting officer satisfactorily in addition to his other duties During the war in 1916 an Inspector of Engineers and Pioneers was appointed to relieve the Director General of Military Works of his inspection duties As his duties during the war were limited to those of inspection the question of studying engineering in connection with operations of war still remains to be developed To attain this object we have suggested in Part II the appointment of a senior officer of the Royal Engineers who shall be the means by which the training of field engineer units is co ordinated

57 In addition to the usual duties in the field for which engineer personnel is required, there are various technical services required either in peace or war whose recruitment from or affiliation with engineers must be considered These services are —

Transportation, Signal Telegraph Postal Survey and Map Production Printing Searchlight Meteorological Forestry, Quarrying Camouflage, and Gas

58 We consider that many of these services should be classified as engineers and we make the following recommendations —

(*a*) Transportation units for the construction of railways ropeways, &c, require personnel of the engineering professions, and we are of opinion that construction units should therefore be engineers The personnel for operating railways, ropeways, &c, are not strictly speaking engineers, but, as operation cannot be a separate organization from construction, we consider that all transportation units employed in peace or war should be engineers

As regards railways there are in existence certain regular companies of Railway Sappers and *Miners which have in peace* time been suitably employed under the Railway Board For work *in the more* forward areas in war we recommend the employment of these companies, increased by railway specialist personnel, who should

be maintained on a reserve basis in peace time, so as to form one or more railway reserve battalions. We consider that in peace these railway companies should be given constant employment in railway construction, in order to maintain their efficiency. If so employed, they are comparatively cheap units to maintain, because the work done by them is assessed at contractors' rates, and is credited to the army budget.

(b) The postal department is a branch of the Department of Posts and Telegraphs. In war, such personnel as are required are placed at the disposal of an army in the field, and should be placed definitely under the orders of the army commander. There would not appear to be any necessity to classify the postal personnel as engineers.

(c) We consider that units of the following services should continue to be engineers :—survey and map production, printing in forward areas, and searchlight.

(d) Meteorological personnel should be found by the Royal Air Force.

(e) Personnel of units required in war for forestry, quarrying, camouflage and gas should be engineers.

General employment of R.E. officers.

59. Prior to 1914 more Royal Engineer officers were employed in Military Works than in any other engineering service, almost all the high appointments open to them being in this branch. The experience gained in the war has led to the increase in the number of field engineer units, many of which are of recent creation ; and we consider that in the future more attention should be paid to the training of engineers for field duties than in the past, and that experience in these duties should be a necessary qualification for the higher engineer appointments.

We are also of opinion that, though much of the training in the Military Works branch is beneficial to an officer in war, a considerable portion of it is of little value from a military point of view, and could adequately be performed, especially in areas of minor military importance, by some civil agency such as the Public Works Department.

In view, however, of the fact that under the Reforms Scheme certain works may be entrusted to local bodies, we are strongly of opinion that no work of imperial importance should be handed over to these bodies, and that no Royal Engineer officers should be placed under their orders.

B.—Organization.

Engineers and Pioneers.

60. In the foregoing paragraphs we have recorded our views as to the general functions of the engineer services. Before we consider how these services should be organized in order to perform adequately these functions, we desire to state our opinion on the question of the amalgamation or otherwise of engineers and pioneers in Indian divisions.

In approaching this question, we have noted the recommendation made by the Committee presided over by Lord Rawlinson, which considered the amalgamation of these services at home to be desirable. In India, however, the conditions are different. Firstly, some of the pioneer battalions are of long standing, with old and cherished fighting records, and deserve to be treated differently to pioneer battalions of the home organization, which were formed only after the commencement of the recent war. There are consequently grave objections, from a sentimental point of view, to amalgamation. Secondly, at home all recruits belong to one homogeneous race ; in India, in order to get enough men, it is necessary to draw from many different races and different castes men who will not intermingle, and have to be enlisted for different classes of work. Thirdly, the disposal of pioneer officers, if amalgamation is decided on, would present great difficulty ; their technical training is not sufficient to admit of their commanding engineer units, and their replacement by Royal Engineer officers would cause inconvenience and expense to the State. Lastly, during the recent war engineers and pioneers in Indian divisions have worked together as a whole or by companies, under the orders of the Commanding Royal Engineer of their division, to the satisfaction of all concerned. The sapper and miner companies provided the skilled, and the pioneer the semi-skilled, portion of the personnel required for the work in hand, and their combined work produced good results.

While, therefore, we realise the advisability of similarity in home and Indian organization, we are of opinion that in India it is neither necessary nor advisable to amalgamate pioneers and engineers

We also consider that the primary rôle of pioneer units should be efficiency in pioneer work and their secondary role that of infantry and we recommend that the footnote on p 18, Field Service Regulations 1914, Part I be revised accordingly

61 We recommend that the Commanding Royal Engineer of an Indian division in war should have at least the rank of colonel that the divisional battalion of pioneers should be placed under his orders and that his engineer field companies should consist of three companies of sappers and miners In the pre war organization of an Indian division only two sapper and miner companies were allotted and the experience of the war has shown that a third company is essential We are further of opinion that the total strength and composition of engineers and pioneers in a division in war should approximate to the total number of Royal Engineers decided on in the war establishments of a division at home and that the present strength of a sapper and miner company requires an increase both in officers and men both in peace and war

We lay stress upon the desirability of training engineer and pioneer units together in peace, though it is realized that owing to lack of accommodation this can be arranged in only few commands All these units should be employed as much as possible on work that is remunerative to the State

Army Engineer Units

62 We consider that the question of the various engineer units to be maintained either in peace or war does not come within the terms of our reference and that this subject should be dealt with locally At the same time we desire to emphasise the fact that the army in India should be provided adequately both with those engineer units whose maintenance in peace has become necessary and also with the cadres of such other units as will be required on mobilization

Nomenclature

63 In view of the variety of units performing engineer work we consider that the term ' Sappers and Miners is inapplicable to all and we suggest a more comprehensive term such as Indian engineers the words ' Sappers and Miners being added in brackets after those units which belong to that branch The following are specimens of the designations suggested —

3rd Field [illegible] and Miners)
B Railway [illegible]
1st Search [illegible]
4th Base Park Company, Indian Engineers

Depot Organization

64 [illegible] are at present organized into three separate corps with headquar[illegible] Bangalore each corps having originally been formed to [illegible] in the provinces of Bengal, Bombay and Madras respectively Their retention as separate corps is due to caste and enlistment necessities Each corps has its own depôt establishment, instructional schools and workshops The strength of each corps has been enormously expanded to meet the requirements of war and in our opinion, these corps will be fully occupied in providing such field companies, field troops and bridging trains as will be required in future by the army in India These Sapper and Miner corps will not be competent to provide in addition a depot organization for other engineer units and we consider that at least two more depôts are required, namely —

(a) For railway units
(b) For special engineering services such as electric light personnel, electrical and mechanical units, survey units litho photo and printing sections, camouflage units, engineer park companies, works battalions &c

Organization at Army Headquarters and in Commands, &c.

65. In Part II we recommend that, in the organization at Army Headquarters, the field engineer training should be co-ordinated by a senior Royal Engineer officer affiliated to the General Staff, and that the Military Works Services should become a directorate under the Quartermaster-General. In Commands, however, we consider that it is desirable to have a chief engineer, who would be responsible for the training within his Command of engineer and pioneer units, and for the execution of military works and the financial responsibility in connection therewith. For carrying out the Works duties he should be assisted by district or area engineer commanders. Where necessary, he should also have under his orders an organization for issuing engineer stores, which could on mobilization develop into an engineer base park. In lower formations, we recommend that Commanding Royal Engineers should be freed as much as possible from duties in connection with the Military Works Services, in order to enable them to pay proper attention in peace to the training of the engineer and pioneer units under their orders.

Decentralisation of Responsibility.

66. Within Commands the financial responsibility for engineer works should, as far as possible, be delegated to Chief Engineers, so as to admit of a greater amount of inter-departmental correspondence on technical matters, and thereby to relieve general officers commanding of much clerical work.

67. We also suggest that the system of administering the Barrack Department might be made similar to that at home.

SECTION V.

Closer Co-operation in Training and Military Education between the Home and Indian Armies.

68. In order that the systems at home and in India may be organized on similar lines, the following conditions should be observed as far as possible:—

(*a*) Similarity in the organization of the General Staff and in the distribution of its duties at the War Office and at Army Headquarters, India.

(*b*) Similarity in the conduct of staff duties, in the application of the principles of war during training, and in war establishments.

(*c*) Similarity of organization, syllabus, and system of training at the Camberley and Quetta Staff Colleges, and at other military educational establishments.

69. As regards 1 (*a*), we understand that the proposals under consideration by Army Headquarters, India, for the organization of the General Staff are so similar to what is understood to be the system of training and military education at the War Office that uniformity between these two headquarters is assured.

70. As regards 1 (*b*), we have been informed that Army Headquarters, India, have already accepted in principle the proposals on the subject of loans, attachments and interchanges of officers and other ranks, formulated by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff on the 15th November, 1919. We recommend that these proposals be put into effect, not only by interchange with the army at home, but also with those of the self-governing Dominions.

71. As regards 1 (*c*), one result of the recent war has been to assimilate the systems of training at all military educational establishments. For the future, all that appears to be required is to put into operation the scheme, which has already been accepted in principle, for interchange of instructors at the Staff Colleges and at other educational establishments.

72. To promote the close assimilation of training methods, it is essential that constant communication should take place between the War Office and Army Headquarters, India, regarding new proposals affecting organization and training.

SECTION VI

APPOINTMENTS

73 We have been [illegible]
British service and [illegible]
and staffs The al[illegible]
conventions on the subject has caused us considerable difficulty Appendix XXII to Army Regulations India Volume II purports to supply this information in tabular form but much of the information is out of date and the qualifications laid down are, in our opinion sometimes unsuitable We therefore attach a table in which we include the alterations that we *suggest*

74 We do not regard as within the scope of our deliberations the question of the actual distribution of staff appointments and commands as between the British service and the Indian Army We feel however, that unless a fair proportion of these high appointments is reserved for officers of the Indian Army its advantages as a career will be appreciably diminished Under existing practice if the Commander in Chief [illegible] his three principal staff officers (C G S A G Q M G) [illegible] We consider that this practice should be maintained, [illegible] ler in Chief belongs to the Indian Army two of the principal staff officers should come from the British service We note with satisfaction that the War Office agrees that a due proportion of the appointments open to major *generals in countries* other than India where Indian troops are *serving* should be allotted to officers of the Indian Army We consider that this principle should be extended to commands above the rank of lieutenant-colonel and to staff appointments

A —COMMANDS

Appointment	Present (*vide* A R I Vol II App XXII)		As proposed by the Army in India Committee		
	Nominating and sanctioning authorities	Qualifications	Nominating and sanctioning authorities	Qualifications	Remarks
Commander in Chief	Nothing laid down		The Cabinet on the nomination of the Secretary of State for War in consultation with the Secretary of State for India		The tenure should be for 4 years
Army Commander	( ) War Office with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for India in the case of an *officer of the* British service (1) Secretary of State for India on the nomination of the Government of India in the case of an officer of the Indian service	•	( ) In the case of an officer of the [illegible] service the Secretary of State for War with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for India ( ) In the case of an officer of the Indian Army the Secretary of State for India on the nomination of the Government of India and with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for War	Not below the rank of lieutenant general	
District Commanders and all commands tenable by officers of the rank of major general	(1) War Office with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for India in the case of an officer of the British service ( ) Viceroy on the nomination of the C in C in the case of an officer of the Indian service	• (1) (?)	As in the case of Army Commander	Major general	
Brigade Commander	( ) War Office after consultation with the C in C in the case of major generals of the British service ( ) Viceroy on the nomination of the C in C in the case of Indian Army officers and of officers of the British service (with the concurrence of the War Office when not on the Indian establishment)	• (1) ( ) (3a) (?)	( ) In the case of officers *of the British service* the War Office with the concurrence of the C in C ( ) In the case of officers of the Indian Army the Government of India on the nomination of the C in C	Not below rank of [illegible] and not over [illegible] years of age	

B—Staff Appointments.

No.	Appointment.	Present (*vide* A.R.I., Vol. II, App. XXII). Nominating and sanctioning authorities.	Present. Qualifications.	As proposed by the Army in India Committee. Nominating and sanctioning authorities.	As proposed. Qualifications.	As proposed. Remarks.
5	Chief of the General Staff.	Secretary of State for India (with the concurrence of the War Office in the case of an officer of the British service) on the nomination of the Government of India.	*, (1)	As for the C.-in-C.	Two of these three should not belong to the same service as the C.-in-C., and their rank should ordinarily not be lower than lieut.-general.	The C.G.S. should receive the same pay and allowances as an Army Commander. If major-generals are appointed, they should be given the temporary rank of lieutenant-general.
6	Adjutant-General in India.	(as above)	*, (1), (2), (9), or (12), (25)	As in the case of Army Commanders.	(as above)	
7	Quartermaster-General in India.	(as above)	*, (1), (2), (9), or (12), (25)	As in the case of Army Commanders.	(as above)	
8	Director of Medical Services in India.	(i) War Office with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for India, in the case of an officer of the British Service. (ii) Government of India, in the case of an officer of the Indian Service. N.B.—Before any officer is nominated on the occurrence of a vacancy, the Government of India will report the vacancy to the Secretary of State for India with their opinion whether it should be filled from the British or Indian Service, and the Secretary of State for India will decide this question in consultation with the Army Council.	(23), (*y*)	As in the case of Army Commanders.	Rank not below major-general.	To be held alternately by an officer of the R. A. M. C. and I.M.S.
9	Secretary Military Department, India Office.	Not included	None laid down	Secretary of State for India, on the recommendation of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.	Officer of the Indian Army not below rank of major-general.	
10	Major-general in charge of administration. (Commands.)	Not included ...	None laid down	As in the case of Army Commanders.	Major-General.	
11	Military Secretary ...	Commander-in-Chief ...	*, (2), (*d*)	Government of India, on the nomination of the Commander-in-Chief.	Officer of the Indian Army not below the rank of colonel or brevet-colonel.	Same tenure as for other staff officers. Title to be Military Secretary, Army Headquarters.
12	Bdr.-General, Gen. Staff.	Viceroy (with the concurrence of the War Office in the case of an officer of the British Service not on the Indian Establishment) on the nomination of the Commander-in-Chief.	(1), (2), (8), (26)	As in the case of Army Commanders.	To follow the practice obtaining at home.	
13	Bdr.-General in charge of administration.	None laid down	None laid down	As in the case of Brigade Commanders.	Ditto.	
14	Directors at A.H.Q.— (*a*) Director of Supplies and Transport.	Viceroy (with the concurrence of the War Office in the case of an officer of the British Service) on the nomination of the Commander-in-Chief.	(2), (15)	(as above)	(as above)	
	(*b*) Dir.-Gen. Ordnance.	Viceroy, on the nomination of the Commander-in-Chief.	(2), (14), (*d*)	(as above)	(as above)	
	Dir.-Gen. Mily. Works.	(as above)	(2)	(as above)	(as above)	
	Dir.-Gen. Army Remount Dept.	(as above)	(15)	(as above)	(as above)	
	Dir. Army Clothing.	(as above)	(3), (15), (*a*)	(as above)	(as above)	

No	Appointments	Present (vide A R I, Vol II App XXII)		As proposed by the Army in India Committee		
		Nominating and sanctioning authorities	Qualifications	Nominating and sanctioning authorities	Qualifications	Remarks
	(c) Dir Mily Operations Dr Staff Duties Dir Mily Training Dep Adj Gen Dep Qr Mr Gen	C in C (with the approval of the War Office in the case of an officer of the British Service not on the Indian establishment)	*, (1), (2), (8) (24)	As in the case of Brigade Commanders	To follow the practice obtaining at home	
	(d) Dir of Farms Dir of Ord Inspection Dir of Ord Stores Other Directors not shown	C in C	(2), (8) (15), (e) (2), (14), (d), (e) (2), (14), (d), (e)			
15	(a) G S O 1 A A G A Q M G	C in C (with the concur		for Brigade Commanders	Ditto	
	(b) D D M S A D M S at A H Q D D E and O S D D G M W	C in C	(30) (31) Nothing laid down (2), (e)	Ditto	Ditto	

QUALIFICATIONS UNDER APPENDIX XXII A R I, VOL II

* Open to officers of the British service on the Imperial establishment

(1) Not tenable by an officer on the cadre of a corps

(2) Rank not below colonel

(3) Rank not below major

(8) Not over 54 years of age

(8a) Not over 54 years of age but major generals of the British service may be appointed up to the age of 55, and such officers will vacate at the age of 58 or on completion of four years tenure whichever is earlier

(9) Five years' service in India

(9a) Five years' service in India, but for the purpose of this rule one year s service in India in the rank of field officer counts as two years' service in a lower rank

(12) Three years' service in India as a regimental field officer who has during a campaign in India—

- (a) commanded a regiment of cavalry, a battery of artillery or a battalion of infantry or
- (b) served on the staff as a field officer, provided that a medal was granted for such campaign or that the officer was honourably mentioned in despatches

(14) British service officer

(15) Officer of the Indian Army.

(23) Ordinarily from the British service, but the Government of India may nominate an officer of the Indian Medical Service

(24) Higher Standard Hindustani

(25) Lower Standard Hindustani

(26) *Higher Standard Hindustani, but when the G O C Army is an officer of the Indian service, the Lower Standard only in Hindustani is required*

(30) Indian Medical Service officer

(31) One each from Royal Army Medical Corps and Indian Medical Service

(a) Appointments to the Clothing Department will be for three years in the first instance Tenure not limited

(d) Five years' tenure

(e) May be held by a lieutenant colonel

(g) The tenure of this appointment by a surgeon general of the British service is unlimited, while that of I M S officers is limited to five years (counting from the date from which the full consolidated salary has been continuously drawn unless reappointed for a second tour of duty), subject in all cases to vacation at the prescribed age limit

CHAPTER III.

AFTER RANJIT SINGH 1838–1848

State of *Afghanistan* Dost Mohammed—Persia and Russia—A buffer-state—British resolve to restore Shah Shujah—Defence of Herat against the Persians—Restoration of Shah Shujah—Annihilation of the British force at Kabul—Disastrous effect on the native mind—Annexation of Scinde—Maharajpore—*Punjab*: the reputed sons of Ranjit Singh—The Jammu brothers—The Sikh army and the Punchayets—Dhian Singh and Shere Singh—Insubordination of the Khalsa—Murder of Maharajah Shere Singh and Dhian Singh.

It has been made sufficiently clear by the foregoing narrative that Afghanistan proper in the "thirties" was in a condition of very grave disorder.

This had been the case from the time when the great Barukzai, Futteh Khan, was murdered by order of Kamran, the heir of the throne, at Herat. Since that time Kamran had maintained himself in the governorship of Herat. At Kabul, Mohammed Azim, and after his death his brother Dost Mohammed, had established themselves as the real heads of Afghanistan. Another group of the Barukzai brothers ruled Kandahar, while another couple governed Peshawur, paying tribute to Kabul or to Lahore as circumstances demanded. As Dost Mohammed gradually emerged into the leading position amongst the brothers, he attempted to assert a more definite supremacy, adopted for himself the title of Amir, and attempted, unsuccessfully, as has been related, to wrest Peshawur from the grip of Ranjit Singh. The Amir, however, was virtually the head of the main part of the Afghan state, while Kamran, the

lineal descendant of Ahmed Shah, and nephew of the exile Shah Shujah, reigned at Herat.

It was during the thirties that the shadow of Russian advance in Central Asia began to fall upon the political prospect as viewed by Indian statesmen. The indifference —to use no stronger term—of the rulers of the British Empire at Westminster, had allowed Persia to enter unsupported on a conflict with Russia, with the result that the Shah found promise of greater advantage to himself in alliance with that power than in dependence on backing from Great Britain. Dreams began to be formed of another great Mussulman invasion, under the ægis of Russia. The Shah, in the eyes of a vast body of Mohammedans, is the head of Islam. If Afghanistan fell under his sway, he would be at the gates of India; the Mussulmans of the Peninsula would rise at his call. The Hindus might very well seize the opportunity to fling off the yoke of their Western masters and take their chance of preventing a complete Mussulman domination to follow; and with Russia behind to back them up, the thing looked as if it might be worth trying for, at any rate. That appeared to be the Persian point of view.

Russia certainly encouraged the Shah's dreams; certainly, also, she made considerable efforts to obtain for herself the favour, and for the British the disfavour, of Dost Mohammed. Whether, as a matter of fact, she had India in view for herself is a question of minor importance. She may merely have desired to keep the British in a state of convenient embarrassment while she prosecuted other designs of extension. Whatever her real ultimate intentions were, her actions were at any rate calculated to rouse serious suspicions, to cause grave uneasiness, and to considerably disturb the mental equilibrium both of the Eastern Mussulman world and of the British governors of so many Mussulman subjects. That anything in the nature of an actual Russian invasion was quite impracticable did not

remove the present source of danger, which was that of a Mohammedan upheaval encouraged by the expectation, however vain, of Russian support. Then, as now, the real danger from Russia was not the fear of Cossack invaders, but of the influence on the native mind created by the belief that in case of invasion or rebellion Russia would throw her weight into the scale against the British.

Thus the rulers of India had to decide whether they were to allow the whole of the country beyond the passes to be in the hands of hostile governments, relying on the Lahore state—friendly and definitely anti-Mussulman as it was under Ranjit Singh—to check any aggressive movement, or whether they should not rather secure the co-operation, in the character of a buffer, of the Afghans, thus retaining a large and, from a military point of view, important section of Mohammedans on their own side. The decision was that Afghanistan should be secured as a buffer-state.

It appears quite certain that this programme would have found an adherent in Dost Mohammed The Amir showed quite plainly that he would prefer a British to a Russian alliance, and had no inclination to recognise Persia as paramount. His quarrel with Ranjit Singh about Peshawur was, *primâ facie*, a serious matter, since the Punjab would have to be included in any alliance, but the Dost seemed willing to accept, as the price of British support, an arrangement which would have satisfied the Maharajah Yet, for whatever reason, the Indian Government refused to trust Dost Mohammed, and came to the conclusion that the most effective plan would be to restore Shah Shujah to the throne of Kabul by Ranjit Singh's assistance. The theory appears to have been that Shah Shujah would be much more completely under British control than the Dost was likely to be, and that Ranjit Singh would get a more agreeable bargain out of him.

Three objections to this plan were overlooked. The

Maharajah wanted nothing more than the Amir was prepared to concede. If Peshawur was held as tributary to him, that suited him rather better than having to garrison it as an outpost of his own, because the Sikh soldiers loathed the place. Secondly, he did not want an Afghan king who should merely be a puppet of the British Power. Thirdly, the question how Shah Shujah was to be kept on the throne when he had been put there was left out of count. A fourth consideration may be added, that Shah Shujah wanted to be reinstated, but not by British arms.

While the expedition was being decided upon, and Ranjit Singh's unwilling concurrence obtained, the Persians descended upon Herat (1838). Chiefly owing to the exertions and enterprise of a young Englishman, Eldred Pottinger, who succeeded in obtaining virtual control of the operations, the defence was brilliantly conducted; a grand assault was triumphantly driven back; and, in spite of the assistance of Russian officers, and the energetic encouragement of the Russian minister at Teheran, Herat continued to hold out, until the Shah and his troops took fright at the rumour of a great British invasion, made terms, and withdrew.

When the siege of Herat was raised, the popular scare of a great Mohammedan invasion disappeared, and the idea that Russia for the present meant to do anything more than make a catspaw of Persia was removed. But the feeling remained that a repetition of similar proceedings must be guarded against, and the plan of reinstating Shah Shujah was persisted with. Ranjit Singh drew the line at allowing a large British army to march through his territories, and the main expedition had to go by way of Scinde and Beluchistan. There were plenty of difficulties in the way of commissariat, but none of importance in the way of fighting; Kandahar and Ghuzni were taken, and Shah Shujah was set up in Kabul. Dost Mohammed could offer n resistance, being very generally deserted; and, after havi

been victorious in a skirmish, the Amir felt that he could surrender with honour, and did so in preference to carrying on a struggle which he saw was hopeless.

Now, however, it became clear that Shah Shujah had been restored by British bayonets, and that nothing but British bayonets would keep him on his throne. The disastrous termination of the great expedition need not here detain us. It is enough to say that with every month of our occupation of Kabul the discontent of the Afghans, and their hatred of the English, rose higher and higher There is no word to be said in palliation of the flagrant mismanagement of the British officers. At last the natives rose, several prominent Englishmen were murdered, and it may roughly be said that the great Kabul garrison was annihilated. At Kandahar and at Jellalabad the honour of the British arms was maintained, and Pollock's brilliant conduct of the relieving force went far to retrieve the British reputation. But it is impossible to escape the fact that the most notable characteristic of the attempt to reinstate Shah Shujah—who, it may be mentioned incidentally, was murdered in the course of the proceedings—was gross mismanagement of an ill-conceived policy, and the chief result that followed was an immediate loss of prestige, and a revival in the native mind, and—which most affects us in this narrative—in the Sikh mind in particular, of the belief that the British were by no means invincible after all, that Ranjit Singh, now dead, had exaggerated the power of England.

Happily, at the time, the Sikh Government still adhered to the British alliance, and not only allowed a free passage to Pollock's force through the Punjab to the front, but furnished a contingent of troops which aided the Pass itself, and further permitted the return of the British troops by the same route to Ferozepore.

Had the Sikh army turned against us whilst Pollock was still in the Afghan passes, the situation would indeed

have been critical. Good fortune, not wisdom or forethought, saved our Indian Empire from disaster.

It is, in fact, by no means easy to gauge the extent of the dangers due to that most disastrous episode. An impetus was given to the idea that, after all, the British advance might be stayed, and the British mastery overthrown, which might easily have led to a very serious native combination. The Punjab, released from the strong hand of its great chief, was becoming restive; anti-British feeling was rapidly increasing in the army, and the army would not be long in learning that it could control the state. Outside the Punjab, the Scinde Amirs were suspected of anti-British designs; and although no tolerable colour for the charge was ever produced, it served as a pretext for one of the few inexcusable acts of aggression in our career in India, and Scinde in the beginning of 1843 was conquered, annexed, and at any rate put out of the way of doing any mischief. Later in the same year, a short, sharp, and decisive campaign was happily precipitated by the conduct of the rulers of the Mahratta state of Gwalior—happily, for the Sikhs had not yet made up their minds to a war. The Gwalior army was anything but contemptible; the Mahrattas were Hindus, and no religious questions would have complicated a coalition between them and the Sikhs if the outbreak had been delayed. The Gwalior army, however, elected to challenge the British while it stood alone; and ceased to be a dangerous element in the situation after the decisive fight of Maharajpore.* But it is doubtful whether either Mahrattas or Sikhs could have challenged us, had it not been for the disaster of Kabul; it is certain that the successful issue of the Sikh War, when it came, would have been most gravely jeopardised if the Gwalior army had not rushed upon its own destruction two years earlier.

With all Ranjit Singh's abilities, the great Punjab State

* See Appendix I.

which he constructed was left by his death in the common condition of Oriental kingdoms when a brilliant chief has died. He left no successor capable of controlling the turbulent elements which had been held in check under his vigorous government.

It would hardly be unjust to say that the Lahore Court had always been somewhat conspicuously licentious; with the careless licence of a rough warlike people, rather than the elaborate sensuality of the effete courts of the Ganges states. One result in Ranjit Singh's own case was peculiar: he had a good many reputed sons, but out of them all one only, Kharak Singh, was probably in truth his offspring. At any rate, being the only one as to whose relationship to himself Ranjit Singh was really satisfied, Kharak Singh was naturally recognised as the successor to the throne. He was himself almost imbecile, but Nao Nihal Singh, the heir apparent, was a youth of very considerable promise. It was, however, certain that another reputed son of the dead Maharajah, Shere Singh, was inclined to assert claims to the throne if opportunity offered.

It is probable, however, that the most powerful man in the state was the late monarch's minister, Dhian Singh. Dhian Singh and his brother Gholab Singh were not Sikhs, but Rajputs, who had found favour in Ranjit Singh's eyes, and had risen in his service. They had received from him large grants of land, and had been made by him jointly Rajahs of Jammu; in consequence of which they are commonly referred to as "the Jammu brothers." It is probable that these two designed to share the rule of the whole Punjab between them, the plan being that Gholab Singh was to acquire the whole of Jammu, Kashmir, and the north-east generally; while Dhian Singh should rule at Lahore. There was also a third brother, Suchet Singh.

The third great factor in the situation was the Sikh army, of which the special peculiarity was its democratic character; in fact, it may, perhaps, be most easily realised

by the analogy of a trade-union. Apart from the military organisation of officers and men, there was a system of what were called Panchayets, or committees of five chosen by the men, for companies, regiments, and battalions, deriving their form from the prevalent customs of village government. These committees guided the united action of the soldiery, were able to dictate to their officers, and later on found themselves able to appear as representing the Khalsa in arms, and to dictate to the "Durbar," or Court, itself. As yet, however, they did not know their own power. The political aspirants were already aware of the advantage to be derived from having the army with them, but the army itself did not for some time begin to take the initiative. When the army did assert itself, it did so in the name of the Khalsa, and the position presents a closer resemblance to the days when in England the army of the Parliament dictated to the Government, than to any other.

Kharak Singh was accepted as his father's successor; but the control exercised over him by a favourite made Dhian Singh uneasy, and was also eminently unsatisfactory to the heir apparent, Nao Nihal Singh. These two, therefore, to begin with, made common cause, and with the support of Gholab Singh, they put the favourite to death in his master's presence, and virtually established Nao Nihal Singh as chief of the state, with Dhian Singh as minister. This, however, was not a condition of affairs calculated to last long. Nao Nihal considered that the power of the Jammu brothers was too great, and was bent on breaking it. Kharak Singh died; Nao Nihal became Maharajah, but on the day of his accession he met with a fatal accident which the Jammu brothers were very strongly suspected of having deliberately designed.

There was only one man who could reasonably be placed on the vacant throne, and this was Shere Singh, the reputed son of Ranjit Singh. The widow of Kharak Singh, however, asserted her right to the position of regent in the

name of a hypothetical unborn son of Nao Nihal's, and this somewhat curious arrangement was sanctioned. Still Dhian Singh was accepted as minister, while Shere Singh assumed for the time most of the functions, and shortly afterwards the title, of Maharajah. At the same time a party of Sikh chiefs, known as the Sindhanwala family, who were connected ancestrally with Ranjit Singh, stood out as supporters of Kharak Singh's widow

Meanwhile, the attitude of the army was becoming steadily more aggressive, they were under no efficient control, the rulers not venturing to treat them with a strong hand, and the regiments began mutinying and deposing their officers. These disorderly proceedings were brought somewhat emphatically under notice of the British, when, in 1841, Major Broadfoot was escorting the wives and families of Shah Shujah and his brother Zeman Shah across the Punjab from Ludhiana to Kabul, some months before the rising against the British took place in the Afghan capital. This was, no doubt, in part the cause of the mistaken estimate formed at British head-quarters about this time of the real efficiency of the Sikh troops. It does not seem to have been perceived that their mutinous attitude did not signify incapacity for united action, or for the display of thorough discipline in the field. Consequently, the idea appears to have become prevalent that the Sikh soldiery were disorderly and of no great account from a military point of view, though it obviously lay in their power to produce anarchy in the administration of the Punjab, and it was supposed that they were not fully competent to face Afghans, or the Jammu hill men.

On the other hand, this same soldiery was rapidly becoming by no means well inclined towards the British, whose proceedings in Afghanistan meant, in the popular judgment, that they were aiming at extension of empire, would presently encircle the Punjab, and would finally fall upon the Sikhs themselves. The tremendous disaster at

Kabul, and the subsequent evacuation of Afghanistan after the honour of the British arms was deemed to have been sufficiently vindicated, did not wholly efface the popular suspicion, while it went far to encourage a disbelief in that British invincibility which had been a cardinal point in the political creed of Ranjit Singh.

Nevertheless, while Shere Singh's power lasted, he maintained his favourable attitude to the British, and rendered them effective assistance when the final Kabul campaign was in progress. The Sindhanwala chiefs, however, whose support of Kharak Singh's widow had placed them in a very precarious position, were restored to favour partly in consequence of the interposition of the British in their behalf. They resolved to get the government into their own hands, and entrapped Dhian Singh, first into a plot for the assassination of Shere Singh, which was carried out, and then into their own power, when they put him to death as well. This double murder opens the last chapter of the Sikh anarchy; which led directly to the war with the British, of which the first stage is known as the Sutlej Campaign.

CHAPTER IV.

THE SIKH ANARCHY

Dhulip Singh and the Rani—Hira Singh and the army—Hostility to the British—Fall of Hira Singh—Designs of the Rani—Policy of Sir Henry Hardinge—Domination of the Panchayets—Increasing animosity towards the British—Crossing of the Sutlej.

It has already been observed that, in addition to his one undoubted son, Kharak Singh, Ranjit Singh had several reputed sons as well. One of these, the infant Dhulip Singh, was born after the great Maharajah's death. His mother, the Rani Jindan, was young and beautiful, and her character was such that Henry Lawrence named her "the Messalina of the Punjab." There were, at least, very strong grounds for doubting whether Ranjit Singh was really the young Dhulip's father; still, it had already been decided while Shere Singh was ruling at Lahore, that the infant was to be regarded as heir to the throne. The plot between Dhian Singh and the Sindhanwala chiefs had been formed on the hypothesis that Shere Singh was to be removed, and Dhulip Singh to be proclaimed Maharajah—when the minister considered that the absolute necessity of retaining him as practical head of the state would immediately become apparent. The Sindhanwala chiefs, however, had other plans in view, and, as related, followed up the assassination of Shere Singh by that of the minister himself.

Dhian Singh, however, had a son, Hira Singh, a youth of very considerable promise, and some personal popularity,

despite the fact that the Sikhs, the people as well as the chiefs, disliked the power of the Jammu brothers. On hearing of the murder, Hira Singh promptly appealed to the army, making effective use of the argument that the Sindhanwala faction looked to the British for support, and would increase British influence in the Punjab. The army at once marched to Lahore, seized and put to death those of the Sindhanwala family who were there, proclaimed their allegiance to Dhulip Singh, and made Hira Singh Vizier.

Hira Singh, then, was in a very difficult position. The army had placed him in power, and he could not afford to quarrel with them. He had used their anti-British feeling to secure their support, and so was committed to an anti-British policy. Yet, unless he was to be a mere puppet, that army must be brought under control, and its power diminished. At the same time he could not rely upon support from the Sikh chiefs, who were set as a body against the ascendency of the Jammu family, while the Rani Jindan wanted to reign herself through her lovers and her brother Jawahir Singh.

Now, not only was the power of the army very apparent; it was also rapidly bringing the finances of the state into a very awkward condition, as in order to secure its good-will the men's demands for increased pay had to be favourably received. It became clear to Hira Singh and to Pandit Jalla, the finance minister, who largely guided his policy, that the expenditure on the troops would have to be diminished; and that then it would probably become necessary to let them attack the British—a policy which would have the double advantage of gratifying them to begin with, and then, either breaking their power or renewing the prestige of the Government, which stood to win in either event. Movements of troops towards the Sutlej frontier were therefore made which excited the apprehension of the British Government, already perturbed by the obvious weakness of the Punjab rulers, and expectant of a collapse

of the great Lahore State. Responsible British officers were rapidly becoming convinced that it would be no long time before a conquest of the Punjab might become necessary, since a strong government from the Passes to the Sutlej was needed, and if the Sikh state went to pieces, the only alternative to annexation would be the establishment of a Mohammedan power, which it was felt could not be permitted.

Hira Singh's difficulties were increased by the fact that his uncle, Suchet Singh, the third of the Jammu brothers—Gholab Singh avoided Lahore, devoting his attention to the North Eastern Provinces, which he wished to turn into a separate kingdom for himself—was jealous of his power Suchet Singh encouraged two more reputed or adopted sons of Ranjit Singh to revolt, but was himself killed in attempting to win over the army, and so displace his nephew.

Out of this revolt arose two matters which the anti-British party in the Punjab were able to seize upon and turn to account in fomenting hostile feeling One of the Sindhanwala chiefs, who had taken refuge in British territory, was allowed to return over the frontier to join the revolting sons of Ranjit Singh—an improper proceeding, of which the Lahore Government was quite justified in complaining. Also, Suchet Singh had left a considerable treasure in the protected states, and the decision of the British Government as to the disposition of this treasure, though proper enough according to English notions of inheritance, was unsatisfactory to the Punjab "Durbar" or Court, which held that the property ought to be confiscated to the state.

Hira Singh appears to have brought sufficient skill and
energy to the problem before him to have effected con-
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assassinatio...
himself. He was obliged to summon the officers and
Dhian Sing...em the necessity for a reduction in expen-
of very considera... position was so clear that they were

compelled to admit the need. The Rani, however, went not to the officers but to the men, and roused their disaffection. The crisis came when some 500 men were discharged in a body. The Rani sent messages to the soldiery, charging Hira Singh and his party with treasonous designs, and throwing herself and the boy Maharajah on their protection. The men declared themselves on her side. Hira Singh and Pandit Jalla, seeing that as far as Lahore was concerned the game was already lost, at any rate for a time, fled in the direction of Jammu, probably hoping to reinstate themselves by the aid of the hill troops and Gholab Singh; but before they had gone far they were overtaken and slain, fighting desperately.

The fall of Hira Singh left the Rani Jindan and her favourites without personal rivals for the time being: her brother Jawahir Singh, a drunken debauchee, was appointed Vizier. But from this time the army scarcely made any pretence of owning allegiance to the Court. The Panchayets gave it to be understood that the Khalsa was supreme, that the Government must obey orders, and that the Rani, and even the Maharajah were where they were merely by grace of the soldiery. It became, therefore, the policy of the Court, which felt itself powerless in the hands of the Panchayets, to devise means of destroying, or else satisfying the army itself; and the plan adopted was that foreshadowed by Pandit Jalla. The Khalsa was to be urged to challenge the British. If it were shattered, the Court would be rid of its masters; if triumphant, the Court would claim the credit.

There were, indeed, some few of the Sikh Sirdars who were alive to the danger of the programme. They had appreciated the wisdom of Ranjit Singh, and could understand the obvious truth that if the army marched against the British and was beaten, the British could scarcely help assuming the government themselves, and there would be an end of the Sikh State.

Anxious as was the British Government to avoid creating needless suspicions, which would only hasten a *dénouement* which it was desired, if possible, to escape; the condition of the Sikh frontier made it absolutely imperative that Ludhiana and Ferozepore should be prepared for an emergency, and that everything should be in train for the advance of troops in case of a crisis. Nothing, indeed, was done which the circumstances did not positively demand in the judgment of the military authorities; and far less than they considered (justifiably enough, as the event proved) requisite for security; nevertheless, exaggerated reports did reach the Sikhs, who were already quite prepared to believe that the British were designing an invasion. On the other hand, the proceedings of the Sikh army were such that a very heavy demand was made on the moderation and caution of the Governor-General, and of Major Broadfoot, the political Agent, to stave off an outbreak. The Sikhs claimed that the presence of so large a body of British troops as was stationed at Ludhiana and Ferozepore was a menace to them, and was a breach of the true relations between the states; on the ground that the Cis-Sutlej estates of the Maharajah (which in our view, and in Ranjit Singh's practice, had been hitherto held not as part of the Lahore state, but in just the same way as other protected states of Malwa) were only under British control so far as was necessary for what may be called police purposes; and a right was asserted to send Sikh troops thither, which Ranjit Singh had himself not pressed. Whereas it was maintained by us that if Sikh troops crossed the Sutlej in arms on any pretence, they must either be accounted as rebels against the Lahore Government, or as committing an act of war on behalf of that Government.

A temporary relief was afforded early in 1845 by the withdrawal of Sikh troops from the Sutlej to march against Jammu, the intentions of the Rajah Gholab Singh being regarded with suspicion by the Court, while the Jammu

family influence had long been viewed with disfavour by the Khalsa. When the troops reached the neighbourhood of Jammu, the Panchayets took matters into their own hands and formulated their own demands. Gholab Singh, conscious that in a military point of view he could offer no resistance, avowed himself the servant not of the Court but of the Khalsa, and placed himself unreservedly in their hands. He was brought down to Lahore, virtually a prisoner, and used his opportunities to conciliate the men, and at the same time to fan their hostility to Jawahir Singh.

Then Peshora Singh, one of those reputed sons of Ranjit Singh who had revolted before, revolted again, and the army were very much inclined to support him. Roughly speaking, from the month of July, 1845, onwards, the army used Peshora Singh and his claims as a means of compelling the Court to accede to any demands they might feel inclined to make; and it appears almost certain that the boy Dhulip Singh would have been ejected, if not killed, and Peshora Singh made Maharajah, if the British had not made it thoroughly clear that they would not recognise any such change of government effected by force.

Gholab Singh judiciously persuaded the soldiers to allow him to return to Jammu, from whence he sent offers to the British of co-operation to enable them to march on Lahore, if they would guarantee him the North Eastern Provinces as an independent ruler. The British, however, declined to consider the proposal, being honestly desirous of maintaining the effort to establish a strong Sikh Government throughout the Punjab, rather than of annexing it themselves. At the same time the gravity of the situation was increased by the fear that the very high rate of pay which the Sikh soldiery had extracted for themselves, and the general success which had attended their insubordination, was having an injurious effect on the *morale* of the sepoys in the British army.

In September, Peshora Singh was murdered—as every one believed, by Jawahir Singh's order The army were in consequence much enraged against the Vizier, who felt that the only available method of self-defence was to turn their attention to the British instead of to himself as the object of wrath. Before the end of the month, however, the Panchayets formally assumed the Government, declared the Vizier guilty of the murder of Peshora Singh, put him to death, and offered the Viziership to Gholab Singh—an offer which the Rajah was much too astute to accept, remarking that he wished to live more than six months. The office was nominally bestowed upon Lall Singh, the Rani's favourite.

The army now controlled the policy of the state, and its feeling was vehemently anti British and favourable to a war This feeling was fostered and encouraged by the Durbar, which hoped to profit by war, in any event, since it could claim credit for success, while the army would be broken up by defeat. On the other hand, most of the Sirdars feared the power of the army, disliked both the Durbar and the British, but believed that a war would be disastrous, still if war was forced on them they were prepared to fight valiantly enough.

Now that the Panchayets had assumed formally the reins of Government, neither Sir Henry Hardinge the Governor-General nor the Agent Broadfoot had much hope that any working system would be established, yet they were inclined to believe that the unpardonable act of aggression—the crossing of the Sutlej by the Khalsa—would not yet take place. The tone and attitude of the army were menacing in the extreme, but there was a possibility of its stopping short of that irrevocable step. By the end of November, however, the probability that the more ardent spirits would frighten the more cautious into compliance with their design became more marked Gholab Singh sent a messenger affirming positively that

the Sikhs were determined on war, and offering to throw in his own lot with the British.

Then came reports that the army was advancing towards the Sutlej.

On the 13th December Sir Henry Hardinge received the intelligence that the body of the Sikh army had crossed the Sutlej on the 11th; and he then issued the proclamation which was the virtual Declaration of War.

BOOK III.

THE SUTLEJ CAMPAIGN

BOOK III.

THE SUTLEJ CAMPAIGN: DEC., 1845-*MARCH,* 1846

CHAPTER I.

OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN: DECEMBER

The Sikh force—Ferozepore and Ludhiana—Umballa and Meerut—Europeans and sepoys—Deficiency of troops on the frontier—Explanation—Sir Henry Hardinge on the frontier—Rapid collection of the available forces—Advance on Moodkee.

THE crossing of the Sutlej by the Sikhs constituted an act of war, and opened the Sutlej Campaign. The next division of the narrative here set forth is almost exclusively military; and it is to military details that our attention must now be turned.

Information as to the Sikh army is not quite as precise as might be desired. But there are certain facts with regard to it which are quite definitely known.

It was under the leadership of Tej Singh, a Sikh Sirdar of some position and repute, who was probably in touch with the Court party, and certainly believed that nothing but disaster would come of the war. Associated with him in the leadership was Rajah Lall Singh, the favourite of the Rani Jindan, and nominal Vizier. It must, however, be observed that there is no evidence in support of the assertion which has been made that these chiefs were guilty of treachery.

The army itself was filled with a vehemently hostile

feeling towards the British, and a strong sense of self-confidence and of loyalty to the Khalsa. Loyalty to the Durbar it had none, its vows were to the Sikh brotherhood, very much as our Covenanters gave their allegiance to the Covenant. But this turbulent and insubordinate body, recklessly democratic in its political treatment of the Government, was fully alive to the impossibility of democratic methods in the field, and the Panchayets now laid aside their assumed control, formally accepting the purely military organisation for purely military purposes.

The component parts of the regular army had been wholly reorganised by Ranjit Singh. In the old days of the Misls the vast bulk of the Sikhs had been horsemen, infantry and artillery were contemned or misunderstood. Ranjit Singh, not without valuable help from his European officers — Allard, Ventura, Avitabile, and others — had educated his people into preferring the infantry to the cavalry service, and into becoming first-class artillerymen. Consequently, in 1845, the regular army was composed somewhat as follows artillery, which could bring 200 guns into the field and serve them admirably, 35 foot regiments of 1000 men each, and 15,000 cavalry, known as "Ghorchurras." But in addition to these regulars, who, when it came to fighting, showed splendid discipline, an immense force could be brought into action, consisting of the private levies of the Sirdars. Neither in armament nor in discipline were these men at all on a level with the regular army, but both in infantry and cavalry they are estimated to have numbered nearly double of the trained troops.

According to information received by Major Broadfoot late in November, the plan of the Lahore Durbar was to send five out of the seven divisions of the regulars against the British. Allowing for the artillery, this would seem to mean a body of from 40,000 to 50,000 men. If the Sirdar's contingents be added to these, it is probable that the whole Sikh force destined to do battle with the British

troops did not fall short of 100,000. No such force, however, was ever collected at one time against the British. It should, perhaps, be noted that Captain Cunningham, in his "History of the Sikhs," places the numbers very much lower. It is not, indeed, clear from his narrative how numerous he reckoned the Sikh army which crossed the Sutlej to have been; but he seems to put it at between 30,000 and 40,000 regulars, with half the number of irregulars. While giving due weight to his opinion, however, it must be remembered that he wrote always as an enthusiastic admirer of the Sikhs, with a strong inclination to give the benefit of every doubt in their favour.

As regards our own troops, the reader to-day should perhaps be reminded that in the year 1845 the British army in India was armed entirely with the old "Brown Bess" of the Peninsular War, the fire of which was not effective much beyond 300 yards, disciplined troops rarely firing a shot till within half that distance from the enemy. The effective range of field artillery was about 800 yards for round shot and shell; about 300 for "grape." The Sikh artillery was as good as our own; their guns were more numerous; and the infantry muskets were the same as ours.

In order to follow the movements of the armies with any accuracy, it will now be necessary to give considerable attention to the map of the "theatre of the war" which is here given, as well as the map at the beginning of the volume.

It will be obvious that the first objective of the force invading from Lahore would be Ferozepore, in the immediate neighbourhood of the point on the Sutlej where the troops would naturally cross.

Ferozepore, as will readily be seen, was the most advanced of the British military stations, being the westernmost post on the Sutlej. Here, and at Ludhiana, also very near the Sutlej, 80 miles to the east of Ferozepore, Sir

Henry Hardinge, the Governor-General, and Sir Hugh Gough, the Commander in-Chief, had throughout 1845 been steadily and quietly increasing the garrisons, also a large number of boats adapted for building pontoons had been collected.

Ferozepore itself was an open cantonment, without any attempt at fortification, though in view of the threatening attitude of the Sikh army, Major-General Sir John Littler, an experienced and trustworthy officer who commanded, had thrown up some shelter trenches and light field works to aid in the defence. It was garrisoned by two troops of Horse Artillery, and two light field batteries of 6 guns each, H.M.'s 62nd Foot, the 12th, 14th, 27th, 33rd, 44th, 54th, and 63rd Regiments Native Infantry, the 8th Native Light Cavalry, and the 3rd Irregulars—numbering altogether about 7000 fighting men, taking the infantry regiments at 700 and the cavalry at 300 The composition of the force was, as can be seen, almost entirely native—a great disadvantage, considering its very exposed position, but as there was no barrack accommodation for another British regiment the reinforcement had been postponed.

At Ludhiana, about 80 miles almost due east of Ferozepore, also on the banks of the Sutlej which was about 10 miles distant, there was a small fort. It was held by a force under Brigadier H. M. Wheeler, at that time a very able and reliable officer (subsequently so unhappily connected with the great Cawnpore disaster in 1857), consisting of H.M.'s 50th Foot, the 11th, 26th, 42nd, 48th, and 73rd Regiments Native Infantry, one regiment Native Cavalry, and two troops Horse Artillery—about 5000 fighting men, with 12 guns.

These two cantonments were situated within the Sikh Protected States.

Umballa, the principal station in support of the two advanced posts, was about 80 miles from Ludhiana and 100 from Ferozepore by the most direct routes. The

country between was a dead flat, very sandy and dusty; the roads being mere tracks, and extremely heavy either to march over or for carts, but better suited for camels, which were principally used by the people. There were very few villages, and little or no water except from wells dug by the villagers; while, for the most part, the country was overgrown with camel-thorn and low jungle trees without any undergrowth—a very different country to what it is now.

Umballa was held by a fairly strong garrison under a most able and gallant soldier, Major-General Walter Raleigh Gilbert. It consisted of H.M.'s 9th, 31st, and 80th Regiments of Infantry; the 16th, 24th, 41st, 45th, and 47th Regiments of Native Infantry; the 3rd Light Dragoons, 4th and 5th Regiments Light Cavalry, and the Governor-General's body-guard formed the cavalry; and, in addition to these, there were the 29th Foot at Kassauli, and the 1st Bengal European Regiment at Subathu, both in the hills. This whole force would amount to about 10,000 fighting men, good men and true, efficient and fit for anything, and held ready to move, literally, at a moment's notice.

These troops—Ferozepore, 7000; Ludhiana, 5000; Umballa, with Kassauli and Subathu, 10,000—were all that were available to meet any sudden emergency; for Meerut, the next large station—too far off to appear in the map—was about 130 miles by road, nor could large bodies of troops be put in motion, equipped for a campaign, without some delay. A certain amount of transport was kept up ready for immediate use at each station, but beyond that transport animals, mostly camels, had to be requisitioned or and got in by the civil authorities. The Commissariat Department, though it may have worked expensively, was, however, very efficient, and supplies of all sorts were generally fully and rapidly obtained.

At Meerut there was a force of about 9000 men and

26 guns, viz. 9th and 16th Lancers, 3rd Light Cavalry, H.M.'s 10th Foot (save one company), the corps of sappers and miners, and several regiments of native infantry, which could be pushed forward in support, and might come into the field later on.

There were also two Goorkha regiments, the Nusseeree Battalion near Simla, and the Sirmoor Battalion at Deyrah Dhoon, which were available at a comparatively short notice.

The backbone of the Indian army consisted of the British troops; but, unfortunately, there were very few of them, and too much reliance was placed in those days on the sepoys. These, on the whole, did well, sometimes very well, led by British officers, and encouraged by the presence and example of the British regiments. Sir Henry Hardinge considered that they were about on a par with the Portuguese troops, with whom he had served during the Peninsular War, and that, like them, they had their "fighting" days. But they were not made of the same stuff as Englishmen; and this was well known to the Sikhs, who invariably concentrated their fire and attention on the English regiments, feeling confident that if they could only stop them the others would soon give way.

Sir Hugh Gough, the Commander-in-Chief, had been fully alive to the insecurity of Ferozepore, situated as it was within such easy striking distance of the Sikh frontier, and so far from all support. Being responsible for the military safety of the frontier, he earnestly wished to take all precautionary measures to meet the possible contingency of a war, and to bring up the troops from Meerut and Cawnpore; but for political reasons, already set forth, the Governor-General did not consider it advisable. The fact is, the Government of India did not think the Sikh army would ever actually cross the Sutlej. In January, 1845, they had prepared to move to the Sutlej, but the troops were withdrawn again, partly owing to the remonstrances

of the political Agent; and the Government, presumably, expected much the same thing to occur again. The Governor-General was most anxious to avoid not only giving the Sikh Government any pretext for alarm, but also taking any step which might precipitate a war without ample cause for making it. Looking back on events that did occur, it cannot be doubted that he carried his prudence too far, and ran a much greater risk by neglecting the precaution of ordering up the Meerut troops. Nevertheless, he had greatly increased the strength of our forces on the frontier since his assumption of the Governor-Generalship. We were far more ready to meet a sudden emergency than we had been previous to his arrival; and all the available frontier troops, from Ferozepore to Umballa, were fully prepared for movement the moment the order should be given.

In these arrangements Sir Henry Hardinge and Sir Hugh acted together in perfect harmony.

On the 20th November Major Broadfoot wrote to Sir Hugh Gough, reporting that he had received Lahore letters, dated the 18th, stating that the Durbar had ordered in writing the following plan of operations: Sikh army to be divided into seven divisions, of which one was to remain at Lahore, one to proceed to Peshawur, and five were to invade British India. Each division to be of from 8000 to 12,000 men. On this Sir Hugh Gough took on himself to order up some of the Meerut troops, and on the 25th a force of nearly 3000 men left Meerut for Umballa. He at the same time wrote to Sir Henry Hardinge, forwarding his order for confirmation or otherwise, as the Governor-General thought fit. The Governor-General was, as already stated, most averse to giving the Sikh Durbar any cause for apprehension; and as the next moment the aspect of affairs looked more peaceful, the order was countermanded, and the troops were ordered back to Meerut, where they arrived on the 30th November. This was unfortunate, as had they been allowed to proceed they would have been up in time

to join in the advance on Moodkee; but great pressure was put on the Governor-General by the Court of Directors to avoid all cause of offence, and not to interfere with the Punjab unless actual aggression was first perpetrated by the Sikhs; so that no further steps were taken to meet the coming storm. Meantime the Sikhs were endeavouring to tamper with the Hindostani sepoys, and many discharged sepoys, having been taken into the Sikh service, were employed in tempting our men to desert, using the high rate of pay as an incentive. A few instances occurred, but the fidelity of the native army stood the strain.

The plan of operations of the Sikh leaders on crossing the Sutlej seems to have been far from badly laid. Part of the force was to cut off Sir John Littler at Ferozepore, while, if possible, the Ludhiana force was to be met and crushed by the main body before the Umballa troops should have effected a junction; the theory being that the danger of Ferozepore would compel the Ludhiana force to advance at once in the hope of effecting a relief. The design, however, was frustrated, as will be seen, by the great marching achievement of the Umballa regiments.

At the beginning of December, the Governor-General, Sir Henry Hardinge, himself a very distinguished soldier, who had won the high approbation of the Duke of Wellington in the Peninsula, was near Ludhiana; the Commander-in-Chief being at Umballa. Sir Henry Hardinge's position was indeed a dangerously exposed one, considering the office he held, for his escort, consisting of only one regiment of native infantry besides his body-guard, could hardly have secured him from capture, had the Sikh cavalry possessed the enterprise to make the attempt. No such attempt was made, however, and accordingly he rode into Ludhiana in order to personally inspect the position and the fort. Seeing that this could be held by a small body, he desired Brigadier H. M. Wheeler to hold himself in readiness to march at the shortest notice, leaving the

defence of the fort in the hands of the sick and weakly. On the 8th December he heard from Major Broadfoot, his political Agent, that there was no longer any doubt whatever that the Sikhs were making preparations on a large scale to cross the Sutlej, and the following day he sent the too-long-deferred orders to the Commander-in-Chief for the immediate advance of troops from Umballa, Meerut, and elsewhere towards the frontier. On the 12th he heard of the actual crossing by the Sikhs, and on the 13th he issued his proclamation declaring war, dated from his camp about 25 miles from Ludhiana.

So complete had been the preparations for an advance that on the 12th the Commander-in-Chief and the Umballa force marched 16 miles to Rajpura; on the 13th to Sirhind, 18 miles; on the 14th to Isru, 20 miles; on the 15th to Lattala, about 30 miles; and on the 16th to Wadni, 30 miles; overtaking the Governor-General, who with the Ludhiana troops had already marched to Bussean on their way to Ferozepore. Bussean was of great importance, as it was here that Major Broadfoot had stored the supplies which it had devolved upon him to collect (most successfully) by the most strenuous exertions at the shortest notice.

On the 17th the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief marched with the now united columns of Ludhiana and Umballa to Charrak—a comparatively short stage—to give some rest to weary men and beasts; for the whole march up from Umballa had been exceptionally rapid, and through an exceedingly trying country. On the 18th they advanced 21 miles to Moodkee.

This march has been described in the diary of an officer, Captain Borton, of H.M.'s 9th Foot, afterwards General Sir Arthur Borton, as throughout most harassing; at one time over heavy ploughed land, then through low, thorny jungle, breaking all order, then again over heavy sand. The dust surpassed all the writer's previous experience; the soldiers

were sometimes the whole day without food, and when their meat rations were served out it often happened there were no means of cooking them, as the cooking-utensils had not come up. Yet, the troops marched bravely, though often straggling fearfully from fatigue and heat and dust.

On approaching Moodkee a patrol of the 9th Irregulars with Major Broadfoot reported it occupied by the Sikhs; and the British, formed in order of battle, marched in at noon, the small Sikh picquets retiring.

Thus about 150 miles had been covered by the troops in seven days over tracks heavy with sand, under clouds of dust which almost smothered the men in column, with little or no water or regular food, and under a sun which was hot and oppressive in the day. This extraordinarily rapid march of all available troops towards the frontier had been necessitated by the Sikh army, which for so long had been threatening an invasion, having at length crossed the Sutlej. Ferozepore, though held by a fairly strong garrison of about 7000 men, was more than 150 miles by the most direct route from the nearest support, and the sudden irruption of an army of 100,000 Sikhs with a powerful artillery was a source of danger which could not be ignored. It was perhaps also felt that forbearance had been carried already too far; that the Sikhs had been allowed to gain an advantage which nothing but very prompt and decisive measures could remedy. The Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief were most anxious to get near enough to Ferozepore to insure a combined movement with Littler's force and to relieve it from the pressure of the Sikhs. Within 24 hours of the receipt of orders the Umballa force was on the march, and Moodkee, about 20 miles from Ferozepore, was reached on the afternoon of 18th.

CHAPTER II.

THE ENGAGEMENT AT MOODKEE, AND AFTER: DEC. 18-21

Order of British troops—Flank movements of cavalry—Rout by the infantry—Losses—Cruelty of the Sikhs—Their generosity to Lieut. Biddulph—Discomfort in camp—Reinforcements from Kassauli and Subathu—Their march—Considerate action of Sir H. Hardinge—Hospital at Moodkee—Sir Hugh Gough's plan for a junction—Sir H. Hardinge appointed second in command—With Sir John Littler—Littler's forces and movements at Ferozepore.

THE country round Moodkee was a plain, with here and there slight risings, covered almost entirely with low, thorny jungle, the soil being heavy and sandy, so that the slightest movement of any body of men created an almost impenetrable dust.

Wearied with long and incessant marching, the troops were enjoying a well-earned rest when reports came in from the cavalry patrols that a large force of Sikhs, preceded by clouds of dust, was advancing upon them. Orders were at once issued to fall in, and in a very few minutes the force was formed in line of battle, the time being now about four o'clock in the afternoon.

The cavalry, together with the horse artillery, immediately advanced under Sir Hugh Gough's personal direction, and formed line in front of the Sikh position, the guns occupying the centre, flanked on the left by Brigadier Mactier, with the 9th Irregular Cavalry and a portion of the 4th Lancers, and on the right by Brigadiers Gough and White, with the rest of the cavalry.

The infantry formed up in second line and moved forward; Wheeler's brigade, of H.M.'s 50th, the 42nd and 48th

Native Infantry, on the extreme right, having Brigadier Bolton, with H.M.'s 31st and the 24th and 47th Native Infantry on their left, these regiments forming Sir Harry Smith's Division. Gilbert's Division, still incomplete, since the British regiments composing it had not yet joined, was only represented by one brigade of native troops the 2nd and 16th Grenadiers and 45th Native Infantry These formed the centre, McCaskill's Division—H.M.'s 9th Foot, the 26th Native Infantry, the 73rd Native Infantry, and H.M.'s 80th Foot, under Brigadier Wallace—being on the extreme left.

The field batteries having joined the Horse Artillery, a smart cannonade was opened. Then, in order to complete the infantry dispositions, the cavalry, first on the right and then also on the left, were ordered to make flank movements, turning the enemy's flank if possible, more especially because their line, extending beyond ours on either side, threatened to turn our left and right. Accordingly Brigadiers Gough and White, with the 3rd Light Dragoons, the Body-guard, the 3rd Light Cavalry, and a portion of the 4th Lancers, swept out to the right, and fell upon the enemy's left flank. The Sikh horse at once fled, and the British and native cavalry swept down along the rear of the Sikh infantry, disconcerting the latter, and silencing their guns. While this manœuvre was being brilliantly accomplished, Brigadier Mactier, sweeping to the left, fell upon the Sikh right in similar style, and with like success, completely averting all danger of the British line being outflanked. But for the jungle, the cavalry would have done even more complete execution.

Meantime the infantry, their front now uncovered, advanced upon the Sikh line in an echelon of brigades from the right, Sir Harry Smith's Division leading, and by their heavy fire soon convincing the Sikhs that they had met more than they expected, the artillery pushing on to close quarters, and maintaining an effective fire in

support. The Sikh infantry and guns stood resolutely, fighting well and with great determination; but were steadily driven back by the British infantry, until they were forced to give way, and fled in great disorder. Darkness put an end to the pursuit, but the conflict was maintained in an irregular manner for another hour, clouds of dust still further obscuring every object.

Night saved the Sikh army from further disaster. Their loss was very severe, the ground being covered with their dead and wounded; and 17 guns were captured on the field. The troops did not get back to camp till midnight, fatigued and worn out by their arduous day's work and the severe fight; a sharp battle which foreshadowed the nature of the coming struggle with the Sikh army. Successful as it was, it was attended with very severe loss, particularly among the leaders and most distinguished officers of the army. Sir Robert Sale, Quartermaster-General of the British troops, was struck by a grape-shot which shattered his thigh, from the effects of which he died shortly afterwards. Sir John McCaskill was shot through the heart leading his division to the attack; and Brigadier Bolton, of H.M.'s 31st, received his death-wound at the head of the first brigade of Sir Harry Smith's Division; whilst Brigadiers Mactier and Wheeler were severely wounded, as also were Lieutenant-Colonel Byrne, commanding H.M.'s 31st Foot, and Major Pat Grant, Deputy-Adjutant-General of the army. The brunt of the fighting had fallen upon Sir Harry Smith's Division. The native infantry fought fairly well, but did not keep up with the European troops, and in the darkness that fell before the action was over some of our troops suffered from the fire of friends as well as foes.

The grand total of losses was:—

Killed	13 officers,	2 native officers,	200 men	=	215
Wounded	39 „	9 „	„ 600 „	=	657
			All ranks killed and wounded		872

Of the head-quarters' staff, 3 officers were killed and 3 wounded. The artillery lost 2 officers and 21 men killed, 4 officers, 1 native officer, and 42 men wounded, 45 horses killed and 25 wounded.

In the Cavalry Division, the 3rd Light Dragoons, who took 497 men into action, suffered most severely, losing 101 of all ranks killed and wounded, and no less than 120 horses, the Native Cavalry lost 1 officer and 20 men killed, 6 officers, 1 native officer, and 43 men wounded. In Sir Harry Smith's Division the 31st Foot lost 175 all ranks killed and wounded, the 50th Regiment 125; the native corps, 1 officer 13 men killed, 7 officers 115 men wounded.

General Gilbert's Division lost 4 officers wounded, 1 native officer, 17 men killed, 5 native officers, 91 men wounded.

In Sir John McCaskill's Division, the only officer killed was its commander, and the loss generally was inconsiderable, but in proportion much heavier amongst the European than the native troops.

The returns published with despatches do not show the regimental losses, which have therefore been compiled from the regimental records.

In the despatches, the Sikh army was estimated at from 20,000 to 30,000 men, horse and foot, with 40 guns. It is most probable they advanced to attack the British under the supposition they would meet only the Ludhiana force, and that they were not aware that the Umballa force had already effected a junction. Other reports put the numbers as low as 2000 infantry, 10,000 horse, and 22 guns. The losses were never ascertained.

This was the first great combat with the Sikhs. Their gallantry and discipline in the fight evoked the admiration of their enemies, but their savage and barbarous treatment of the unfortunate wounded that happened to fall into their hands roused the most revengeful feelings on the part of

British officers and men; for not only were the wounded horribly mutilated and slaughtered, but so treacherous and fanatical were they that even when their own lives had been spared by the order of officers, they were known in several instances to have fired on their deliverers, as soon as their backs were turned, and some fine gallant soldiers fell victims to their own generosity. So strong was the indignation excited in the 3rd Light Dragoons, who were horrified to find their comrades, who had fallen wounded in their splendid charge, cruelly murdered, that "Remember Moodkee," became a cry with them when they met the Sikhs again, and many were ruthlessly slain who would otherwise have been spared.

Mercy in the field of battle is not a thing understood by Orientals. One instance, however, deserves to be recorded to the credit of the Sikhs. About the time that the Sutlej was crossed, an officer, Lieutenant Biddulph, on his way to join his regiment at Ferozepore, fell into their hands, and although his life was in peril, it was spared, and he was made over to the charge of an officer of Sikh Artillery; the gunners became his friends; and, strange to say, after the Battle of Moodkee, he was allowed to return to the British camp, whither he was escorted by the artillery officer's brother. Sir Henry Hardinge very rightly would not allow Lieutenant Biddulph to take part in the subsequent battle at Ferozeshah; remarking that he owed that at least to the generous enemy who had released him. It is pleasant to be able to record occasional traits of civilisation and generosity on the part of our brave enemy, for, as a rule, their conduct on the field of battle was merciless in the extreme. Another striking act of generosity will, however, fall to be related in connection with the Battle of Ferozeshah.

The following day the force halted in order to allow reinforcements to join, being now near enough in its position at Moodkee to render assistance to Littler's force

in case of any urgent need. So that the principal object of the very rapid advance had been attained. In consequence, however, of the proximity of the Sikh army, the troops remained under arms all day, ready to fall in, in case the enemy should attempt a fresh attack.

The dead were as far as possible buried, and the wounded brought in, but owing to the very rapid advance at only a few hours' notice, the arrangements for the Field Hospital were by no means complete, and the sufferings of the wounded were great, without either proper shelter or food. The medical men worked, as they always do on such emergencies, with more than zeal, and did all that was possible, but rice-water and coarse wheaten cake, prepared for the elephants, were the only "hospital comforts" available.

Meantime such reinforcements as were at all within possible reach—those, namely, from Kassauli and Subathu—were hurrying up, eager to join the Commander-in-Chief and take their share of the fighting they knew would have to take place before Ferozepore was relieved. These reinforcements consisted of H.M.'s 29th Foot, and the 1st European Light Infantry, with a division of heavy guns and some native infantry

The 29th Foot were quartered at Kassauli, and the 1st European Light Infantry at Subathu. Both regiments had received orders to be ready to move at a moment's notice. They received the orders for the march at very nearly the same time—that is, about 10 o'clock on the evening of the 10th December The night was a busy one for all. A hurried medical examination was held at once, and all men unfit for active service, and those in hospital, were hurriedly told off to remain at regimental headquarters, whilst the regiments were ordered to prepare for their march forthwith. Shortly before this campaign, Robert Napier (subsequently Lord Napier of Magdala) saw the 1st European Light Infantry drawn up on parade at Subathu,

numbering then nearly 1000 strong, and described its appearance as "glorious." About 60 men were left at Subathu; and by 10 o'clock on the morning of the 11th December, the regiment, probably about 800 strong, was in full march to join the Commander-in-Chief. In the same prompt manner the 69th Foot at Kassauli completed all its arrangements during the night of the 10th, and early on the morning of the 11th was on the march for Kalka, each man being served with 100 rounds of balled ammunition.

There was no "mobilization scheme" in those days, yet nothing could have been more prompt and effective than the rapid and highly disciplined manner in which all these troops moved off for the war. The 29th were one march nearer Kalka, at the foot of the hills, than the 1st European Light Infantry. The former regiment arrived there, received their camp equipage and transport without any delay from the commissariat department, and resumed their march in the afternoon for Munny Majra, doing twenty-three miles that day. Here they received orders to wait for the 1st European Light Infantry, who, likewise, on arriving at Kalka, were equipped for service, and reached Munny Majra on the 12th. On the 13th the two regiments, with the heavy guns, pushed on by double marches from 20 to 35 miles a day. On the 18th, late in the evening, the sound of heavy firing in front announced that the war had begun in earnest. The troops struggled on to reach the field, but it was not possible, eager as they were; nor was it till the following evening, the 19th December, that they were able to join. They were sorely disappointed at not having been up in time for the first brush, but they had done all that could be done, and had covered nearly 200 miles in nine days' marching. Sir Henry Hardinge, always considerate for the soldiers, sent his own private elephants to help to bring the regiments in; a string of camels with fresh water was sent for the relief of the

thirsty; whilst the bands of the regiments that had fought the battle of Moodkee the day before were sent out to march them in, so warmly were they welcomed, so fully were their efforts to join recognised by the Governor-General, the Commander-in-Chief, and their comrades.

On the 20th, preparations were made to attack the enemy. No further reinforcements could possibly reach for weeks. The army could not remain in front of the Sikhs, waiting for them to come up. Ferozepore was partly invested, and open to an attack from the whole Sikh army; and it was necessary to relieve it and drive the Sikhs across the Sutlej. Accordingly sixty rounds of balled ammunition was served out to each man, and two days' cooked rations ordered to be carried with the troops, each man carrying all he could in his haversack, besides a bottle covered with leather slung over his shoulders for water. They were clothed in their ordinary scarlet uniform and blue trousers, and wore forage caps covered with white cloth, and a curtain hanging down behind for the protection of the head and neck; great coats were not carried.

There were no means of moving the large number of wounded, and consequently they were placed in a small fort at Moodkee. Two regiments of native infantry were all that could be spared for their protection, each regiment being ordered to detail one officer and a small party of men for their assistance.

Ferozepore was about 20 miles distant north-west from Moodkee, but the Sikh army, under Lall Singh, lay between the two. It might be possible to get Littler's force out by the south, and, effecting a junction with the Commander-in-Chief, to make a combined attack upon Lall Singh. The British Force all told would then be about 18,000 men; but Littler had only one European Regiment, the 62nd Foot, and it was quite possible that he might not be able to get away from Ferozepore without the knowledge of Tej Singh, who was lying before it; so

that the junction could not be calculated on as a certainty. The Commander-in-Chief, therefore, had to decide on his plan of operations in view of Littler not being able to join. He could not march round by the south and throw himself into Ferozepore, as that would have left the whole country open to the Sikh army, and his wounded at Moodkee, as to whose safety he was honourably solicitous, would have been at the cruel mercy of the Sikhs. Moreover, the armies of Lall Singh and Tej Singh, now known to be separated, would certainly have united and become more formidable than they were at present. Clearly, then, it would be advantageous to deal with Lall Singh whilst separate from Tej Singh, and to attack him—with the aid of Littler's force, if possible; if not, without. Accordingly secret and trustworthy messengers were sent to Sir John Littler, with orders for endeavouring to march out with as large a force as he could bring, consistently with the safety of Ferozepore, and without detection by the Sikhs; and so effecting a junction with the Commander-in-Chief.

On this day also Sir Henry Hardinge, Governor-General of India, placed his services as a general officer at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief. Whether right or wrong in his position, it was a noble and chivalrous act. He was a soldier of great experience and of the highest reputation, and had already, at Moodkee, shared the honour and the danger of battle with the army. His offer was accepted by Sir Hugh Gough with a full acknowledgment of its value, and he was appointed second in command.

Ferozepore was threatened on the north-east side by Rajah Tej Singh, with a force of all arms, immediately after the passage of the Sutlej. Sir John Littler told his force off into brigades; one cavalry brigade, under Brigadier Harriott, consisting of the 8th Native Light Cavalry, and the 3rd Irregular Cavalry, each numbering about 300 men; the infantry in two brigades, of which H.M.'s 62nd, the 12th, and 14th Regiments Native Infantry,

formed one under Brigadier Reid, of H.M.'s 62nd; while the other consisted of three native infantry regiments, the 33rd, 44th, and 54th, under Brigadier the Honourable T Ashburnham, of the 62nd; and artillery, one European and one Native troop Horse Artillery, one field battery European, and one Native gunners, under Lieut.-Colonel Huthwaite, of the Artillery. The 63rd Regiment Native Infantry occupied the entrenchment, into which all the ladies, women, children, and sick of the station were sent, the 27th Native Infantry occupied and covered the city, while half a battery of artillery, and a squadron of irregular cavalry watched the ford at Koonda Ghat, to the north-west of the station.

A position was taken up by Sir John Littler to the north-east of cantonments, and he drew his small force up in order of battle on the 13th, Tej Singh, however, declined to make the attack, and Littler pitched his camp so as to cover the cantonments and the native city, the Sikh army having their camp within a short distance, and their outposts close up. The Sikhs made demonstrations threatening an attack on the 15th, 16th, and 17th, but though Littler drew out his force in the open, neither side precipitated a combat, for Littler, acting under particular instructions received from the Commander-in-Chief, would not be drawn away from his post, and whilst showing himself ready to engage, acted strictly on the defensive. On the evening of the 17th the approach of the Umballa force under the Commander-in-Chief was reported, and was followed by intelligence of the battle of Moodkee and the repulse of the Sikh army. At midnight on the 20th Sir John Littler received his orders to move out the following morning in order to effect a junction with the Commander-in-Chief. He arranged to move at 8 o'clock the following morning with the artillery, the cavalry brigade, and the two infantry brigades made up as described above, leaving the defence of the cantonments to the 63rd

Regiment Native Infantry, under Lieut.-Colonel Wilkinson, and that of the town to the 27th Native Infantry, with half a field battery in the town, and a battery of heavy guns in the cantonments, which was strengthened by entrenchments.

CHAPTER III.

FEROZESHAH—THE ATTACK: DEC. 21

The start from Moodkee—Composition of Sir H. Gough's force—Position of Tej Singh and Lall Singh—Sir Hugh's plan of action—Forbidden by the Governor-General—Junction with Littler—Disposition for attack—Commencement of attack—Littler's advance—Repulsed—Losses of his division—Advance of Gilbert's Division—Taylor's Brigade—McLaran's Brigade—Charge of the 3rd Light Dragoons—Wallace's Division—Sir H. Smith's Division—Within the Sikh entrenchments—Dispositions for the night—Danger of the situation—Prince Waldemar—Events of the night.

THE force at Moodkee, under the immediate orders of Sir Hugh Gough, was called to arms in perfect silence at 2 a.m. on the 21st December; by 3 a.m. the camp had been struck and packed on camels, and by 4 a.m. the whole formed up in a line of columns preparatory to the march—four hours before Littler made his start from Ferozepore. Camp equipage and all heavy baggage were left behind at Moodkee. In consequence of the arrival of the reinforcements, the previous distribution in brigades and divisions was modified. They now stood as follows:—

Cavalry and *Artillery* the same as at Moodkee.

Infantry: First Division, under Major-General Sir Harry Smith; H.M.'s 31st Foot, the 24th and 47th Regiments Native Infantry, under Brigadier Hicks; the 2nd Brigade, H.M.'s 50th Foot, the 42nd and 48th Regiments Native Infantry, now commanded by Brigadier Ryan, of the 50th, *vice* Wheeler severely wounded at Moodkee. Second Division, under Major-General Walter Raleigh

Gilbert (a descendant of Sir Walter Raleigh, and worthy of his ancestor); H.M.'s 29th Foot, the 80th Foot, and the 41st Native Infantry, under Brigadier Taylor, of H.M.'s 29th; and the 1st European Light Infantry, with the 16th Native Grenadiers and the 45th Native Infantry, under Brigadier McLaran. Third Division, now commanded by Brigadier Wallace, *vice* Sir John McCaskill; consisting of H.M.'s 9th Foot, the 2nd Native Grenadiers, the 26th and 73rd Regiments Native Infantry.

The army advanced for about four miles in a line of columns, ready to deploy into line in case the Sikhs should be met with; but when it was ascertained that the enemy had concentrated about his entrenched position at Ferozeshah, they moved in a column of route, left in front.

The advance was necessarily slow, owing to the broad front of the army, the darkness, and the rough nature of the country; the road being a mere track through the jungle. At about half-past ten the Sikh position was approached; and the troops halted, and were allowed to rest awhile and get a scratch breakfast from their haversacks, whilst the Commander-in-Chief rode forward to make a personal reconnaissance. Littler's force had not yet joined, but it was ascertained that he was on his way, and his junction was secure.

The Sikh army was in two divisions. One under Tej Singh lay on the north of Ferozepore, facing Sir John Littler's cantonments. The second, and larger, under Lall Singh, had occupied a position at the village of Ferozeshah, between Moodkee and Ferozepore, some two miles on the northern side of the line of march. Here they had formed batteries, and thrown up entrenchments (within which was the village), shaped roughly like a horseshoe. The toe, or central front, faced towards the south, and lay more or less parallel to the British line of march. The right wing faced westward, in the direction of Ferozepore; and the left eastward, in the direction of Ludhiana. Thus, Sir

John Littler, starting from Ferozepore, would march out in a south-easterly direction, leaving Tej Singh on the north and east of his cantonments. The force under the Commander-in-Chief, arriving from Moodkee, might either give battle to Lall Singh or march on towards Ferozepore, but this, of course, would leave the whole country eastwards, including Moodkee, open to the advance of Lall Singh.

While the troops were breakfasting, the Commander in-Chief rode forward to make a personal reconnaissance, as the result of which he formed the following plan of action Knowing definitely that Littler's force was on the way and was secure of effecting the junction, he resolved to leave it the duty of acting as a reserve, and to himself at once attack the position at Ferozeshah with the whole of his three divisions, without waiting for Sir John. The arguments in favour of this plan of action were strong By making the attack early in the day the troops would be able to do their work while fairly fresh, and in Sir Hugh's judgment, supported by the event, they might then be relied on to carry the entrenchments and drive the Sikhs back. Meantime, if Tej Singh advanced from Ferozepore, Littler would hold him in check, or if he did not advance would be able to fall on Lall Singh's engaged army and effect a complete rout. On the other hand, delay would mean that the day might close before the engagement was decisively at an end, and would be accompanied by the risk of Tej Singh's arrival at a critical time.

The Commander in-Chief explained his plan of action to the Governor-General, who was also second in command in the field, but Sir Henry was flatly and resolutely opposed to it. In his view, the issue at stake was so serious, and the Sikhs had already at Moodkee shown such high fighting qualities, that he considered it imperative to wait till the junction with Littler was accomplished before proceeding to the attack.

Now, Sir Henry Hardinge, as things stood, occupied a

very anomalous position. As Governor-General, he was responsible for the safety of the British dominion in India, but as a matter of course a civilian Governor-General cannot be held responsible for military operations. On the other hand, previous military Governors-General had combined that office with the Commander-in-Chiefship. There was no precedent for his position. An experienced military officer, he had a very strong opinion as to the military necessities of the position which was in flat contradiction to that of his Commander-in-Chief, whose view was equally strong. Sir Hugh Gough could not surrender his judgment in favour of that of his subordinate in the field; Sir Henry could not escape his own sense of responsibility. Taking this view, there was only one course open—as Governor-General, he must overrule the Commander-in-Chief on the very field of battle, and in the presence of the enemy.

The affair must have been painful enough for both; but it is clear that the responsibility for the serious results which followed this historic incident falls entirely upon Sir Henry Hardinge. The Commander-in-Chief had no option in the matter; Sir Henry could and did simply overrule him. But, to his honour, it can be said that no man ever more resolutely and loyally carried out the Governor-General's wishes than did Sir Hugh Gough; and from this moment, throughout the critical events which immediately followed, no trace or hint appears of the vexation which he might legitimately have felt.

When, after considerable discussion, this decision had been arrived at, the troops were ordered to move to their left, and at about one o'clock the junction with Littler was effected, at the village of Shukur, close to Misreewalla, some 3000 yards south-west of the enemy's extended position. Sir John had accomplished his withdrawal from Ferozepore with great skill, and entire success. Leaving his camp standing, and his picquets out as usual, he had thoroughly deceived Tej Singh, and had marched

out on the southern side at about eight o'clock in the morning, without arousing a suspicion in the mind of the Sikhs—who remained watching the empty shell while the army went on its way to join the forces from Moodkee.

By waiting for the actual junction, valuable time had been lost; for it must be remembered that the day was December 21st, the shortest in the year. The arrival of the fresh column, moving in another direction, involved further delay before the troops could be got into position; and it was close upon four o'clock before the attack commenced. By this time, the force that marched from Moodkee had been already nearly fourteen hours under arms; that from Ferozepore nearly eight hours, under a hot sun, and marching over a heavy sandy country in clouds of dust, with scarcely a drop of water.

The army then was drawn up fronting the southern and western faces of the Sikh position, with Littler's division on the left, Wallace's in the centre, and Gilbert's on the right, Sir Harry Smith's forming in reserve. A powerful battery, including the heavy guns, was placed between the divisions of Gilbert and Wallace, and batteries of horse artillery on the flanks. White's Cavalry Brigade, 3rd Light Dragoons and 4th Bengal Lancers, protected the right, whilst Gough's Brigade, consisting of the Governor-General's Body-guard and 5th Cavalry, was in support of Wallace; and Harriott's Brigade, 8th Light Cavalry and 3rd Irregulars, supported Littler's Division, he having also with him the artillery from Ferozepore.

By four o'clock the action had commenced, and the first gun was fired. The British artillery came into action within effective range all along the front, and poured their fire on the Sikh position, our infantry being ordered to lie down. The enemy's artillery, however, responded vigorously, and, after heavy pounding on both sides, it became apparent that our guns were quite unable to gain the mastery of the Sikhs, who had a considerable superiority both in number

as drawn up at the commencement of the

BATTLE OF FEROZSHAH

at 3½ P.M. on the 21st December, 1845.

Fought under the personal command of H.E. Genl. Sir Hugh Gough Bt., G.C.B Commander in Chief

H.E. Genl. Sir H. Gough, Bt., G.C.B. Commr. in Chief

Major Genl. Sir J. Littler, K.C.B.

Br. Ashburnham
2-9 Pr. Batteries
54
33
44

Br. Reed
14
12
H.M.62
2 Troops H.A.

Br. Harriott
3 Irr. 8 Lt. Cav

Br. Gough
5 Lt. Cav. B: Gd.

Lieut. Genl. Sir Henry Hardinge, G.C.B.

Brigadier Wallace
73 9 FOOT
26 N.I. 26
H.M.9 2 N.I.
2 N.I. 73 N.I.

Br. Brooke
Troop 8 Inch Howitzers
2-9 Pd Batts.
2 Troops H.A.

Major Genl. Gilbert

Br. McLaran
16
1st E.L.I.
45

Br. Taylor
41
H.M.80
H.M.29
1 Troop H.A.

Br. White
4 L.C. 3 L.D.

Major Genl. Sir Harry Smith, K.C.B.

Br. Ryan
42
48
H.M.50
One Troop H.A.

Br. ? Hicks
47
24
H.M.31

of guns and weight of metal; while the day was drawing to a close. Our artillery therefore advanced to closer quarters, supported by the infantry.

Littler's division somewhat prematurely advanced to the attack, on the Sikh right or westerly front, under a most galling fire; and, to quote his description, "the casualties were awful." Brigadier Reid led the right brigade, the 62nd Foot and 12th Native Infantry in first line, the 14th Native Infantry in support. The advance was conducted with perfect steadiness, notwithstanding that the nature of the country made occasional breaks in the line. As they approached the entrenchments the ground became more open and the enemy's fire increased to a storm of grape. The line approached the enemy's battery to within about one hundred and fifty yards, when the prize seemed to be within their grasp; but it chanced to be the strongest part of the position, defended by numerous guns of heavy calibre, although the entrenchments were no stronger than elsewhere. The native infantry regiments had, to a certain extent, melted away, and the 62nd was assailed by a terrific fire. Sir John Littler, Brigadier Reid, and all the officers cheered and encouraged the men; but, unable to advance, the 62nd were brought to a stand. So fierce was the firing that, within a few minutes, 7 officers and 97 men were killed, and 11 officers and 184 men wounded. Lieutenants Gubbins and Kelly fell from sabre cuts, close to the entrenchments, and many individuals distinguished themselves in setting a brilliant example of courage. But the regiment was almost alone and unsupported; the Sikh cavalry were threatening their left; and Brigadier Reid at length, to save the regiment from further useless destruction, ordered them to retire, seeing the hopelessness of carrying the enemy's works. This movement was executed in good order and with deliberation, the men, in fact, being so exhausted as to be scarcely able to put one foot before the other, till they came upon H.M.'s 9th Foot and the 26th

Native Infantry who were formed in reserve. The Divisional Staff lost 1 officer killed and 1 wounded, and Brigadier Reid and 1 officer of the Brigade Staff were wounded. The 12th Native Infantry, which advanced with the 62nd, lost 4 officers wounded, and the 14th Native Infantry 5 The other losses of the native infantry regiments amounted to 8 native officers and 47 men killed, 5 native officers and 164 men wounded. As far as can be ascertained from the returns of casualties, the second brigade, on the extreme left, commanded by Brigadier Ashburnham, and consisting of three native infantry regiments, suffered no loss what ever, and cannot have afforded any support to Brigadier Reid. The Sikhs paid all their attention to the European troops, and Ferozeshah was unfortunately not one of the sepoy's "fighting days." As a matter of fact, the Hindostani sepoys of those times had not the stamina to stand the long and hard day's work, and were far more exhausted than the European troops.

The news of Littler's repulse went down the line before the attack of the centre and right was made. It was announced by wild shouts of triumph among the Sikhs, whose hopes of victory were greatly raised by it, but it in no way affected the Moodkee force, unless perhaps it made them even more determined to succeed. The assault was ordered in direct echelon from the right, Brigadier Taylor leading with H.M.'s 29th in advance, closely and vigorously supported by H.M.'s 80th, and after them the 41st Regiment Native Infantry, under the direct personal leading of the Commander-in-Chief, who took the right of the line, whilst Sir Henry Hardinge took command of the centre. Covered by a line of skirmishers, the 29th advanced in quick time with the utmost steadiness, notwithstanding the heavy fire it was exposed to, which swept away sometimes whole sections, Brigadier Taylor, himself being grazed by a round shot in the side was removed from the field, suffering much from the shock. The 80th, eager to bear their

full share of the honour and danger of the fight, pressed on so close as almost to form in prolongation of the 29th. The two regiments cheered each other as they advanced. Unflinchingly, and pouring in a heavy fire, Taylor's brigade charged up the entrenchments, but only to find on crossing them that though they had got the guns, the Sikh infantry stood unsubdued behind them. The men, however, pushed gallantly and resolutely on, driving the enemy back at the point of the bayonet, and entered the Sikh camp. Here the 80th came upon a number of the enemy clad in chain armour, who suddenly rushed upon the regiment and inflicted considerable loss before they were bayoneted.

Brigadier Taylor's attack was rapidly followed by Brigadier McLaran with the 1st Bengal European Light Infantry, and the 16th and 45th Regiments Native Infantry. Major Birrell commanding the 1st, wisely ordered the regiment to reserve their fire until they came to close quarters with the enemy. As the line advanced the fire from the Sikh guns increased in intensity, the round shot and shell tearing through the ranks. Many officers and men fell; but the brigade, led by the 1st Europeans, continued its steady advance. As they approached close to the enemy's battery, the order was given to charge, and in a few minutes the regiment was right under the batteries, the smoke being so dense that it was almost as dark as night. The Sikhs had thrown down branches of trees to form a sort of entanglement. Surmounting these, the men were soon amongst the guns. The Sikh gunners, fighting desperately, were bayoneted to a man; behind them the Khalsa Infantry was drawn up, and their camp stood visible in rear. The infantry, dropping on one knee as if to receive cavalry, opened a galling fire; but with a cheer McLaran's Brigade, the 1st leading, charged. The Sikhs fired a wild volley and broke; many drew their swords and fought to the death, compact bodies again and again dashing at the colours. At length, however, they

gave way, seeking cover amidst their tents, though hard work still remained, as will presently be told.

Thus Gilbert's Division had been completely successful in its assault, which was followed almost immediately by a magnificent charge by the glorious 3rd Light Dragoons. Led by White, and accompanied by a troop of Horse Artillery, they had followed up the attack of the right. Now, advancing through a most destructive fire of grape and musketry, their leaders falling in numbers, they charged undismayed over the Sikh entrenchments with loud huzzas, dashed through the Sikh infantry, silenced their guns, cut down the gunners, swept right through the enemy's camp, and finally emerged among their friends with numbers thinned, but, as it was said at the time, "covered with imperishable glory"

Wallace's Division next followed, and was directed partly against the portion of the enemy's position from which Littler's Division had been already repulsed, i.e. the left central face The four regiments of which the division was composed were being temporarily formed in two brigades—that on the left consisting of the 9th Foot and 26th Native Infantry, led by Colonel Taylor of the 9th, the 2nd and 73rd Regiments Native Infantry being on the right. The smoke and dust combined were so thick that it was impossible to see the exact position of the enemy's guns, the left wing of the 9th found itself immediately in front of the muzzles, and suffered terribly, Colonel Taylor and many officers and men being killed. So severe was the fire that a portion of the regiment was for a time thrown into confusion, but, although himself very severely wounded by a grape shot in the right arm, Captain Borton, the senior officer on the spot, rallied them, and the right pressing on with great dash, the guns were captured at the point of the bayonet. Here, in the increasing darkness, the Grenadier company under Lieutenant Daunt, with part of the right wing of the 9th under Major Barnewell, got separated from

the remainder of the regiment, and falling in with a party separated from McLaran's Brigade, which formed the left of Gilbert's Division in their movement to their left, advanced with them upon the village of Ferozeshah; which was found to have been captured by Sir Harry Smith, who, having been placed in reserve, had been ordered by the Commander-in-Chief to follow up Gilbert's attack, in view of the severe fighting on the right. With this force that portion of the 9th remained till next day.

Sir Harry Smith had formed in rear of the centre of the line, his right brigade led by Brigadier Hicks, and his left by Brigadier Ryan. As they advanced they came under a heavy fire, and passing through a gap in the first line, charged the entrenchments, cheered on by Sir Harry, who shouted, "Into them, my lads; the day is your own!" Here fell Major Broadfoot, the Governor-General's political Agent, shot through the heart, having already been once knocked off his horse by another shot—a brave and invaluable officer, whose thorough knowledge of frontier affairs was most useful to the Governor-General. Smith pressed with Ryan's (the left) Brigade into the Sikh camp, driving all before him, and then coming upon the village of Ferozeshah, stormed and captured it; but in the confusion and darkness which was fast falling, his right brigade, under Brigadier Hicks, was separated from him, adhering to Gilbert's Division.

After carrying the entrenchment, as narrated, Gilbert's Division had been involved in a further struggle. His left brigade (McLaran's), with the 1st European Light Infantry leading, had wheeled to their left, and were charging along the line of the Sikh entrenchments, capturing and spiking many guns, when orders were received to secure the village of Ferozeshah. Towards this they now bent their way, but before they had gone more than 200 yards the men were suddenly scattered by the explosion of a large magazine of powder, the air being filled with smoke and fire, which, as it

cleared away, exposed to view a number of gallant soldiers lying frightfully mutilated. This fearful explosion in the rapidly approaching darkness scattered the regiment so much that scarcely 150 men remained with the colours of the 1st Europeans, whilst the fire spread, causing other and smaller explosions, all adding to the confusion. McLaran's Brigade, however, now greatly reduced in numbers, continued its advance on the village, but finding it already in possession of Sir Harry Smith, returned towards the line of the entrenchments.

A number of men of the 1st Europeans, scattered by the explosions, were collected by their officers, and, falling in, as related, with a portion of the 9th Foot, joined Sir Harry Smith in the village of Ferozeshah. Parched with thirst, the men, seeing some wells near by, sought for water, when the Sikhs from the camp suddenly opened fire on them. Lieutenant Greville of the 1st, the senior officer on the spot, led his men against the Sikhs, but was met by so severe a fire from a barricade the enemy had built up that they were forced back. Lieutenant Moxon, carrying one of the colours, was killed immediately in front of the barricade, when Lieutenant Percy Innes, seeing the colour lying on the ground, rushed back alone and brought it off amidst the cheers of the men. Lieutenant Greville, leading a second charge, succeeded in driving off the Sikhs and capturing the barricade.

Darkness was now rapidly increasing, and with it confusion. The Sikh camp was on fire, and frequent explosions were taking place, there became a danger of the troops firing into each other The Commander in-Chief therefore wisely decided to withdraw the scattered troops from the Sikh camp, and to form a bivouac in the open space about 300 yards from the entrenchments. The assembly, with the various regimental calls, was sounded. At length, after much search, the regiments, which had got considerably mixed, were collected and formed up.

It will indeed be obvious that the confusion was very great. Sir Harry Smith, with Brigadier Ryan's Brigade and detachments of various regiments, principally the 9th and 1st European Light Infantry from Taylor's and McLaran's Brigades respectively, with scattered bodies of sepoys, remained in the village, but without knowing the position occupied by any other troops. Owing to the sudden arrival of the darkness, the day being the shortest of the year, they were enveloped in its shades before Sir Harry Smith had means of ascertaining the whereabouts of the rest of the force, or of communicating his own position to the Commander-in-Chief. He formed up the 50th in a square on the eastern side of the village, the detachment of the other corps forming another square, irregular, but effective. These retained their position all through the night, although harassed by the enemy's fire and by parties of Sikhs prowling round in the darkness.

Littler's repulsed brigades had drawn up westwards, near Misreewalla, but this was not known to the other divisions.

In this position the British troops, with the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor-General of India in their midst, passed the night of the 21st December. The attack had been on the point of success when night put an end to the conflict. It was impossible to say exactly what was the position of the troops, but it was certain that the losses had been very severe. Littler's Division had been repulsed, and its position was unknown, while Sir Harry Smith, with a portion of his brigade, was missing. The men and officers were all worn out with fatigue, having been at work since 2 a.m.; hungry and without food, parched with thirst and without a drop of water, bitterly cold, without great-coats or any shelter, and unable to light fires without bringing down the fire of the enemy; and all this after a terribly severe struggle, while the Sikhs still maintained an incessant fire, and made the darkness more hideous with their shouts and clamour.

That night, when, as it has well been said, "the fate of India trembled in the balance," was a truly awful one for all, most so for the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor-General, while it tried the nerve of the most resolute and intrepid.

The Commander-in Chief did not, indeed, disguise from himself the critical nature of affairs, but he never for one moment wavered. Sternly and firmly he remained fixed to his decision to fight it out in the morning, fully relying on the discipline, courage, and tenacity of his British regiments. There were, indeed, those who would have counselled retreat, to one such he replied, "Better that our bones should bleach honourably on the field of battle, than retire." Sir Henry Hardinge was equally resolved, and entirely supported the chief, and their courageous determination proved the highest wisdom. No troops in the world could have behaved better than the Englishmen. Fatigue, hunger, thirst, the bitter cold, the losses they had suffered, the groans of their wounded comrades, the yells and incessant firing of the enemy—all these failed to shake their nerve. Animated and encouraged by the noble example of their commanders, and placing full reliance on their leading, they faced the worst with stern resolve to drive the enemy out in the morning But even brave and experienced officers were forced afterwards to admit that they had the most gloomy anticipations, knowing that the attack was to be renewed in the morning, they had uneasy doubts as to the result, for the native troops were much disheartened and unnerved by the carnage of the two preceding fights. The stern valour of the English troops and their indomitable courage was felt to be the sole and only resource.

Up to this time a gallant and distinguished officer, Prince Waldemar of Prussia, a member of the royal family, had accompanied the Governor-General through all this severe fighting, attended by some of his own friends, one

of whom had already met a soldier's death upon the field. But now Sir Henry Hardinge felt it would not be right to allow him to risk his valuable life in a cause not his own, and, to his great disappointment and vexation, Sir Henry insisted upon Prince Waldemar leaving the field and proceeding to Ferozepore. The prince was filled with regret at not being allowed to remain with the comrades he had learnt to love and respect, and to share their dangers to the end. He was, however, allowed subsequently to rejoin, and came in for further fighting at Sobraon.

The Sikhs had also suffered terrible losses, had been driven from their entrenchments, and, though much shattered, and to a considerable extent demoralised by the combat, still clung to the interior of the position. But when they found that the British force had evacuated the entrenchments, they reoccupied them, and opened fire upon the British bivouac. One gun causing especial annoyance, Sir Henry Hardinge at length called on H.M's 80th, with the 1st Europeans, to "Silence that gun." They responded gallantly, Colonel Bunbury leading with the 80th, assisted by Lieut.-Colonel Wood, an aide-de-camp to the Governor-General, and supported by the 1st, under Major Birrell. In perfect silence they advanced straight upon the gun till within a short distance, when they charged, bayoneting the gunners, spiking the gun, and completely dispersing the enemy. This gallant and very decisive episode showed the Sikhs beyond any doubt that they had not yet done with the English army, and gave a comparative peace to the weary troops for the remainder of the night.

Whilst this, the main portion of the army, consisting of the divisions of Gilbert and Wallace, and part of Smith's, together with the artillery and most of the cavalry, were lying outside to the south of the Sikh entrenchments, Sir Harry Smith, with his one brigade, held on to the village of Ferozeshah, in the centre of the Sikh position. To them also it was a terribly trying night, nor could they ascertain

what had become of the rest of the army, nor whether they were conquerors or conquered. In this state of isolation, and without any apparent support, Sir Harry Smith decided to evacuate the village before daylight, and to rejoin the rest of the army as best he could. Accordingly, at 3 a.m. he withdrew his troops by the south-west corner, and, guided by the lights of a bivouac, effected a junction with Sir John Littler, who after his repulse had drawn up his force in the neighbourhood of Misreewalla.

CHAPTER IV.

FEROZESHAH—SECOND DAY: DEC. 22

Renewal of the attack—Flight of the Sikhs—Approach of Tej Singh—His attack repulsed—Gallantry of Sir Hugh Gough—Retreat of Tej Singh—Generosity of a Sikh soldier—Losses at Ferozeshah—Comment of the Duke of Wellington—Discussion of Sir H. Hardinge's action on the previous day, and its effect.

So closed the memorable night of the 21st December; though not, for some hours yet, the Battle of Ferozeshah.

At the first appearance of the dawn, that portion of the army under the immediate orders of the Commander-in-Chief, formed line to renew the attack. Sir Hugh Gough placed himself at the head of the right, and Sir Henry Hardinge at the left of the line; Gilbert and Wallace at the head of their respective divisions. H.M.'s 31st, with the remains of the native corps attached to it, were on the extreme right. The Horse Artillery occupied the flanks, the heavy guns and a rocket battery the centre. These opened as effective a fire as they could pour in upon the Sikhs; under cover of which the infantry advanced in magnificent style unchecked by the enemy's fire, till the charge was sounded. Thereupon the whole line rushed upon the Sikhs, driving them in headlong flight at the point of the bayonet; then changed front to their left, swept the camp, and dislodged the enemy from their whole position. The line then halted, and drew up victorious on that well-fought battle-field, receiving both Sir Hugh Gough and Sir Henry Hardinge with loud and prolonged cheers, as they rode together down the line. The division of Sir John Littler, with Sir Harry

Smith's 2nd brigade, now rejoining, the whole army was concentrated in the Sikh position.

The troops which had been over twenty-four hours under the severest physical and nervous strain, with scarcely any food, and but little water, were fairly exhausted; but at last it seemed as if their labour was over, and they might get water and refreshments from the village and the camp. They were in the highest spirits, and already congratulating each other over their hard-won victory, when intelligence was sent back by the cavalry following up the retreat, to the north, of the defeated Sikhs that a fresh Sikh force was approaching from the direction of Ferozepore. The approach of these new-comers was presently heralded by huge clouds of dust. Tej Singh had spent the whole of the previous day watching, as he thought, Littler's force. *Hearing* the heavy fire in the evening, and probably finding that Littler had moved out, he had marched in the early morning of the 22nd to the assistance of Lall Singh; and now arrived upon the scene with some 30,000 cavalry and infantry and a large field of artillery. It is impossible to say whether he expected to find Lall Singh still in possession of his entrenched position; but it must soon have been made clear to him that the British were now entire masters of the field, and that the Sikhs had fled.

Our position, however, was now most critical. There was a perfectly fresh army to face; our men had had no opportunity for rest or refreshment; the ammunition was all but exhausted; the cavalry horses were so worn out by the long-continued work and want of food that many of them could hardly raise a trot. On the other hand, the Sikhs, brave and stubborn as they showed themselves in defence, never displayed equal capacity in the attack, owing, no doubt, in part, to want of training and ability in their leaders. Moreover, they were ignorant of the straits in which we were; whilst they plainly realised that our

army had driven Lall Singh from his entrenchments, and were now clearly determined to hold them.

Tej Singh drew up his army, sending his artillery to the front, and opening a heavy fire which was maintained with great vigour. An energetic attempt was made to turn our left flank, which was repulsed; this was followed by a similar attack and repulse on the right; and then the Sikhs began to fall back. It has been believed by many that Tej Singh took alarm at a movement on the part of the bulk of our cavalry and horse artillery, which had been ordered by an officer of the head-quarters staff to proceed to Ferozepore. That order has never been explained—it was wholly unauthorised; and the officer who gave it (who is said to have been suffering from sunstroke) was subsequently removed from his appointment, and severely reprimanded. But Tej Singh, unable to account for this curious movement, appears to have jumped to the conclusion that it was intended to attack him in the rear. At any rate, he began to fall back, when a bold dash of a squadron of the 3rd Light Dragoons, supported by a portion of the 4th Bengal Lancers, into the middle of the horde of Sikh cavalry, sent them flying. This charge was led by Brigadier White in person, and as they galloped past Gilbert's Division in their attack, that fine old soldier rode up and joined in the charge.

The second Sikh attack, and the fire of their heavy artillery, had been a great strain on the endurance, discipline, and pluck of our troops, and occasioned considerable loss; amongst others, Brigadier Wallace of H.M.'s 9th Foot, commanding the 3rd Division, was killed by a round shot. During this cannonade, Sir Hugh Gough was so deeply moved at seeing his brave infantry, soldiers who had fought so nobly, subjected to the severe fire, that he rode out to the flank of the force, accompanied by one aide-de-camp, and placed himself in a conspicuous position, in order to draw the fire of the Sikh guns away from his men. The shot

struck all round him, but neither Sir Hugh nor his gallant steed moved, nor were even touched, though His Excellency had had one horse struck by a round shot in the earlier part of the battle.

Tej Singh had now become aware of the tremendous carnage which had taken place in the course of expelling Lall Singh's troops from their entrenchments. From this knowledge he appears to have derived a conviction that it would be utterly useless to attempt dislodging from those entrenchments the men who had carried them with such manifest valour in the face of a resistance so conspicuously stubborn. Accordingly, he now withdrew, suddenly and entirely, and commenced a hasty retreat northward and towards the Sutlej. Detractors have affirmed that he merely wished for a plausible pretext, but the defence given is the one he himself subsequently alleged for his action, nor does it appear unreasonable. He did not know how exhausted our men were, nor that ammunition was failing, he did know that the troops before him were behind entrenchments out of which they had thrashed the flower of the Sikh army, while his own troops were chiefly irregulars. Had he been inspired with the enthusiasm of the Khalsa, he might have acted differently, but there is no real ground for questioning the honesty of his explanation.

Whatever Tej Singh's motive was, the sight of his army in hurried retreat was singularly welcome to the British troops. They had now been under arms for upwards of forty hours, they had had neither food nor water since the previous morning, they had been ceaselessly exposed to the most fatiguing work, the additional strain of anxiety, during the past night especially, had been intense, and for a great part of the time they had been engaged in actual hard fighting with a powerful and most stubborn foe. Now at last the weary troops, completely tired out and exhausted by their two days' sanguinary contest, and the want of food and water, could seek shelter and refreshment.

Fortunately the Sikh camp and village of Ferozeshah afforded both, large stores of grain having been collected by the enemy; besides which several bullocks were found and promptly killed.

The wounded, many of whom had been lying for twenty-four hours on the ground untended, were now looked after. Their sufferings had been terrible, and many had fallen victims to the merciless cruelty of the Sikhs; but it is again gratifying to be able to give one instance of humanity on the part of the enemy. Lieutenant Sievwright, an officer of H.M.'s 9th Foot, had been desperately wounded in front of the Sikh battery, and lay all that night in dreadful anguish on the field with a shattered leg, helpless and unable to move. At daylight, finding that the Sikhs were cutting up the unprotected wounded, he managed with incredible difficulty to drag himself some short way further off. Seeing a Sikh soldier approaching, Sievwright grasped his pistol and challenged him; to his relief, the Sikh replied, "Salaam, sahib." Seeing that he was clearly kindly disposed, Sievwright called him up; the man sat down beside him, and after some conversation it was arranged that the Sikh soldier should carry him to the nearest succour. This good Samaritan took his wounded foe on his back, and carried him, at the peril of his own life, some two miles to the rear, where he met a dooli, in which Sievwright was placed, and conveyed into Ferozepore. Acts of kindness between enemies have often been heard of on a battle-field, but never one that could surpass this. The Sikh remained with Lieutenant Sievwright, and tended him in hospital; but it is melancholy to relate that the gallant young officer himself died only a week after from the effects of his wound, which necessitated the amputation of his leg above the knee. Records do not show what became of the brave and kind-hearted Sikh, but it may be certain that his generous humanity did not pass unrewarded.

The list of casualties in this great battle shows not only

how stubborn was the fighting, but also how entirely the brunt of it was borne by the European troops. Sir Hugh Gough himself had one horse killed under him, and one of his personal staff, Lieutenant—now Field-Marshal Sir Frederick—Haines severely wounded. The Governor-General had every member of his staff disabled, and Major Broadfoot was killed. Brigadier Wallace, in command of a division, was killed. General Gilbert, commanding a division, had one horse killed and another wounded under him, and Brigadiers Harriott, White, and Taylor, were all wounded.

It is difficult to ascertain the actual strength of regiments in action. The European infantry regiments probably numbered about 5600, making up about 6000 with the grand old 3rd Light Dragoons, who had already lost nearly 100 killed and wounded at Moodkee, and cannot now have amounted to more than 400 men. On the other hand, the 15 regiments native infantry, and 5 regiments native cavalry, must have made up 10,000, but the losses were —

Killed officers, British, 37, native, 17, men, British, 462, native, 178, total, 694.

Wounded officers, British, 78, native, 18, men, British, 1054, native, 571, total, 1721

Grand total of all ranks killed and wounded, 2415.

The losses of the British regiments are given in detail in a footnote. Proud indeed may those regiments be of the part they played in the battle of Ferozeshah.*

* Losses in British Regiments—

	Killed.				Wounded.			
3rd Light Dragoons	2	officers	53	men	7	officers	86	men
H.M.'s 9th Foot	3	„	67	„	7	„	167	„
H.M.'s 29th Foot	3	„	52	„	3	„	192	„
H.M.'s 31st Foot ...	2	„	59	„	0	„	96	„
H.M.'s 50th Foot	2	„	24	„	6	„	80	„
H.M.'s 62nd Foot ...	7	„	97	„	11	„	181	„
H.M.'s 80th Foot	4	„	39	„	4	„	78	„
1st European Light Infantry ..	4	„	51	„	4	„	164	„
Artillery, European and Native	2	„	30	„	4	„	84	„

Two officers mortally wounded are included among the killed. There is a slight discrepancy between the returns of casualties as shown by the various regiments in their records given as above and those made up somewhat hastily and forwarded to Army Head-quarters immediately after the action.

Seventy-three guns had been captured on the field; a Sikh army of over 60,000 men had been completely routed, and the enemy driven over the frontier. The Duke of Wellington, writing to Sir Hugh Gough, on receipt of his news of Ferozeshah, lamented the heavy losses, but added these words: "Long experience has taught me that such achievements cannot be performed, and such objects attained as in these operations without great loss, and that in point of fact the honour acquired by all is proportionate to the difficulties and dangers met and overcome."

Before leaving Ferozeshah, it is necessary once more to revert to the conflict of opinion between the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief. No one will dispute that Sir Henry Hardinge acted in a manner which must have been most distasteful to him, and under stress of a strong sense of duty, an entire conviction that the Commander-in-Chief's plan involved a risk which it was out of the question for him to sanction. For the plan which was followed, Sir Henry took the responsibility which was his and his only, although some of those who blamed the course taken have spoken as if Sir Hugh Gough was to be held accountable. Opinions may differ as to the wisdom of the course chosen; there is no room whatever for difference as to the responsibility for choosing it. On the other hand, the consequences of that choice are perfectly clear. The attack was delayed so long that night came on before the Sikhs were fairly driven from their position, the British brigades lost each other in the darkness, heavy losses were incurred, and a fresh fight with fresh troops had to be carried on through the greater part of the following day without time or opportunity for food or refreshment. It may indeed be argued that no one can tell what would have happened had the Commander-in-Chief been allowed to carry out his plan. Looking at the facts, however, it seems difficult to doubt that that plan would have met with complete success. It was opposed broadly on the ground

that the Sikh position could not be carried without Sir John Littler's force, but when that force joined, one-half of it, Ashburnham's Brigade, never seems to have come fairly into action, and the other half was repulsed. The approach of night greatly increased the hurry and consequent confusion, yet before the darkness fell, the Moodkee force, and the Moodkee force alone, had carried the en trenchment, and would, it may be said with certainty, have driven the Sikhs completely out of their position—as they did the next morning—with another two hours of daylight to do it in. Had this same force made the attack at twelve o'clock instead of at four, while still comparatively fresh, the Sikhs must have been completely routed. Littler's force would have arrived early in the engagement, in time to give whatever support was required, whereas in the actual battle, from the time of its repulse, which preceded the advance of the right and centre, it rendered no assistance whatever The plan of the Commander-in-Chief, in fact, bears a remarkable resemblance to that of Moltke at Königgrätz, when, instead of waiting for a junction to be completed, he attacked the Austrians, the second army coming up and attacking the enemy in flank during the engagement—thus achieving a decisive victory

Even if the attack had met with an initial check, Sir John would have been in time to prevent disaster The horror of the night of December 21st would have been escaped, the British troops would have had that food and water which were so sorely needed, and would have faced Tej Singh the next day recuperated instead of exhausted.

Still it must be remembered that with the smaller force the *possibility* of a complete repulse would have been greater, and its effects terrific. Sir Henry accounted that risk too tremendous to be incurred, very much as in 1857 General Wilson, before Delhi, could hardly be persuaded to sanction the storming, in which failure would have meant the loss of India.

Sir Henry's action may be deplored or applauded, and Sir Hugh's generalship commended or condemned, according to the judgment of the critic; but whatever view may be taken of the Governor-General's interference, his personal conduct in the presence of the crisis, the splendid example he showed of courage, of resolution, of calmness, or, in one word, of *grit*, are beyond all praise; and their effect on the spirit of the men on that night when "the fate of India trembled in the balance" can never be over-estimated.

CHAPTER V.

BUDHOWAL AND ALIWAL DEC. 23–JAN. 28

Movements of troops—Renewed activity of Sikhs—Movements on Ludhiana—Skirmish of Budhowal, Jan. 21.—Runjoor Singh at Aliwal—Junction of Sir H. Smith and Wheeler—Advance on Aliwal—The attack—Action of cavalry—Rout of the Sikhs—British losses—Effects of the victory

The Sikh army, shattered, and having lost nearly 100 guns and about 5000 men, retired from Ferozeshah and recrossed the Sutlej, just ten days after the invasion; whilst the Commander-in-Chief encamped at Sultan Khan Walla, watching the frontier and awaiting the arrival of the troops which had been ordered to advance from the more distant stations of Meerut, Delhi, and Cawnpore, at the same time as those from Umballa and the hill stations. On the 27th December, Sir Hugh Gough advanced to Arufkee, and personally pushed a reconnaissance to the fords at Sobraon, where the enemy were to be seen encamped on the right bank of the river Sir Harry Smith's Division was placed at Malowal, from which point he maintained a careful watch on the enemy

In the meantime the Sikhs had not been idle. Short as the time was, they had already brought up a fresh supply of guns from Lahore, and were almost as well furnished with artillery as before, whilst their army was rehabilitated and reinforced by large bodies of well-trained soldiers. By the 5th January they were showing renewed signs of aggression and making predatory incursions across the Sutlej, in the direction of Ludhiana, with the intention

of interfering with the advance of the British reinforcements.

On the 6th January, Sir John Grey arrived at the army head-quarters with a force of about 10,000 men, consisting of H.M.'s 9th and 16th Lancers, each over 500 strong; the 3rd Bengal Light Cavalry, the 4th Irregular Cavalry, two Batteries of Artillery (12 guns), H.M.'s 10th Foot, and three regiments of Native Infantry with a company of Sappers. Leaving Meerut between the 10th and 16th December, they had marched over the fields of Moodkee and Ferozeshah still covered with the signs of the sanguinary battles which had there been fought. Ludhiana also had been reinforced by the Sirmoor and Nusseeree Battalions of Goorkhas, the 30th Regiment Native Infantry, and one of cavalry under Brigadier Godby; whilst other troops were still on the march and closing up.

The Sikhs again assumed the initiative by crossing in a considerable body near Ludhiana for the purpose of gathering in supplies from their Jaghir states in that vicinity, and about Dhurmkote, a small fort halfway between Ferozeshah and Ludhiana, in which they had a garrison. On the 17th January, therefore, Sir Harry Smith was sent against this small fort, which was easily reduced, the garrison surrendering at discretion. But the Sikh force which had crossed the river, and which had been reinforced with all arms, now, under the Sirdar Runjoor Singh, threatened an attack on Ludhiana, and even indicated an intention of cutting our line of communication. Consequently, the Commander-in-Chief decided to utilise Sir Harry Smith's force, strengthened by H.M.'s 16th Lancers, the 3rd Light Cavalry, a troop of Horse Artillery, and H.M.'s 53rd Foot (now on its way up and near Bussean), to relieve and secure Ludhiana.

Accordingly, on the 20th, Sir H. Smith marched from Dhurmkote to Jugraon, so as to skirt round Runjoor Singh, and so move by him into Ludhiana. On the 21st he

advanced from Jugraon towards Ludhiana, but on approaching Budhowal, about 11 a.m., he found that Runjoor Singh had taken up an entrenched position which flanked and commanded the road by which he was moving Being desirous of reaching Ludhiana without fighting a battle, he decided to move on across Runjoor's front, leaving him to be dealt with when the force was consolidated, and this brought on the affair of Budhowal. The Sikhs opened a heavy fire, but Smith moved on, covering his movement with his cavalry, artillery, and the 53rd Foot. The Sikh cavalry came out and followed up, cutting off a large portion of the baggage and a portion of the rear-guard, but avoiding a conflict with our cavalry Several European soldiers, exhausted by the long and arduous marching, were taken prisoners by the Sikhs, who, to their credit be it said, treated them fairly well, and, after the battle of Sobraon, released them and sent them back. Still, the number of killed and wounded, particularly in H.M.'s 53rd, proves that many stragglers, and probably sick men in the rear of the column, must have been mercilessly murdered. Quartermaster Cornes, who with a party of 1 sergeant, and 30 men of H.M.'s 53rd, was in charge of the regimental baggage, finding his party cut off from the main body, rallied round him a small detachment of the 16th Lancers and a party of sepoys, making in all 2 officers and 80 men, and succeeded in saving a considerable portion of the baggage, and making good his retreat on Jugraon, in the face of about 1000 Sikhs with a field-gun, who threatened to attack him, but were held in check by his bold front and steady discipline.

There are no official details of this affair, this account is taken principally from what can be gathered from regimental records. Sir Harry Smith, although he succeeded in passing by Runjoor Singh without fighting a general action, suffered a considerable loss in men and baggage, and marched into Ludhiana that evening, with his troops

greatly exhausted. The 16th Lancers lost 2 men killed, and 1 wounded. H.M.'s 31st Regiment lost 21 men killed and wounded, and 19 taken prisoners. H.M.'s 53rd Regiment lost 36 men killed, and 12 wounded. There is no means of ascertaining the loss of native troops. The Sikhs seem to have derived considerable encouragement from this skirmish; some highly exaggerated language about defeat and disaster was used by people who ought to have known better.

The Commander-in-Chief also despatched the 2nd Brigade of Sir Harry Smith's Division on the 22nd January to reinforce him; the expulsion of the Sikhs from the Ludhiana neighbourhood being regarded as very important. Brigadier Wheeler, now recovered from the wound received at Moodkee, had resumed the command and reached Dhurmkote that evening, not having heard of the affair which had occurred at Budhowal on the previous day. On the 23rd he continued his march direct on Ludhiana, but on arriving at Sidham he gained information that a large Sikh force was on the road, and between him and the rest of the division. He therefore decided to return to Dhurmkote, and move round a circuitous way by Jugraon, his troops being fairly fagged out by their hard day's march of over 30 miles through heavy sand and under a hot sun. On the other hand, Runjoor Singh, hearing of Wheeler's advance, and feeling that he might be attacked both from Dhurmkote and Ludhiana, made haste to evacuate his threatening position at Budhowal, and fell back on Aliwal close to the banks of the Sutlej. On the 24th Wheeler moved to Jugraon; on the 25th Sir Harry Smith advanced from Ludhiana to Budhowal, where he was joined by Wheeler, and his whole force concentrated.

On the 26th, then, Sir Harry's whole force was made up as follows:—Artillery: 22 guns Horse Artillery, and 6 guns Field Artillery, under Major Lawrence. Cavalry—1st Brigade, under Brigadier McDowell: H.M.'s 16th Lancers, 530 strong; 3rd Light Cavalry, 372; 4th Irregulars, 398

= 1300 men. 2nd Brigade, under Brigadier Stedman Governor-General's Body guard, 351, 1st Light Cavalry, 422, 5th Light Cavalry, 402 = 1107 men. Cavalry of the Shekawatti Brigade, 631 men, under Major Forster, the whole cavalry force, under Brigadier Cureton of H.M.'s 16th Lancers, numbering 3038. Infantry—1st Brigade, Brigadier Hicks commanding H.M.'s 31st Regiment, now reduced to 544 men, 24th Regiment Native Infantry, 481 men, 36th Regiment Native Infantry, 571 men = 1596 2nd Brigade (Brigadier Wheeler) H.M.'s 50th Regiment, 494 men only (sad results of Moodkee and Ferozeshah), 48th Native Infantry, 857 men, and the Sirmoor Goorkhas, 781 men = 2132. 3rd Brigade, under Brigadier Wilson H.M.'s 53rd Regiment, 699, 30th Native Infantry, 824, Shekawatti Battalion, 625. 4th Brigade, under Brigadier Godby 47th Native Infantry, 713, the Nusseeree Battalion Goorkhas, 586 = 1299 Total infantry, 7175.

Sir Harry Smith's total force, therefore, amounted to more than 10,000 fighting men, with 28 field guns, and two 8-inch howitzers.

Sirdar Runjoor Singh, whose troops at Budhowal had been chiefly irregular levies, had also received a reinforcement of 4000 regular troops and 12 guns, on the 26th.

Sir Harry Smith's men had gone through such long marches and such hard work that he considered it advisable to give them a day's rest to recruit themselves, but at daylight on the 28th January he advanced from Budhowal to attack Runjoor, who was known to be in position at Aliwal, on the left bank of the Sutlej, about 16 miles to the north west, having a very considerable force and some 50 guns, and with every intention of fighting

The cavalry in the line of columns, with two troops of Horse Artillery, formed the first line, and covered Sir Harry's front, scouting the country as they advanced, infantry and artillery following After proceeding in this order about 9 miles, the enemy were sighted in position

on the west of a low ridge about a mile in front. Sir Harry Smith had received information through spies that it was Runjoor Singh's intention to move out of his position that morning either on Ludhiana, or to attack him at Budhowal; and as he approached, this rumour was confirmed by a spy, who reported that the Sikh army was actually on the march. Sir Harry, however, felt confident that whatever movements Runjoor might be contemplating, he had him in his grasp now; and his continued advance direct upon the Sikhs brought them entirely to the defensive.

Runjoor took up a position with his left on the banks of the Sutlej, along the crest of some rising ground; the village of Aliwal was held somewhat in front of his left, and the village of Boondree on his right, his guns being placed all along the line of front, the general bearing of which was south-east. Sir Harry Smith's line faced north-west. As he approached Runjoor Singh the cavalry and horse artillery wheeled outwards, and took up position on the right and left, displaying the now deployed line of infantry advancing to the attack. The batteries immediately advanced to effective range, and came into action; and the battle began.

It was now 10 o'clock, and the whole scene most striking. The morning was clear and beautiful, the country open and hard grass land—a fair field for all arms. There was no dust, and the sun shone brightly. Brigadier Stedman commanded the cavalry on the right; the 1st and 5th Regiments of Native Cavalry, the Governor-General's Body-guard, the Shekawatti cavalry, and the 4th Irregulars. Then came Godby's Brigade, the Goorkhas of the Nusseeree Battalion, and the 36th Native Infantry; next, Hicks's Brigade, H.M.'s 31st Foot, with the 24th and 47th Regiments Native Infantry; on their left and in the centre of the line the two 8-inch howitzers and a large battery of 18 guns; then Wheeler's Brigade, H.M.'s 50th, the 48th

Native Infantry, the Sirmoor Goorkhas (Brigadier Wheeler had so much confidence in his own regiment, the 48th, that he placed it in the centre of the brigade the corps fully justified his opinion), then two batteries of artillery (12 guns), then Wilson's Brigade of H.M.'s 53rd Foot, the 30th Native Infantry, and the Shekawatti infantry, then on the extreme left H.M.'s 16th Lancers and the 3rd Light Cavalry

Sir Harry Smith soon perceived that by bringing up his right, and carrying the village of Aliwal in front of the Sikh left, he could with great effect precipitate him self upon their left and centre, and cut off their line of retreat by the ford. He therefore brought up Godby's Brigade, and with it Hicks's. The latter was directed upon the village, which was carried in fine style, and two guns taken. At the same time the right brigade of cavalry was directed to attack the Sikh horse, and this also was most gallantly done, their cavalry being driven back upon and among their own infantry, while our right pushed on rapidly Whilst these operations were going on on the right, Brigadier Wheeler also advanced to the attack, supported by Wilson, the guns of Alexander, Turton, Lane, Mill, Boileau, and of the Shekawatti Brigade, as also the 8-inch howitzers, pushing on continually in front of the advancing infantry The enemy's fire fell heavily upon the right brigade—Wheeler's own—but they advanced most steadily, halting twice and lying down under the fire, to steady the men and prevent hurry, and to allow Wilson's Brigade to get forward, which was necessary

and the Goorkhas and 30th Native Infantry, a thunder of horses' hoofs was heard on their left, and H.M.'s 16th Lancers, in great strength, came sweeping by with lances lowered, and, supported by the 3rd Bengal Light Cavalry, charged right down upon the foe. The Sikh infantry hurriedly formed squares; but the squadrons of the 16th swept through and through them, and smashing up a large body of the celebrated Aieen troop, trained by General Avitabile, utterly routed the whole Sikh right. The charge of one squadron of the 16th Lancers, led by Major Smyth and Captain Pearson, upon a well-formed square of Avitabile's Regiment, deserves special notice; as, notwithstanding the steadiness of the enemy, the Lancers broke the square, charged through, reformed and charged again in splendid style—a feat very rarely accomplished. Wheeler, with his own and Wilson's Brigades, followed up rapidly, with the result of capturing the village of Boondree and many guns; the village being stormed by H.M.'s 53rd. The Sikh infantry declined to meet the charge of Wilson's Brigade; but their gunners resolutely stood their ground. They could not, however, hold the guns, which were captured at the point of the bayonet. The whole Sikh force was now driven in utter rout and confusion to the ford. Pursued by the cavalry, who made repeated charges, and pressed by the infantry, they were unable to make any attempt to rally, and flinging themselves into the river, fled to the right bank, leaving all their guns, camp equipage, baggage, and stores to fall into the hands of the victors; 67 guns were amongst the captured trophies, and many camel-guns.

Sir Harry Smith bestowed well-deserved praise on the officers and men who had fought this brilliant action. Of the artillery, he said, "Our guns and gunners, officers and men may be equalled, but cannot be excelled; no troops ever behaved more nobly, British and native, without distinction; the native cavalry vieing with H.M.'s 16th Lancers, and striving to head in the repeated charges.

Throughout the day there was no hesitation, but a bold and intrepid advance; and thus it is our loss is comparatively small." On this occasion also the Field Hospital arrangements were efficiently and well carried out, and the wounded well provided for.

Aliwal proved the utter inability of the Sikh army, even with double the number of men and guns, to make more than an honourable stand against British troops on a fair field. It showed also that the native troops, when not exhausted by hunger and fatigue, as they had been at Ferozeshah, could render invaluable support to the English regiments; and to this Sir Harry Smith in his despatches amply testified.

The loss in this well-fought battle was small, in all regiments except H.M.'s 16th Lancers; they in their brilliant charges, against guns and well-trained infantry who fought to the death, suffered heavily. There were 2 officers and 57 men killed, 6 officers and 77 men wounded—making a total of 8 officers and 134 men; 66 horses were killed, and 85 wounded. The 50th Foot also, which advanced against the Sikh central battery, suffered considerably; the native corps serving with them lost 5 officers wounded, 1 native officer and 15 men killed, 9 native officers and 75 men wounded.

The total loss of the force amounted to: killed 151, wounded 413, and missing 25 men = 580.

The immediate result of the victory was the complete submission of the whole of the Sikh territory on the left bank of the Sutlej, which was entirely evacuated by the enemy.

The news of the complete defeat of Runjoor Singh was received, as might be expected, with great joy by both Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief. The former issued a general order announcing the victory, congratulating the commander and his force, and extolling their valour, discipline, and skill, in well-deserved terms. To

the cavalry especially he gave great credit. To Brigadier Cureton, who commanded the cavalry, his thanks were more markedly given for the skill and intrepidity with which he had handled his force; since the admiration of the army had been elicited by the resolute charges of H.M.'s 16th Lancers, penetrating the Sikh squares with the gallant support of the 3rd Native Light Cavalry. The guns taken in addition to those already captured at Moodkee and Ferozeshah brought the total up to 143 pieces. At Aliwal, also, the two Goorkha regiments, not yet enrolled among the regular regiments of infantry, much distinguished themselves. By order of the Governor-General a royal salute was fired from the British camp, the bands raising the National Anthem. The Sikhs on the opposite bank, not to be outdone, followed suit with both; and their bands were heard playing "God save the Queen"!

CHAPTER VI.

SOBRAON: FEB. 10

The Sikh position—Plans of attack—Final plan—The British force—Preparations for attack—Artillery duel—Advance ordered—The left attack—Smith's Division—Gilbert's Division—Rout of the Sikhs—Losses.

REINFORCEMENTS of all arms had been moving up ever since the great battle of Ferozeshah, and now the whole army was concentrated for the decisive struggle on the banks of the Sutlej. The siege-train, with ammunition for the field guns, reached the Commander-in-Chief's camp on the 7th of February, and on the 8th Sir Harry Smith, with his victorious division, marched into camp. Meantime the Sikhs had been as busy as bees strengthening their position, and were to be seen at work every day until it had assumed quite formidable proportions. Strong earthworks with deep ditches stretched in half-circle from bank to bank, behind these the river formed a loop, and across it, in order to maintain their communications, the Sikhs had thrown a bridge of boats. There was also a ford. In order still further to protect the bridge, interior lines of earthworks had been erected in succession; the position was throughout armed with heavy guns, whilst batteries were placed on the north side of the river, more effectually to sweep the front, especially of their right, against an attack in that direction. The strongest part of the enemy's position was the centre, the weakest on their right, where the earthworks were less formidable.

The position had been most carefully reconnoitred, the proceedings of the Sikhs strictly watched, the plan of attack most deliberately thought out.

At one time a plan was considered of suddenly breaking up from before Sobraon, and endeavouring to cross the Sutlej by surprise at the Ford of Gunda Singh Walla, and then advancing upon the Sikhs; but Sir Hugh Gough, after full consideration, decided against this, as in his opinion there was little chance of effecting a surprise, the Sikhs having full information of all our movements. Moreover, even if we did cross successfully, the Sikh army might easily fall back on Lahore, thereby increasing our difficulties, owing to the hostility of the people; and the war might possibly be thus converted into one of sieges. He fully recognised the strength of the Sikh position at Sobraon; but he judged that a defeat there would be fatal to them, and would be in all probability decisive of the war; and he resolved to make it so.

Accordingly he arranged to attack the enemy's extreme right, and, having penetrated there, to roll them up.

This plan was submitted to the Governor-General, who replied in the following cautious and guarded words, "If, upon the fullest consideration, the artillery can be brought into play, I recommend you *to attack*; if it cannot, and you anticipate a heavy loss, I would recommend you not to attempt it." Unhesitatingly Sir Hugh Gough accepted the responsibility. On the 9th of February orders were issued for the attack, and these were fully explained to the generals commanding.

In order the better to understand the delivery of the attack, it is advisable to enumerate the force now collected, re-organised, and disposed for attack.

Major-General Sir John Littler still held Ferozepore and watched the ferry over the Sutlej. Sir John Grey, with the 8th Light Cavalry, and the 41st, 45th, and 68th Regiments Native Infantry, held Attaree, watching fords

west of Sobraon. Brigadier Wheeler also took no part in the battle of Sobraon, having been left, after Aliwal, in command of a detachment of native troops, to watch the fords of the Sutlej, and cover Ludhiana.

The main body was concentrated before Sobraon with the Commander-in-Chief.

Brigadier Smith commanded the engineers, and here it is fair to mention the fact, so honourable to Brigadier Irvine, a very distinguished engineer officer, who arrived in camp on the evening of the 9th, that the command would have devolved on him as senior officer, but that, with the generosity of spirit which is always a characteristic of a true-born soldier, he declined to assume it, in order that all the credit of the work which Brigadier Smith had begun might attach to that officer. For himself, Brigadier Irvine sought only to share the perils of the field, and throughout the day he accompanied the Commander-in-Chief.

Brigadier Gowan, C.B., commanded the artillery. An endeavour had been made to rectify the inferiority of our guns in the matter of weight of metal by enlarging the bores of nine-pounders into twelve, but the number of our *guns did not exceed 60*.

Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, a distinguished Peninsula and Waterloo officer, commanded the cavalry division, Brigadier Cureton commanded the greater part of the cavalry, H.M.'s 16th Lancers, with the 3rd, 4th, *and 5th Regiments of Light Cavalry—with which he was* to make a show of crossing the Sutlej by the Hurreekee Ford, on the right flank of the attack, so as to draw the enemy's attention to that point.

Sir Harry Smith's Division of Infantry of two brigades, under Brigadier Penny and Brigadier Hicks respectively (the former consisting of H.M.'s 31st Foot, the 47th Native Infantry and the Nusseeree Battalion (Goorkhas), and the latter of H.M.'s 50th Foot and the 42nd Native Infantry),

was to attack the enemy's extreme left; and formed on our right, supported by Campbell's Cavalry Brigade, which included H.M.'s 9th Lancers and two troops Horse Artillery.

The centre was occupied by Gilbert's Division of Infantry: 1st Brigade, under Brigadier Taylor, H.M.'s 29th Foot, the 41st and 68th Regiments Native Infantry; 2nd Brigade, the 1st European Light Infantry, the 16th Regiment Native Infantry, and the Sirmoor Battalion (Goorkhas), under Brigadier McLaran. Between him and Sir Harry Smith on the right, was placed a battery of eight heavy guns. Gilbert's Division was accompanied by No. 19 Field Battery.

On Gilbert's left was to be placed another battery of heavy guns.

On the extreme left Sir Robert Dick was to lead the attack, and his force was strengthened accordingly; it was to advance in two lines, and to have a strong reserve of both cavalry and infantry. His first line consisted of H.M.'s 10th and 53rd Regiments, with the 43rd and 59th Regiments Native Infantry, under Brigadier Stacey, accompanied by Brigadier Orchard. His second line was made up of H.M.'s 80th Foot, with the 33rd Native Infantry, under Brigadier Wilkinson; whilst in reserve were placed H.M.'s 9th Foot, the 62nd Foot, and the 26th Native Infantry, under Brigadier Hon. T. Ashburnham; and to their rear, again, Brigadier Scott's Cavalry Brigade, H.M.'s 3rd Light Dragoons, and the 3rd and 9th Irregulars, with whom were the 4th, 5th, and 73rd Regiments Native Infantry.

Fortune so far favoured the British that the river had suddenly risen owing to a storm of heavy rain which had occurred a day or two before; so much so that the ford, which was usually safe, had become extremely dangerous on the day of the attack.

At 2 a.m. the troops fell in silently, and, forming into

columns, moved quietly towards their respective positions No sound or sign of the coming attack reached the Sikhs, and, whilst it was yet dark, the various columns had all formed accurately according to their orders for the attack There they waited, in disciplined order and silence, for the dawn of day When it came, a dense fog so covered the ground that nothing could be seen, and it became necessary to wait yet longer, but presently the scene changed. In the animated language of the historical records of the 1st Bengal European Light Infantry, now the Royal Munster Fusiliers, evidently written by one who was present—

"The rising sun rapidly dispelled the fog, when a magnificent picture presented itself. The batteries of artillery were seen in position ready to open fire, and the plain covered with our troops, the fortified village of Rhoda Walla on our left rear being strongly held by our infantry Immediately the guns opened a heavy fire. The enemy appearing suddenly to realise their danger, their drums beat the alarm, their bugles sounded to arms, and in a few minutes their batteries were manned, and pouring shot and shell upon our troops."

Thus quickly was the scene transformed from the picturesque to war in veritable earnest, and thus began the Battle of Sobraon.

For two hours the hail of shot and shell continued on both sides, and yet no decided advantage had been gained, the Sikh guns, firing from behind their field fortifications, could not be silenced. It was clear, as at Ferozeshah, that the battle could not be gained by superiority of artillery fire, the ammunition of the heavy guns was failing and their fire slackening This was reported to the Commander-in-Chief, to whom it was evident that the issue of the struggle must be brought to "the arbitrament of musketry and the bayonet." He had the most implicit confidence in the ability and leading of his officers, and the courage and discipline of his troops. Turning to his nephew, Colonel J B. Gough, Quartermaster-General, he directed him to convey the order to Sir Robert Dick to commence the attack. In such moments as this the spirit of the

commander communicates itself like magic to his troops, and a rumour flew down the line at once "that old Gough had been told that there were only four more rounds left per gun, and says, 'Thank God! then I'll be at them with the bayonet.'" Whether he actually used those precise words or not is immaterial; the fact that the rumour went down the line is beyond any manner of doubt, and it was received with delight by the men, because they knew and felt there was not a doubt of success in their brave old leader's mind, and that he had most perfect confidence in them.

Sir Robert Dick received the order at nine o'clock, and immediately the batteries of Horsford, Fordyce, and Lane's Horse Artillery galloped to the front, and proceeded to cover the advance of Stacey's Brigade, which moved forward with the utmost steadiness, frequently halting to correct the line and prevent any hurry on the part of the men. The guns continued their advance in this manner, preceding the infantry, and taking up fresh positions till within 300 yards of the entrenchments, when a body of the enemy's cavalry moved out and threatened the left flank of the line, where H.M.'s 53rd Foot was advancing. These were soon dispersed by a well-directed fire from the flank company of the regiment, and by the discharge of some rounds of grape from one of the batteries. The 53rd immediately following up, with a cheer charged the enemy's entrenchments, being the first to enter them. During this advance the regiment was enfiladed for a time by a Sikh battery on the right bank of the river, Captain Warren being killed, and Lieutenant Lucas, carrying one of the colours, wounded. Stacey's Brigade rushed forward simultaneously, and the first line of the enemy's entrenchments was occupied. Colonel Gough, who accompanied Sir Robert Dick's attack, here fell severely wounded. Stacey's attack was ably supported by Brigadier Wilkinson, not a shot having been fired, except by the flank company, until the first line of entrenchments was carried.

Here, however, Stacey's advance was checked, and he

had to wait until Dick brought up his second line, for the Sikh batteries to the right now enfiladed our troops. These were attacked and carried by H.M.'s 10th and 80th, Sir Robert Dick meeting his death-wound about this time. The division then continued its advance, driving the enemy towards the centre, the Sikh Akhalis (fanatics corresponding to the Mussulman Ghazis) fighting most stubbornly. Here a curious form of defence had been adopted by the enemy. Large pits capable of holding 30 men had been prepared, into which they were now crowded, and, being caught like rats in a trap, were easily disposed of.

The Sikhs, seeing that their right had been broken into, commenced a rush from all parts of their position to retake it. In order to hold them in check, and to relieve the pressure on Dick's Division, the divisions of Sir Harry Smith on the right, and Gilbert in the centre, were ordered to attack at once.

In the same manner as Dick had advanced, Sir Harry Smith led on his division against the extreme left of the Sikh position, Brigadier Penny in the first line, supported closely by Brigadier Hicks, and covered by the fire of the artillery. The men, who up to this had been lying down, sprang up, formed, and advanced. But the ground immediately in front of the Sikh works was much broken by watercourses, which made it difficult for the men to keep their places, the enemy's fire was very severe, and the formidable nature of the earthworks prevented the assailants climbing up. After a desperate struggle, the first line was compelled to give way and fall back, but they were well and resolutely supported by Brigadier Hicks, who, opening the ranks to let the men through, re-formed and charged. Penny's Brigade, rapidly rallying, joined in the charge again, the soldiers being maddened by seeing the Sikhs run out and cut up their unfortunate and brave comrades who had fallen in the first attack. This time the entrenchments were carried. Brigadier Penny having been severely

wounded in the first attack, Colonel Spence, of H.M.'s 31st, assumed command of the 1st Brigade.

Thus our troops had established themselves on the enemy's left flank, and were pressing on when a fire was opened on them from behind. Turning round, it was seen that some of the Sikhs had run in again on the captured guns and reopened fire; whereupon Hicks directed H.M.'s 50th to retake them, which was quickly done.

Gilbert's Division, in the centre, attacking at the same time as the first division under Smith, came upon such high earthworks that they were quite unable to scale them without ladders, and were twice forced to fall back. Not even their devoted gallantry could overcome the obstacles, and their loss was great. Gilbert himself was wounded, and Brigadier McLaran most severely. Major Fisher, of the Sirmoor battalion, was shot dead with a bullet in the brain; it is remarkable that he remained sitting on his horse for an appreciable interval before he fell. Many officers and men were struck down. Yet a third time the division was led on to the charge, on a part of the earthworks considerably to the left of the part previously attacked, where they were lower. Mounting on each other's shoulders, they gained a footing in the entrenchments, and as they increased in numbers they rushed upon the guns, which were now captured; and soon the glad news that all the troops had won their way into the Sikh position spread down the line. In this third charge fell also Brigadier Taylor, of H.M.'s 29th, struck by a bullet in the head, after he had already been wounded by a sabre-cut in the face.

H.M.'s 3rd Light Dragoons again greatly distinguished themselves by their exceptional gallantry. Following up Dick's Division, they found their way within the line of the entrenchments, and charged down among the now discomfited Sikhs; yet to the last the enemy fought bravely and doggedly, endeavouring to stem the torrent of retreat; but, pressed on all sides, they were forced headlong to the

bridge. The guns now brought up opened a heavy and destructive fire, the bridge gave way under the fugitives, and no resource was left but the river, the deepened ford of which was no longer safe. Our troops, fairly infuriated by the butchery of their brave comrades massacred before their eyes, spared not, and it is calculated that the Sikh loss exceeded 10,000 men. Every gun within the position was captured, 67 guns, mostly of heavy calibre, being taken on the field, and the whole Sikh army was utterly and irretrievably defeated.

The action was completed before noon, but this great success was not achieved against a determined and resolute foe without a corresponding loss. Many brave and distinguished officers fell, foremost amongst them Sir Robert Dick, a veteran of the Peninsula and Waterloo, mortally wounded by a grape-shot in the moment of his glorious success, he died in the evening Brigadier Taylor, of H.M.'s 29th, who had led his brigade so splendidly at Moodkee and Ferozeshah, was killed. Colonel Ryan, K.H., and Colonel Petit, both of H.M.'s 50th, were severely wounded. Colonel J B Gough and Colonel Barr, on the Commander-in-Chief's staff, Brigadier Penny, and Brigadier McLaran, were all severely wounded. Altogether, the killed numbered 320, and the wounded 2063

Sir Henry Hardinge did not take any actual command on this occasion, but his fine military spirit led him into the thick of the battle, and he followed up the attack in person, encouraging the troops by his noble example

PLAN OF THE

BATTLE OF SOBRAON

FOUGHT ON THE 10TH FEBY 1846 BY THE BRITISH ARMY

under the personal command of


GENL SIR HUGH GOUGH, BART G.C.B.

— *with the* —

SIKH FORCES ENTRENCHED

— *on the* —

SUTLEJ.



CHAPTER VII.

SURVEY OF THE CAMPAIGN

Quality of the Sikh army—Conduct of the British troops—Account of the European regiments engaged in the various battles—Of the Native troops—Of the officers—Merits of the Sikhs—Conclusions as to the campaign.

SOBRAON virtually terminated the war. The disaster to the Khalsa was complete and overwhelming. The Governor-General was now able to march, without meeting further resistance, upon Lahore, and there to dictate his own terms. In the next chapter we shall turn again to the political side of affairs, during the campaign and after it. Before doing so, however, we shall here pass in review certain aspects of the campaign itself.

On and about December 11th, 1845, the Sikh army crossed the Sutlej. The soldiery were the most stubborn we ever fought in India. Their guns were heavier and more numerous than ours, and were admirably served. At every stage our troops were greatly outnumbered; yet, within two months, four pitched battles were fought, and the enemy's army shattered; and another week saw the submission of Lahore to the Governor-General.

It is difficult to do even bare justice to the conduct of the troops engaged. The Umballa men were moving within 24 hours of receiving their marching orders. Over a rough country, heavy, sandy, amid clouds of dust, under a blazing sun, with little water, and often very inadequate food—for camels move slowly, and bullock-carts more

slowly still, so that the cooking-utensils often arrived too late to allow of proper cooking—they marched 150 miles in seven days. They had already covered twenty miles on the day when they first came in collision with the enemy, whom they then put to rout after a stubborn resistance, capturing 17 guns. Three days later, having commenced their march at two o'clock in the morning, and having been for 14 hours already under arms, and almost without food, they stormed the Sikh entrenchments at Ferozeshah, and, despite a desperate resistance, would assuredly have carried them completely had not the fall of darkness made it necessary to draw off. The strain of the night which followed, with the bitter cold, the continued want of food and water, the incessant firing and yelling of the Sikhs, the uncertainty as to the fate of their comrades, was tremendous. Yet, when morning came, worn and exhausted as they were, they renewed the attack with undaunted courage, swept the enemy's entrenchments clear at the point of the bayonet, put them to flight, and faced without flinching the fresh army which Tej Singh led from Ferozepore.

The courage, endurance, and discipline displayed were beyond all praise. The victories of Aliwal and Sobraon were brilliant, but they were fought under far more favourable conditions. In every case, indeed, we had foemen worthy of our steel, disciplined troops, fighting behind entrenchments with dogged resolution, well armed, well supplied with artillery, and superior in numbers to our own. But at Aliwal and Sobraon we fought with a moral assurance of winning. The task was hard, but the event was never really in doubt. Whereas at Ferozeshah, from the moment when it became evident that the falling darkness must prevent the completion of the victory so nearly won, the event was very doubtful indeed. These are the conditions which put the highest military qualities to the sternest test, and our men passed the ordeal with magnificent spirit.

Ferozeshah showed emphatically the superior quality of the European troops as compared with the sepoys. There the latter, with less stamina, seemed to have lost nerve as they became exhausted, did nothing like their share of the fighting, and might have broken down but for the stubbornness of their British comrades. At Sobraon and Aliwal, where they came to their work fresh and confident, no such reproach could be laid to their charge, and they won their full meed of enthusiastic praise.

Of the British regiments which took part in this campaign, it may, indeed, be said that every one covered itself with glory. No cavalry regiment has ever surpassed the feats achieved by H.M.'s 3rd Light Dragoons. At Moodkee they entered into action 494 strong; their killed and wounded there numbered 101. Out of their diminished numbers, in their grand charge at Ferozeshah, when they swept right through the Sikh batteries and camp, they lost 148 men; altogether, just half their original strength, in the two engagements. Nor did they fail to distinguish themselves once more at Sobraon, where there fell 31 of their reduced band, and Sir Hugh Gough referred to them as a regiment "whom no obstacle usually held formidable by horse appears to check." At Moodkee, indeed, it seems likely that if they had been supported by a second and third line of such cavalry as the 9th and 16th Lancers, there would have been little left for any one else to do.

The 16th Lancers (part of the reinforcements from Meerut) won their laurels at Aliwal, where the notable achievement of the squadron which broke a Sikh square, charging clean through it, has been duly recorded. It certainly seems peculiarly unfortunate that, owing to the political exigencies before referred to, the Governor-General had found himself unable to order them to the front in time to take their part in the earlier engagements. Their losses at Aliwal were heavy: 2 officers and 57 men killed, 8 officers and 134 men wounded. At Sobraon, however,

they were posted on the right, where the cavalry were not called upon to take any active part in the battle, and their losses were nil.

The 9th Foot, at Ferozeshah, after Reid's Brigade had already been repulsed, stormed and captured the same batteries, losing 265 killed and wounded out of a little over 800 of all ranks. Two distinguished old officers of the regiment, Sir John M'Caskill and Colonel Taylor, were killed at its head in the course of the war.

The 29th Foot, in spite of great exertions and hard marching, did not reach the Umballa force till after Moodkee; but at Ferozeshah, the former led the attack on the right, losing 250 of all ranks out of 758 engaged; and at Sobraon, after three desperate assaults, they again, in company with the 1st Europeans, stormed the Sikh entrenchments, losing 171 men out of the 518 which completed their muster on that morning; Colonel Taylor in command, than whom there was no better officer killed that day, fell in the third charge. When the brief campaign was over, they could scarcely turn out 350 men.

The 1st European Light Infantry, like the 29th, joined the army too late for Moodkee, after marching about 190 miles in 8 days, but were in the thick of the fight at Ferozeshah, losing 51 men killed and 164 wounded, 215 in all, out of a strength of about 650 in the field. At Sobraon they mustered not much more than 400 in the field, of whom they lost 197 killed and wounded. Brigadier McLaran, who commanded the brigade on both occasions, fell mortally wounded at their head, at Sobraon; an officer greatly beloved and respected by all who served under him. In recognition of its conspicuous gallantry and distinguished services, the regiment was granted, on the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief, the honourable title of "1st Bengal Fusiliers," which, again, has given place to their present name, "The Royal Munster Fusiliers." So severe had been the duty, so nobly did they perform it, that, on

the 11th of February, the day after Sobraon, this regiment was only able to muster 6 officers and 230 men fit for duty, a casualty roll rarely paralleled by any regiment in a successful campaign.

H.M.'s 31st and 50th Regiments served in Sir Harry Smith's Division, and were present at Moodkee, Ferozeshah, Aliwal, and Sobraon. At the first of these battles, where the brunt of the fighting fell on Smith's Division, the 31st lost 9 officers and 155 men killed or wounded out of 30 officers and 844 men taken into action. At Ferozeshah, in the two days, there fell 8 officers and 151 men more. At Budhowal 21 men more were killed or wounded, and 19 men taken prisoners by the Sikhs; these, however, were released after Sobraon. At Aliwal it lost 16 men, and at Sobraon 6 officers and 137 men, making a loss in the campaign of 503 out of a total strength of not more than 900. The 50th, a regiment of Peninsular fame, maintained its noble record. At Moodkee there fell 6 officers and 129 men; at Ferozeshah 6 officers, 113 rank and file, out of a strength of about 700 men. Although before Aliwal they were joined by a draft of 5 young officers and 90 men, they could not muster more than 494 men for that battle, where they lost 10 officers and 68 men killed and wounded; while at Sobraon there fell 197 of all ranks, including 12 officers. Colonel Ryan, who commanded the regiment with great ability throughout the campaign, fell dangerously wounded at Sobraon, dying of his wound not long after. Every one of the senior officers was disabled early in the fight, the command of the regiment devolving upon a subaltern, Lieutenant Wiley, and nearly half the men fell. To add to the mournful roll, a terrible calamity overtook this same regiment shortly after its return from the campaign, the barracks occupied by them at Ludhiana being blown down in a violent storm on the night of May 20, 1846, when 80 men, women, and children were killed, and 135 seriously wounded. During the campaign almost every officer was

wounded, the total loss amounting to 565 killed and wounded of all ranks.

The 80th Regiment were engaged at Moodkee, Ferozeshah, and Sobraon. At the first action they lost 5 men killed, 1 officer and 19 men wounded; at Ferozeshah, 4 officers 32 men killed, 4 officers 73 men wounded, besides 7 privates returned "missing," who were never seen again, and were undoubtedly killed; in all 127 casualties. A detachment, 1 officer and 23 men, on the march up to join the army, took part in the Battle of Aliwal, losing 6 men killed, and 1 wounded. At Sobraon they lost 13 men killed, 4 officers 74 men wounded; during the whole campaign, 250 casualties of all ranks.

The 62nd lost heavily at Ferozeshah, 18 officers and 281 men falling in their assault upon the Sikh batteries; and at Sobraon they lost 1 officer killed, 1 officer 45 men wounded; total loss, 346. Records do not show what strength the regiment took into action, but it is probable that the number at Ferozeshah did not exceed 800 men.

The 53rd Foot did not appear on the field of battle until after Ferozeshah. They were attached to Sir Harry Smith's force, and took part in the relief of Ludhiana. At Budhowal they formed the rear-guard, and covered the movement on Ludhiana, losing 36 men killed, and 12 wounded. At Aliwal the regiment appears to have gone into action 699 strong; their small loss, 6 men killed and 8 wounded, being due to the admirable manner in which the regiment advanced upon the Sikh batteries, running forward at the double for about 100 yards, then lying down and advancing again, by which manœuvre the Sikh gunners were prevented from getting the range, and the men advanced both rapidly and steadily, without getting exhausted. At Sobraon, the loss was 1 officer and 6 men killed, 8 officers 112 men wounded; total, 139, out of a strength of about 700.

H.M.'s 10th Foot took part in the crowning victory of

Sobraon, where the extreme steadiness of its advance, under that strict disciplinarian, Colonel Franks, attracted universal notice and admiration. Their loss amounted to 10 officers 27 men killed, 2 officers 101 men wounded.

Of the native troops engaged, few remain now on the rolls of the Indian army, almost all having been swept away in the vortex of the great Mutiny of 1857; but their services in this campaign cannot be disregarded or unrecognised. It is true that neither at Moodkee nor at Ferozeshah were they equal to the occasion, but this was undoubtedly owing to the frightful exhaustion of the sepoys, who had not the same stamina and physical endurance as the British soldier. Both at Aliwal and Sobraon they fought well, and bore their fair share of the loss, affording valuable support to their European comrades. Records do not give the various losses by regiments, but simply abstracts of the loss sustained by divisions, including Europeans and natives, in one total. What the native regiments suffered can only be approximately calculated by deducting the losses of the European regiments as taken from their records.*

Sir Harry Smith spoke in warm terms of the conduct of the native troops, both cavalry and infantry, at Aliwal, and both Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief were able to applaud their conduct at Sobraon. The Goorkhas, a regiment of which, the Sirmoor battalion, is now represented by the 2nd Prince of Wales's Own Goorkhas, distinguished themselves particularly in the two last engagements, and were specially mentioned by Sir Hugh Gough at Sobraon. They were not present at Moodkee or Ferozeshah. Of the other native infantry regiments the only survivors now existing in the Indian army are the 4th Bengal Infantry

* Comparative losses at Sobraon—

							Total.
1st Infantry Division	350 Europeans	...	280 Natives	...	630
2nd „ „	368 „	...	535 „	...	903
3rd „ „	360 „	...	366 „	...	726

(formerly 33rd), the 5th (formerly 42nd), the 6th (formerly 43rd), the 7th (formerly 47th), the 8th (formerly 59th), and the 9th (formerly 63rd) Native Infantry.

The campaign of the Sutlej throws us back in touch with the soldiers of the Peninsula and Waterloo, many of whom were here in high command. Besides Sir Henry Hardinge and Sir Hugh Gough, both of whom gained high distinction under Wellington, Sir Harry Smith, Sir Robert Sale, Sir John McCaskill, Sir Robert Dick, Sir Joseph Thackwell, Brigadier Cureton, and Brigadier Taylor, of H.M.'s 29th, all served in the Peninsula. Of these, McCaskill, Sale, Dick, and Taylor fell gloriously for Queen and country, after long lives spent in honourable service. Amongst the most distinguished officers whose loss was to be deplored was Major Broadfoot, chief political officer to the Governor-General. General Gilbert, whose services were highly appreciated by the Commander-in-Chief, and who led his division with such intrepidity and ability, was a grand old soldier of the Indian army He was passionately fond of riding and horses, and a distinguished performer on the pig-skin, both on the turf and in the pigsticking field. So devoted was he to this sport that during the period when the army was lying encamped in front of Sobraon, he, with a few congenial spirits, used to hunt the jungles for wild boar, riding close up to the Sikh outposts in pursuit of his game, while they never offered to molest or interfere with him. He subsequently served with equal distinction and credit, as will hereafter be related, in the second Sikh War, and it was to him that eventually the Sikh army, in 1849, surrendered and laid down their arms.

In considering the course of the whole campaign, certain points deserve special attention. Emphasis has already been laid strongly on the nature of the odds against which it was conducted. The quality of the Sikh troops was such that they showed themselves behind entrenchments hardly, if at all, inferior to average European soldiery Insubordinate

as they had been politically, their discipline and steadiness on the field were admirable. Their muskets were the same as ours, their artillery usually superior, and their fire directed with precision. Such a foe could not be beaten without heavy losses on our part. It would even seem that if they had shown the same capacity for attack as for defence, if Tej Singh had known what to do with his fresh army at Ferozeshah, the frontier force with the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief might have been crushed on December 22nd. It is evident that if the nature of the struggle before us had been realised, if it had not been credited that there was a real chance of averting the war altogether, and that the Sikh troops were too insubordinate to be dangerous, so small a force ought never to have been left to bear unsupported the brunt of such a contest.

But the hope that war might be avoided, coupled with the consciousness that preparations on at all a large scale, and especially any palpable increase of the frontier force, would certainly precipitate a conflict, counted for more than the urgent representations of the military authorities. When the great Sikh host crossed the Sutlej, it became absolutely necessary to make an instant advance, with all available troops, to save Ferozepore and Bussean. To wait for troops from Meerut would have meant the loss of those important places. Consequently, when the available troops got to Ferozeshah, there were not enough of them, in the Governor-General's opinion, to attack the entrenchments until Littler should arrive. Rightly or wrongly, the attack was in consequence deferred till late in the day; and further comment on the highly critical position which resulted would be superfluous, after what has been said.

Under such conditions, to have literally crumpled up the army of the Khalsa within two months of the declaration of war was no small achievement. But if the conduct of the British troops, from highest to lowest, deserves all

praise, no little praise also is due to our valiant and stubborn foe. The admiration they inspired in the heart of one who knew how to appreciate their qualities may well be expressed in Sir Hugh Gough's own words, referring to the slaughter of the Sikh army at Sobraon. "Policy," he wrote, "prevented my publicly recording my sentiments of the splendid gallantry of a fallen foe, and I declare, were it not from a conviction that my country's good required the sacrifice, I could have wept to have witnessed the fearful slaughter of so devoted a body." It was indeed fortunate for us that the leaders were not worthy of the men, that Tej Singh was faint-hearted, and Lall Singh incompetent and only half trusted; that, while the chiefs were not unskilful in disposing their troops behind entrenchments, none of them had the training or the skill in manœuvring large bodies of men which would have enabled them to reap the full benefit of a temporary advantage. That is no doubt the reason why the Sikhs, in face of the British troops, invariably adopted the defensive attitude, retiring under Tej Singh before Ferozeshah, and failing to make a real attack even at Budhowal, where the consequences might well have been very serious.

But when all is said, the whole campaign shows very conclusively one fact, which always appears to be a source of astonishment to the British public—that if we have to do battle with an enemy whose army is highly disciplined, well armed, and game to fight till it can fight no longer, that army cannot be beaten without correspondingly heavy losses, and demands treatment considerably more respectful than Clive found it necessary to show for the mercenary troops of Surajah Dowlah or Chunda Sahib. Also, that it is a mistake to take for granted that "Native" opponents must be lacking in those high qualities.

BOOK IV.

BETWEEN THE SIKH WARS

BOOK IV.

FROM THE TREATY OF LAHORE TO SHERE SINGH'S REVOLT: MARCH, 1845-*SEPT.,* 1848

CHAPTER I.

THE LAHORE TREATY: MARCH-DEC., 1846

Submission of the Durbar—Policy of annexation—Of a subsidiary alliance—Of the buffer-state—Conditions of a treaty—System of government—Triumphal march—Henry Lawrence and his problem—Early disturbances—Gholab Singh—Imam-ud-Din—Fall of Lall Singh—Request for a continued protectorate.

THERE was no question as to the completely decisive character of the great victory of Sobraon. The Sikh army was shattered, and scattered beyond possibility of an effective rally; the way to Lahore lay open to the victors. The battle was fought and won on February 10th; on the 13th the British troops were encamped in the Punjab at Kussoor; on the 20th they were at Lahore.

The war, as has been observed, was due in the first place to the enthusiastic belief in itself and its imperial destinies of the Khalsa soldiery. The Durbar—that is to say, the Rani and her immediate following—had done all in their power to foster this spirit, calculating that by means of the war they would, in the first instance, be released from the terrorising presence of the uncontrollable troops; and that secondly they could turn either victory or disaster to their own advantage. Among the Sirdars, however, who loved neither the Rani, nor the soldiery, nor the English,

the majority had little hope of success at any time. They acquiesced in the war when they found that opposition to it was useless, many of them took their share of the fighting with magnificent valour, some professed enthusiasm, and were content with the profession, a few, like the astute Gholab Singh, kept out of danger, and took measures to secure friendly treatment for themselves when the British should enter the country as conquerors.

If the chiefs who had not gone to the front were doubtful of the results before the war actually commenced, their doubts were dispelled by the outcome of the first fierce struggles. The dogged faith that the tables might yet be turned on the British prevailed at the front, but at Lahore itself, the defeat of the Khalsa was now expected with confidence The Rani and the disaffected chiefs, who recognised the Rajah of Jammu as the shrewdest among them, were merely awaiting the final overthrow to get the best terms available for themselves from the conquerors, and the British had hardly crossed the Sutlej when the emissaries of the Durbar were hurrying to meet them. On the 15th they reached Lord Hardinge's camp, on the 18th the boy Maharajah presented himself in person to the Governor-General, and accompanied him to Lahore, where the future arrangements were to be decided.

There were three main lines on which it might be possible to effect a settlement.

First, there was the obvious course of immediate annexation. But the policy of annexation was one to which the Company and the Governor General himself were strongly averse. Moreover, in the present case, it would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, to carry out. The Sikh army itself had indeed been thoroughly beaten in the field, but there were some 25,000 of them at Lahore and Amritsar, there were 8000 at Peshawur, and the complete subjugation of the Punjab would have involved a protracted war of sieges. For such operations the forces at

the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief were quite inadequate. As we have seen, the illusory hope of averting a collision altogether had prevented Sir H. Hardinge* from bringing up to the frontier such a mass of troops as the occasion demanded; and Sir Hugh Gough's army at Lahore now numbered less than 20,000 of all arms, of whom only 3500 were Europeans. For the sieges, he would have required 70 or 80 siege-guns, with 1000 rounds for each; he had only thirty guns with 300 rounds for each. Even with reinforcements from Scinde, where Sir Charles Napier had 16,000 men and 60 guns, it is evident that the army at disposal would have been insufficient to undertake the real subjugation of the country.

The second method was one which had been very extensively employed in the past—that of a "subsidiary alliance." The meaning of this term has been explained in a previous chapter. The plan was to maintain the existing native Government with troops levied by the Company, but paid for by the allied State. When the British were surrounded by hostile or potentially hostile Powers, the military advantages of this method had been very marked; but by producing an ambiguous authority it was by no means conducive to good government within the allied State itself, and the British Government in India had steadily declared against such a policy in the Punjab.

There remained then the third policy: of attempting to establish a strong and friendly Government which should be independent of British support, and yet should not be a menace to the British Power in India; which should in fact stand to the British in much the same relation as the Lahore state had done when ruled by Ranjit Singh.

* Sir Henry Hardinge and Sir Hugh Gough were both rewarded at this time with peerages for their services. This intelligence, however, did not arrive till later.

Lord Hardinge then resolved to make the attempt at establishing in the Punjab a government strong enough to take care of itself, but with its military resources sufficiently curtailed to prevent it from being a standing source of possible danger To this end certain preliminary conditions were necessary The rehabilitation of the Khalsa army must be precluded, the British would have to be indemnified for the war, and, further, a substantial penalty must be exacted. Accordingly, the Jalandhar Doab was annexed to the British dominion (i.e. the south-eastern tract of the Punjab, lying between the rivers Beas and Sutlej), and a crore and a half of rupees, equivalent to one and a half millions sterling, was demanded. But only half a million was forthcoming from the exhausted Lahore treasury, so the cession of Kashmir was accepted in lieu of the other million. Then Gholab Singh of Jammu obtained his desire. As a reward for his consistently friendly attitude, he was confirmed in the independent sovereignty of Jammu, to which the newly ceded Kashmir was added in exchange for a crore of rupees—a transaction to which we shall presently revert.

From what may be termed the confiscatory provisions of the treaty proposed by Lord Hardinge, we turn to the arrangements made for the better government of the Lahore State, now curtailed to the Punjab proper and the trans-Indus provinces of Peshawur and the ' Derajat."

The first condition of regular government was the permanent reduction of the Sikh army to manageable dimensions. To this end, the numbers were limited to 20 000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry, while the whole of the artillery which had been used against the British was required to be delivered up to the victors.

Next, the conduct of the administration was placed in the hands of a Council of Regency, comprising a few of the leading Sirdars, at whose head was Lall Singh, the Rani's favourite. A British Agent was appointed to exercise

effective control over this Council, and to act as the mouthpiece of the British Government; this part being entrusted to Major Henry Lawrence.

At the direct request of the Sikh chiefs, who declared their total inability to control the Khalsa unsupported, it was agreed that the British troops should remain in occupation of Lahore until the end of the year; this limit of time being expressly insisted on by Lord Hardinge.

Such were the terms of the Treaty of Lahore, concluded on March 11th, 1846; the signatories being, besides the Maharajah, Lall Singh, Tej Singh, the Sirdar Ram Singh, and the astute finance minister Dina Nath. The Governor-General's parting words to the Council contained a note of warning: "Success or failure is in your own hands; my co-operation shall not be wanting; but if you neglect this opportunity, no aid on the part of the British Government can save the State."

When the Sikhs had thrown down their challenge to the British, they had produced a widespread effect among the peoples of India. Happily they had fought us single-handed, since the one army which might have lent them efficient help—that of Gwalior—had already brought about its own premature destruction. But every State, more especially every Hindu State, disaffected towards British rule, had looked to the Sikh rising with the hope that at last a Hindu army had appeared which might drive back the English; that the chances of Hindu supremacy were reviving. The wildest rumours prevailed as to the results of the campaign itself, due in part to the severe straits in which the British found themselves during the earlier stages of the war. It was not to be believed that the contest could have been brought to a decisive conclusion within a couple of months of its commencement; the British reports of success being thus discredited, it was questioned whether the Sikhs had been defeated at all. These questionings Lord Hardinge resolved to set at rest

conclusively; and he made his march down from Lahore to Calcutta a visible and tangible proof of a decisive triumph, displaying at every station and every city on the way 250 guns, the spoils of the routed armies. The doubters required no further conviction.

The task which Henry Lawrence found before him at Lahore was no easy one. The Governor-General had impressed on him his own views on the difficulties with great clearness, while placing entire confidence in the judgment, ability, and sympathetic tact of the Agent between whom and himself there was a very warm friendship. The Rani was a born intriguer, and was certain to play for her own hand. The Council of Regency was small; the Sirdars excluded from it were sure to be jealous. The chiefs were likely to be perpetually suspicious of the intentions of the British; they must be induced to understand that we had no desire to interfere with internal administration, still less to annex, or to adopt the subsidiary system. Lastly, the army could not but remain an object of intrigue and a source of suspicion: an army which was notably brave; which had not fully lost the belief that it was a match for the British, and owed its own defeat to treachery; which had already tasted the sweets of political predominance, and learned to make its would-be chiefs pay for their support; which was loyal to itself and to "Govind," but to no living ruler.

The Governor-General therefore had written to Lawrence in these terms:—

"The Sikh chiefs, excluded from power, will probably intrigue against the present Government, and may attempt to excite the soldiery against those who were parties to the Treaty of Peace. . . . It will be necessary at all times to be in a state of military vigilance. . . . You will [do] everything in your power to ensure the success of this trial of re-establishing a Sikh Government, which may eventually carry on its functions without British aid or British interference. Whilst we do not desire the annexation of the Punjab . . . the Government is determined not to lend itself to any subsidiary system, and as soon as its troops are withdrawn will decline to interfere in the internal affairs of the Sikh State."

The nature of the difficulties was promptly illustrated by a "Cow Row," when a European sentry in Lahore, being pressed upon by some cattle, slashed at them with his sword; whereupon the Hindu population became violently excited, and the British officers were mobbed. By dint of combined firmness and good humour the disturbance was quickly allayed; but the affair served as an example of the miscellaneous causes of friction which the casual misconduct of an unthinking soldier might set in motion. Nor was it long before the political disorganisation was illustrated by the open refusal of the Governor of Kangra to recognise the new regime. The fort of Kangra was strong, the Governor's words were bold, and it was very obvious that he was receiving encouragement from high quarters. Discretion, however, proved to be the better part of valour, when Lawrence's troops arrived before the fort; and no sooner were the siege-guns in position than the garrison surrendered.

These were small affairs, though symptomatic; but they were followed by a more serious disturbance.

A good deal has already been written about Gholab Singh, of Jammu, who had been converted by the recent treaty into the independent sovereign of Kashmir and Jammu. Comments on this transaction had been by no means uniformly favourable. There was no doubt whatever that Gholab Singh was a very able man, as his brother Dhian Singh had been likewise. It is no less clear that he was a cold-blooded, self-seeking ruler; a man who would cheerfully pocket a peasant's last farthing, and contrive the "removal" of an enemy without any sort of compunction; a man whose fidelity could be counted upon precisely so long as he considered it in his interest to be faithful. These evil qualities, however, were shared by the majority of native chiefs, and, in his case, they were tempered—as in most cases they were not—by a sagacity which restrained him from a wanton indulgence in them. That is to say, he was quite

prepared to be merciful, even beneficent, if he thought his interest lay that way, and his fidelity to the British could be relied on, because he had wit enough to know that his interest *must* lie that way He might play at disloyalty if hard pressed, but no man in the Punjab was so little likely as he to become actively disloyal. In short, it might be said of him that his policy would almost certainly be sagacious, of others, that their policy would be cunning Therefore he could be depended upon to aim at some comparative decency of government, and to use his influence—covertly, even if he was professedly acting against them—on behalf of the British, which is more than could be said for the Sikh leaders.

Such was the man to whom Kashmir had been sold, and it must also be remembered that the province itself was not naturally a part of the Lahore State, but had been conquered by the Khalsa. When, however, Gholab Singh desired to take possession of his kingdom, the governor, Sheikh Imam ud Din, refused to give it up. Gholab Singh could not himself drive the recalcitrant Sheikh out by force of arms, and Henry Lawrence called upon the Lahore Durbar to carry out their Treaty engagement, and deliver over the province of Kashmir to its new owner.

And then was seen the very remarkable spectacle of the British Agent marching at the head of Sikh troops to wrest Sikh territory from Imam ud Din, in order to hand it over to the last of those Rajput brothers, who had always inspired the Sikhs themselves with intense jealousy Supported by British troops from Jalandhar, Lawrence, in October, led 10 000 Sikhs, unwilling yet obedient, into Kashmir, under the command of Sirdar Shere Singh, compelled the submission of Imam-ud-Din without striking a single blow, and established Gholab Singh in his dominion. Nothing could have shown more conclusively the immense personal influence and prestige acquired by Lawrence than the way in which this paradoxical task was carried out.

The event proved at the same time that the Lahore Durbar was a hotbed of intrigue, for the deserted and disgusted Sheikh handed over to the British Agent documents signed by the Vizier, Lall Singh, which proved conclusively that he had countenanced and encouraged the rebellion. Armed with these documents, Lawrence required that Lall Singh should be brought to trial. In the presence of all the chief Sirdars the enquiry was held before a Commission of five British officers; Lall Singh's guilt was proved beyond question; the Sirdars acquiesced without hesitation in the verdict; and the Vizier was deposed from his office, and removed from public life and from the Punjab without any sort of opposition. The Viziership was placed in commission, which was composed of Tej Singh, Shere Singh, Dewan Dina Nath, and Fakir Nur-ud-Din. The truth was that Lall Singh had been the Rani's favourite, and owed his position to that and nothing else; consequently his colleagues had no sort of objection to his disappearance.

But the time was now at hand when, according to the Treaty stipulations, the British troops were to be withdrawn, and the Punjab Government was to take care of itself; whereas the Punjab Government was in no wise ready to take care of itself, being, indeed, aware that the immediate effect would be sheer anarchy. The ambitious Rani made great efforts to win over the Sirdars to her own point of view, which was that she should herself be made regent, while the chiefs pledged themselves to obey her. The Dewan Dina Nath, however, was alone in supporting her; and Shere Singh communicated to Lawrence, as his own desire and that of the leading Sirdars, the wish that the British should virtually constitute themselves guardians of the State until the young Maharajah came of age.

A Durbar was then held to make a definite settlement, the chiefs being offered their choice of two alternatives. Either they must be left entirely alone to manage their own

affairs, without British interference, or, with the reluctant assent of Lord Hardinge, the entire civil and military administration of the Punjab must be placed absolutely under British control, though conducted through the Durbar, during the Maharajah's minority, on the termination of which the British would withdraw entirely.

CHAPTER II.

THE RULE OF HENRY LAWRENCE: 1847

Terms of the new arrangement—Lord Hardinge's military arrangements—Lawrence's men and methods—Bunnoo and Herbert Edwardes—Influence of British officers—The Rani's plots—State of the Punjab—Lord Dalhousie becomes Governor-General—Sir F. Currie takes Lawrence's place—Multan.

The Sikh chiefs decided unanimously in favour of the British Protectorate. Every one of the fifty-two Sirdars who were accounted important enough to express an opinion voted in its support.

The formal arrangements of the "Treaty of Bhyrowal," * in which the new settlement was embodied, were as follows:—

There was to be a Council of Regency, consisting of eight members. Five of these are already known to the reader, namely, Tej Singh, Shere Singh (who was the Maharajah's brother-in-law), Runjoor Singh, the Dewan Dina Nath, and Fakir Nur-ud-Din. The other three—Utter Singh, Shumser Singh, and Bhaee Nidhan Singh—were all men of note.

The Council was to act "under the control and guidance of the British Resident," Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Lawrence. "The power of the Resident extends over every department, and to any extent."

* The earlier treaty was signed and ratified at Lahore. This treaty was signed at Lahore, but ratified by the Governor-General at Bhyrowal. In the "Life of Sir Herbert Edwardes," the *earlier* treaty is, by an apparent misapprehension, referred to as the "Treaty of Bhyrowal."

A fixed sum—twenty-two lakhs of rupees—was to be paid annually during the protectorate.

"A military force may be placed in such forts and posts, and of such strength, within the Lahore territory, as the Governor-General may determine. These terms give the British Resident unlimited authority in all matters of internal administration and external relation during the Maharajah's minority, which would terminate on the 4th September, 1854."

Alive to the military necessities of the new Resident's position, Lord Hardinge—having had personal experience of the dangers involved by an insufficient frontier force—enlarged the armies of the north-west, at and beyond Meerut, to 50,000 men, with 60 guns. Three brigades, organised as movable columns ready to take the field at once, were placed at Lahore, Jalandhar, and Ferozepore. It was the Governor-General's belief, however, that there would be no more fighting for several years; recent expenditure had been very heavy; and so, while the troops of the Company's army were redistributed, so as to increase the forces immediately available in the north-west, a very large reduction was made in the general military establishment, the sepoy army being cut down by the amount of 50,000 men. Since this was precisely the force whose services would be most required in case of troubles arising during the hot months of the year, it did unfortunately happen that the Commander-in-Chief's plan of operations in 1848 had to be adapted to the conditions produced by this reduction. At the same time, the expectation of peace on which Lord Hardinge acted had strong justification, since there was every appearance that Lawrence's administration of the Punjab was rapidly removing the danger of disaffection. Nevertheless, the event showed that now, as before the Sutlej campaign, Lord Hardinge acted on a too sanguine forecast.

Thoroughly trusted by the Governor-General, and

endowed with unlimited powers by the Bhyrowal Treaty, Henry Lawrence was now virtually director in the Punjab; with subordinates who were the men of his own choice, and to whom he in turn allowed a freedom of action and a weight of personal responsibility which were exactly suited to the conditions under which the work had to be done, but were practicable only where the subordinates were picked men, and in thorough sympathy with their chief. Among these were his brothers John and Major George Lawrence, M'Gregor and Abbott; Nicholson, Herbert Edwardes, Lake, John Beecher, Harry Lumsden, Reynell Taylor, Pollock, and Hodson; Cocks, Browning, Coxe, and Melville; men who rendered brilliant service, not only in the Punjab, but elsewhere. Many of these names are recorded on the undying roll of heroes; some are household words even to this day, though fifty years have passed.

Lawrence's men were distributed over the districts of the Punjab, with their guiding principle briefly summed up in the words, "Settle the country, make the people happy, and take care there are no rows." How the work was done, one of them, Herbert Edwardes, told the English public in his book, "A Year on the Punjab Frontier," where he detailed his own experiences. The pacification of Bunnoo is worth a brief reference here, because Edwardes's work there was typical, not exceptional, illustrating the methods and practice of Henry Lawrence's school.

Bunnoo is a district beyond the Indus, lying between the province of Peshawur on the north, and the provinces known collectively as the Derajat southwards. The inhabitants were an exceedingly mixed race, whose relations to the Sikhs were simple. Every village in the country was virtually a fort, and of them there were from four to five hundred. The Sikhs, therefore, had made no attempt to occupy, much less to govern, the country, but had periodically collected the tribute, or part of the tribute, considered

due by sending an army, which raided the country and brought back what it could. The tribute was now considerably in arrear, and Edwardes went with a Sikh contingent to collect it. The Sikh soldiery had been in the habit of plundering right and left; but their British commander, after a hard struggle, brought them into order and discipline, amazed the Bunnoochees by marching through the country without laying it waste, and for the first time brought the troops and the population into something like friendly intercourse. The arrival of the hot weather made it necessary to retire before much had been accomplished, but later in the year Edwardes returned. Matters, of course, did not work with perfect smoothness—Edwardes, for instance, had to shoot a would-be assassin in his own tent—but the inhabitants were so impressed with the novel idea of a Government which set the example of orderly conduct, and of a Governor who worked, not by intriguing amongst the chiefs, but by proving in free discussion in which direction the general interest obviously lay, that the tribute was paid; and, more remarkable still, the fort-villages were dismantled, and one Government fort, practically impregnable, was established.

Such methods as these, accompanied as they were by a general lightening of the revenue burdens, could not fail to have an excellent effect on the popular mind, more especially in the subordinate provinces. The influence acquired by the British officers over the rude native tribes was immense, and the personal devotion to them was in some cases more than remarkable. Abbott, in the Hazara district, was the object of enthusiastic adoration; Nicholson, in later days, found it difficult to keep the tribesmen from deifying him. In judging, however, of the problem before the British Resident, it must not be forgotten (as it too often is in parallel cases) that immense portions of the Sikh dominion were not Sikh, properly speaking, but in subjection to the Sikhs; and the inhabitants might often

be fairly described as victims of the Sikhs, and quite ready in turn to make victims of their rulers if opportunity offered. It by no means followed, therefore, that the introduction of good government, or the approbation of tribesmen, was agreeable to the dominant race, since it meant a diminution of their opportunities for plunder. Undoubtedly the capacity for command displayed by the "Feringhis" did greatly increase their personal prestige, even among the Sikhs themselves. But it did not remove, it only held in check, the two great factors which told against a peaceful settlement—the intrigues of the Rani and the temper of the Khalsa.

It was manifest from the beginning that the Rani would intrigue to recover her position. For that she had first sought the support of the soldiery; for that, when the soldiery declared themselves her masters, she had fomented their resolve to attack the British; for that she had done her best to get the British withdrawn in December; whereas now, while the British Resident was at Lahore, it was perfectly certain that she could take no ostensible part in public affairs. A conspiracy known as the Preyma plot was discovered. The primary aims were the assassination of Tej Singh, for whom the Rani had a violent hatred, and of the Resident; schemes for the corruption of the sepoy troops formed a part of it; and a correspondence between the Rani and Mulraj, the Governor of Multan, of which the full significance did not become apparent till later, was discovered in connection with it. The association of the Rani with the plot was indisputable. To have pressed the matter in such a way as to necessitate the publication of details would have been impolitic; but the facts being laid before the Council, it was agreed without question that the young Maharajah must be separated from his mother. The Rani was removed to Sheikapore, some twenty miles from the capital—Lawrence would have preferred her removal from the Punjab—and a proclamation

was issued declaring that her presence at Lahore had prevented the proper education of her son, while it rendered the palace a focus of intrigue and treason.

It was not, however, until May of the following year, when she was proved to be deeply implicated in a plot for seducing the sepoys at Lahore, that the Rani's intrigues were finally ended by her removal to Ferozepore, and from thence to the home of dethroned monarchs at Benares.

The removal to Sheikapore took place in August, 1847, and in September it was found that Henry Lawrence's health had suffered so severely that he must leave for England at the close of the year. Much had been done during the months in which he was Resident, and it is matter of mere speculation whether his continued presence at Lahore, and the exercise of his unique influence, might have prevented the outbreak of the following year. However that may be, he left the Punjab believing that there was a good prospect of a healthy settlement, but he certainly did not suppose that there was no cause for anxiety. His own expectations had indeed been exceeded, the Khalsa had shown no signs of restlessness or insubordination, the Sirdars appeared loyal, the population generally was becoming acquainted with the benefits of orderly government. Still, to use his own words, "the people had not lost their spirit, and so fickle were they, so easily led by their party, so filled with pride of race and of their old triumphs, that it would be the extreme of infatuation to believe in their satisfaction with their present state, or in their not chafing at our victory and their own loss of power." And again, "no great conquest has ever been followed by complete peace and security, or by the universal goodwill of the people who have been beaten in the field." And just before he left India, "The Sikhs have come to terms, and have settled down because they have been well treated by us, and protected from their own army and chiefs, because scarcely a single jagheer has

been resumed, and because the rights and even the prejudices of all classes have been respected." It is obvious, from this sentence, that "their own army and chiefs," could not be expected to view British administration in quite the same favourable light as the people.

During a brief interval, John Lawrence acted for his brother until the arrival of the new Resident, Sir Frederick Currie. On January 18th, 1848, Henry Lawrence sailed from India with the retiring Governor-General. The next day arrived the new Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie. It is impossible not to recognise that the simultaneous withdrawal of the Governor-General, and of the most experienced officer in the Punjab, was singularly unfortunate at so early a stage of the settlement. The result was that the head of the State was now a man of undoubted ability, but one who had as yet no first-hand knowledge of the peoples over whom he was to rule, or of the men through whom he was to rule them. At Lahore, a place where an experiment was being tried under conditions for which there was no precedent, where the chief and his subordinates had worked together with a success dependent on the strongest personal sympathy and mutual reliance, a new chief took over the control; who had been trained in the regulation school of Bengal officialdom, had no special knowledge of the Punjab, no special intimacy with the officers there, and no special personal touch with the natives. Whatever Sir F. Currie's abilities had been, it was literally impossible for him to carry on the administration on that principle of unlimited personal responsibility which had been the essence of Lawrence's method, and the grand factor in its success.

When Lord Dalhousie took up the Governor-Generalship of India, and Sir F. Currie became British Resident at Lahore, one of the two main disturbing factors had been only partially removed from the Punjab by the ejection of the Maharajah's mother from Lahore. The other

remained. The whole population indeed needed watching. The hill-men of the north, or the trans-Indus Pathans, might give trouble. But the great danger lay in the Khalsa, with its traditions of dominion, its corporate loyalty, its religious sentiment, and its capacity for independent action and concerted insubordination. That danger had by no means been removed by the unexpected display of obedience and discipline during 1846 and 1847.

Yet if the Khalsa had been the only source of fear, it may be that the prophets of tranquillity would have been justified. For, contrary to all expectation, it was not in the Sikh army or the Sikh community, or even on account of Sikh interests, that the disturbance arose which led to the final Sikh war; but from a comparatively insignificant trouble on an outlying Mohammedan frontier.

CHAPTER III.

THE OUTBREAK AT MULTAN: MARCH–MAY, 1848

Apparent tranquillity—Dewan Mulraj—Attack on British officers at Multan—Revolt of Mulraj—The Derajat and Multan district—Action of Herbert Edwardes—Van Cortlandt and Foujdar Khan—Lord Gough's objections to a force for Multan—Endorsed by Lord Dalhousie—Position of Edwardes—Movements of Mulraj—Sir F. Currie's plan of operations—The Derajat operations—Capture of Dera Ghazi Khan—Advance of Bhawal Khan.

At this period, in the early months of 1848, when the Multan disturbance was about to break out, there appeared to be tranquillity everywhere. The districts were all quiet, and especially the great Sikh district of the Manjha, in which lay both Lahore and Amritsir, and which had been wisely controlled and influenced by a fine old Sirdar, Lehna Singh, of Majeetea. Such anxiety as there was seemed to be respecting the conduct of two men of note in the north, *i.e.* in the Hazara and Peshawur direction; one that noted Afghan intriguer Sultan Mohammed, the other Shere Singh's father, the Sirdar Chutter Singh, whose daughter was to marry the Maharajah Dhulip Singh. Both of these men were being carefully watched. The British representatives in that neighbourhood were Major George Lawrence, at Peshawur, and Major James Abbott, in Hazara. South of Peshawur, Lieutenant Edwardes, having settled Bunnoo, as we have seen, was now engaged in similar work in the still more southerly Derajat district, stretching from Dera Ishmael Khan to Dera Ghazi Khan, a town on the banks of the Indus, just opposite Multan, the Indus and the Chenab flowing between.

Multan itself, lying east of the Chenab, below its junction with the Ravi, and above its junction with the Sutlej, was a place of considerable importance, with a great reputation for strength. An outpost of the Afghan monarchy, it had long defied Ranjit Singh, and had been added to his dominions only after a stubborn contest. The present Governor was the Dewan Mulraj, the son of a very distinguished father, Sawan Mull. Mulraj, however, was no great ruler, he had, in fact, declared himself anxious to retire into private life, since the difficulty of raising the revenue demanded by Lahore was more than he was capable of coping with. It must be understood that this offer of resignation was purely voluntary, and was only accepted on his own urgent representations.

Finally, however, after much discussion and intrigue, he was informed that his resignation would be accepted, and he was requested to prepare the accounts of the last years of his office for the inspection of his successor. To this office, the Sirdar Khan Singh was appointed, in co-operation with two English officers, Mr Vans Agnew, of the Civil Service, and Lieutenant Anderson, both men who were making a reputation for winning the confidence and friendship of the natives.

These officers received full instructions for their guidance on March 31st, and moving from Lahore partly by road and partly by river, arrived at Multan by degrees, from the 13th to the 17th April, having with them, as escort, about 1400 Sikh soldiers, a Goorkha regiment, some 700 cavalry, and 6 guns. On the 18th, they encamped at the Eedgah, about half a mile from the fort. Next morning, the British officers and Khan Singh, with some of their escort, accompanied Mulraj into the fort, went over it, and after discussing the arrangements to be made, were on their way back to the Eedgah, when one of Mulraj's soldiers, at the bridge over the ditch of the fort, struck and then wounded Vans Agnew—the signal, evidently,

for an attack on the party. Mulraj rode off to his own residence, while his sowars attacked Anderson; but the Goorkhas rescued Anderson, and Khan Singh rescued Agnew, putting him on his own elephant. Both officers were brought into their encampment, where their wounds were dressed.

Agnew immediately wrote and despatched a report of what had occurred to the Resident at Lahore, and also sent off a messenger with a note asking for aid, addressed to either General Van Cortlandt (an officer of the Sikh army), or Lieutenant Edwardes, in the Derajat.

The results of these communications will be dealt with presently. Meanwhile, at Multan itself, Mulraj sent his emissaries over to the Eedgah to inform Agnew that his own people would not allow him to resign, and he could give the Englishmen no help. At the same time he invited the escort to desert and come over, and placed himself at the head of the revolt. In the evening, some of the soldiery and town rabble mobbed the Eedgah, took Khan Singh prisoner, and murdered the two English officers. The die was now cast; all the troops joined Mulraj, who forthwith proceeded to strengthen the fort, enlist troops, and send the fiery cross of revolt through the surrounding districts, calling on all to rise against the English, "who were treating the Maharajah and their proper rulers as prisoners." So far Mulraj.

Before attempting to follow the operations which will now be described, the reader will do well to impress the geography of the south-western Punjab on his mind; taking Multan as the central point of interest. The Indus and Sutlej form the sides of a triangle, the Chenab lying between them. A little above Multan, the Ravi flows into the Chenab on the east side; higher up, again, the Jhelum joins the Chenab on the west side. The land lying between two rivers is called a Doab; and thus in the district with which we are dealing we have (1) between the Indus and

the Chenab, the Sindh Sagur Doab, (2) between the Ravi and the Chenab, the Rechna Doab, (3) between the Ravi and the Sutlej, the Bari Doab, (4) west of the Indus, the Derajat, (5) on the south of Multan, outside the Punjab, close to the Sutlej, the state of Bhawalpore, friendly to the British. Certain positions should at the same time be noted in the Derajat, Dera Ishmael Khan at the north, Dera Ghazi Khan at the south, Dera Futteh Khan and Mangrota between the two in the Sindh Sagur Doab, Leia, opposite Dera Futteh Khan, with the Indus between, and Munkhera in the Bari Doab, Tolumba on the Ravi, and Mylsee near the Sutlej, as well as Shujabad, lying between Multan and Bhawalpore.

We now turn to the communications sent by Agnew to Edwardes or Van Cortlandt. The messenger found Edwardes in his court at Dera Futteh Khan, on the trans-Indus bank, halfway between Dera Ishmael Khan and Dera Ghazi Khan, and facing the town of Leia (which lies cis-Indus, but separated by the width of the Sindh Sagur Doab from the Chenab river) Edwardes's immediate action, after at once replying to Agnew, was to raise the neighbouring mountain tribes, and discipline the raw levies, gallantly and effectively aided by Van Cortlandt, at Dera Ishmael Khan, and by his own staunch *attachés*, Foujdar Khan and Futteh Khan. At the same time he wrote to Bhawal Khan, the chief of Bhawalpore, urging him to move with all his army against Multan, and to the Resident at Lahore, begging him to support this measure, and to send an English officer to the help of Bhawalpore.

Van Cortlandt and Foujdar Khan claim a few special words of notice. The former was a shrewd soldier, thoroughly versed in the Sikh character, and skilled in the Sikh methods, to whose guidance Edwardes owes not a little of his success. Foujdar Khan was a Pathan, loyal to the core, and with a consummate knowledge of the people, the country, and the local resources of every description. Edwardes had the

most thorough and well-deserved reliance both on his fidelity and his intelligence, and confided his plans to him freely. Foujdar Khan's Eastern suavity cloaked a large capacity for acute criticism. He invariably accepted Edwardes's proposals with admiration; "they were all that could be desired; were, in fact, exactly the right thing—*But*"—and then he would proceed to point out that there was just one small defect, and another slight improvement to be made, until, as often as not, the plan as originally propounded was in shreds, and something quite new and a good deal more judicious had taken its place. And the new plan was the one adopted. Moreover, his conduct in the field was worthy of his conduct in council. Of Futteh Khan, it should be mentioned that he rendered excellent service in Bunnoo, subsequently when he was left in charge, though he was unable to prevent the troops there from ultimately joining the revolt.

At Lahore, the Resident on first hearing of the attack on Mr. Agnew, resolved to send towards Multan the British movable column stationed at Lahore, in order to support the Sikh Sirdars and the Durbar troops against Mulraj.

The view taken at this moment was that since the lives of British officers were in peril, an immediate expedition must be made at any cost. But when the news of the murder followed, the question became one of policy, and Sir F. Currie wrote to the Commander-in-Chief, asking his opinion from the purely military point of view. Lord Gough declared emphatically against any present action. He believed that Multan was exceedingly strong; that a very large expedition would be required to produce any decisive results, larger than there were present means for providing;* and that during the hot season the mortality of the troops would be tremendous. Also, he held that the rebellion was against the Durbar; that it was the Durbar's business to put it down; and that the employment of the

* See Appendix II., A and B.

Bengal troops would be more likely to precipitate than to check a general Sikh rising On the other hand, by the time the weather became practicable, preparations could be made for an expedition on a comparatively irresistible scale, while in the meantime the risk of allowing small bodies of British troops to co-operate with large bodies of Sikh troops, who might betray them at any moment, was not to be thought of.

The views laid down by Lord Gough were endorsed by the two principal persons concerned, Sir Frederick Currie and Lord Dalhousie, it may be remarked that Sir Charles Napier subsequently declared that in his opinion they were right. Their decision was thus laid down in Lord Dalhousie's minute of 11th May:—

"We are fully sensible how important it is that this rebellion against the State of Lahore should forthwith be repressed, and that the insult offered, and foul treachery shown to the British power, should be followed by early and signal punishment. But, however imminent may be the risk, that, if the British troops do not now move, insurrection, apparently successful for a time at Multan, may extend its influence over the Punjab, and may cause disturbance and revolt throughout its bounds, we yet think that the dangers which would thence arise to British interests in India, are far less than those which would be created by our being compelled to discontinue operations once begun, before they had been brought to a satisfactory termination, and by the fearful loss among the troops which is anticipated as the consequence of entering on military operations on the scale required in such a district as Multan, at such a season of the year as this.

"We have determined, therefore, not to make any such movement at present, but we shall proceed to make the necessary preparations for enabling us, as soon as the season will permit, to enter on operations which we consider imperatively necessary for punishing the causeless rebellion of Mulraj, and for exacting ample reparation from the State of Lahore for the insult offered, and the deep injury inflicted on your Government in the base murder of your faithful servants, through the treachery, desertion, and crime of the servants of the Maharajah of Lahore."

Thus was the decision of Government three weeks after the murder of the English officers, during which period Mulraj had been strengthening his position and spreading revolt unchecked.

But with regard to Edwardes in the Derajat, it has to be observed that he was directly threatened by the Multan insurrection. Mulraj, unless some check was brought to bear on him, would be able to advance into the Derajat; and then the whole trans-Indus from Dera Ghazi Khan to Peshawur would be in a flame, since the Sikhs throughout the districts would be certain to join the rebels. Of the temper of the Sikh soldiery, Edwardes had a disagreeably intimate personal knowledge, since he had ascertained that the regiment with him was in active correspondence with the Sikh rebels in Multan; that an incendiary proclamation, signed "in the name of Govind," had been issued by the Khalsa leaders in Multan, and circulated among his own men; that there was a handsome reward offered for his own capture; and, in short, that his own prospects depended entirely on the loyalty of the Pathan tribesmen whom he had called to his standard. The presence of the Sikh regiment was a standing source of danger and weakness. From these considerations, Edwardes was convinced of the necessity, first, for at least confining Mulraj to the neighbourhood of Multan, if a sufficient force could not be provided to capture it; secondly, for doing this by the help of Bhawalpore, in the absence of British troops; thirdly, for keeping the Durbar troops out of the whole affair; inasmuch as the Derajat force was not sufficient by itself, and Sikh regiments might be confidently expected to join forces with the enemy.

Meantime, then, he had been raising levies and collecting a force on the right bank of the river opposite Leia, where Mulraj had been concentrating his own troops. On the 5th May, the Indus had risen so much that Edwardes would have to move somewhat to the rear to avoid the inundations, and was anxious about the effect that such a movement might have, when, fortunately, a much more marked movement was made by the enemy. Mulraj,

having heard rumours of an advance of troops from Lahore, ordered back all the force from Leia to Multan on the 7th May, and sent an emissary, Mustapha Khan, to Edwardes, to sound him about terms of surrender Of course, all terms were refused, though, in reply to a direct question, Edwardes said that certainly Mulraj could depend upon receiving a fair trial, a remark afterwards censured by Lord Dalhousie, as being an offer of terms to Mulraj

And now Edwards was on the point of crossing to Leia, and there threatening Multan, when he received peremptory instructions from Lahore not to cross the Indus, but to operate on its right bank, with a distinct part to play as one of five converging columns. The scheme of operation was as follows —

1. A force of 5000 men under Rajah Shere Singh, Shumser Singh, and Uttur Singh, was to move down the Bari Doab, along the Ravi from Lahore, towards Multan, as far as Tolumba. These generals were on the Durbar Council.

2. A column from the north was to move down the Sindh Sagur Doab to Munkhera, under Dewan Jawahir Mull.

3 A force under Sheikh Imam ud Din was to move down the Bari Doab, on the right bank of the Sutlej, to Lodhan or Mylsee The Sheikh was the same who had held Kashmir against Gholab Singh, but had now quite made up his mind that the British was the winning side.

4. The Bhawalpore troops were to cross the Sutlej, come up the Doab, and get into touch with the third column at Mylsee, and—

5. Edwardes and Van Cortlandt were to occupy the whole Derajat along the banks of the Indus.

These columns would hem in the Multan revolt in a triangle, of which the north-east side would be a cordon from Dera Ishmael Khan, by Munkhera and Tolumba, to

Mylsee; the south and south-east, the Sutlej and the Bhawalpore force; and the west, the Indus.

But this scheme collapsed, owing to the failure of four out of the five columns to carry out the part assigned them. The three northern columns simply loitered on their way in consequence of the distrust of the commanders in their men, and Bhawal Khan had to wait until he could co-operate with the others, as he was not meant, and did not mean, to face Multan singlehanded.

The result was that the Derajat force took action prominently, by itself first, and then in conjunction with the Bhawalpore troops.

The *rôle* assigned to Edwardes and Van Cortlandt was the occupation of the Lower Derajat, the northern part of which, called Sungurh, has as its key the Fort of Mangrota; the southern part being the well-known district of Dera Ghazi Khan, opposite Multan. The first step to be taken was to secure the Fort of Mangrota. This was held by Mulraj's troops, under his officer, Cheytun Mull, but it was surrounded by the Khusrani tribes, with whom he was unpopular. Their chief, Mitka Khan, under Edwardes's influence, got Cheytun Mull to quit Mangrota, which thus fell into Edwardes's hands. At the same time, Cheytun Mull was held to have acted advisedly, as, though he evacuated Mangrota, he concentrated with his men on Dera Ghazi Khan, joining his nephew Louza Mull, who was its Governor, and to whose garrison his force was a valuable addition.

But with Mangrota in their possession, Edwardes and Van Cortlandt were much more free to act. Edwardes's first impulse was to cross the Indus on the 12th May, to Leia, where he had left a picket of 100 men. But on the 11th he heard that Mulraj, being advised of the ill-feeling in the troops advancing southwards on Multan, had taken heart, and was about to reoccupy Leia in force. The picket left there had orders to retire before any

superior force, and recross to the right bank of the Indus, but, meanwhile, a brilliant skirmish had raised their spirits to a great pitch of eagerness. On the 15th, they had been reinforced by 200 men to help them in the withdrawal, and they were then attacked by an advanced detachment of some 400 of Mulraj's men, whom they defeated and routed utterly, killing many, and taking many prisoners, as well as all their guns, without the loss of a man.

But, in consequence of his being unmolested, Mulraj was becoming active and threatening the Lower Derajat seriously, the movement on Leia proving to have been only a feint. Van Cortlandt had 6 guns, one disaffected regiment, and only one regiment that could be depended on, Edwardes had under 2000 men and 4 guns, while Mulraj had 6000 men and 15 guns, with a fleet of boats available for the passage of the Indus. Edwardes, therefore, wrote urgently for the advance of the Bhawalpore men to create a diversion, and, after a false alarm of the enemy having already crossed the river, he concentrated on Van Cortlandt's force in the district of Mangrota, opposite Dera Deen Punnah, on the 18th, and there faced the whole of Mulraj's force on the left bank of the Indus.

Here, again, on the 20th, he wrote apprising the Resident that his force was unequal to coping alone with Mulraj, but that if Bhawal Khan could co-operate with him, Mulraj could be driven into Multan, and that fort invested, and this view was confirmed by the intelligence he was able to send forward next day of the complete victory of his partisans in the south, and the triumphant capture of Dera Ghazi Khan The Khosuh clan, a Beloochee tribe, were friendly to the English, and at bitter feud with the Lugharees, who held Dera Ghazi Khan under Louxa Mull and his uncle Cheytun Mull Gholan Hyder Khan, a chief of the Khosuhs, offered to seize Dera Ghazi Khan, being permitted, he surrounded the camp of the Lugharees with his clan on the night of the 20th, and attacked and defeated

them in the morning, killing Cheytun Mull, taking Louza Mull prisoner, and capturing the fort. This feat, with that at Leia on the 15th, caused much depression in the enemy's camp, and the clan, elated with their success, sent 400 cavalry to join Edwardes permanently for the rest of the campaign. The Khosuhs had captured all the enemy's fleets of boats, and now, under Edwardes's advice, they brought them close under their own bank of the Indus; just in time, as a large force of the enemy appeared a day too late, with the object of securing those boats and re-capturing Dera Ghazi Khan.

South of the Derajat, however, within the trans-Indus territory, the strong fort of Hurrund, garrisoned by Sikhs and Pathans, was holding out for Mulraj under Mokhum Chund, one of his officers. But the surrounding Beloochee tribes were favourable to the British; hopes were entertained and soon fulfilled that the Pathans of the garrison might be won over; and for the present, at any rate, the fort was powerless for mischief.

The successful efforts of the English lieutenant and his supporters were soon rewarded by the news that Bhawal Khan was going to wait no longer for others, but was about to cross the Sutlej and move up towards Multan; in the hope that Edwardes would cross the Indus and the Chenab from the south of the Derajat, and co-operate with him. Though it soon transpired that the offer to cross the Sutlej was not so unconditional as it had at first appeared, still the inclination was clear; and so on the 30th, Edwardes wrote asking permission for the proposed movement, pointing out that Bhawal Khan's advance up the east bank of the Chenab would facilitate his own passage of that river, as well as of the Indus, and nothing would then be left intervening between him and Multan. Bahawal Khan's specific proposal now was that, after crossing the Sutlej, he should advance as far as Shujabad, and there await Edwardes.

CHAPTER IV.

ADVANCE OF HERBERT EDWARDES: JUNE AND JULY

Edwardes crosses the Indus—Prepares for junction with the Daoodpootras—Crosses the Chenab—Victory of Kineyree—Edwardes's plans—Battle of Suddoosam—Edwardes's wish to attack Multan—Lord Gough's view—Approach of the Durbar troops—Junction with them—Attitude of the Sikh soldiery.

On the 31st May, having received an appeal from Bhawal Khan direct, the Resident sanctioned Edwardes crossing the Indus, and co-operating with the Bhawalpore men—the Daoodpootras, as they were also called. A week afterwards, he posted Lieutenant Lake as the British officer with the Bhawalpore force, virtually its commander—and at length, on the 10th June, he sent instructions to Edwardes giving *carte blanche* for his co-operation with the Daoodpootras.

On receiving permission to advance, Edwardes directed Van Cortlandt to join him; and leaving Hurrund invested by a strong force of friendly Beloochees, besides 300 men under his own Kardar, he turned his whole strength towards co-operation with the Bhawalpore army, *viâ* Dera Ghazi Khan. On the 10th June, he learnt that the army was not all collected on the east side of the Chenab, and advancing towards Shujabad, as he had assumed; but that part of it was moving up separately on the west of the Chenab, between it and the Indus. He further found that the enemy on his front had broken up their camp, and were withdrawing towards the Chenab.

On the night of the 10th, Edwardes took 2500 men and

10 guns across the Indus, and then ascertained that his enemy had withdrawn to Khangurh, on the west bank of the Chenab—the convenient point for crossing that river on the way to Shujabad, where it was intended that reinforcements from Multan should join them. In fact, Mulraj was concentrating on Shujabad to meet the advance of the Bhawalpore force. Edwardes's first measure then was to send directions to those Bhawalpore troops that were like himself on the west bank of the Chenab, but lower down, to cross that river, and to join and reinforce their own main body on its east side. Edwardes was presently joined by Van Cortlandt, but he delayed moving till he was sure of the actual position of the enemy, and of the Bhawalpore army. On the 14th, he learnt that the enemy, after hesitating, had evacuated Khangurh. On the 15th, accordingly, he moved over to Khangurh and occupied it, with the object of crossing the Chenab and joining the Daoodpootras, having with him 3000 men and 20 small guns. Then he learnt that Mulraj was sending his whole force under his brother-in-law, Lalla Rung Ram, to meet and fight the Bhawalpore army before it should reach Shujabad.

Finding that the Western Division of the Bhawalpore force had not yet crossed over, Edwardes again wrote to its commander (Moozood deen Khan) to join the main body. At the same time, he wrote to Futteh Mohammed Khan, in command of the Bhawalpore main body, to throw up entrenchments and remain on the defensive until he Edwardes, should join.

These injunctions were carried out. Futteh Mohammed threw up entrenchments, Moozood deen Khan joined him; and his force was raised by this and other reinforcements to 9000 men and 11 guns. Ten miles still separated the Daoodpootras at Goweyn from Rung Ram, who halted two miles below Shujabad instead of attacking the Bhawalpore army, before the force from the Derajat arrived.

On June 17th, Edwardes made his arrangements for crossing the Chenab to Kineyree, and here, accordingly, Futteh Mohammed took up his position in order to cover the crossing Meantime, the enemy, under Rung Ram, moved down eight miles towards it, and next morning, the 18th June, they attacked the Daoodpootra army

Mulraj's troops numbered from 8000 to 10,000 men, with 10 guns. The Bhawalpore force was 8500 men, with 11 guns and 30 zumbooruks (camel pieces) Edwardes's consisted of 1500 Sikhs and 15 guns, under Van Cortlandt, and some 5000 Irregulars, with 30 zumbooruks, under Foujdar Khan.

The river was three miles across, while there were only a few boats with which to effect its passage. On the night of the 17th, 3000 men under Foujdar Khan crossed over and joined the Daoodpootra army In the early morning of the 18th, Edwardes, going over in a small boat, heard the firing begin, of the battle of Kineyree The anniversary of Waterloo was not a day on which gloomy anticipations were permissible, but the omen was more encouraging than the crude material circumstances. When he reached the field, he found that the fight had started inauspiciously, the Daoodpootras, brave but undisciplined, taking the firing as a challenge, rushed wildly towards the enemy, well posted on commanding ground, and were checked by their superior artillery Happily, Edwardes arrived in time to bring them into order, for the incompetent Futteh Mohammed considered that a general's principal function was to sit under a tree and do nothing The Englishman, vigorously supported by Foujdar Khan, succeeded with difficulty in persuading officers and men that they must remain on the defensive until the arrival of Van Cortlandt should give the necessary superiority This plan of operations was anything but to the taste either of the allies or of Edwardes's Pathans, who were ready to charge against any odds, but could not understand sitting

still to be shot at. For six hours the enemy kept up their fire; the strain was becoming ominously severe; already the Bhawalpore men were beginning to be forced back slowly towards the river. The advance of the Multanis, however, called out all the best qualities of the Pathan soldiery on the left, and the enemy were checked, first by the hot fire with which they were received, and then by a brilliant cavalry charge headed by Foujdar Khan. The fight had lasted about seven hours, when the whole Multan line advanced to the attack; but, just in time, Van Cortlandt's troops completed the crossing, joined the Bhawalpore force, turned the tables on the enemy, overwhelmed their artillery fire, and drove back their whole line until they turned in precipitate flight.

Thus, in the battle of Kineyree, was Mulraj's army routed by the undisciplined troops of our Bhawalpore ally, and by Edwardes's levies, with the small body of artillery and the staunch regiments under Van Cortlandt.

After a halt of three days, the force moved on to Shujabad, where it was learnt that Mulraj, distrusting his Pathan adherents, was pinning his faith on the support of the Sikh troops, and was strenuously improving the defences of the Multan Fort. Having a total strength of 18,000 men and 30 guns, and expecting to be able to force Mulraj to withdraw from the open country and concentrate on Multan, Edwardes now suggested to the Resident that he should be allowed to commence the siege at once, that guns and mortars should be sent down the river to him from Ferozepore, and that Major Napier (afterwards Lord Napier of Magdala) should plan the operations. This proposal, dispensing with the employment of any except native soldiery, may have been a rash one; but Edwardes knew that Lord Gough was opposed to any present movement of British troops towards Multan, while he held it to be an imperative necessity to keep the area of Mulraj's insurrection and operations within the narrowest possible limits;

for, however successful he had been in his own proceedings, all was not smooth elsewhere. The Sikh temper was the chief danger. A fanatic, Bhaee Maharaj Singh, calling himself a Guru, had raised a band of followers, and, after having been supposed to have been destroyed, had reappeared at Multan; and the Sikh soldiery of the three columns from the north were said to be advancing, without or contrary to orders, on Multan, where it was doubtful whether they might not desert to Mulraj.

There was no doubt that the central one of these three columns, which should have been halted at Chichawatni, was within some 30 miles of Multan, and this could not now be helped. But Jawahir Mull's Sikhs (of the Sindh Sagur column) had partly deserted and partly returned to Lahore, and Sheikh Imam-ud-Din, of the Sutlej column, now sent back its Sikhs to Lahore and joined Edwardes with only his Mussulmans.

From Shujabad, Edwardes moved on the 26th to Secunderabad, halfway to Multan, and seized the fort there without further fighting. At the same time he learnt that Mulraj meant to oppose his approach to Multan, at the passage, at Sooruj Khoond, of a large canal which there crosses the road. On June 28th he advanced up to Sooruj Khoond, and was joined by Lieutenant Lake, who forthwith took command of the Bhawalpore troops, but, having a wise appreciation of the danger of divided councils, voluntarily assumed the position of Edwardes's subordinate. The position held by Mulraj was very strong, advantage having been taken with considerable skill of the banks and nullahs of the canal and its branches, while its bridge had been destroyed. Edwardes planned, therefore, not to force the passage at that point, but to march up his side of the canal till he should meet its passage by the road from Multan to the Rajghat ferry on the Chenab, and there turn and advance on Multan.

On July 1st he carried out this plan. Mulraj's troops

confronted him gallantly; but Edwardes had 22 guns to the enemy's 10; and as his artillery fire gradually subdued that of Mulraj's army, his line advanced, driving the enemy back at all points, and winning the day decisively with a brilliant charge of Van Cortlandt's Sooruj Mukhie regiment, which forced the defeated rebels within the walls of Multan.

Such was the Battle of Suddoosam, fought on July 1st, nominally in support of the Sikh Durbar against the rebel Mulraj. The whole struggle had been conducted under the pressure and guidance of Lieutenant Edwardes. At the outset, on April 25th, he had suggested the moving of a British (*not* a Sikh) force against Multan; but on learning Lord Gough's judgment, he deferred to it with entire loyalty, and refrained from repeating any such proposals. Now, however, he did suggest that some heavy ordnance should forthwith be sent him from Ferozepore down the Sutlej *viâ* Bhawalpore, which *at that time, early in July*, would, he thought, enable him, with the force he had, to capture Multan while its defences were comparatively weak. Besides, he was especially nervous at the threatened approach of Shere Singh and Shumser Singh's Durbar troops, and anxious that they should be held back by the Durbar at a distance from Multan. But the answer he received was that ordnance would be useless without artillerymen, and that that meant a British force, to which, as he knew, there was strong objection.

That special feature or reason in Edwardes's suggestion above referred to must not be forgotten, viz. that the fort of Multan was still unprepared for defence, although Mulraj had been taking steps to improve it; but that it would now grow stronger every day, and prove much more difficult to besiege and capture three or four months later. And Major Napier, at Lahore, concurred in this view.

Lord Gough, however, seems to have paid little regard to this theory, believing that Multan was already so strong that delay could not be utilised to make it effectively

stronger. Moreover, heartily as he admired Edwardes's pluck and vigour, he had no great confidence in the young man's judgment, suspecting that he overrated his own capacity, and might be led into indiscretions in consequence. To supply him with guns but not troops he regarded as futile, his objection to sending either a small or a large detachment of British troops remained unchanged; while he judged from Edwardes's own reports that that officer was already strong enough to keep Mulraj in Multan, and to do more before a cold-weather campaign be held to be impracticable Lastly, he did not believe that delay increased the danger of Sikh disaffection or treachery, not from trust in the Sikhs, but from the expectation that their disloyalty was more likely to be precipitated by premature action.

Under the Lahore plan of operations, three columns of Durbar troops had been despatched, under command respectively of Jawahir Mull, Shere Singh, and Imam-ud-Din—not a little to the perturbation of Edwardes. Of the troops under their command, some reliance could be placed on the Mussulmans, but none on the true Sikhs. None of the commanders had been in any hurry. Imam-ud-Din, however, had quite made up his mind not to go against the British, and he succeeded in bringing hardly any but Mussulmans to swell the forces, just before the Battle of Suddoosam. Jawahir Mull, also, by the time he did arrive, had shed his Sikh followers. But Shere Singh, a Sikh himself, with a large body of Sikhs behind him, was now nearing Multan. As far as can be judged, he himself at this time intended to remain loyal, but his men's sympathies were certainly on the other side, and the chances that they would desert on the first convenient opportunity were enormous. Shumser Singh, the second in command, and a personal friend of Edwardes, declared to him that but for the victory of Suddoosam, they would have gone straight over to Mulraj on arrival.

Naturally, when this column reached Gogran, five miles from Multan, on July 5th, four days after Suddoosam, Edwardes was nervous. Placed there, they could communicate with Mulraj. Accordingly, he arranged with Shere Singh that they should advance further, and take up their position in the rear of his own force at Sooruj Khoond, he himself being at Tibbee, three miles south-west of Multan. By this means he hoped to check communication with the rebels, while—somewhat rashly, perhaps—he rather looked forward to the Sikhs declaring themselves while he lay between them and Mulraj, hoping thereby to obtain a chance of getting rid of the Sikh contingent altogether. The actual effect, however, was to keep the Khalsa troops for the time being loyal.

Mulraj did his best to detach them. On July 20th, he made a sortie. The besiegers drew up in line, offering battle; and when he found that the Sikh troops were co-operating with them, and, crossing from Sooruj Khoond, were threatening Multan on the south-east, instead of deserting, he thought better of it, and withdrew. A similar attempt was made on the 26th, with a similar result; though it was believed that some of the Sikh cavalry would on this occasion have gone over, had they not been disconcerted by Shere Singh drawing up his whole force in line of battle.

About this time two *émeutes* had taken place across the Indus; one at Hurrund, the other at Bunnoo. Both, however, had been repressed by the Mussulman chiefs left by Edwardes in control of those districts.

Also two conspiracies were discovered, both instigated by Mulraj. One was a treacherous intrigue with Louza Mull, formerly Governor of Dera Ghazi Khan, now a prisoner in the camp, which resulted in his execution. The other was a plot, having at its head a trooper named Shujan Singh, to poison Shere Singh. The trooper was blown from a gun; but the incident showed forcibly the

secret leanings of the Sikh soldiery, and was evidence that so far they were under the impression that Shere Singh meant to be loyal, and were disgusted with him accordingly.

To which it may be added that all this time Mulraj's forces were freely augmented by Sikh deserters, while he was steadily and vigorously strengthening the defences of Multan.

CHAPTER V.

THE FIRST SIEGE OF MULTAN: JULY–SEPTEMBER

The Resident decides to send a force to Multan—Lord Gough increases the force—Chutter Singh—Arrival of Whish's force—Proclamation—Plan of attack—Difficulties of the situation—Fighting from Sept. 9 to Sept. 12—Shere Singh joins the rebellion—Story of his plot on Sept. 13—Change in the situation—Shere Singh prepares to summon the Khalsa—Making the war a national rising.

Before the occurrence of the events last narrated, the report of Suddoosam had caused Sir Frederick Currie to change his mind, and decide to follow Edwardes's advice. The precise point of that advice, however, he had not grasped. At the time of Suddoosam, Edwardes had announced that Mulraj was shut up in Multan, and that he could capture the place if only he were slightly strengthened at once. "Major Napier, with a company of sappers and a few large guns" was the reinforcement he actually suggested. What he meant was that Mulraj could not leave Multan, and that the place might be taken if siege materials and some additional troops could be supplied at once—before the fortifications could be strengthened, or the situation complicated by the arrival of a quantity of disaffected Sikhs. But it was not till July 10th that Currie adopted his new resolution; and after consultation with General Whish, in command of the movable column at Lahore, decided to use the special powers allowed him for acting in emergency, and order a British force to move on Multan, partly from Lahore by the Ravi, partly from Ferozepore by the Sutlej.

A force which would not reach Multan till the middle of August scarcely answered to what Edwardes meant as one which would enable him to capture Multan. Moreover, that officer's report had conveyed to military head-quarters the misconception that he had Mulraj closely invested, whereas there was nothing to stop his egress on the north and west, though he could not venture to move any number of troops to any distance. There is no doubt, however, that Lord Gough, Sir John Littler, and others, interpreted the report to mean that Mulraj could not move outside the walls, in short, it was supposed that Edwardes's own position before Multan was much more dominant than was actually the case.

Lord Gough objected to the expedition altogether, having found no reason to change his view But, since Sir Frederick had used his powers, the Commander-in-Chief, while expressing dissent from the policy followed, did not oppose the Resident, but said that since the thing was to be done, the force must be considerably augmented, the Governor-General endorsing both his views and his action under the circumstances.

The force despatched, as organised by Lord Gough's orders, was thus composed —

Two brigades of infantry, each containing a British regiment,

One native cavalry brigade, and two troops of horse artillery,

A siege train with foot artillery

This was constituted a division, and placed under the command of General Whish, with Major Napier as his Chief Engineer

The British troops were to move down the two rivers by boat, while the native troops marched by night down the left bank of the Ravi and the right bank of the Sutlej respectively The season was hot, but not otherwise unhealthy

On July 22nd the Resident issued a proclamation of the British advance against Multan, and the two columns started on July 24th and 26th, a fortnight after Sir F. Currie had given orders for the move; but took about twenty-five days over it, not reaching Multan till the 18th and 19th August.

While the columns from Ferozepore and Lahore were advancing, no change took place before Multan. Mulraj went on with his defences; Shere Singh still professed loyalty, nor had his troops yet openly gone over to the enemy. But, in the meantime, the Sikhs in the north were breaking into open revolt, of which the history will be given later. Here, however, it may be remarked that the rebellion was as yet local, being confined to the Hazara district, where the leader was Chutter Singh, the father of Shere Singh. The importance of this, as far as concerned Multan, lay in the fact that the son was in constant receipt of urgent and sarcastic messages from the father, pressing him to throw off his allegiance; whereby his loyalty was put to a very severe strain, while his troops were hardly awaiting the word from him to join Mulraj.

When the Ravi force was still a march off, Edwardes arranged to interchange camping-grounds with Shere Singh, in order to facilitate his own junction with the new arrivals. The Sikhs, on entering their new camp, fired a series of salutes, thereby causing much uncertainty in the minds of the approaching forces, who, not knowing the meaning of the firing, were kept very much on the alert. Consequently they gave an unexpectedly warm reception to a body of Mulraj's troops which he sent out in the early morning to attack the advanced guard. This happened on August 17th, and on the 18th the Ravi column proceeded to Seetul-ki-Mari, three miles east of the fort, where it was joined next day by the Sutlej column.

The disembarkation of the siege-train and its transport to Multan was not effected till the 4th September, and on

that day, General Whish issued a proclamation calling on Multan to surrender unconditionally. The wording of this proclamation clearly conveyed that the authority to be yielded to was not the Durbar, but the Queen of England. This receiving no attention, operations began. To improve the position, Edwardes's force was moved from Sooruj Khoond to Mosum Khan's Well, some three miles to the right and front, nearer Multan. This move was not made without some sharp fighting, during which General Whish and his staff reconnoitred the position.

The force was composed of—


2 troops horse artillery
4 companies fort artillery
5 companies of sappers
3 regiments of cavalry
2 regiments British infantry
4 regiments native infantry

13,400 native infantry		under Edwardes
5000 „ cavalry		
900 „ infantry		under Shere Singh,
3400 „ cavalry		

with 32 siege-guns and 61 light guns.

On September 6th, alternative plans which had been drawn up were discussed. Two proposals—(1) to capture the city at once by a *coup de main*, and (2) to attack the fort on its north by regular approaches—were negatived; while the third, to run a trench to a point called Ram Teerut, and there establish batteries, was approved. The trench works were accordingly begun the next day September 7th.

Many of the senior officers, however, and notably Major Napier (afterwards Lord Napier of Magdala), the chief engineer, very soon formed an adverse view of the prospects of the siege. The Bhawalpore men and the Pathan Irregulars were loyal and brave enough when it came to fighting; but they neither could nor would take their share in the essential trench and battery work, the whole of which



Huzooree Bagh
Shere Singh's Camp 20 Sept.
Eedg
Lahore G.
B.Hu
FORT
Bowlu
Bridge
MULTAN CITY
Delh
Hurram G.
Pak G.
SUBURBS
ANAL
Khoonee Boo
Mundee
Seede Lal ka Behr
Enemy's Entrenchments
Jumoona ka Kerbe
Pah man
Kutee Byraghee
DES
BAHAWULPORE
VAN CORTI

consequently devolved upon the British Division alone. The known temper of Shere Singh's troops made them a source of anxiety instead of a real addition to the strength of the besiegers. Hence, without considering that the siege ought to be raised, Napier was clearly of opinion that the besieging force was inadequate for the reduction of the stronghold. This view was communicated to Whish on the 9th, but the General by no means acceded to it.

On the night of the 9th, then, in consequence of a mischievous fire from some buildings in front, an attack was made on them; but not with success, owing to the preparations not having been made in daylight.

On the 12th, Mulraj, having greatly strengthened his works between Multan and Seetul-ki-Mari, made a counter-attack on the besiegers in force. Edwardes's troops on the left drove back the enemy in their front, and held the village of Jummoondar-ke-kirree, half a mile from the Khoonee Boorj, at the southern angle of the city walls, which they could now see fully and breach. On the right, two columns of Whish's army cleared the ground in front of the projected batteries, storming and capturing the positions held by the enemy, especially a very strong one called the Dhurmsala; where the fighting was very fierce, and hardly any of the defenders returned to Multan to tell the tale. The enemy left 500 dead on the ground. This victory advanced the British position by half a mile.

A change, however, was close at hand. Hitherto it had appeared, on the whole, probable that Shere Singh himself meant to stand by the British. To this day it is uncertain when he made up his mind to join the revolt. According to Imam-ud-Din, his resolution had remained firm up till the failure of the besiegers' attack on the 9th; then for three days he remained irresolute, still acting loyally, but with an uncertain mind, while Chutter Singh's letters exercised an increasing influence on him. Despite the successes of the 12th, on the 13th he made up his mind, and on the

14th he went over bag and baggage to the rebels, taking his Sikh followers with him.

If this account is incorrect, it is undoubtedly curious that he took no earlier opportunity to desert. On the whole, it seems to tally with such evidence as there is. It was rumoured that his plan of action, formed on the 13th, was to support the advance of the besiegers against Multan, help *them to force their way into the town, and then fall on* their rear while Mulraj met them in front; but that the risk of detection made him afraid to wait. The rumour has some confirmation from an occurrence which did not become generally known, but is vouched for by a distinguished officer then present as a subaltern.

The officers attached to Edwardes's force used to dine together, and it was Shere Singh's custom to visit them when the meal was over. On the night of the 13th, Edwardes being at the head of the table, and Van Cortlandt *at the foot nearest the entrance, Shere Singh came in* as usual, but with more attendants than was his wont, and took his seat by Edwardes. Van Cortlandt, a very shrewd man, who knew the Sikhs thoroughly, at once had his suspicions aroused, slipped out, drew a guard of loyal Pathans round the tent, and returned quietly. But he succeeded in conveying to Shere Singh a hint of what he had done, and the Rajah withdrew unusually early. From the information subsequently obtained by Van Cortlandt, there seems little doubt that the Sikh chief had told off his followers to mark their men, and had intended to seize and secure the person of every officer present. Van Cortlandt had spoilt the plot, but Shere Singh felt that after that the tables might be turned upon him at any moment, that at any rate the others would now be on their guard; and that, consequently, the sooner he betook himself to Mulraj the better.

On the 14th, then, the besieging army was shocked, gh not altogether astonished, to learn that Shere Singh

with his army had marched from their camp to join the rebels.

Up to this date the capture of Multan had seemed a task which the besiegers might possibly succeed in accomplishing, despite the great strength of the defences; though Napier and others had already declared it to be beyond their powers. But after Shere Singh's defection, no such chance remained. The transfer of so large a body of troops from the besiegers to the defenders put it out of the question. Now, therefore, General Whish decided that the siege operations must be suspended, and the troops must fall back to the original positions at Tibbee, Sooruj Khoond, and Ram Teerut.

For the moment, the raising of the siege appeared to be the only effect of Shere Singh's desertion, for Mulraj gave him anything but a cordial reception, having, indeed, grave doubts as to the genuineness of the movement. He refused the Sikh General admission into Multan, directing him to encamp in the Huzuree Bagh under the guns of the fort, while his suspicions were actively fomented by the introduction of letters into Multan addressed to Shere Singh, as though the latter were a secret friend of the besiegers. But it was not Shere Singh's intention to confine himself to the Multan operations; his avowed purpose now was to raise and organise the Khalsa against "the oppression of the Feringhis," and though, under stress of Mulraj's taunts, he led out his army to attack Edwardes, he withdrew it again on finding the enemy fully prepared to meet him. From the latter part of September his preparations were all directed to a march on Lahore or to Gujerat (in the Jetch Doab), where Chutter Singh was urging him to gather the Khalsa; and on October 9th he marched from Multan to raise the Sikh nation in arms.

The movement of leaving Multan for a march northwards, whereby Shere Singh transferred the struggle to the Sikh districts, where he recruited the old Sikh soldiery

as he advanced, and raised the Khalsa cry, commenced a new epoch, and was the beginning of the real Punjab campaign. The move was strategically a good one, throwing the whole weight of the Sikh force to the north-west front of the disaffected Manjha country, with the Multan thorn on the British flank, the great Punjab rivers to aid Shere Singh in his own warfare, and his rear supported by the Afghan Power, of which Chutter Singh was securing the alliance, by the cession of the much-coveted Peshawur districts.

Lord Dalhousie was perfectly alive to the character of the impending war, and left Calcutta for the front on October 10th, the day after Shere Singh left Multan. Before leaving Calcutta, he had, at a public banquet, announced the situation in these words, "Unwarned by precedents, uninfluenced by example, the Sikh nation has called for war, and on my word, sirs, they shall have it with a vengeance."

BOOK V.

THE CONQUEST OF THE SIKHS

BOOK V.

THE CONQUEST OF THE SIKHS: 1848-9

CHAPTER I.

THE SIKH RISING: AUG., 1848-JAN., 1849

Lord Gough's reasons for a winter campaign—General and specific—Suspension of Multan operations—Peshawur and Hazara in August—Chutter Singh and Abbott—George Lawrence—Refusal of a brigade for Hazara—Herbert at Attok—Lahore and the Jalandhar Doab—Govindguhr—Spread of the revolt.

THE defection of Shere Singh may be regarded as opening the Sikh War proper. At this point the insurrection became a national revolt against British control; a rising for that final trial of strength, the expectation of which had been the fundamental justification of Lord Gough's military policy. He had, indeed, maintained that, so long as the rebellion was one against the Durbar Government, the Durbar itself was bound to put it down without British help. But beyond this, being convinced that the great war was inevitable, he considered it imperative to have at control, when it came, an army strong enough to bring matters to a final and decisive conclusion; to conquer the Sikhs thoroughly, not merely to scotch their power for a time; to ensure that there should be no moments such as had been experienced at Ferozeshah, when annihilation had to be faced as a grim possibility. If detachments intended to be effective were despatched to Hazara, to Peshawur, to

Bunnoo, and to Multan, his main army would be seriously weakened, and the detachments themselves might still prove insufficient. For, while the frontier force had been greatly strengthened by Lord Hardinge, a part of it only was really available for acting on the offensive, owing to the contemporaneous reduction of the military establishment generally. Lord Gough formed the plans, which were adopted by Lord Dalhousie, on the theory that the movement was one which could not be nipped in the bud by local successes; and that consequently the army should not move until it could do so in sufficient force to meet the Sikh nation in arms. Incidentally there was this additional objection to early action—that it would be dangerous for European troops to move in the hot weather, while sepoy regiments, without European support, could not be relied on to fight their best.

These were the general grounds on which Lord Gough based his objection to sending a force to Multan, or isolated columns to other parts of the country. Here, however, it will be well to enter into further details.

In the first place, as to the strength of Multan itself. At the beginning of July Edwardes believed that a small immediate reinforcement, accompanied by siege-guns, would enable him to carry Multan at once. Lord Gough believed that this theory was the result of a complete miscalculation of the strength of the defence. The one definitely ascertained fact is that, two months later, Napier, when he appeared before Multan, came to the immediate conclusion that Whish's Division was not strong enough for the purpose. Mulraj had, no doubt, in the interval, concentrated his energies on strengthening the defences, so that their condition in September is not conclusive as to their condition in July; still, the manifest inference is that a *small* reinforcement, sent earlier, would have been insufficient, as Lord Gough held. The presumption, then, is that a small force would have been merely wasted; and that view was

strongly supported by past experience of the ability of the natives to hold a strong fort. Thus, for instance, twenty years earlier, Bhurtpore had held out for a month against an army of 25,000 men with 112 pieces of heavy artillery and 50 field-guns; and was then only taken by storm. The enthusiastic hopes of a young officer like Edwardes could hardly be expected to weigh against the practical lessons of experience.

The despatch of an overwhelming force, on the other hand, might have effected the immediate object of capturing Multan; but it would also have the effect of rousing the whole Sikh nation to arms, and the force immediately available could not crush the whole Sikh nation.

The obvious conclusion was that neither a small nor a large force should be sent at once to Multan; but that a force competent to crush the whole Sikh nation in arms should be collected; and such operations as the circumstances demanded should be then undertaken. But to collect such an army would take months. The required force, according to the Commander-in-Chief's calculations, would include some 24,000 of all arms, with 78 field-guns and 50 siege-guns. For this purpose, carriage must be supplied, in which Government had caused a serious deficiency; and troops would have to be brought up even from Calcutta; the sepoy army, greatly cut down by Lord Hardinge, having been further reduced by the large proportion of men absent on furlough.

These, then, were the views and designs which Lord Gough submitted to Lord Dalhousie. Whether they should be adopted or not was a matter for the most autocratic and independent of Governors-General to decide; and he decided absolutely and unreservedly in favour of the Commander-in-Chief.

Lord Gough had been prevented from acting on his own views in their entirety by Currie's action in despatching Whish to Multan; but in the main he was able to

carry them out. The influence of the siege on the winter campaign was, however, confined to the fact that it detained Whish's troops until the fall of Multan in January.

From the time, then, of Shere Singh's defection, which translates the rising from a local outbreak into a national war, the siege of Multan became of secondary importance, the real centre of interest lying in the coming contest in the more northern districts. The principal object of hastening it was to release the troops engaged. Preparations were already on foot for the despatch of a column from Bombay; and orders were now sent that the actual siege should be suspended until the arrival of this contingent, since it was now abundantly evident that Mulraj was strong enough to hold out against the troops actually present.

Before continuing the Multan narrative, we now turn to the events which may be briefly termed the Rising of the Sikhs.

It has already been observed that during the month of August, while Shere Singh was still supporting Edwardes before Multan, his father, Chutter Singh, raised the standard of rebellion in the north

In the northern district, the principal position was Peshawur, over the possession of which Sikhs and Afghans had waged a long contest in the days of Ranjit Singh. Here there was a large body of Sikh troops, under a loyal but aged governor, Gholab Singh,* distinguished by the class-name "Povindia" from the Rajah of Kashmir Here the British representative was Major George Lawrence.

South-west of Peshawur lies Kohat, where Sultan Mohammed was governor, of whom mention has previously been made in the account of the Afghan troubles. He was one of the Barukzai brothers, of whom the most notable

* It should be mentioned that there was also at Lahore a third Gholab Singh, "Attariwalla," another son of Chutter Singh, of whom mention is made with some frequency in official correspondence at this period.

was Dost Mohammed, Amir of Kabul; who had been displaced to enthrone Shah Shujah, and restored in 1843. Sultan Mohammed was, of course, a Mussulman; he was under personal obligations to Henry Lawrence, and had always expressed the strongest personal attachment to George Lawrence also. But he had already shown an exceptional capacity for treachery. There was no British officer at Kohat.

Across the Indus, in the Hazara district, Chutter Singh was Nazim or governor. But among the true native population—Mussulmans—the British officer, Major James Abbott, had obtained an extraordinary personal influence.

Abbott long suspected the loyalty of the Sikh troops in the Hazara district, and believed that Chutter Singh was engaged in sowing disaffection among them. At last, in the beginning of August, some of the Sikhs prepared to quit their cantonments, obviously with intent to revolt; though their actual destination was uncertain. Chutter Singh, on the pretext that Abbott's influence had made the local population hostile, ordered out the troops at Hurripore. An officer, Colonel Canora (an American), refused to move without instructions from Abbott, and was shot dead. Abbott, however, forthwith called out the local peasantry, whose appearance in arms checked the movements of the Sikh soldiery. News of the disturbance being sent to Peshawur, Major Lawrence promptly sent down John Nicholson to secure Attok, close to the confluence of the Kabul river and the Indus. By these means the revolting troops were prevented from attempting immediate action.

Chutter Singh, however, while affirming that he was loyal, and declaring that his proceedings had been forced on him by the distrust and disregard of him which Abbott displayed, was engaged in active intrigues; as was afterwards proved. Not only was he sending messages to Multan inciting Shere Singh to revolt; but he opened communications with Gholab Singh of Kashmir, who, as usual, followed

a policy of masterly inactivity; and also with the troops in Peshawur, with the Amir at Kabul, and with Sultan Mohammed. These latter intrigues proved more successful. The special object of drawing in Dost Mohammed was to obtain Mussulman support, which was not readily given to Sikhs; and for this purpose Chutter Singh counted it worth while to offer Peshawur itself as a bribe.

Yet within Peshawur, George Lawrence's influence was sufficiently strong to keep a force composed of Sikhs loyal for a surprisingly long time. It was not till near the end of October that their loyalty at length gave way, with the assurance that Sultan Mohammed meant to play the traitor. The British officers were obliged to evacuate Peshawur, withdrawing under an Afghan escort to Kohat; when it became rapidly clear that they were in effect prisoners; and they were shortly afterwards handed over to Chutter Singh.

Throughout September and October, Lawrence as well as Nicholson had been pressing on the Resident, at Lahore, the advisability of sending a British Brigade to the north-west. Lord Gough, however, adhered firmly to his determination not to allow small bodies of troops to be dispersed among distant districts, for the reasons already given. In the north, moreover, he considered that there was a special objection, owing to the doubts as to the possible action of the Maharajah of Kashmir. It was felt that if that monarch came to the conclusion that revolt would pay him, he certainly would revolt; and his forces joined to Chutter Singh's might bring disaster on any possibly available British detachment.

Thus, by the beginning of November, Multan was still holding out in the south; in the western Punjab proper, the old Khalsa soldiers were flocking to Shere Singh; while Peshawur and the northern part of the Sindh Sagur Doab had declared for the revolt; the only check on them being Lieutenant Herbert, who had taken Nicholson's place at

Attok, with a Mussulman garrison, and Major Abbott, with the Hazara tribesmen. Attok was stubbornly held against great odds; and it was not till Dost Mohammed's Afghans began to appear that the garrison declared to Herbert that they had done all that could be demanded of their loyalty, their wives and families were in the Dost's hands, and they must surrender the place. Herbert himself was captured while attempting to escape, and was sent to join the other prisoners in Chutter Singh's hands at Peshawur. The fall of Attok, however, did not take place till January 3rd.

While the advance of the great expedition was still being awaited, the Sikhs were displaying restlessness not only in the north, and in the districts where Shere Singh was at work, but also in the east. Ram Singh, son of the Vizier of Nurpur, one of the small hill states, rose in arms and proclaimed the end of British rule. By the energetic action of John Lawrence, who was commissioner in the Jalandhar Doab, the insurgents were suppressed; Sikh troops, unwillingly obedient, following the British leader against the party with whom their real sympathies lay.

At Lahore, Sir Frederick Currie long strove with a certain obstinacy to retain his confidence in the loyalty of the Sikh Sirdars. It was not till all possibility of doubt was destroyed that he would credit Abbott's reiterated warnings against Chutter Singh. Before September was over, the proofs of plotting on the part of leading members of the Durbar led to important arrests, including Runjoor Singh and Shere Singh's brother. Grave suspicions attached to the Sikh garrison of the strong fort of Govindguhr, dominating the sacred city of Amritsir. It was resolved to anticipate any hostile declaration by a stratagem; a small party of Guides was sent down to the fort nominally to escort some treasure. Matters not being yet ripe in Govindguhr, they were admitted; and early the next morning opened the gates to two sepoy regiments from Lahore, who had marched thirty-six miles

by night, and now quietly and without resistance took the place of the Sikh garrison. It is noteworthy that in lieu of the two guns which, according to the Durbar authorities, constituted the Govindguhr artillery, eighteen were found ready mounted, and a quantity more—bringing up the whole number to fifty-two—buried, with the obvious intention that they should be unearthed and put in order when the critical moment arrived.

The capture of Govindguhr removed a very serious source of danger. The presence of the sepoy regiments at Lahore, and Amritsar, and in the Jalandhar Doab, coupled with the vigilant activity of the British officers and the influence of a very fine Sikh Sirdar, Lehna Singh, sufficed to prevent any organised rising in the Manjha district, but did not suffice to give any adequate feeling of security; and the knowledge that Lord Gough's army was now collecting on the border, and would soon be in motion, was exceedingly welcome. For before it was ready to start, Peshawur had already fallen; Attok was being besieged; the siege of Multan was at a standstill, awaiting the arrival of the Bombay contingent, the Bunnoo regiments had revolted, killed Futteh Khan, and were on the march to join Shere Singh, the disbanded members of the old Khalsa army were flocking to his standard; and the whole Sikh population north and west of the Chenab was virtually in insurrection.

Shere Singh himself had started from Multan on October 9th, at such speed that pursuit by a detachment of the slower moving British troops before that city was out of the question. Moving rapidly up the Chenab he allowed it to be reported that he intended to attack Lahore, where the situation was felt to be somewhat critical. A troop of his cavalry even advanced so near the capital as to burn some boats on the Ravi not two miles away, at the end of the month.

It was known, however, that the grand army was

collecting at Ferozepore; and the arrival of an advance cavalry brigade, under Cureton, relieved the strain; this being soon followed by two brigades, under Godby and Eckford; Colin Campbell being in command at Lahore. It was supposed that the enemy would make a stand at Gujeranwalla, but they preferred falling back across the Chenab, Shere Singh's real object being to effect a junction with the Bunnoo troops. He now concentrated upon the fords at Ramnuggur, leaving only outposts on the eastern bank; and Cureton, who had been joined by Campbell with two regiments of native infantry, awaited the arrival of the main army.

Early in November that army was complete; on the 9th Lord Gough crossed the Sutlej, reaching Lahore on the 13th, and on the 16th the troops crossed the Ravi.

CHAPTER II.

SECOND SIEGE OF MULTAN SEPT-JAN., 1849

Order of the narrative—Period of inactivity—Renewal of active measures—Arrival of the Bombay column—Plan of attack—The enemy driven into the city—Bombardment—Capture of the city—Operations against the fort—Surrender of Mulraj, Jan. 22—Release of the Multan army

THE bulk of the events narrated in the last chapter were contemporaneous with the two months of almost complete inaction forced on the Multan Division after Shere Singh joined the rebels—a term, by the way, of which the use is strictly accurate, since the official Government of the State continued to profess loyalty to the treaty with the British, and the whole revolt originated in the refusal of a local "Dewan" to obey the orders of the Durbar.

Active preparations for the second siege commenced in November, and the citadel surrendered on January 22nd. During this period Lord Gough commenced his advance, crossed the Chenab, and fought the actions of Sadulapore and Chillianwalla on December 3rd and January 13th.

For the sake of continuity, therefore, we shall now relate the whole of the Multan operations from September 16th, 1848, to January 31st, 1849, in this chapter, and then proceed consecutively with Lord Gough's campaign, with the last stage of which alone—Gujerat—the Multan force was associated.

On September 14th Shere Singh went over to Mulraj, and it became at once evident that active operations must

be suspended until reinforcements arrived, to which end the Bombay Government were already making arrangements.

On September 16th Whish shifted his camp across the canal; and nine days later moved a mile and a half to the rear, so as to command the two roads leading respectively from Multan westward to the Rajghat ferry, and southward towards Bhawalpore. During the ensuing six weeks the enemy were engaged in occupying advanced positions, and throwing up works in front of the British lines. Mulraj, meantime, despatched emissaries to various points; to Peshawur, where, the place not having yet fallen, the messenger was hanged; to Bunnoo; to the Afghans and Pathans beyond the Indus. The design was shrewd enough; since by urging them into the Derajat, he might not only get material assistance for himself at Multan, but might seriously hamper the British forces, should they advance from the Manjha towards Peshawur, by threatening their flank. The response to his overtures was, however, by no means enthusiastic, Dost Mohammed finding employment for as many troops as he cared to send at Peshawur and in Hazara; while the Pathans generally were anything but devoted to the Khalsa.

The Bombay Column tarried, and Whish found the enemy's works among the canal excavations acting as a serious check on the British batteries. It was therefore resolved to make an attack in force on November 7th (about the time when Lord Gough's army was getting into motion from Ferozepore). The state of affairs was illustrated on the 6th by the desertion *en masse* of a Hindostani regiment in the service of the Durbar, known as the Katar Mukhi, which was occupying an advanced post under Van Cortlandt's command. They did not, however, attack their officers.

On the 7th, then, when the proposed attack was about to begin, it was found that the foe had already taken the

initiative, and were advancing to attack Edwardes's position. Here, however, they were driven back, with heavy loss. Meantime Whish, on the right, advanced, and turned the left flank of the Sikh position; and then, sweeping down its whole length, captured all but three of their guns. This success served to keep the enemy quiet for the time.

On November 30th Colonel Cheape, the chief engineer of the army, arrived to take control of the engineering operations, Multan being the place where the activity of that branch of the service was most in demand. On December 6th, 13th, and 16th he made special reconnaissances. Major Napier had previously drawn up a project of attack, which was directed against the north-east angle of the fort, and this project had gone up to the Commander-in-Chief. On December 12th Colonel Cheape recorded objections to it, and proposed instead that the attack should be similar to that in the first siege—against and through the city, beginning at its southern bastion, the Khoonee Boorj. This was approved by General Whish, and preparations were made to start it on the arrival of the Bombay Column.

At last, after long delay, the Bombay Column actually arrived; delay caused, in part at least, by a curious piece of bungling. The Bombay authorities appointed General Auchmuty to the command; but, since he was senior to Whish, he would have superseded the latter, who had his appointment from the Supreme Government. Whereupon the Government required some one junior to Whish to be appointed in place of Auchmuty, who in the mean time issued orders to the troops not to move until he arrived to take command. Ultimately, Brigadier Dundas was sent. The first detachment arrived on the 10th; but it was not till the 21st that the whole column was assembled.

Two regiments of British and five of native infantry, with three regiments of cavalry, were thus added to the

besieging force, while the artillery was brought up to 67 siege and 30 field-guns.

On the plan of attack being laid before Brigadier Dundas and his engineer, Major Scott, they agreed to support by preference a plan on the same lines as Major Napier's. But General Whish continued to adhere to Colonel Cheape's project, and the movements and positions adopted were in conformity to it, till the 26th; when, in deference to the officers who had to lead the column, he agreed, instead, to the plans of Majors Napier and Scott, in which the chief point of attack was the north-east angle of the fort. As the first step of the operation, the whole force was next day, the 27th, to drive the enemy back at all points in the semicircle from the south-west to the north-east.

The British position was in three parts—the Bengal Column on the right, with their camp at Seetul-ki-Mari; on its left, the Bombay Column, reaching to the Wullee Mahomed Canal; and, on the left of that canal, Edwardes's Force, with the Bhawalpore men.

The British force was to drive back the enemy, and Edwardes's troops were to cross the canal and support its left flank. The advance was in three columns; the right was to sieze the brick-kilns about a mile to the east of the fort, and work its way forward from that point; the centre was to operate against the eastern face of the city, through the suburbs there; and the left against the Khoonee Boorj, the southern bastion of the city.

The operations were thoroughly successful. The right column moved as far as the Amkhas, 500 yards from the south-east angle of the fort; the centre column drove the rebels into the city at the Delhi Gate; and it and the left column planted batteries on heights called respectively Mundee Awa and Seedee Lal-ka-Behr, a site also being seized for a breaching-battery 120 yards from the Khoonee Boorj.

During the following night and next day (the 28th) breaching-batteries were begun; on the 29th a battery of the right attack opened out, and on the 30th the battery against the Khoonee Boorj. Next day the centre battery was completed, and began breaching the Delhi Gate. Other batteries also were started, and, as they were completed, joined in the circle of attack.

During these days a determined sally was made against Edwardes's Division by a large body of Sikhs, but they were thoroughly repulsed. In this fight Henry Lawrence again appears on the scene; he having returned from leave in England, and joined the camp on the 28th.

On the 30th, the enemy's large magazine on the south face was blown up, and the minor defences near it destroyed. On January 2nd, the breaches in the city walls being thought to be practicable, the assault was delivered on them. The breach at the Delhi Gate was found insufficient, and the attacking column was accordingly halted; but the Khoonee Boorj was successfully stormed by the Bombay Fusiliers, and the two columns, acting together, then cleared the whole of the south side of the city, and opened all its gates. Thus the city was taken, but the fort remained in the hands of Mulraj, who, seeing the besiegers' success, closed the gates, so shutting out the troops that had been holding the city, and leaving them to their own devices for safety or flight, whilst he kept with him only about 4000 picked men. Next day both the Delhi Gate and the Dowlut Gate at the extreme north-east of the city were seized, the whole of the city wall thus being held by the besiegers, who were consequently enabled to survey and examine thoroughly the fort or citadel defences.

A brigade was at the same time moved to the Dewan Bagh, on the north of the fort, to complete the investment, and the saps or regular trenches of approaches were vigorously advanced. On the night of the 12th a sortie was made from the fort against the advanced saps, but was

driven back, after doing some slight damage, and next day a fresh breaching-battery was begun. These took place on the right attack.

Meanwhile, however, work had also been in progress at the esplanade on the city side of the fort, and two breaching batteries had been constructed.

The full knowledge now procured of the several lines of defence made it certain that the best point for the attack lay, as originally thought, at the north-east angle, near the point called Bahawal Huk. Here, therefore, the saps, batteries, and mines against the outer defences were being vigorously carried forward; but meanwhile other batteries attacked the interior lines, and succeeded in breaching the upper wall on the 20th. On the 21st, the successive lines had all been breached, and the passage of the ditch made practicable; so the route was settled for the assault.

But the assault was unnecessary. Ever since the capture of the town, a terrific and increasing cannonade on the fort had been maintained; the buildings had been knocked to pieces, and before preparations for the final attack were completed, the besieged had peremptorily demanded that Mulraj should adopt one of two courses—cut his way out at their head, or yield. He chose the latter alternative. On January 22nd the siege was terminated by Mulraj surrendering at discretion to the victors; the entire garrison laying down their arms and becoming prisoners of war.

No terms had been granted, since all negotiation had been steadily refused. Mulraj got the one thing which Edwardes had told his emissary he might count on—a fair trial. He was taken to Lahore, charged with complicity in the murder of Agnew and Anderson, and found guilty, but with extenuating circumstances. He spent in confinement the remainder of a life which was prolonged only for a short time.

No great demand was made on the forces to hold the captured fort in security; and the two British columns made immediate arrangements to march north, to join Lord Gough; the Bengal troops starting on January 27th, followed by the Bombay column four days later.

CHAPTER III.

THE CROSSING OF THE CHENAB: NOV.-DEC. 4TH, 1848

Lord Gough's force—Shere Singh on the Chenab—British advance to Ramnuggur—Cavalry skirmish—Col. W. Havelock's charge and death—Preparations for crossing the Chenab—Necessity of the operation—Thackwell's march to Wazirabad—Passage and descent to Sadulapore—Engagement at Sadulapore—Defeat of Shere Singh—Retreat of the Sikhs to Russool—Comments on the operations.

WHILE General Whish's Division was still posted before Multan, awaiting the tardy arrival of the Bombay Column, and more than two months before the fall of the citadel, the grand army under Lord Gough's personal command entered Manjha territory, and advanced to wage the decisive struggle with Shere Singh.

The army of the Punjab was constituted as follows:—

CAVALRY DIVISION, under Brigadier Cureton—

1st *Brigade*, Brigadier White: British, 3rd and 14th Light Dragoons; Native, 5th and 8th Light Cavalry.

2nd *Brigade*, Brigadier Pope: British, 9th Lancers; Native, 1st and 6th Light Cavalry.

INFANTRY—

1st *Division*, before Multan.

2nd *Division*, Major-General Sir Walter Gilbert.

1st *Brigade*, Brigadier Mountain: British, 29th Foot; Native, 30th and 56th Native Infantry.

2nd *Brigade*, Brigadier Godby: British, 2nd European Light Infantry; Native, 31st and 70th Native Infantry.

3rd Division, Sir Joseph Thackwell.

1st Brigade, Brigadier Pennycuick: British, 24th Foot; Native, 25th and 45th Native Infantry.

2nd Brigade, Brigadier Hoggan: British, 61st Foot; Native, 36th and 6th Native Infantry.

3rd Brigade, Brigadier Penny; 15th, 20th, and 69th Native Infantry.

[It will thus be seen that Lord Gough's command contained three British and four Native cavalry regiments, besides Hearsey's Irregulars; with four British and eleven Native infantry regiments.]

ARTILLERY, Brigadier Tennant.

Horse Artillery, Lieut.-Colonel Huthwaite; 6 troops, or batteries, commanded respectively by Lieut.-Colonel Lane, and Majors Christie, Huish, Warner, Duncan, and Fordyce.

3 *Field Batteries*, Major Dawes, and Captains Kinleside and Austin.

2 *Heavy Batteries*, Major Horsford: commanding Majors Shakespear and Ludlow.

These were exclusive of the troops established at various points in the Manjha district, and the Jalandhar Doab, as well as those before Multan.

General Cureton, with the greater part of the cavalry division, had preceded the rest of the army by about a fortnight, having been despatched to cover Lahore, in case Shere Singh should contemplate an advance on the capital. The Sikh chief was now lying with his army on the western bank of the Chenab, opposite Ramnuggur. Cureton, who was joined, on November 16th, by Brigadier Colin Campbell (afterwards Lord Clyde), in command at Lahore, and Godby, took up his position about eight miles from Ramnuggur, on the east side of the river, from whence the cavalry were employed in daily reconnaissances, but avoided any engagement.

The Chenab at this point is very wide from bank to

bank. The river-bed being extremely sandy, sand-banks are constantly forming and changing in its course, splitting it up into channels, sometimes wet and sometimes dry. At Ramnuggur there was a fairly good ford; and the Sikhs had consequently thrown an outpost across the river, with which communication from the main body was easy, so that the troops there could be reinforced or withdrawn at pleasure; while to force a passage from the east was practically impossible. Before they could be effectively dislodged, therefore, it would become necessary for the opposing army to find a way across the Chenab.

On November 21st, Lord Gough, with the main army, came up to the advanced brigades, the heavy artillery being still behind, and resolved at once to make a reconnaissance in force, so as to ascertain the real position and strength of the enemy, and to drive their outposts across the river.

Accordingly, early in the morning on the 22nd, an advance was made on Ramnuggur. The Sikhs, aware of the approach of the British, could be seen drawing up on the opposite bank, in manifest excitement over the prospect of again meeting the British face to face. Their artillery, always, until the battle of Gujerat, stronger than our own, opened a heavy fire; while numbers of their cavalry crossed over to reinforce the cis-Chenab outpost, by fords somewhat on their left.

The Commander-in-Chief, however, had no intention of indulging in a general engagement. His object was simply to drive the outposts over and obtain information. Accordingly, while some of the light artillery advanced and opened fire, the 1st Light Dragoons were moved forward alone. At first Ouvry's squadron was pushed on to reconnoitre; but the Sikh cavalry coming to the east bank of the river in increasing numbers, Brigadier White ordered the regiment to drive them back, which was done successfully. White, however, perceiving that the river-

bed and its immediate neighbourhood were not at all fitted for a cavalry attack, halted the regiment, which was now joined by the 8th Light Cavalry, and began to withdraw. On seeing this movement, the Sikhs became greatly excited, and began to come on. On the cavalry fronting round, they again fell back, but once more advanced as the withdrawal was renewed. On reaching better ground, however, White again halted, turned, and now charged, driving the enemy back helter-skelter, but again halting when the broken and sandy ground was reached.

So far, matters had progressed favourably enough. The immediate object in view was accomplished with few casualties, and the cavalry continued to fall back unmolested. But, at this stage, an unlucky accident occurred, one of the guns, which had been sent forward to cover the cavalry, and a couple of waggons, sticking hard and fast in the sand. The most strenuous efforts could not move them, and the Sikhs, seeing that some contretemps had befallen, directed a hot fire on the spot, and were evidently making preparations to come on once more.

It was evident that the gun itself could not be withdrawn, and that sheer waste of life was the only alternative to its abandonment.

There was, however, another ford on the Sikh right, near the site where Lord Gough—having accomplished what he wanted—intended to pitch his camp, and some of the Sikh "Gorchurras," or irregular cavalry, had crossed over, and were appearing on the ground at this point. Lieut.-Colonel Havelock, with the 14th Light Dragoons, was accordingly ordered by Lord Gough to charge them, simply for the purpose of clearing the ground, and with express instructions not to advance into the heavy ground by the river-bed

The conduct of this charge was the grave mishap of the day Havelock rushed down on the Sikhs with the 14th Light Dragoons, supported by the 5th Light Cavalry, and drove the Gorchurras before him, but, when the broken

ground was reached, he became aware that the dry channel close at hand was full of Sikh infantry, hitherto concealed. To his headlong valour, the opportunity seemed irresistible. He was seen to be forming up his men for another charge. Cureton, realising the danger, dashed from the Commander-in-Chief's side to stop Havelock, but almost immediately a bullet struck him in the chest. Before any fresh order could be dispatched, Havelock had made the second fatal charge, and the horses began to flounder in the sandy river-bed. The Sikhs swarmed down on them; and though the brigade succeeded in cutting its way back, Havelock was slain. The lives of Cureton, of Havelock himself, and fifty soldiers, were a heavy price to pay for that last charge, which—perhaps naturally, certainly most unjustly—was popularly imputed to the recklessness of the Commander-in-Chief, who was at once too chivalrous and too heedless of popular censure to refute the accusation.

The 14th lost, besides their Colonel, Captains Fitzgerald and M'Mahon and Cornet Chetwynd; and Captain Gall was severely wounded. The 5th also suffered considerable loss. But it is to be noted that the casualties of the day, from Cureton's death down, were nearly all due to that last unfortunate charge in the river-bed.

Such was the cavalry affair of Ramnuggur. The foremost purpose, however, had been effected, and the Commander-in-Chief encamped near the village, opposite the Sikh army; devoting the ensuing days to the further examination of the enemy's position, and of the Chenab fords, and to preparations for accomplishing the crossing.

It was ascertained that there was a ford at Ghurriki, seven miles above Ramnuggur, held by a detachment of 4000 Sikhs; another higher up at Runniki, also guarded; and a third, higher still, at Ali-Sher-ke-Chuk, which was unguarded, but dangerous, owing to the strength of the stream. Failing all these, the passage would have to be effected at Wazirabad, 22 miles above Ramnuggur; for it

is obvious that to cross a broad Indian river, with a shifting sandy bottom, in the face of a battery of artillery, is practically impossible, and is certainly not to be thought of when the ford is commanded by an entrenched position as at Ramnuggur On the other hand, it is no less clear that a force which had to march 20 miles up one bank of the river, and 20 miles down the other bank, would have the greatest difficulty in maintaining touch with the troops which would have to remain at Ramnuggur to prevent the Sikh main body from moving, while the entire evacuation of Ramnuggur would leave the way open to Lahore. Yet the ejection of Shere Singh from his present quarters was necessary, since, while he continued there, he could accumulate both supplies and recruits with ease, and his proximity to Lahore encouraged the hopes of the disaffected Sirdars and others behind the British army, whereas, if our troops had the Chenab at their backs, with the Sikhs driven up to the Jhelum, they might be held more easily in check until Multan should fall and release the division detained there, even if they were not caught and crushed where they were.

Therefore the conclusion arrived at was that the extended operation must be undertaken of throwing a division across the Chenab, above Runniki at any rate, and that the division must be a strong one.

Sir Joseph Thackwell was placed in command, with White's Cavalry Brigade (in which, however, two regiments of Irregulars took the place of the 14th) and the 24th and 61st (British) Foot, and five regiments of Native Infantry, under Colin Campbell, besides 30 field-guns and 2 heavy guns. The artillery had come up with the main body since the Ramnuggur affair, and the force was ordered to assemble at midnight of November 30th.

The night happened to be extremely dark, and the start was delayed for a couple of hours in consequence, some of the infantry having mistaken their route for the point of

assembly. Hence Runniki was not reached till 11 o'clock. A halt of three hours to examine the fords here and at Ali-Sher-ke-Chuk resulted in the decision that to attempt a crossing at either would be too risky, and the whole force moved on to Wazirabad. John Nicholson, mentioned before in connection with Attok, who fell gloriously not nine years later at the siege of Delhi, was with Thackwell's army. The moment the decision was arrived at, he proceeded at full speed to Wazirabad, where with extraordinary energy and promptitude he had already collected every boat on the river, and staked out the fords by the time the division arrived, about sunset. For, although the troops had been on the move since an hour before midnight, it was imperative that the passage should be made and a strong force established on the opposite side forthwith; lest the enemy should come up during the night, and the whole movement be rendered futile.

Accordingly, three regiments, one British, and two native, were at once ferried over in boats; and another detachment (Native Infantry) marched over the ford without a halt, bivouacking on an island; throughout the night the artillery were being conveyed across, while the cavalry and the remainder of the infantry bivouacked on the left bank, crossing early on the following morning (December 2nd).

By noon the whole force was established on the west of the Chenab, and messages were despatched to the Commander-in-Chief to report the successful completion of the passage. At two o'clock Sir Joseph commenced his march down the right bank of the river; advancing until, in the evening, a point was reached about nine miles from the Sikh position, where the British force encamped. By this movement the Sikh outposts at the fords and elsewhere were driven in, Ghurriki (the ford below Runniki) being now no longer guarded, and communication with Lord Gough at Ramnuggur being thus established.

During these two days, December 1st and 2nd, Lord

Gough had successfully concentrated Shere Singh's attention on Ramnuggur, by keeping up a constant cannonade and making demonstrations as though with a view to forcing the fords at that point.

On the following morning, December 3rd, Sir Joseph moved forward with the intention of attacking the Sikh flank, while Lord Gough should engage them from Ramnuggur But he was still some way from his destination when a message reached him to the effect that reinforcements were on their way to join him by way of the Ghurriki ford. Sir Joseph certainly believed that his instructions were to secure the ford, and on no account to attack until the reinforcements arrived, which they did not do till the following morning, Godby having failed to effect a passage. Accordingly, Thackwell occupied ground at Sadulapore, and sent a native regiment to guard Ghurriki. On the other hand, it seems equally clear that Lord Gough intended him to act on his own discretion, according to circumstances.

The consequences of the misunderstanding were somewhat unfortunate. Shere Singh, finding Thackwell so near, marched against him from Ramnuggur with great part of his troops, and the British were startled at about two o'clock by the sudden commencement of a cannonade. The British fell back some 200 yards, to avoid some fields of sugarcane serving as cover for the enemy, who at first rushed forward in excitement; but then, perceiving that the movement had been made merely for security, and that its object was already attained, they showed no further disposition to come to close quarters. Shere Singh, in fact, had shown the customary skill of the Sikhs in choosing a strong defensive position which his men might be relied on to hold with their wonted stubbornness. But also, as usual, neither leaders nor followers understood how to attack; and they now contented themselves with maintaining a hot cannonade, to which the British replied with

vigour. Colin Campbell was now anxious to attack, and it seems probable that if he had been given his way, a very severe blow might have been dealt. But Thackwell, believing that he had the most positive orders not to attack till the expected reinforcement should arrive, would not give permission. A further message from Lord Gough, with express instructions to the General to use his own judgment about waiting, did not arrive till the day was drawing to its close. With the experience of Ferozeshah behind, the risk of advancing and storming Sikh entrenchments as the darkness fell seemed too serious, and the enemy were allowed to retire. Under cover of night, Shere Singh withdrew from his entrenchments with his entire army, falling back to a very strong position northwards on the Jhelum; and he had already gone too far for effective pursuit when the morning broke.

It would seem, therefore, that, owing to a misunderstanding, Thackwell lost an opportunity of inflicting a very damaging blow on the Sikhs. But the immediate purpose of the extremely difficult and complicated movement had been successfully effected. Shere Singh was driven back from the Chenab to the Jhelum; from a rich country, where supplies were readily obtainable, to jungle; his opportunities of intriguing with the Durbar were cut off by the increased stretch of territory lying between him and Lahore; and the whole invading army had passed the Chenab with only the slight losses caused by the cannonade at Sadulapore.

This movement of the troops across the Chenab had been a source of the gravest anxiety to Lord Gough, since it had compelled him to divide his army in the face of the enemy, under circumstances which made steady communication difficult; yet the Sikhs had to be driven from their position, and there was no other way of doing it. Its successful accomplishment was therefore an intense relief to him, and to those who understood its importance—a feeling

by no means extravagantly expressed in the terms of his despatch.

Still, the position now occupied by Shere Singh was exceedingly strong, and covered to a great extent by jungle. His troops greatly outnumbered Lord Gough's, while he was decidedly superior in artillery. The Commander-in-Chief therefore resolved to be content with holding him in check, until the fall of Multan should enable Whish to come up, and so give the force the strength both in men and artillery requisite for striking a decisive blow. It was unfortunate for Lord Gough's plans that the siege was so long protracted as to make an advance necessary before the desired reinforcement from Multan could move.

Just a month after the retreat from Ramnuggur, Attok fell into the hands of Chutter Singh and his allies. The insurgents were now free to give their exclusive attention to strengthening the army on the Jhelum. Thus the risks of continued delay seemed to outweigh those of an engagement; and on January 12th the advance began.

CHAPTER IV.

CHILLIANWALLA: DEC. 4–JAN. 13, 1849

After Sadulapore—Advance by Dinghi—Composition of army—Chillianwalla occupied—Action forced by the Sikhs—Order of battle—*On the left:* Movement of guns on the left—Robertson—Mowatt—Campbell's Division: he takes the left brigade—Pennycuick's Brigade—Campbell leads Hoggan's Brigade—Supported by Mowatt—Successful advance—His losses—White's Cavalry Brigade—Losses—*On the right:* Pope's Cavalry Brigade—Disastrous movement—Gilbert's Division—Godby's and Mountain's Brigades—Joined by Campbell—Penny's Brigade—Rout of Sikhs—Lane's detachment—Losses of Gilbert's Division.

A DEGREE of uncertainty appears to attach to the grounds for Lord Gough's forward movement. For a month after Sadulapore he had remained in the same neighbourhood, at Heylah, resolved not to give battle to Shere Singh till the arrival of Whish's reinforcements should give him the strength to make the fight conclusive. The policy of delay was emphatically Lord Gough's own, and was of a piece with the principle which he had throughout maintained of concentrating the whole available force for one crushing blow. Lord Dalhousie appears to have given the Chief instructions in the same sense; but so far his interference in a purely military question was of little consequence, since Lord Gough's view of what ought to be done coincided with his own. But during December the Governor-General's ideas appear to have changed, and before Christmas he had written to Lord Gough expressing

his desire that Lord Gough should attack if he thought it safe to do so. Whether Lord Dalhousie himself ever went further in the way of pressing an immediate advance is not certain, owing to apparent breaks in the correspondence. But Major Mackeson, the political Agent, was urgent with the Commander-in-Chief for an advance, and the latter seems to have regarded the pressure from him as inspired by the Governor-General.* It appears that Lord Gough would have preferred waiting for his reinforcements, but that believing himself—quite accurately—to be in fact strong enough, at any rate, to strike an effective blow, and knowing that the enemy would be very shortly reinforced by Chutter Singh, after the fall of Attok, he allowed the Governor-General's known desire and the Agent's urgency to turn the somewhat nicely adjusted scale. The result was the advance on Chillianwalla, and a victory, but one which was both indecisive and expensive. Why it was so we shall presently see.

On January 12th the army advanced to Dinghi, lying nearly due east of Shere Singh's position beyond Chillianwalla.

Sir Joseph Thackwell had now been placed in command of the cavalry division in lieu of Cureton, the command of his infantry division being transferred to Colin Campbell. The whole force, therefore, was now made up as follows, amounting in all to about 14,000 men and 66 guns —

CAVALRY DIVISION, Sir Joseph Thackwell commanding

1st Brigade, under Brigadier M. White 3rd Light Dragoons, 5th and 8th Light Cavalry

2nd Brigade, under Brigadier Pope 9th Lancers, 14th Light Dragoons, 1st and 6th Regiments Light Cavalry

The European cavalry regiments numbered about 400 men each, the native cavalry 300, effective in the field.

* There is a note in Lord Gough's private diary "Jan. 9. Heard from G G that he would be glad if I gained a victory."

INFANTRY (2nd Division),* under Major-General Sir Walter Gilbert.

1st Brigade, Brigadier Mountain: H.M.'s 29th Foot; the 30th and 56th Regiments Native Infantry.

2nd Brigade, Brigadier Godby: 2nd European Regiment; the 31st and 70th Regiments Native Infantry.

3RD DIVISION, Brigadier-General Colin Campbell, commanding.

1st Brigade, Brigadier Pennycuick: H.M.'s 24th Foot; the 25th and 45th Regiments Native Infantry.

2nd Brigade, Brigadier Hoggan: H.M.'s 61st Foot; the 36th and 46th Regiments Native Infantry.

3rd Brigade, Brigadier Penny: the 15th, 20th, and 69th Regiments Native Infantry.

ARTILLERY DIVISION, under Brigadier Tennant.

Six troops of Horse Artillery under Brigadier Brooke, with Colonels Brind and C. Grant; the troops respectively under Lieut.-Col. Lane, Majors Christie, Huish, Warner, Duncan, and Fordyce.

Two batteries of four 18-pounders and two 8-inch howitzers each; under Majors R. Shakespear and Ludlow; Major Horsford commanding.

Three field batteries: No. 5, commanded by Lieutenant Walker, in the absence of Captain Kinleside, sick; No. 10, commanded by Lieutenant Robertson, in the absence of Austin, wounded; and No. 17, commanded by Major Dawes.

The Foot Artillery under Brigadier Huthwaite.

The European infantry numbered about 900 each, and the native infantry about 700. H.M.'s 24th, an exceptionally strong regiment, turned out 1000 men in the field.

The Sikhs were lying with the Jhelum behind them,

* The 1st Division of the army of the Punjab was employed in the siege of Multan.

on the west, occupying a group of villages protected by jungle, with their left reaching to Russool, where there was a belt of hills. Chillianwalla, in advance of the line, was held only by outposts. Lord Gough's intention, therefore, was to march from Dinghi to Chillianwalla, drive in the outposts, and defer the attack till next day, when more accurate information as to the details of the position should be obtainable, unless circumstances should point to the advisability of an immediate engagement.

At 7 a.m., on the 13th January, the army advanced from Dinghi, formed in line of contiguous columns.

About twelve o'clock Chillianwalla was reached, and the enemy's outpost promptly driven in. From a high mound in front the Sikh entrenched position, stretching from Russool on their left to Moong on the right, was clearly visible, and Lord Gough had two alternatives before him one to attack at once while there was plenty of daylight, and force the jungle without obtaining more complete knowledge of the ground, the other to encamp, and employ the interval in reconnoitring before giving battle on the morrow This was the course which Lord Gough selected, and preparations were in progress for laying out the camp, when the Sikh guns opened fire, in doing so revealing the position of their batteries, whereupon Lord Gough, perceiving that the Sikh army had advanced beyond their entrenchments, gave orders to prepare for immediate action.

Historians and others have committed themselves to a total misconception of Lord Gough's action in giving battle when he did, and have talked as if the sound of the Sikh cannon proved too much for his self-control. But the simple fact of the matter is, that until the Sikh guns by opening fire betrayed the position of their batteries, all that could be seen or learnt about them gave the impression that encamping would be safe, and delay could be turned to advantage. But the action of the Sikh guns revealed that they had

moved forward from the line of villages,* and so disposed their forces that encamping was for us a sheer impossibility. There was no alternative but an immediate engagement. On the other hand, the very conditions which enabled the Sikhs to force an engagement—their advance beyond the line of villages—removed the principal reason which had before made delay seem desirable. An attack on them was now the less formidable, since they no longer had the shelter of their entrenched position. And it may here be added that if Lord Gough's plan of action had been carried out, the engagement would have been decisive; as will become apparent from the course of the narrative, and the subsequent examination of its leading features.

For an hour the battle was an artillery duel, in which the enemy had the advantage both of position and of guns. At three o'clock the advance commenced.

The course of the battle is not easy to follow, and it is of no little importance to master at first the position of the different brigades.

On the flanks were the cavalry: White's on the left, Pope's on the right. Hoggan's Brigade was on the left of the line, with Pennycuick's next, both under Colin Campbell; then came Mountain's, and then Godby's, both under Gilbert; with Penny's Brigade (the 3rd of Campbell's Division) in reserve. The artillery were ranged: in the centre the heavy batteries; attached to Campbell's Division, three troops Horse Artillery (Brind), and Walker and Robertson's field-batteries, both under Major Mowatt; attached to Gilbert's Division, three troops Horse Artillery (Grant), and Dawes's field-battery.

On the other side the Sikh line extended for about six miles, covered by thick jungle, and with their right considerably overlapping the British left.

According to the plan of action, Campbell, with the brigades of Hoggan and Pennycuick, was to advance,

* See Appendix III., A.

supported by the guns attached to his division. Consequently the Horse Artillery on the extreme left moved forward, and came into action at effective range against a powerful battery of Sikh guns. Mowatt and Robertson at the same time moved forward with the lines of skirmishers thrown out by Pennycuick's and Hoggan's Brigades respectively, but almost immediately a staff officer, who —happily for his own reputation—has never been identified, rode up to Robertson, and ordered him to "take his three guns to the left, and assist the Horse Artillery to silence those guns." There appears to have been no authority whatever for the order, which was given in entire disregard of Campbell's movement, but Robertson was, of course, bound to act upon it, and did so, being thereby prevented from performing the specific function he was really intended to serve. Trotting out to the left for about 500 yards, he discovered a considerable body of Sikh horse on his front, on whom he opened fire, quickly dispersing them. Advancing again in the direction pointed out to him, the position of the enemy's guns was made known to him by a shot or two crossing his front, aimed apparently at the advancing infantry Thereupon he brought up his right, and came into action against them, they being now engaged with Brind and the Horse Artillery Placed where he was, his fire completely enfiladed the Sikh guns, and after about half an hour the latter were completely silenced. Having thus carried out his orders, and rendered signal service to the Horse Artillery, he proposed to rejoin his division, an exceedingly risky process, since it was out of sight, and he was without an escort. He succeeded, however, by the designed deliberation of his movements, in deceiving the Sikhs into the belief that he was supported, until, coming in sight of Hoggan's Brigade, he was able to trot on rapidly and join it, passing on the way four deserted Sikh guns and numbers of dead, marking the track along But ·h the infantry had in the mean time advanced.

While Robertson's battery was thus diverted from the purpose for which it was intended, Mowatt advanced in line with Pennycuick's skirmishers on Hoggan's right; but, as he afterwards told Patrick Grant, the Adjutant-General, Pennycuick's Brigade advanced so rapidly that they were carried in front of the battery at the very commencement of the action, so that he could not render them the desired assistance; although, as will be seen, he was able to render most material service to Hoggan.

Thus, with regard to the artillery attached to Campbell's division, Robertson, owing to the unauthorised orders he received, did excellent service to the Horse Artillery, instead of to Hoggan's Brigade: Mowatt, for a different reason, rendered equally good service, but to Hoggan instead of to Pennycuick. To Mowatt's action we shall revert presently, but clearness in an extremely confusing narrative will best be attained by first turning to the movements of the infantry division itself.

According to generally recognised principles, it was Campbell's primary function, as divisional commander, to control the action of both his brigades, so that they should act in concert. But before the advance commenced he formed the opinion that the nature of the jungle made it impossible to control the co-operation of the two brigades; and accordingly he informed Pennycuick that he would leave to him the sole direction of the right brigade, taking himself the lead of the left brigade; judging that, of the two, it occupied the more responsible position, because of the overlapping of the Sikh right. By so doing he abrogated the duties of a divisional commander to discharge with splendid success those of a brigadier. He himself, and others who were present, maintained that the nature of the ground made any other course impracticable; but in the result, the want of co-operation between the brigades proved most disastrous to that of Pennycuick: and on the other hand, Gilbert, with difficulties to face of precisely

the same kind, manipulated his division with marked success.

Pennycuick's rapid advance rendered the intended support of the field-batteries nugatory at a very early stage. The ground for some distance, being comparatively open, soon became interspersed with trees and thick, thorny bushes, impeding the regularity of the advance and screening from observation whatever might be in front. So serious was the obstruction that the line became disordered, and the companies were reduced to columns of sections. After moving forward a few hundred yards, the right brigade came under a fire of round shot, which was converted, as it advanced, to an incessant fire of grape, directed principally upon H.M.'s 24th, the centre regiment. This was the more formidable as the enemy were still completely screened from view. Officers and men began to fall in increasing numbers; nevertheless, the brigade continued to advance most steadily, although the difficulties of the jungle increased as it approached the enemy; until finally, about fifty yards in front of the Sikh guns which at last came into full view, the 24th came upon an impassable swamp, or pond, partially filled with water, and surrounded by scraggy trees and stumps, the ground being much broken. Thus two companies were obliged to file in rear, and so it happened that the centre of the regiment, and several of the companies on the left, were brought up nearly to the muzzles of the guns in masses and in much disorder, and were received by a tremendous discharge of grape and musketry. Brigadier Pennycuick and many officers and men fell as they closed on the enemy. Colonel Brookes was distinctly seen in front of the colours of the 24th, showing a splendid example, and cheering his men on. The 24th never for a moment hesitated, but pressed forward and captured the guns at the point of the bayonet without firing a shot; but only for a moment. The Grenadier company on the right, having experienced less

difficulty in the advance, carried the position in front of them before the rest of the regiment, and Lieutenant Lutman assisted Private Marfield in spiking one of the guns. The enemy's fire was, however, so heavy, that the Grenadiers were forced back; but, led by Captain Travers, again advanced to the charge, again carried the guns, and more were spiked. Captain Travers here fell, cut down by a tulwar. The whole regiment was now hotly engaged and numbers fell on both sides. Colonel Brookes was seen to fall close to the guns; Major Harris was mortally wounded and carried to the rear; Lieutenant Collis and Ensign Phillips, carrying the colours, both fell, struck by grape, close to the guns; Lieutenants George Phillips, Woodgate, and Payne fell at the guns. Thus in the short time that elapsed between the advance and this struggle on the part of the regiment to hold the position it had so nobly won, all their leaders and many officers, thirteen in all, were killed; ten more officers were wounded, and an immense number of non-commissioned officers and men had fallen. Exhausted by their exertions, and the rapid advance for so long a distance; wholly unsupported, for no support was available at the critical moment; was it to be wondered at that the regiment which had made so splendid a fight, and suffered so fearful a loss, at length gave way? For some time the few officers who remained were unable to restore order, nor was the regiment re-formed till it had got clear of the jungle. Its loss, in addition to the officers, amounted to 231 killed and 266 wounded. With the 24th advanced the 25th regiment Native Infantry on the right and the 45th on the left, meeting with the same obstacles, and advancing also under a heavy fire of all arms; they also suffered severe loss, and on the retreat of the 24th they also were compelled to give way.

Several parties of both regiments were, however, quickly rallied. Captain Clarke kept his whole company, the rifle company of the 25th, together, and about 100 of the 45th

Native Infantry rallied round the colours of the regiment under Lieutenants Oakes and Tozer, Ensigns Trotter and Evans. These parties by their fire drove off the Sikh horsemen who attempted to follow up the brigade. They advanced again and moved with White's Cavalry Brigade when taking ground to the right, and subsequently joined Hoggan's Brigade. The 25th regiment lost 1 European officer, 6 native officers, and 105 men killed, 2 European officers, 8 native officers, and 87 men wounded. The 45th lost 20 non-commissioned officers and men killed, 4 European officers, 1 native officer, and 54 men wounded.

Pennycuick's Brigade behaved with gallantry and exemplary devotion, but its advance was too precipitate, and unfortunately he had no support from artillery

Hoggan's Brigade on the left advanced under the personal command of Colin Campbell, the jungle soon causing it to lose touch with Pennycuick. Unlike Pennycuick's, it received considerable help from the guns, the artillery duel already narrated serving to check, and then silence, the fire of a powerful battery, by which it would have been otherwise enfiladed, on the left, while Mowatt's battery also covered it on the right.

That officer had advanced as related with No. 5 Battery He had found considerable difficulty in forcing his guns through the thickets of stunted trees, and for some time could get no sight of the enemy, a distant sound of guns to his right being all he heard. After going half a mile or more he caught sight, on a sudden, over the tops of the trees and through an opening in the jungle, of a crowd of the enemy straight in front of him, about 700 or 800 yards distant. The position being unsuitable, he urged his men forward another 300 yards, during which time two or three Sikh guns opened on his left flank, the shots passing in rear of him He then came to clearer ground, beyond which he saw on a crest a crowd of Sikhs, distant about 450 yards, their guns and masses appearing through the smoke. These

immediately opened a heavy fire of round shot, shell, and musketry upon him. Here he promptly came into action, bringing as heavy a fire as he could upon the Sikhs, their shots mostly going over the heads of his men and tearing through the trees to his right and left, but, fortunately, not doing him much harm. In about twenty minutes the Sikh fire began to slacken, and through the smoke he saw their numbers melting away.

All this time nothing had been seen, on the right, of Pennycuick's expected brigade; but now on the left he did see Hoggan's emerge from the jungle and go straight at the Sikhs, keeping up a heavy fire as they advanced.

In the interval Campbell, leading the brigade, had regulated the pace with great care, and so kept his troops well in hand during the advance, although the nature of the ground had caused frequent breaks in the line. Nor had he met with obstacles so serious as those encountered by Pennycuick. After half a mile of jungle, he came out on comparatively open ground, where he found a large body of Sikh cavalry and infantry with four guns which had been playing on the advancing troops. The 61st charged and dispersed the Sikh cavalry; the 36th Native Infantry attacked the infantry, but were thrown into some disorder by a body of Sikhs falling on their flank; Campbell, however, wheeling the two right companies of the 61st, charged and repulsed these, capturing two guns. Now it was that Mowatt saw the brigade "going straight at the Sikhs," and forthwith concentrated his fire upon the opposing infantry. Throughout this most difficult operation, nothing could have been better than Major Mowatt's action, nor more serviceable to Hoggan's Brigade. The Sikhs at this point were most gallantly led by a few chiefs, but found the attack too fierce, and fled back to the jungle.

The brigade now rapidly formed to the right, astride the enemy's line; in doing so the 46th Regiment, on the left, was attacked by the Sikh cavalry in considerable strength;

these they gallantly repulsed under their commander, Major Tudor At the same time the Sikhs brought up two more guns and fresh infantry against the right, upon which those who had just been driven back again formed. This was, in the opinion of General Campbell, the most critical moment of the day, but so ably was the brigade led, and so steadily did it behave, that this difficult change of front, whilst actually engaged with the enemy, was effectually and successfully carried out. The whole brigade advanced to the attack, driving the Sikhs before it, and capturing, one after another, thirteen guns, all of which were obstinately and bravely defended by both Sikh infantry and gunners, and only taken after a sharp struggle. So close was the fighting that the Brigadier-General himself was severely wounded by a sword-cut on his right arm. The brigade continued to move swiftly on, rolling up the Sikh line as it advanced, and overcoming all opposition, being exposed all through the movement to repeated attacks of Sikh cavalry, who were following up, compelling General Campbell at intervals to halt, face his troops about, and drive them off Thus Campbell completely defeated and dispersed that portion of the Sikhs which just before had inflicted so terrible a repulse and such severe loss on Pennycuick's Brigade. Seeing a battery of artillery on his right, and finding it to be Mowatt's, which had maintained its fire until now, he ordered it to join, and continued his movement till he fell in with Mountain's Brigade, when he again wheeled to the left, forming his line on the original front. It was during this flank movement that Campbell first heard from Colonel Brooke, commanding the Horse Artillery, of the disaster that had happened to his right brigade. About the same time the division was also rejoined by Robertson's battery, and Warner's troop of Brind's Horse Artillery, which, with an escort of a squadron of the 8th Light Cavalry, had been ordered up by Sir Joseph Thackwell to his support.

Campbell's loss in this attack and sharp hand to-hand

fight, though considerable, was by no means excessive, seeing the difficulties of the country and the obstinate defence of the enemy. H.M.'s 61st Foot lost 11 men killed, 3 officers and 100 men wounded. 36th Regiment Native Infantry, 1 native officer, 27 men killed; 6 European officers, 2 native officers, 69 men wounded. 46th Regiment Native Infantry, 3 men killed; 3 native officers, 48 men wounded.

The loss of the artillery was comparatively small. Fordyce lost 5 men and 2 horses wounded; Duncan's troop, 1 officer and 6 horses killed, 2 men and 1 horse wounded; Warner's troop, 1 man and 1 horse killed, and 1 man and 1 horse wounded; No. 5 Light Field Battery, 5 men wounded, 11 horses killed and 2 wounded; No. 10 Battery, only 1 horse wounded. Although the Sikh gunners stood well to their guns, they had not learnt the art of shooting straight.

Away on the left, White's Cavalry Brigade had advanced at the same time as Campbell's Division. But the ground was quite impracticable for the action of cavalry; unable to see anything in their front, they came suddenly under a very heavy fire of round shot, which mostly struck the ground in front of the line and ricochetted over the heads of the men. The brigade formed in support of the guns. On the Sikh battery being silenced by the Horse Artillery, as already related, Sir Joseph Thackwell proposed to follow up the advantage by a cavalry attack, and accordingly ordered the Grey squadron of the 3rd Light Dragoons and the 5th Light Cavalry to charge. These two bodies, led respectively by Captain Unett and Captain Wheatley, advanced. The 5th Light Cavalry coming upon a mass of Sikhs, were received with a considerable musketry fire, and, being much broken by the thick and scrubby jungle, were unable to make any impression on the enemy, and were repulsed; they, however, rallied at once very steadily and in good order on the 8th, the centre regiment. Unett's squadron of the 3rd Light

Dragoons, coming on a smaller body, broke through and swept on right through to the Sikh rear, then, re-forming his men and wheeling about, he cut his way back, but did not rejoin the brigade till towards the close of the action, causing great anxiety to Thackwell, who feared he had been annihilated. This splendid charge was unfortunately attended with very severe loss, for the line being broken by the jungle, the Sikh horsemen followed up, and, falling upon those who were isolated and separated, cut down many gallant soldiers. The squadron lost 23 men killed, 2 officers and 15 men wounded, 15 horses killed and missing, 7 wounded. The want of success that attended this attack prevented Sir Joseph Thackwell attempting any further offensive movements, and he was obliged to content himself with affording such protection as he could to the left of Campbell's Division. He detached Warner's Horse Artillery troop and a squadron of the 8th Cavalry to join Hoggan's Brigade, and with the remainder of the brigade took ground to his right, following Campbell's movements. In doing so the cavalry crossed the line by which Pennycuick's Brigade had advanced, and the field, littered with the bodies of the fallen, attested the severity of the struggle. Here were picked up some parties of the 45th Regiment who came on, and the brigade formed up in rear of Hoggan's and Mountain's Brigades on about the centre of the position originally held by the Sikhs. Thus fared the left attack. The loss of the Cavalry Brigade was 3rd Light Dragoons, 24 men killed, 2 officers and 15 men wounded, 5th Light Cavalry, 2 European sergeants and 4 men killed, 2 officers and 14 men wounded, 8th Light Cavalry, 1 man killed and 2 wounded.

From the stubbornly contested fight on the left and left centre, we now turn to that on the right and right centre.

When Sir Walter Gilbert prepared to advance, shortly after the beginning of Campbell's movement, the troops

were thus drawn up. On the extreme right, Pope's Cavalry Brigade, with the three troops Horse Artillery under Colonel Grant; then Godby's (Infantry) Brigade, and Mountain's, with Dawes's battery between them.

On the left, as the narrative has shown, the cavalry manœuvres had comparatively little influence on the course of the battle; on the right it was far otherwise. The action of Pope's Brigade is a painful and unaccountable blot on the day, and may fairly be held responsible for the indecisive results of Chillianwalla.

The greater numbers of the Sikhs enabled them to threaten our right flank as well as our left; and accordingly, Pope, observing a considerable body of Sikh horsemen on the slopes towards Russool, detached a wing of the 1st and 6th Light Cavalry, and the 9th Lancers (retaining the other wing of each regiment, with the 14th Light Dragoons), with some guns, under command of Colonel Lane, to protect the flank.

Then, advancing in line with the infantry brigades, he found a body of Sikh horse immediately to his front. The guns were immediately pushed forward; but before they could come properly into action, Pope with the cavalry passed in front of them, thus masking their fire, and making it practically useless. He advanced with his nine squadrons in one line, with no supports or reserves. Proceeding in such order and at such speed as the ground permitted, they soon came upon the enemy; but a charge under such conditions could hardly deserve the name. It was delivered slowly and without momentum; and almost immediately Pope himself was disabled, and had to be conducted from the field. Then occurred an event happily rare in the annals of British cavalry. Somebody, it is said—who, no one knows—was heard to give the order, "Threes about." Some of the men turned; a movement to the rear was started, which speedily degenerated into a panic; and the whole brigade went galloping in a reckless stampede to the rear,

in spite of the strenuous exertions of the officers, plunging through the guns and throwing them into wild confusion, and leaving the infantry flank wholly uncovered. A body of Sikhs followed on their heels, fell on the guns, cut down many of the men, severely wounded Major Christie in command, and carried off four guns and two waggons. As for the cavalry, they could not be stopped till they were clear of the field, and were at length with difficulty rallied by the exertions of the Adjutant-General, Colonel Patrick Grant, Major (now Field Marshal Sir Frederick) Haines, and Colonel Gough, on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief.

Such sudden panics are among the most inexplicable phenomena of war The bravest troops may succumb to them. The one thing certain is that they are wholly and utterly unreasoning and incalculable, quite unrelated to the degree of danger to which the men are exposed, though raw soldiers, however brave, are more liable to them than veterans.

This disaster, however, must in great measure be attributed to the astonishing disregard of all recognised rules displayed by the brigadier in the manner of his advance. It is essential that cavalry in attacking should form with due supports to follow up an advantage or retrieve a check. No arm of the service is so liable to be disorganised, even in a successful charge, and a point to rally on is a vital necessity When the advance had to be made through jungle, which of itself broke up the lines, and inevitably caused confusion, the need of supports was all the more imperative. Yet Pope led the advance absolutely without supports, in one line. Bad handling produced disorganisation, with no point to rally on, disorganisation developed into panic, and the flight of some of the finest troops in the service left the right flank of the advancing infantry division open for the enemy to turn.

This melancholy episode was accompanied by little

enough loss to the culprits. Their punishment was different. The 14th had only 1 officer killed, 1 man killed, and 14 wounded; the 9th, 3 men killed, 4 wounded; the 1st, the same; the 6th, 1 European officer, 2 native officers, and 4 men killed, 2 officers and 8 men wounded. With the guns, 12 men were killed, and 5 wounded, and Major Christie died of his wounds. But the Sikhs carried off 53 horses and 4 guns, and rendered 6 more useless for the day.

This most serious disaster occurred as Gilbert was leading his division to the attack, Dawes and his battery being in line with the skirmishers in front. The flight of the cavalry, which took place before the infantry joined battle, compelled him to refuse his right (Godby's) brigade in order, to some extent, to protect his right flank; but his troops behaved magnificently. Continuing their advance with perfect steadiness, covered by the very effective fire of No. 17 Field Battery, Mountain's Brigade came upon a strong battery of the enemy in front of the village of Lullianee, and promptly charged, carrying the whole of the guns at the point of the bayonet; this attack being almost immediately followed by Godby's Brigade, who also charged and carried the Sikh guns in their front.

Godby now halted his brigade, re-formed his line, and was collecting the wounded, when suddenly a fire was opened on him from his rear. His flank, left unguarded by the movement of Pope's Brigade, had been completely turned by a large body of Sikhs; and, in fact, he was surrounded. The journal of a subaltern of Godby's Brigade records in stirring language the incidents of the day. Godby's order was coolly given, "Right about face." Major Dawes's battery, which seems to have been everywhere at the right moment, was splendidly handled, and, moving to the right flank, poured in a heavy fire and scattered the Sikh horsemen who attempted to charge, knocking over men and horses in heaps. Sir Walter

Gilbert at this moment rode up, and, seeing Major Steele, commanding the 2nd Europeans, addressed him coolly and cheerily, "Well, Major, how are you? Do you think you are near enough to give those fellows a charge?" "By all means," answered Steele. "Well, let us see how you can do it." Such conduct was equal to a reinforcement of 1000 men! In an instant the brigade, led by the 2nd Europeans, marched to the rear, and, with a cheer, rushed upon the Sikhs. These fought manfully sword in hand, and strove to break through the line, but after a short, sharp struggle, they were swept away, and the "2nd Europeans," now known as the Royal Dublin Fusiliers, again stood masters of the field.

Mountain's Brigade, equally well led, met with the same desperate resistance, and were compelled to face about to repulse the enemy, but about this time Colin Campbell, with Hoggan's Brigade and White's cavalry, and the whole of the artillery of the left, moved up and joined them.

Meantime, Penny's Brigade, which had been ordered up by Lord Gough from its position in reserve, on the report of Pennycuick's disaster, had followed a devious course. Losing its bearings in the intricacies of the jungle, it had moved diagonally from the centre to the right, and suddenly found itself on the front and right of Godby (whose brigade, it will be remembered, had faced about), and here Penny in turn was attacked in front and right and rear, until the ubiquitous and inevitable Dawes came to the rescue with his guns, and drove the enemy off.

By this time Campbell had joined on to Mountain's Brigade, the whole of the artillery were brought up, and a destructive fire was opened upon the Sikhs, who now, in great disorder, were in full retreat upon Tupai.

Colonel Lane, detached on the right as related, virtually took no part in the main engagement. His movement, ordered by Pope, was unknown beyond the brigade authorities, and in the confusion caused by Pope's wound,

and the subsequent panic, no instructions were sent to him. In fact, he appears to have known nothing of what was going on; and having himself neglected the duty of keeping in touch with the proceedings on his left, omitted the necessary measures for retrieving the worst effect of the cavalry disaster and covering Gilbert's flank. The service for which he had been detached was a judicious precaution in itself; but the Sikhs whom he was engaged in watching, and on whom he fired with some effect, never gave a sign of being a serious danger, not even returning his fire; while the immediate duty of covering the flank of the infantry brigade was of paramount importance. When Godby and Mountain had already stemmed and turned the counter-attack of the enemy, Lane advanced and poured a heavy fire into the large bodies of Sikhs whom he now observed retiring. But by this time the approach of darkness made it impossible to follow up the retreat, and the engagement was over. The Sikhs had been driven in to Tupai, and the British fell back to Chillianwalla; the enemy during the night succeeding in recovering and carrying off such of their own guns as had been left on the deserted field of battle.

The detailed losses of Gilbert's Division were as follows:—Godby's Brigade: the 2nd Fusiliers, 2 European officers wounded, 6 men killed, and 60 wounded; 31st Regiment Native Infantry, 3 men killed, 1 European officer, 1 native officer, and 54 men wounded; 70th Regiment Native Infantry, 2 native officers and 3 men killed and 20 men wounded. Mountain's Brigade: 29th Foot, 31 men killed, 5 European officers and 203 men wounded, and 3 missing; 30th Regiment Native Infantry, 2 European officers, 1 native officer, and 64 men killed, 9 European officers, 9 native officers, and 200 men wounded; 56th Regiment Native Infantry, 2 European officers, 4 native officers, and 39 men killed, and 36 missing (who may be added to the killed), 6 European officers, 6 native officers, and 227

men wounded. Dawes's Battery No. 17, lost 2 officers wounded, and 8 men; 8 horses killed, 1 missing. The loss of Penny's Brigade amounted to 12 men killed, 5 European officers, 1 native officer, and 103 men wounded.

The total loss of the British force was 22 officers, 16 native officers, and 561 men killed, and 98 men missing, who may be added to the number; 67 officers, 27 native officers, and 1547 men wounded. Grand total, 2338 men.

CHAPTER V.

AFTER CHILLIANWALLA: JAN. 14–FEB. 21

Further movement stopped by rains—Popular impressions of the battle—Misjudgment on the Commander-in-Chief—Injustice of the charge of impetuosity—True explanation of the events—Anecdotes of Lord Gough—Of Sikh generosity—Subsequent movements of the Sikhs—Lord Gough's command of the situation—Sikhs move on Gujerat—Lord Gough's counter-moves—Final concentration.

THE routed Sikhs had not been able to retire directly upon Russool, where the real strength of their position lay, but had been driven to Tupai on the Jhelum (see map). Had the defeat been completed with a little more time to spare, the mass of them would in all probability have been driven right into the river. This end might have been accomplished by an advance next day; but, as ill-luck would have it, for two days after the battle rain descended in such torrents as to render any further movement impossible for the time, the soil in the neighbourhood of Tupai being turned into a species of soft pudding. The Sikhs were thus enabled to regain their practically impregnable position at Russool. It would otherwise have become apparent that the blow struck at Chillianwalla was by no means so ineffective as it seemed. For, a few days later—on the 19th—Elahi Buksh, commandant of the Sikh artillery, came in; and reported that immediately after the action the troops had been in a state of utter demoralisation, although now, since Chutter Singh had arrived with large reinforcements, they were beginning to reckon the affair as a virtual victory.

Public opinion at home, hastily formed on insufficient data, endorsed the adverse view. The advantages gained were not obvious, the casualties had been exceedingly heavy, three regiments had lost their colours, four guns had been lost, and a British regiment had given way to unreasoning panic. In the shock of this knowledge, the fact that immense numbers of the enemy had fallen, thirteen of their guns been captured, and many more spiked (fifty out of sixty brought into action were said by Elahi Buksh to have been either taken or spiked) was forgotten. That the loss of the colours was due to the bearers being shot down unperceived in the confused jungle fighting was overlooked. Public opinion, as usual, demanded a scapegoat, found it in the person of the Commander-in-Chief, and his recall was decided upon, but happily, before it could take effect, he had already achieved the crowning triumph of Gujerat.

That the feeling against the Commander-in-Chief was altogether unreasonable and unwarranted, will be apparent on a calmer review of the facts than has usually been given. But it is to be recorded that, even while it misjudged him, the public did not forget those qualities of Lord Gough which had won him a place in popular affection, and the devotion of his men.* Indomitable resolution, fearless courage, a most chivalrous sense of honour, a very warm heart, were characteristics universally recognised. But from these, other qualities were inferred, quite incorrectly Because he was personally daring almost to rashness—it has already been related how at Ferozeshah he exposed himself to draw the enemy's fire from his men—it was imagined that he was rash as a commander Because he had much trust in cold steel, he was accused of being over-hasty in its employment. The current tales—fiction quite as often as fact—told of him would never have been fastened on to a chief who was not regarded with a species of fond enthusiasm.

* See Appendix IV

But they also made it the easier to believe that he had a besetting tendency to rashness.

Now, in the first place, nothing can be clearer than this—that his plan of campaign could not be charged with want of caution. Month after month the political Agents had urged him to send a brigade here, and a brigade there; to run heavy risks; to take the chances of throwing away, as he held, an immense number of lives in a series of minor expeditions. He had held stoutly to the principle that no force was to be employed unless it was really adequate. He had refused to advance against Chillianwalla without his Multan reinforcements, until strong pressure was put upon him. When he did advance, it was only because the chances were in favour of his striking a thoroughly effective blow; and after Chillianwalla, when he was again subjected to perpetual pressure, and was constantly urged to advance again, he remained imperturbable, waiting and watching till he could crush the foe once and for all.

At one point only can it be argued that he attacked when in insufficient force—at Chillianwalla. The answer is that, as a matter of fact, he was in sufficient force; that but for circumstances and mischances for which it was not he that was to blame, his victory there would have been decisive; and that although a certain risk was run, it was worth running at that particular stage, for the sake of preventing the imminent junction between Shere Singh and his father.

Lord Gough was the last man to bring forward the failure of his subordinates in his own defence. But it is to be remarked that his method of attack was precisely the same which he adopted with such signal success at Gujerat, modified only by the fact that at the later battle he was *for the first time* stronger in artillery than the enemy. That of itself points to the soundness of his dispositions; and the view that if his plans had been properly carried out the victory would have been decisive, will be borne out by a review of the battle.

In the first place, according to his orders, the attack was to be made under cover of the artillery, but Robertson's battery was ordered out of its proper place by the unknown staff-officer, Pennycuick's Brigade advanced too rapidly for Mowatt, and Pope's went in front of the guns intended to support him.

In the second place, Campbell's two brigades should have acted together, but the Divisional Commander allowed Pennycuick to act independently, holding that the nature of the ground rendered co-operation impossible, and never making the attempt. The result was disaster to Pennycuick Nor is it possible to avoid the remark that Gilbert, with the right division, with just the same difficulties in his way, performed his function of Divisional Commander, and kept his brigades working together, with entire success.

In the third place, the cavalry and guns on the right ought to have covered Gilbert's Division. Under proper handling, Christie's guns would have been allowed to remain in advance, would have cleared the ground in front of Pope, and have poured an overwhelming enfilading fire on the battalions opposed to Gilbert. Not only would his advance have been facilitated, but the turning of his flank would have been impossible, while the cavalry would have been available to strike at the right moment, and to fall with overwhelming effect upon the retreating foe, thereby rendering the victory complete and decisive The whole plan was wrecked by Pope's total disregard of the first principles of cavalry action.* Pushing in front of the batteries, he masked their fire and made them useless. On ground where he could not charge effectively—where the jungle necessarily broke his line and disorganised it—he advanced in single line, with no supports whatever Next, being wounded himself and forced to retire, he never notified the fact to the next senior officer And so the men, badly as they had been handled, were seized with an unreasoning

* See Appendix III. B

panic, rode over the guns to the rear, and left the infantry flank open for the foe to turn, unshielded by horse or artillery.

Lastly, Lane, with his cavalry and guns, might have retrieved this mishap; but he neglected to keep himself informed of the course of events, and remained watching a distant body of Sikhs—troops who never so much as fired a shot—while the mischief was done. Thus nothing but the magnificent behaviour of Godby's Brigade averted a most grave disaster.

It is a curious instance of irony that the Chief's silence with regard to Lane in his dispatches was translated into a deliberate slight on that officer's invaluable services. The theory appears to have been that, by staying where he did Lane triumphantly effected precisely what he failed to do. He was described * as having by his "firmness" prevented the masses of horse and foot on the enemy's left from bearing down upon our right and rear. As a matter of fact, by remaining isolated, he allowed the masses of the enemy to turn the right and rear, while he held in check a detachment which never showed any inclination to take a serious part in the engagement at all.

Thus the comparative ill-success of Chillianwalla was to be attributed to the failure of some of the guns to fulfil their proper functions, for which, on the left, the Divisional Commander in the main, and on the right, Pope, were responsible; to the separation of Hoggan's and Pennycuick's Brigades; to the cavalry disaster; and to the negligence of Colonel Lane. The disasters to Pennycuick and to Pope's Brigade were in great measure retrieved by the splendid conduct of Hoggan's Brigade and Gilbert's Division respectively. But the check delayed victory till the approach of night prevented its completion; while, in spite of all, the greatly superior force of the Sikhs was beaten fairly from the field.

* Sir J. Durand, in the *Calcutta Review*.

But for these circumstances, for no one of which could the Commander-in-Chief be held responsible, his plan of action would have been fully vindicated; the enemy would have been in full flight much earlier than they were, and their shattered regiments would have been driven into the Jhelum in total rout before the shades of night descended to shelter them.

As for the story that Lord Gough only commenced the action because he found the smell of powder too exciting, it is a fiction. His intention was to encamp if the Sikhs remained in their entrenchments, while he was equally prepared to fight and vanquish them if they did not. When the Sikh batteries opened fire, they forced the second alternative on the Commander-in-Chief; the immediate engagement had become a necessity, but, owing to the change in the Sikh position, not an unwelcome one. If Lord Gough then failed to achieve his purpose, this narrative has shown to whom the blame is to be rightly attributed.

Lord Dalhousie, better informed than the general public, addressed to the Chief an exceedingly sympathetic and gratifying letter. "God be thanked," the old soldier wrote in his diary; "he sees the case in its proper light."

A highly characteristic story, which had the further merit of truth, may be here repeated. When the fight was over, officers and men were worn out; and, more particularly, were suffering severely from thirst and want of water. One after another came petitions for leave to go back to water; and to one of these requests the Chief's answer was memorable and conclusive: "I'll be damned if I move till my wounded are all safe!"

Another of the current tales of the Chief's personal combativeness has a humorous aspect which makes it worth recording; though even as fiction it belongs not to Chillianwalla but to Gujerat. It was related that in order to prevent Lord Gough from plunging personally into the fray, Patrick Grant enticed him on to the roof of a house

and then took away the ladder. That the Chief was reluctant to remain in a position of personal security was, in fact, no doubt true enough; but that he recognised the necessity and acted on it without any such extraneous compulsion, is equally certain. In the words of one who was there, "he came away when he chose; just exactly when he chose." Undoubtedly he did mount the roof of a house, but for the obvious reason that it was one which gave him a particularly complete view of the field.

The accounts of the battle make mention of the cruelty shown by the Sikhs when they returned to the deserted field under cover of darkness. They certainly mutilated the slain, but it does not seem likely that there were many wounded left for them to murder. On the other hand, it is remarkable, and not a little to their credit, that on the 18th Shere Singh sent back to the British camp two men belonging to the 9th Lancers, who had been caught straying in the jungle and taken captive. And Chutter Singh not only allowed George Lawrence to go to Lahore on parole, but likewise permitted Lieutenant Bowie—who had been taken in the Derajat, and was now a prisoner within the lines of Russool—to visit Lord Gough's camp on parole. It need hardly be said that both these officers observed their parole loyally. The remarkable fact is that the Sikh chiefs not only knew that they might be trusted, but were generous enough to give them the benefit of that confidence.

The three days of heavy rain made it impossible, as we have seen, to follow up the defeat of Chillianwalla; and during that time large reinforcements were received by the enemy, who had now been joined by Chutter Singh. Under these circumstances, it would have been manifestly unwise to engage further, the position at Russool being extremely strong and well entrenched; and Lord Gough reverted to his determination to wait for the fall of Multan, and the

reinforcements from the south. The two armies lay at Russool and Chillianwalla, watching On the 25th the joyful rumour reached the camp that Multan had fallen, next day the news was confirmed, and now it was certain that the final conflict would not be long deferred.

Some doubt prevailed as to the intentions of the Sikhs, who were known about this time to have removed part of their forces to Pooran, lying a little to the north, without resigning their hold on Russool

There were rumours of an intended advance, and early in February, still without leaving Russool, Shere Singh brought part of his army down to Khoree, threatening Dinghi As early as February 5th it was ascertained that part of the Russool entrenchments had been evacuated, though the Russool position was still held by a considerable force, and was far too strong to be attacked.

Mackeson, indeed, was urgent with Lord Gough that the attack should be renewed. The Chief, however, maintained that deliberate patience which is so curiously overlooked in the popular idea of his character. Shere Singh sought to entice him into a battle by demonstrations, approaching so near as Nur Jemal, but in vain. The Multan Division was on its way, though the Bombay column moved with irritating dilatoriness, but Lord Gough, holding the interior lines, could intercept any attempt Shere Singh might make to circumvent him. The fords of the Chenab were guarded, and could be secured before they were seriously threatened. The line of communications was held by way of Dinghi, and, in spite of the movement to Khoree and Nur Jemal, the Commander-in-Chief still refused to give battle, even when, on the 12th, Shere Singh made a strong demonstration of attack, contenting himself with holding the enemy in check by means of a few squadrons of cavalry Shere Singh, in fact, was not prepared to attack him where he lay, nor could he venture to march by him southwards, since he would thus be caught between Whish's

advancing division in front, and Lord Gough's army on his rear; while, if he attempted to cross the Chenab higher up, the latter could still intercept him.

On the 14th, the Sikh army left its encampments for Gujerat, and next day Lord Gough moved to Lassoorie. Learning that the enemy had now placed themselves precisely where he wanted them, Lord Gough, pushing forward a column to Wazirabad—whither Whish had already despatched a detachment, under Colonel Byrne, to secure the ford—moved on the 16th to Pukee Nuggar and Sadulapore. From the 17th to the 19th the forces from Multan were joining, the army being completed in its full strength on the 20th. During these days the Commander-in-Chief made a series of very short marches by Ishera and Tricca to Shadiwal, moving always in order of battle, so that the enemy were kept in uncertainty as to the moment when the blow would be struck.

Thus, throughout these weeks, Lord Gough had successfully resisted every inducement to give battle to the enemy prematurely; and, while holding their movements in check, had also so kept them in hand that he could concentrate his entire force to deliver the final blow, and utterly shatter the Khalsa army when he delivered it.

CHAPTER VI.

GUJERAT AND THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN FEB. 21

Force before Gujerat—Sikh views on artillery—The Sikh position—British order of battle—Advance—Artillery to the front—Overwhelming effects—Advance of the line—The villages carried—The Scinde Horse—The Afghan Horse on our right—Rout of the Sikhs—Gilbert's pursuing column—Surrender of the Sikh army—Summary of Gujerat.

On February 20th the arrival of the Multan army gave Lord Gough the force—and especially the preponderance in artillery—which he desired, in order to deliver the final blow to the enemy who had held the British power at bay with a stubborn skill hitherto unparalleled in Indian warfare.

In the first place, there were the same regiments which had taken part at Chillianwalla. The divisional commanders were as before, but Brigadier Penny was now in command of what had been Godby's Brigade, in Gilbert's Division, while Penny's and Pennycuick's Brigades, in Campbell's Division, were commanded by Carnegie and M'Leod.

To these were added the 1st Infantry Division, under Whish, with Brigadier Markham in command of the 32nd Foot and the 49th and 51st Native Infantry, and Hervey in command of the 10th Foot and the 8th and 72nd Native Infantry, also Dundas's Bombay Column, 60th Rifles, 3rd Bombay Native Infantry, Bombay Fusiliers, and 19th Native Infantry.

The Scinde Horse and four regiments of Irregulars were added to the cavalry. The artillery, under Brigadier Tennant, now numbered 96 guns, 18 being of heavy calibre. The engineers and sappers were under command of General Cheape, who had conducted the engineering operations at Multan.

Major George Lawrence had been brought down by Chutter Singh when he joined his son. Lawrence had been very well treated, and had made friends with many of his captors. Being allowed to visit Lahore on parole, to see his brother Sir Henry, he communicated a remark which they had frequently made, to the effect that although the British artillery was what they most feared, it had never been fully brought into play against them. The same remark had been made by Elahi Buksh. With fuller information, they would have learnt that the reason for this hitherto had been the exceedingly simple one, that their own artillery was the stronger; though it was true that at Chillianwalla there was the further reason that both Pennycuick and Pope had advanced beyond the support of the guns. These things were to be very effectually remedied at Gujerat. A curious fiction, however, prevailed, that, because Lord Gough had not won his battles by artillery when it was not strong enough for the purpose, therefore he would not have used his artillery when it *was* strong enough, except under pressure from Lord Dalhousie. Whereas, if the Commander-in-Chief had been reinforced with the guns from Multan in early January, he would have fought Chillianwalla precisely as he fought Gujerat, without requiring advice either from the Governor-General or the enemy.

The morning of February 21st broke in splendour over the open fields of young corn which lay between the opposing armies; beyond in the distance the mountain ranges shot their snow-clad peaks into the blue, forming a glorious scene. The Sikhs lay in the form of a rough crescent,

facing nearly due south. Their right flank lay across a deep dry nullah or watercourse, which curved round the city behind them, and covered part of their front, then took a sharp turn south, and passed through the centre of the British encampment. Their left reached to a smaller nullah full of water, which ran south into the Chenab. Their cavalry—Afghan horsemen for the most part—extended beyond the nullahs on right and left. Between the two nullahs they had occupied, fortified, and loopholed, with the skill for which they were remarkable, the villages of Burra Kalra and Chota Kalra (Great and Little)

The British faced them, looking north, their line divided by the great nullah.

Next to this nullah, on the right, was Gilbert's Division, beyond that, Whish's, with Hervey's Brigade in the front line, and Markham's in the second. On the flank were the cavalry brigades of Lockwood and Hearsey

On Gilbert's left was the heavy battery of 18 guns, Whish was supported by three troops Horse Artillery, with Dawes's Battery and two troops Horse Artillery for the time in reserve. The cavalry were supported by Warner's troops of Horse Artillery

On the left of the nullah was Campbell's Division, with Carnegie and M'Leod in the front line, and Hoggan in second line, supporting Dundas and the Bombay Column on the left. White's Cavalry Brigade, with Sir J Thackwell, was on the left flank, supported by two troops of Horse Artillery The Bombay Column was supported by Blood's Bombay Horse Artillery, Campbell, by the two light field-batteries of Ludlow and Robertson.

A reserve, consisting of the 5th and 6th Light Cavalry, the 45th and 69th Native Infantry, and the Bombay Field-Battery, was in charge of the rear

Having broken their fast, the troops were in motion by half past seven. Somewhat too soon for their own interests, the Sikhs opened fire, exposing the position and range of

their guns; so that the advancing line was halted, out of their reach, and the whole force of artillery was moved to the front, covered by infantry skirmishers. At nine o'clock the long line of guns was in position, some 800 yards from the Sikhs, and then the storm began in earnest. For two hours and a half the hail of shot and shell poured in upon the enemy; the first shot being fired by the inevitable Dawes. By the end of that time it may be said that the defence had been pretty thoroughly knocked to pieces, although our artillery suffered very considerably in the duel.

At half-past eleven, a general advance of the line was ordered, the artillery still leading. But, in spite of all they had suffered, the gallant Sikhs were still determined to fight to the last. From the village of Burra Kalra, they poured so fierce a fire on our advance party, sent forward to occupy it under the impression that it was deserted, that the place had to be stormed in the teeth of desperate resistance by the 2nd European Light Infantry of Penny's Brigade, led by the Brigadier himself and Major Steele. Similarly, Chota Kalra was carried by the 10th (part of Hervey's Brigade), led by Colonel Franks. More than once the stubborn foe attempted to stem the advance, and even to advance themselves against the brigades of Markham and Hervey on our right; but each time the fire of the Horse Artillery overwhelmed them.

So completely effective was the action of the artillery, that on the left the nullah was cleared out by it, and Campbell's infantry needed not to fire a single shot.

Out on our left, the Afghan horsemen had shown an inclination to try and turn our flank; but Thackwell sent forward the Horse Artillery to open fire upon them, and cover a magnificent charge by the Scinde Horse, supported by the 9th Lancers; who shattered the opposing squadrons and drove them in headlong flight, thus enabling Thackwell to turn the enemy's flank. The ground prevented the cavalry from

being brought further into play, but the guns were now brought up so that they could enfilade the Sikh position, and play a vigorous part in hastening the flight, which was now becoming general.

On our right, the movements of the Afghan horsemen kept attention very much alive, but no real conflict took place, the ground being ill adapted for cavalry action. A troop of these audacious warriors did, however, succeed in getting round, some thirty of them venturing even to dash along the British rear, and approaching the spot where Lord Gough stood with his staff. But they were charged and cut to pieces by the Chief's escort, a troop of the 5th Light Cavalry, led by Lieutenant Stannus.

By half-past twelve, the whole Sikh army was in full flight. By one o'clock, Gujerat itself, the Sikh camp, their baggage, and most of their guns, were in possession of the victors. On the left of the town, Dundas and Thackwell passed in pursuit, on the right, the other divisions. For twelve miles the cavalry pursued the fugitives, till darkness fell, compelling them to drop as they fled most of the few guns which they had succeeded in withdrawing from the field.

With the least possible delay, Sir Walter Gilbert—whose prowess as a horseman has already been alluded to—was despatched with some 12,000 men of all arms in pursuit across the Jhelum George Lawrence, to the intense admiration of the enemy, fulfilled his pledge and returned to their camp, and passed frequently to and fro with proposals for terms from Shere Singh But no terms were to be granted save unconditional surrender So hotly were the Sikhs pressed, that they had no chance of obtaining rest or supplies, and worn out with the flight, their ammunition exhausted, with no means of obtaining food, they first, on March 6th, restored all their prisoners, and finally, on the 12th, surrendered at discretion.

Sir Colin Campbell, who had been sent with a column

to secure the subjection of the northern districts, overtook Gilbert about this time, and describes the bearing of the vanquished chiefs, who boldly affirmed their right to do as they had done, while frankly recognising the hopeless completeness of the disaster which had come upon them. In the hour of surrender as in the hour of battle, they approved themselves a worthy foe, as in days to come they were to prove themselves worthy comrades in arms.

A few days later, the last remnant of opposition was ended with the surrender of Peshawur, and the flight of the Afghans across the border.

Little in the way of comment needs to be added to this account of the triumph of Gujerat. From first to last, there was no flaw in the conduct of the fight. With his artillery at last brought up to the desired strength, Lord Gough had used it to the full; and for all the desperate valour of the Sikhs, the battle was won before the line advanced. Horse, foot, and artillery, every arm of the service did thoroughly and successfully what it was called upon to do. Throughout the campaign, the Sikh leaders had displayed higher qualities than in the Sutlej campaign; their followers had assuredly shown no falling off. Yet this great army was at Gujerat utterly shattered beyond conceivable hope of recuperation; and the achievement cost the victors a total loss of 5 officers and 91 men killed, 24 officers and 646 men wounded. The principle which Lord Gough had maintained from the beginning, that the whole available force must be concentrated to deal the decisive blow, was vindicated. On that he had rested his objection to the Multan expedition, or to a Hazara expedition; to the deviation from it (though on exceptional grounds, as already explained), and to exceptional accidents, was due the comparative failure of Chillianwalla; to the imperturbable maintenance of the same principle after Chillianwalla was due the final triumph. The one great Power left in India was prostrated after two wars which it had

wilfully forced upon us. Lord Gough, recalled from his command because he had been misrepresented through ignorance, answered his detractors once for all by a victory ranking with the most brilliant achievements of our Indian armies.

CHAPTER VII.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE SIKH WARS

Reasons of the Sutlej campaign—Of the second war—And their result—Character of the wars—Lessons in criticism—Military policy of the Sutlej campaign—Of the Punjab campaign—Misconceptions as to loss of life—As to the Commander-in-Chief's "impetuosity"—Close of Lord Gough's Indian career—His farewell to the army of the Punjab.

The war was ended. It was not four years since the Khalsa, full at once of religious fanaticism, military ardour, and arrogant self-confidence, had first launched itself against the tide of British power. Ranjit Singh, whose penetrating vision and cool brain had enabled him to direct his policy and control his ambition in a very precise relation to his strength, had gauged the possibilities of the situation with an astuteness denied to his successors. He knew that the native State which hurled itself against the British was doomed to shatter itself, sooner or later—probably sooner. But the disaster of Kabul dealt a crushing blow to British prestige, for which Meanee and Maharajpore failed to atone. If the Gwalior army had not then been too precipitate, and brought destruction on itself while still single-handed, it is hard to say what might not have resulted from a junction between Sikhs and Mahrattas. As it was, the Sikh army crossed the Sutlej with the confident expectation of a triumphant career, whatever the shrewder of the Sirdars may have thought. Once, at least, during the conflict they were within an ace of a victory which would have set all India in a blaze. They were beaten; but they half believed

that they were not fairly beaten. The magnanimity of their conquerors obtained no recognition. The mother of their Maharajah fanned the smouldering flame of their resentment. The voices of their soothsayers prophesied an early restitution of the Khalsa. Once again they crossed swords with the foreigners, but this time, so overwhelmingly decisive was the arbitrament of war, that they accepted the inevitable. The respect for British fighting qualities then engendered, was so confirmed by the beneficent influences of our Government, that the Company's most stubborn foes have become the most loyal subjects of the Empress of India, and the race whom fifty years ago our "political" officers were wont to condemn as traitors, have shown their mettle as the staunchest comrades in arms of the British soldier in many a hard-fought field.

The termination of the second Sikh war is a fitting point at which to draw both some general conclusions, and others relating specifically to Lord Gough's conduct of the wars.

In the first place, it is to be noted that the enemy we had to deal with was neither a miscellaneous horde of mercenaries, nor troops of daring but undisciplined hill men, but an army of soldiers trained on the European model, better provided with artillery than our own until Gujerat, far outnumbering the troops opposed to them, and full of religious enthusiasm and dogged courage.

Secondly, both were wars of pitched battles, some of them *extremely sanguinary*

Thirdly, the first campaign was concluded in two months, and the second in three months, from the time when the Commander-in-Chief actually took the field.

But the British public has been accustomed, by the *brilliant exploits of small armies in India from the days of* Clive to those of Havelock, to expect British troops to face enormous odds, and achieve victory after victory with very

small loss. If there is hard fighting, as must inevitably be the case where such an army as that of the Khalsa has to be met, there is a general inclination to believe that the British commander must be to blame. Anything in the shape of a reverse is magnified into a disaster; while there is a common disposition to believe that any force will do to overcome any resistance, without running any risks. Obviously no one would own to adopting the theory thus baldly stated, but virtually that is what a great deal of popular comment on our "little wars" amounts to.

And yet it would seem sufficiently manifest that a war in which the armies opposed to us are well trained, stubborn, superior in numbers, and equal in armament, are not picnic parties, but affairs in which many lives must be lost; not to be reckoned by scores, hardly even by hundreds.

Further, it should be borne in mind that there is a false economy in lives as well as in money.* It may very well be the case that a three months' campaign which involves a heavy expenditure of money and lives may be both in money and lives much less expensive than a series of campaigns which cost much less relatively to the time over which they are protracted.

The attitude of the public towards Lord Gough exemplifies forcibly the wrong way of looking at matters. When the news of the desperate fight at Ferozeshah reached England, there were plenty of voices raised to condemn the Commander-in-Chief's "rashness." They were well answered before the Board of Directors by the Chairman, Sir Archibald Galloway. "Complaints are made that Sir Hugh Gough at Ferozeshah *took the bull by the horns*. But, gentlemen, in this case *the bull was all horns*." As to the actual method of attack, the bull was indeed all horns in the sense that wherever an attack might be attempted, the Sikh entrenchments were equally strong. If the bull was attacked at all, he had to be taken by the horns. And the

* See Appendix III., C.

plain fact was that the crossing of the Sutlej made it absolutely imperative that the Sikhs should be met and fought at once with the available force. That the force available was far too small was no fault of the Commander-in-Chief's. We have seen the reason. A choice had to be made between trying to avert war and having an adequate force on the frontier The former policy was followed, and the frontier force was inadequate. The result was that we narrowly escaped an overwhelming disaster

In the case of the Punjab Campaign, the choice was a somewhat different one, but again it depended on a calculation of chances—to decide what course to follow, it must be assumed that the Sikhs were sure to rise *en masse*, or that they were sure *not* to rise *en masse* On the latter assumption, the employment of small forces to nip the revolt in the bud would have been sound policy, on the former it could only have led to disaster Lord Gough held that the risk was too great, particularly if the forces were scattered amongst untrustworthy allies, and therefore he resolved on the winter campaign.

In the first war, Sir Henry Hardinge resolved to run the greater risk in the hope of averting war altogether, in the second, Lord Dalhousie adopted Lord Gough's view, preferring the certainty of a big but successful war to the chance of a small war with the risk of a serious disaster thrown in. The event proved Sir Henry's calculation to be wrong in the first instance, there is certainly no proof that Sir Hugh's was not right in the second.

The loss of life at Sobraon and Chillianwalla was, of course, made a ground of reproach against the Commander-in-Chief As to Sobraon, no defence is needed. As to Chillianwalla, a word may be added to what has already been said. That battle could not have been otherwise than sanguinary, even if none of the errors committed by Lord Gough's subordinates had taken place, for the simple reason that the Sikh position was far too strong to be carried without much

loss. They were adepts in the art of preparing rapid entrenchments; the advance against them had to be made through jungle; and their artillery was powerful. But when at last, at Gujerat, the British troops were supplied with a force of guns which obviated what had always been a necessity before—the arbitrament of the bayonet and the tulwar—the loss of life was small out of all proportion to the magnitude of the victory. A table is given in an Appendix,* showing the loss of life and the forces engaged at Lord Gough's battles as compared with some others; and considering the character of the Sikh soldiery—the real odds against which Lord Gough was fighting—such a comparison is legitimate, and may fairly be held to exonerate the Commander-in-Chief from the charge of reckless disregard of life.

In fact, that the loss of life was excessive can be maintained only by overlooking the fighting capacities of the enemy. If, as has happened often enough in Oriental warfare, our opponents had taken to flight on the first approach of British bayonets, or if they had adopted the not uncommon practice of charging the British lines and being shot down before reaching them, the result would have been different. But, on the contrary, they met cannonade with cannonade, avoided miscellaneous rushes, and stood up against cold steel as stubbornly as a European foe would have done, standing their ground and selling their lives dearly.

But the common charge against Lord Gough is that of inpetuosity. First at Ferozeshah, where Sir Henry Hardinge overruled his plan of action. The facts, however, have been set forth. The conflict of opinion was simple. Both Sir Henry and Sir Hugh knew that a battle must be fought and a victory must be won. But Sir Henry considered that the risk of a reverse would be minimised by waiting for a junction with Sir John Littler. Sir Hugh held that to wait would increase the risk—that the additional

* Appendix III., C.

forces would not compensate for the lateness of the hour and the approach of darkness. He urged his plan, not because he was thirsting for the fray, but because he considered it the safer. In the result, Sir Henry's plan was followed, the additional forces gave no practical help, and all the unhappy consequences of delay foreseen by Sir Hugh occurred.

Nor is the case for rashness made out at Ramnuggur, where nearly the whole of the losses were incurred by a charge being carried beyond the point to which Lord Gough had limited it.

Lastly, at Chillianwalla, the accusation is based exclusively on the fact that Lord Gough gave up his intention of camping, and joined battle when the Sikhs opened fire. Yet, it is clear that he had no choice, while, to deprive him of choice, the enemy had, at the same time, deprived themselves of the shelter of their entrenchments. He attacked because encamping was impossible, only when the truth that it was impossible, hitherto concealed by the jungle, became evident by the unmasking of the Sikh batteries.

The truth appears to be that Lord Gough's personal daring gave colour to an expectation that he would be rash. What people expect, they are apt to discover justification for, and every act was labelled as rash which did not bear *primâ facie* marks of caution. It is probable that the popular accounts of the engagement at Maharajpore,* when the Gwalior army was crushed, stereotyped the idea that he was a sort of happy-go-lucky, reckless hard-fighter, and that the idea was consequently read into his subsequent campaigns. And since he consistently refused either to vindicate himself or to let his friends vindicate him from the aspersions of his critics, it is, perhaps, hardly surprising that he has been so erroneously judged.

With the victory of Gujerat, Lord Gough's services in

* See Appendix I.

India practically terminated. The last embers of the revolt were stamped out, as related, by Sir Walter Gilbert, and the Punjab was annexed, as will be told in the next Book. It was not till the middle of April that his successor, Sir Charles Napier, arrived, nearly two months after Gujerat had turned the vituperation of detractors into pæans of applause; and again, three months later, came the announcement, marking the rapid change of public opinion, that he had been made a Viscount. And so, at the age of seventy, Lord Gough departed from the scene of his services. This section of the narrative may well be closed by quoting the General Orders, in which he bade farewell to the army he loved.

31st March, 1849.

The Commander in Chief in India announces his farewell and adieu to the Army of the Punjaub.

The troops which, since October, have been in arms under his command, are dispersed to their respective cantonments, and on this, the last occasion of addressing them, Lord Gough desires to place on record his sense of the great services and exertions through which the sway of British India has been now extended over the broad plains and classic rivers and cities of this kingdom.

The tide of conquest which heretofore rolled on the Punjaub from the west, has at length reached and overcome it from the east; and that which Alexander attempted, the British Indian Army has accomplished. It is with no common pride that the Commander in Chief applauds the conduct and the valor which have led to so glorious a result.

The favor and approbation of the country and Government will, without doubt, mark enduringly the estimate entertained of its desert; and no time will efface from the memory of this army, and every true soldier in the field, the high sense of triumph and of the glory with which this campaign has terminated. Undismayed by stern opposition, untired by the procrastinations and delays which circumstances forcibly imposed, or by the great labors and exposure which have been borne so manfully, the army has emerged with a fame and a brightness, only the more marked by the trying nature of its previous toils and endurances.

The mere battle day, when every glowing feeling of the soldier and the Gentleman is called into action, will ever be encountered nobly where British armies are engaged; but it is in the privations, the

difficulties, and endless toils of war, that the trial of an army consists; and it is these which denote its metal, and show of what material it is formed.

Since the day when at Ramnuggur the too hasty ardour and enthusiasm of the troops first gave signal of the determined character of the war, and of the fierceness with which a mistaken but brave enemy were bent to oppose the progress of our arms, till now, that a crushing and overwhelming victory has prostrated at the feet of our Ruler and his Government, an independent, a proud and a warlike people; Lord Gough, relying upon British courage and endurance, has never for one moment entertained a doubt of the result; nor yielded even to adverse chances and circumstances a lurking fear of the successful issue, which true constancy and firmness never fail to attain.

The rule which, despite the signal clemency and considerate mercy of the Government, it has nevertheless been found at length necessary to impose upon the Seikhs and their country, has not been thrust upon a defenceless or unresisting people; their valor, their numbers, their means and preparation, and the desperate energy with which, in error and deceived, the Khalsa and Seikh nation mustered and rallied for the struggle, have been conspicuously apparent; and the army which, in virtue of a most persistive constancy, has reduced such a race and such troops to submission and obedience, merits well the highest eulogium which Lord Gough can bestow.

The Commander in Chief lingers upon the severance of those ties which have bound him to that army: the last which in the field it was his duty and his pride to command. Long practice and experience of war, and its trying vicissitudes, have enabled him to form a just estimate of the conduct and merit of the troops now being dispersed; and the ardour, the vigilance, the endurance, the closing and triumphant bravery and discipline which have marked their path in the Punjaub, will often recur to him in that retirement he is about to seek; and in which the cares, the earnest exertions, and grave anxieties inseparable from the duties of high military command, will be richly recompensed and rewarded, by the sense of duty performed, and the consciousness of unwearied and uncompromising devotion to that Sovereign and country, which in common with the British Indian army, it will ever be his boast and his pride to have so successfully served.

To every General, to every individual Officer and soldier, European and Native, of the Army of the Punjaub, Lord Gough finally repeats his cordial and affectionate farewell. Their persons and services are engraved in his heart and affections, and to those among them who may hereafter, within the brief span of life yet before him, revisit their Native country, he tenders the unaffected renewal of that intercourse and friendship which mutual esteem and regard and mutual dangers and exertions have produced and established,

BOOK VI.

THE ANNEXATION

PART V.

Conditions of Service in the Army in India.

SECTION I.

British Officers (including Indian Officers with King's Commissions).

One of the subjects to which we were enjoined to devote particular attention is the amelioration of the general conditions of service in the Indian Army, as regards both British and other ranks. We had not proceeded far in our investigations before we found it necessary to include in our enquiry the conditions obtaining in the British service in India.

We have given considerable attention to this subject, and we have become aware that a spirit of unrest and dissatisfaction is noticeable in both armies. This spirit is no doubt in great part due to the war and its aftermath, such as frequent transfers, the prevalence of high prices, and the fluctuations in the exchange value of the rupee, and also to changes in the political organisation in India. Close investigation has, however, shown that there are other causes, many of long standing, which we think can and should be removed at once.

Before we proceed to make our recommendations, we will endeavour to indicate briefly what, in our opinion, are the principal causes underlying the undoubted feeling of discontent which prevails throughout the army in India.

2. Taking first the case of the British officers, we note that the pay in both services has recently been increased. There are still, however, certain anomalies in the pay of British officers of the Indian Army which require to be removed, and we deal separately with these in a later Section.

3. The delays experienced by officers in obtaining what they believe to be their just dues are a fruitful source of dissatisfaction. These delays, as we have shown in Part II, Section III, are not altogether the fault of the Military Accounts Department, which in India is responsible for pay, accounts and audit. Apart from temporary causes, such as congestion of work arising out of the war and the recent fluctuations in the sterling value of the rupee, they are largely due to the complexity of the regulations governing pay, leave, travelling allowances, &c. Until these regulations have been revised and simplified, there will continue to be friction between military officers and those responsible for dealing with their personal claims; and in the Section dealing with Military Finance we have emphasised the necessity for a complete revision of the regulations.

4. A serious ground for discontent is the difficulty experienced by officers in obtaining suitable accommodation for themselves and their families. Even before the war there was room for considerable improvement. With the increase in the number of officers serving in India, the lack of accommodation assumed very serious proportions; and though a certain amount has been done by Government in the direction of building temporary quarters in some stations, especially in northern India, the supply has by no means overtaken the demand, with the result that officers, and married officers in particular, are put to the greatest inconvenience and discomfort. We recognise that it would have been difficult for Government to provide quarters in adequate numbers and sufficiently promptly to meet the ever-increasing demands of an expanding army. To the extent that the present shortage is due to the large number of officers in excess of the authorised establishment, this particular ground for discontent will disappear gradually, as conditions revert to the normal. But, apart from the inadequacy of the quarters available, there can be no doubt that the standard of accommodation before the war was far below what is suitable, and, as we shall show later, the same remark applies with even greater force to the accommodation provided in the barracks and married lines of British troops, in Indian lines, and in hospitals. In the matter of improving accommodation, little was possible during the war, when the Government of India were straining every nerve and devoting all their resources to the raising, training, and equipping of a new army. Nevertheless, we note with satisfaction that some progress has been made, even under war conditions,

with the supply of electric light and fans in barracks and hospitals and with improvements of the latter The progress made in these directions during the next few years will be the measure of the contentment and to a great extent of the efficiency, of the army in India, and we urge that considerations of finance should not be allowed to postpone work of so urgent a character Had the necessary measures been taken in the years before the war to improve the conditions under which officers and men had to live both in health and in sickness there would be less legitimate discontent than now exists and the ultimate cost to Government would have been far less

5 In the preceding paragraphs we have mentioned two of the main factors which operate to cause dissatisfaction and resentment in the minds of British officers serving in the army in India But no examination of the matter would be complete which failed to take into account a certain feeling of despondency which prevails among many of the British officers of the Indian Army at the present time To understand this feeling it is necessary to bear in mind that the army to which they belong and of which they were proud was shown in the early stages of the war to be inferior to the British Army in training and equipment and consequently in efficiency In spite of these drawbacks the Indian Army rendered reat service to the Empire at a time of dire peril and played a gallant part in stemming the German onslaught in the west in the winter of 1914 1915 Then came the decision to transfer the bulk of the Indian troops from France to Mesopotamia The history of the Mesopotamian campaign is known to all Such defects as existed in the organisation and administrat o i of the Indian Army came prominently to notice The later phases of the campaign more than atoned for previous failures but the credit which the Indian Army gained for the ultimate victory of our arms, both in Mesopotamia and in Palestine c uld not wholly wipe out from the minds of numbers of keen and devoted officers the stigma which through no fault of theirs had by that time attached to Indian army administration They were also taught by criticisms in the press and elsewhere to attribute to the Government which they served a disregard of their interests and the want of close liaison between Army Headquarters and the troops contributed to strengthen the belief that the Government of India and Army Headquarters were indifferent to the welfare of the Indian Army Later, too many Indian Army officers who had begun to earn high reputations and to fill staff appointments and commands of considerable importance on the western front found themselves recalled to India and in many cases on their arrival were assigned posts of less importance than those which they had held in the field while they lost the opportunities for earning distinction and gaining promotion which were in their grasp in other theatres of war

6 This general feeling of soreness accentuated no doubt by war strain and the inability to obtain leave which resulted from the Afghan war and the Waziristan operations following closely after the armistice the British officers have not yet lost nor will they lose it until they feel sure that their own Government is doing its best to uphold their interests and to redress their grievances We may mention that our attention has been called to what is considered to be an attitude of undue reticence adopted by the military authorities in India as to their policy and intentions regarding matters which affect officers of the Indian Army and the conditions of their service The fact that any important proposals have to be referred by the Government of India for the sanction of the Secretary of State in Council is responsible for this reticence and it is a matter for regret that the position is not better understood in the Indian Army At the same time we think that there are many matters in respect of which Government and the military authorities in India might and should take officers into their confidence while maintaining a proper reserve in regard to questions the decision of which does not rest in their hands

7 Recent changes and reforms have no doubt proved another unsettling factor in the minds of British officers of the Indian Army but this feeling it is to be hoped will pass away in time For the present it contributes to the unpopularity of service in India and we therefore feel bound to notice it

8 All these circumstances have combined to produce a condition of affairs which calls for immediate remedy It is impossible to ignore the signs of the times or to shut our eyes to the fact that whereas the Indian Army formerly attracted the pick of the Sandhurst cadets, there is a reluctance at present on the part of cadets and their

parents to elect for that army. This reluctance is particularly noticeable in the case of those families which have a long and honourable connection with the Indian Army. To some extent this may be attributed to the fact that the rates of pay of officers in the British Army, as recently revised, now afford a living wage; and that consequently a young officer who has no private means is no longer obliged to seek a career in the Indian Army. It is true that the latter still offers pecuniary advantages somewhat in excess of the British service, but it is equally true that these advantages are far smaller than they used to be, and are no longer, in our opinion, sufficient to turn the scale in favour of an Indian career.

9. The problem before us, then, is to render service in the Indian Army sufficiently attractive to secure a constant flow of the best of the Sandhurst cadets, and to ensure that officers who have elected for that army, and British service officers while stationed in India, remain contented throughout their service.

House Accommodation.

10. We have already indicated two directions in which reforms are urgently needed, firstly, the simplification of the regulations dealing with pay and allowances; and secondly, the provision of suitable accommodation for all officers. We realise that the latter problem is one of no small difficulty, but we are strongly of opinion that the Government should recognise definitely its obligation to provide accommodation for all its military officers, as well as for messes of units. The grant of lodging allowance, as in England, will not meet the case, for the necessary accommodation does not exist. The decision as to the best methods of relief is a matter for the Government of India, and these methods will no doubt vary in different parts of the country. The alternatives appear to be (*a*) to build; (*b*) to buy; (*c*) to hire. The first would be very expensive, and a combination of (*b*) and (*c*), according to local circumstances, would probably be preferable.

The following suggestions are put forward as practical solutions of the difficulty:—

(i) In addition to providing a sufficient number of bungalows to accommodate officers remaining in the plains during the hot weather, huts might be erected for use in the cold weather only: and such officers as remain in the plains during the summer should be permitted to share quarters in the bungalows, the occupants paying rent on the scale laid down in clause (ii) below, the total not to exceed the assessed rent of the bungalow. Thus rent would be paid for the huts only during the winter.

An arrangement of this kind would also tend to prevent heavy expenditure on building in a cantonment which it may be advisable to abandon later.

(ii) The rent of Government quarters should be assessed in the usual way; but the total should not exceed 5 per cent. per annum of pay of rank for unmarried officers' quarters, and 10 per cent. for married quarters.

(iii) Bachelors' quarters, to hold four to six officers, might be built, by Government or private enterprise, near messes, thus releasing bungalows for married officers.

(iv) The legal machinery for obliging landlords to keep their houses in proper repair should also be rendered more speedy, effective and easy of application.

(v) If officers (married or single) are obliged to live in camp, because no house accommodation is available, tents should be supplied free by Government on an adequate scale.

We are also of opinion that, following the home arrangements, the necessary furniture should be supplied and kept up in all Government quarters, and hire be charged for its use. The rate of hire might be that adopted by the Public Works Department, viz., 10 per cent. on original value.

Before leaving the subject of officers' quarters, we wish to draw attention to the importance of installing electric fans and light in all cantonments in the plains as soon as possible. Officers will, we feel sure, be willing to pay reasonable rates for these comforts in their houses, and the effect upon their health and spirits cannot fail to be beneficial.

Pay and Pensions.

11. As regards pay, we consider that certain recommendations which we have made in Section II of this Part will, if adopted, go far towards maintaining throughout all the regimental ranks the relative advantage of service in the Indian Army over service with the British Army. We consider it essential that this advantage in favour of the Indian Army should be maintained also in regard to pensions,

since we are aware that the prospect of a higher pension plays a great part in the selection of an Indian military career

Concessions in Kind

12 Apart however from pay, there are certain concessions in kind which are enjoyed by officers of the British service in the United Kingdom but are denied to them and to British officers of the Indian Army while serving in India In considering to what extent similar concessions or allowances in lieu should be given in India we have not overlooked the fact that the higher pay given in India is intended *inter alia*, to compensate for the loss of these concessions or allowances Nevertheless there are certain matters in respect to which we consider that a more liberal policy should be adopted for we feel convinced that if British officers are to serve contentedly in India additional attractions are necessary and these we think should take the form of concessions in kind

13 In the British service in India officers who are required to maintain chargers receive an additional allowance of Rs 30 a month for each charger In the Indian Army all officers are required to maintain chargers in varying numbers according to their rank and to the arm of the service to which they belong and their pay in theory includes an allowance of Rs 30 a month for each charger which they have to maintain The cost of keeping a charger has risen greatly since this rate was fixed and evidence points to the conclusion that it is now at least Rs 60 a month in most stations It is obvious that the Indian Army officer who draws in the lower ranks only Rs 100 a month higher pay than a British service officer of corresponding rank and has to spend Rs 60 a month out of that Rs 100 to maintain a charger is only Rs 40 a month better off than an officer of the British service This advantage is too small to compensate for the disadvantages of continuous service in India with Indian troops Moreover the horse allowance of Rs 30 a month included in the Indian Army officers pay was intended to cover in part the cost of purchase Its inadequacy for this purpose is patent and the result is that the young Indian Army officer has to start his career by providing himself with a charger and is then continuously out of pocket by the difference between the cost of its upkeep and the sum included in his pay for that purpose

In the United Kingdom mounted officers are provided with chargers by Government which also pays for their upkeep We recommend the adoption of a similar arrangement in India But we see no reason why all officers in the Indian Army other than cavalry officers should be mounted and we consider that in infantry regiments and similar units only the following officers should be mounted and should have one charger each —the commanding officer second in command company commanders adjutant and quartermaster a total of 8 In cavalry regiments we recommend that all officers including the commanding officer should have two chargers each

14 Subject to these limitations we strongly recommend for both the British service and the Indian Army —

(1) That Government should provide each mounted officer free of charge with the authorised number of chargers

(2) That Government should provide forage free of charge for the upkeep of such chargers

(3) That Government should provide an Indian groom for each horse such grooms to be enlisted soldiers paid rationed and clothed by Government

(4) That in the case of officers of the British service the horse allowance now given in addition to pay should be withdrawn

(5) That no reduction should be made in the pay of officers of the Indian Army in consideration of Government relieving them of the cost of providing and maintaining chargers The reason for this recommendation will we believe be made clear by a study of the Section dealing with the adoption of a uniform scale of pay for officers of the two services

(6) That saddlery and horse kit should be issued free by Government and be borne on regimental charge

It is for consideration however whether under modern conditions there is the same necessity to provide all staff officers with chargers In many theatres of war a pool of horses was formed to enable officers of the staff and departments of divisions and higher formations to carry out such mounted duties as were necessary A pool of

motor cars was also formed to enable them to perform those duties for which horses were not needed. A somewhat similar system might be adopted in India, both in peace and in the field.

15. Other concessions which we recommend for all British officers are the following:—

(1) Officers should have the right to purchase from Government rations, fuel, oil and other articles stocked by Government departments, for themselves and their families.

(2) Tents should be provided free by Government and be kept in unit or arsenal charge. They should be issued for use on manœuvres and field training, as well as on active service, and transport for them should be provided free by Government. No deduction should be made from the pay of officers of the Indian Army in return for the free provision of tents, notwithstanding the fact that this pay theoretically includes a sum on account of tentage.

This tentage allowance has been for so long merged into pay that it is not easy to ascertain exactly what it was given for, and thus it has had for years past little or no relation to its original object.

(3) Officers of the British service should be allowed a soldier servant from the ranks, as in the United Kingdom. Officers of the Indian Army should be allowed an Indian soldier servant from the ranks, special enlistments being made for the purpose, if necessary.

Travelling and Detention Allowances.

16. The present arrangements under which British officers draw travelling and detention allowances are complicated, unpopular and uneven in operation.

When travelling by rail, officers pay their own fares and draw a certain sum in cash, as laid down in Army Regulations, India, Volume X, paragraph 29 (A). This sum is expressed in terms of fares, and varies according to factors such as the railway line over which the journey is performed, the rank of the officer travelling, and the nature of the duty on which he travels, whether permanent transfer or temporary or inspection duty. There is also a scale of allowances for an officer's wife and family.

Officers also draw detention allowance at Rs. 5 a day, under the conditions specified in Army Regulations, India, Volume I, paragraphs 254 and 254 A. Ordinarily, however, an officer is not entitled to any dètention allowance for the day on which he commences or terminates a journey, nor if he returns to headquarters on the same day.

In lieu of the present arrangements, we recommend the adoption of a system under which warrants, to cover the officer, his servants and baggage according to an authorised scale, and, where admissible, his family, should be issued for all journeys on duty; and the officer should draw in addition an allowance at the rate of Rs. 5 for a single day or part of a day on which he travels, and Rs. 10 for a night away from his headquarters, but not both.

We also recommend the grant of a free passage home, for an officer of the Indian Army and his family, once at the end of his service, either on retirement or on unemployment.

Medical Attendance.

17. Another matter which has been brought prominently to our notice relates to the insufficiency of European medical officers. In the past there has been an implied understanding that the British officer, while serving in India, has the right to expect that his wife and family will be treated, when sick, by men of their own race. We find that considerable anxiety is felt by married officers of the Indian Army and their wives in regard to medical attendance in the future. It is recognised by these officers that the Indian Medical Service is being recruited more and more from Indians, and that in consequence there is increasing probability of their wives and daughters being stationed in places where European medical aid is not procurable without much delay and great expense. This risk they are most anxious to minimize; and they consider that it is the duty of Government to take measures to assist them. We entirely agree. We strongly urge that hospital accommodation for the wives and families of British officers should be provided in places where European doctors are available, either in station hospitals for British troops or in civil hospitals. We recommend that, until such arrangements are complete, a British medical officer should be placed in visiting medical charge of outlying places where officers' wives and families are stationed.

We also consider that the *establishment* of maternity homes at suitable centres is deserving of every encouragement that convalescent homes for officers in good climates are urgently needed and that the *matter of their provision should be taken* up as soon as possible

Transfer to Half pay List

18 Our attention has been called to the regulation (A R I Vol I para 723) under which an officer whose transfer to the half pay list has been caused by medical unfitness resulting from military duty is, on restoration to full pay only allowed to reckon up to one year of the time spent on half pay for promotion and pension This regulation appears to us to bear very hardly on officers who have spent more than one year on the half pay list as a *consequence of wounds received or illness contracted* on active service and we *recommend* that the limit of time should be abolished with retrospective effect from the beginning of the war

Family Pension Funds

19 In the course of our investigations in India we became aware that there is considerable dissatisfaction with the present methods of management of the two military provident funds which consist of the subscriptions and donations of officers viz *the Indian Military* Service Family Pension Fund (now closed to new entrants and its successor, the Indian Military Widows and Orphans Fund

The complaints are briefly as follows —

(a) That the 4 per cent interest given by the Secretary of State on balances is too low having regard to rates of interest now obtainable

(b) That no accounts beyond a statement after the quinquennial actuarial audit are published that even this statement is not circulated to all subscribers and is not in a form intelligible to men unaccustomed to deal with financial problems

(c) That *the subscribers whose money forms the funds* have *no voice* whatever in its management

(d) That the rule under which a wife who divorces her husband loses all benefits from the fund is unjust

We put forward the following suggestions —

(1) We understand that the rate of interest is for the present to be 5½ per cent instead of 4 per cent We recommend that any benefits which may accrue *from* this or subsequent increases should be devoted to increasing pensions rather than decreasing subscriptions and we are in a position to say that this is the general feeling in the Indian Army

(2) A simple and intelligible annual balance sheet should be published as soon after the close of the financial year (31st March) as possible and the opportunity should be taken of explaining very briefly the principles on which the funds are managed the advantages compared with *those obtainable* from an insurance company and mentioning also the benefits admissible under the Royal Warrant

(3) It would be a source of satisfaction to the officers of the Indian Army if a small committee nominated officially from among their own number were given facilities to examine the affairs of the funds once a year at the India Office and so be in a position to inform their comrades that they are satisfied (as far as *laymen* can be) that the funds are being managed in the best interests of the officers of the Indian Army This committee might consist of the Secretary Military Department India Office a pensioned officer to be nominated by the Secretary of State and an officer on furlough to be nominated by the Government of India Their report should be included in the same document as the balance sheet and a copy of the complete document should be sent to every subscriber to the funds

(4) We agree that the rule mentioned in clause (d) above is inequitable We suggest that a clause should be included in the regulations providing that in such circumstances the surrender values of the pension of the wife and of the *children* if committed to her charge should be paid to the wife

SECTION II.

Applicability to India of a Uniform Scale of Pay of British Officers.

20. In paragraph 2 of Section I of this Part we referred to the existence of certain anomalies in the pay of British officers of the Indian Army. It has been suggested that the British officer at home, in the Colonies, in India, or in the Indian Army, should be paid, under Royal Warrant, a universal rate of pay (which may be called A), with an automatic overseas allowance when serving out of the United Kingdom (termed B), and an Indian allowance, to compensate for service in the Indian Army (which may be called C). Thus the British service officer serving in India would receive A *plus* B; while the British officer in the Indian Army would receive A *plus* B *plus* C.

Three main difficulties stand in the way of the complete adoption of this system. Firstly, fluctuations in the sterling exchange value of the rupee render it practically impossible to express A in terms of rupees: consequently it would be necessary to adopt an arbitrary rate of exchange which might, in the course of time, differ materially from the actual market rate, and this would almost certainly give rise to doubt and misunderstanding as to the equity of the process of calculating Indian rates of pay. Secondly, the basic British rate, A, is liable to periodical revision with reference to the rise or fall in the cost of living at home; and it might thus happen that an officer's pay in India was automatically raised or lowered with reference to conditions at home which did not affect his expenses in India to any marked degree. Thirdly, it is impossible to secure a uniform system of pay so long as promotions in the British service depend on regimental vacancies, and in the Indian Army are governed by a time scale.

These objections appear to be so valid that we are forced to reject the proposal, in the form in which it has been placed before us.

21. In effect, however, the system under which the scales of pay of British officers serving in India have recently been fixed is based to a large extent on the principle referred to in paragraph 20. That is to say, although pay is consolidated and expressed in rupees, the amount has been fixed with reference to the sterling rates of pay at home, increased in recognition of such factors as service in India, loss of home allowances, and, in the case of the officers of the Indian Army, with the addition of "staff pay." That element of the consolidated rupee pay which represents the excess over the home scale of pay is not, however, "automatic," but varies from rank to rank. Taking the rupee at 2*s.* for the purpose of illustration and comparison, and converting the authorized rupee scale of pay into sterling at that rate, element (B) ranges from £190 in the case of a 2nd-lieutenant of the British service to £736 in the case of a lieutenant-colonel in command.

22. We consider that the method of fixing scales of pay in India, as described in the preceding paragraph, is the only practicable one, in view of the difficulties already referred to, and that the pay must, as in the case of the other services, be fixed on a rupee basis. But an analyis of the consolidated scale of pay of the British service officer in India, and of the pay of rank (exclusive, that is, of "staff pay") of the British officer of the Indian Army, indicates certain anomalies which it is desirable to eliminate. It will be seen that the rates vary only in the following ranks, the scales in all other ranks being the same for both classes of officers.

Ranks.	British service (consolidated pay).	Indian Army (pay of rank).	Remarks.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Captain on promotion	750	700	Indian Army officer is worse off by 50
Captain after 15 years' service ..	850	750	" " " " 100
Major	950	900	" " " " 50
Major after 5 years' service as such ..	1,050	950	" " " " 100
Lieutenant-Colonel	1,250	1,150	" " " " 100

In a few years there will be no captains in the Indian Army with less than 9 years' service, at which period an officer, if a captain, will draw Rs. 750 a month, or the same as the British service captain from date of promotion until he attains 15 years' service.

In the other four cases the relative inferiority of the Indian Army officer is compensated for by the higher staff pay which he is probably drawing by that time viz Rs 200 a month as company commander instead of Rs 100 as company officer

The system however under which staff pay is drawn by British officers of the Indian Army requires examination It is not properly staff pay since most of the officers are holding regimental and not staff appointments, in effect it is an additional allowance for serving in the Indian Army Every officer from the most junior upwards draws it but its real nature has been obscured by the fact that although every officer on joining the Indian Army draws this so called staff pay of Rs 100 a month (in the infantry) as a company officer the staff pay is increased to Rs 200 a month in the case of a company commander, Rs 250 in the case of the second in command and Rs 600 in the case of the commanding officer while the adjutant and quartermaster draw Rs 200 and 150 a month respectively, in lieu of their Rs 100 as company officers

23 We consider it desirable to separate the present staff pay into two elements viz (1) an Indian Army allowance of Rs 100 a month to be drawn by all British officers of the Indian Army (excluding departmental or staff officers on consolidated rates of pay) up to and including lieutenant colonels commanding regiments and by Indian Army officers serving in departments (other than those on consolidated pay) and (2) command or additional regimental pay at the following monthly rates —

	Rs	
Commanding officer	400	Command pay
Second in command	150	
Company commander	100	
Adjutant	100	Additional regimental pay
Quartermaster	50	

24 Coupled with this proposal we recommend an exact assimilation of the pay of rank of the British officer of the Indian Army with the consolidated pay of the British service officer

The following table shows the effect of these proposals in respect of infantry officers of the Indian Army —

Officers serving with Indian cavalry draw a higher rate of "staff pay" than officers of the infantry branch The rates are as follows —

	Staff Pay
2nd Lieutenant	150*
Lieutenant	150*
Lieutenant after 7 years' service	150*
Captain	150*
Captain after 9 years service	150* / 250†
Captain after 15 years service	150* / 250†
Major	150* / 250†
Major after 5 years as such	250† / 300‡
Lieutenant Colonel	250† / 300‡
Lieutenant Colonel in command	700§

* As squadron officer † As squadron commander ‡ As second in command § As commanding officer

The adjutant draws Rs. 250 a month and the quartermaster Rs 200 a month, as compared with Rs 200 a month and Rs 150 a month in the infantry

It will be seen that the staff pay of cavalry officers is Rs 50 a month higher than the corresponding rate in the infantry and Rs 100 higher in the case of the commanding officer These higher rates are presumably due to the fact that cavalry officers have to maintain two chargers each (three in the case of the commanding officer) whereas infantry officers have to maintain only one *Incidentally we recommend* that in future the commanding officer of an Indian cavalry regiment should be required to maintain only two chargers instead of three as at present

We have already recommended that Government should relieve all infantry officers of the cost of upkeep of a charger for which a sum of Rs 30 a month is included in their pay, and all cavalry officers of the cost of upkeep of two chargers for which a sum of Rs 60 a month is included in their pay The evidence which we have received shows that the cost of maintaining a charger is not less than Rs 60 a month at the present time We consider therefore that cavalry officers who under our proposals will be relieved of the cost of maintaining two chargers should be treated exactly the same as infantry officers in respect of pay of rank Indian Army allowance, command pay, *and additional regimental pay*

The following comparative table shows the effect of these proposals in typical cases of each rank in the cavalry —

Rank	Present				Proposed				Difference
	Pay of rank	Staff pay	Deduct cost of keeping chargers	Nett emoluments	Pay of rank	Indian Army allowance	Command pay	Total	
	Rs	Rs	Rs	Rs	Rs	Rs	Rs	Rs	
Lieutenant (squadron officer)	475	150	120	505	475	100		575	+ 70
Captain after 9 years service (squadron officer)	750	150	120	780	750	100		850	+ 70
Major (squadron commander)	900	250	120	1 030	950	100	100	1 150	+ 120
Major after 5 years as such (second in command)	950	300	1 0	1 130	1 050	100	150	1 300	+ 170
Lieutenant Colonel (in command)	1 150	00	180	1 6 0	1 250	100	400	1 750	+ 80

25 In the foregoing paragraphs we have shown *inter alia* how it is proposed to effect an assimilation of the pay of rank of the British officer of the Indian Army with the consolidated Indian pay of the British service officer *There will however be in the future a certain number of Indian officers serving in* the Indian Army and holding the King's commission, and it is necessary to consider what difference if any should be made in their pay as compared with that of British officers

26. The Secretary of State has laid down the principle that the pay of European officers of the civil departments in India should include an item to be called "overseas or expatriation allowance," which will be drawn by Europeans only whilst serving in India, and by Indians only when serving outside India. This allowance ranges, in the revised scales of pay of the Indian Civil Service, from Rs. 150 to Rs. 250 a month, and in those of the Indian (Imperial) Police Service from Rs. 125 to Rs. 250 a month. The periods on the various rates of overseas allowance are shown in the following table:—

Indian Civil Service.	Rs.	Police.	Rs.
7 years	150	6 years	125
4 years	200	4 years	150
Thereafter	250	3 years	200
		Thereafter	250

In both services there are appointments above the time-scale, which are filled by selection, and the holders of which draw the same rates of pay, whether Europeans or Indians.

27. It appears impossible to resist the view that a similar principle should be applied in the case of the Indian Army, that is to say, that Indian officers with King's commissions should receive rather less emoluments in India than the British officer. At the same time, it is undesirable to make any great reduction in the emoluments of Indian officers, in view of the fact that they will have to live in the same style as the British officers, pay the same mess subscriptions, and conform generally to the same standard in respect of entertaining, sports, games, social obligations, &c. To this extent their standard of obligatory expenditure is perhaps more definitely fixed than is the case with Indian officers of other services, such as the Indian Civil Service and the Police, who can regulate their style of living, within certain limits, to suit their own tastes and pockets.

28. For these reasons we recommend that the overseas allowance of British officers of the Indian Army, which will not be drawn by Indian officers with King's commissions, should be at lower rates than in the case of either the Indian Civil Service or the Police service, and we suggest the following:—

2nd Lieutenant	Rs. 100 a month.
Lieutenant	Rs. 100 a month.
Captain	Rs. 100 a month.
Major...	Rs. 150 a month.
Lieut.-Colonel	.. 200 ,, ,,

In staff appointments and commands, the pay of which is consolidated, Indian officers will draw the full pay equally with British officers. In departments in which the emoluments are regulated by Indian Army pay of rank *plus* departmental pay, Indian officers will draw the pay of rank admissible to them while in regimental employment, that is, without the overseas allowance, and departmental pay in addition. Indian officers will also draw the Indian Army allowance under the same conditions as British officers.

29. We also recommend that the Indian pay of British service officers should be expressed in similar terms, so as to indicate what portion of the excess of their Indian pay over the sum of their pay and allowances at home represents overseas or expatriation allowance. The balance of this excess represents roughly the estimated difference in the cost of living in India as compared with that at home, taking into account the various allowances admissible at home but not drawn in India.

30. The following table shows the pay of rank and overseas allowance admissible under this proposal to officers of various ranks, in both the British service and the Indian Army. It omits Indian Army allowance, command pay, and additional regimental pay, which will be admissible to British officers and Indian officers with King's commissions alike, as shown in the table in paragraph 24:—

	Pay of rank.	Overseas Allowance.	Total.
2nd Lieutenant...	325	100	425
2nd Lieutenant after 2 years' service Lieutenant	375	100	475
Lieutenant after 7 years' service ...	450	100	550
Captain ... ... Captain after 9 years' service ...	650	100	750
Captain after 15 years' service ...	750	100	850
Major...	800	150	950
Major after 5 years' service as such...	900	150	1,050
Lieut.-Colonel	1,050	200	1,250

31 We recommend that British officers of the *Indian Army*, serving temporarily with Indian troops outside India should continue to draw the overseas allowance which should of course be admissible in all cases to Indian officers with King's commissions when serving outside India

Effect of the Foregoing Proposals

32 It will be observed that the first effect of the *foregoing* proposals will be to increase the emoluments of five officers in each regiment holding the appointment of company or squadron commander or second in command by Rs 100 a *month (or in* some cases by Rs 50 a month) and the emoluments of captains of less than nine years service (a rapidly disappearing class, by Rs 50 a month We think that there are good grounds for recommending such increase, since the present scale is open to the criticism that it does not provide for a sufficient periodic rise during the years between attaining nine years service and promotion to lieutenant colonel For instance, a captain of nine years' service who is also *company commander, draws Rs 950 a* month and receives no increase till he is promoted major at eighteen years service when he gets Rs 1 100 He then waits five years for a further rise of Rs 50 a *month For purposes of comparison* the following extract from the table showing the revised rates of the Imperial Police service is instructive —

Indian Army	Police	Rs
	After 9 years	800
	10	850
	11	900
	12	950
Captain after nine years service and company commander Rs 950	13	1 000
	14	1 050
	15	1 100
	16	1 150
	17	1 200
	18	1 250
	19	1 250
	20	1 300
Major and company *commander* Rs 1 100	21	1 300
	22	1 350
	23	1 350

It will be seen that while a captain of nine years service and company commander may remain for ten years on Rs 950 a month, and on promotion to major will draw Rs 1,100 a month for the next five years the police officer will rise during the same period from Rs 800 to Rs 1 350 by annual increments of Rs 50 up to Rs 1 250 and then biennial increments of the same amount

We consider that the relative advantage of the Police service during the above mentioned years affords a strong ground for supporting the slight increase in the emoluments of the British officers of the Indian Army which we have proposed in paragraph 24

33 *Our proposals will however, have other consequences which require* careful examination

In the first place it will affect the total emoluments of officers both of the British service and of the Indian Army holding staff appointments in India. At present, under paragraph 14 Army Regulations India Volume I a British service officer holding a staff appointment in India draws the Indian Army pay of his rank *plus* the staff pay of the appointment as laid down in paragraph 1 Army Regulations, India Volume I As Indian Army pay of rank is in some cases lower than the British service rate of Indian pay this method of calculation involves certain inconveniences The result however, of adopting the proposal to level up Indian Army pay of rank to the British service scale of pay of the corresponding rank would be to increase the total emoluments in each case (British service and Indian Army) of the officer holding the staff appointment. For example we take the case of a lieutenant colonel appointed to be general staff officer, 1st grade (staff pay Rs 700)

He now draws Indian Army pay of rank = Rs 1 150 *plus* Rs 700 staff pay = Rs 1,850 If the Indian Army pay of rank were assimilated as we propose to the scale of Indian pay of the British service, a general staff officer 1st grade would receive, if a British service officer, Rs 1,250 *plus* Rs 700 = Rs. 1,950 and if an Indian Army

officer, Rs. 1,250 *plus* Rs. 100 Indian Army allowance *plus* Rs. 700 staff pay = Rs. 2,050. Therefore there would be an increase in emoluments of Rs. 100 in one case and Rs. 200 in the other case, for which there appears to be no justification; and the rates of pay would be different for the two services, which is undesirable.

34. For these reasons, we propose that the pay of staff appointments should be consolidated, at the following monthly rates:—

		Rs.
Present rate of staff pay Rs. 700.	General Staff Officer, 1st grade ... Assistant Adjutant General ... Assistant Quartermaster-General ... Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General	1,850
Present rate of staff pay Rs. 400.	General Staff Officer, 2nd grade ... Deputy Assistant Adjutant General Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General	1,350
,, ,, ,, ,, ,,	Brigade Major	1,200
Present rate of staff pay Rs. 250.	General Staff Officer, 3rd grade ... Staff Captain	1,000

These consolidated rates are, with one exception, the same as those which a lieutenant-colonel, a major after five years as such, and a captain of nine years' service or over would draw respectively under the present system, and are, in our opinion, adequate. A brigade-major at present draws Indian Army pay of rank, *plus* Rs. 400 staff pay. We recommend that, in accordance with the home practice, a brigade-major should receive rather lower emoluments than a general staff officer, 2nd grade, and we propose a consolidated pay of Rs. 1,200 a month.

35. The next point to be examined is the effect which our proposals will have on the emoluments of Indian Army officers, serving in departments, whose pay is governed by Indian Army pay of rank, *plus* departmental staff pay. The departments affected are:—

Cantonment Magistrate's Department.
Judge Advocate General's Department.
Remount Department.
Supply and Transport Corps.

The rates of departmental staff pay admissible in addition to Indian Army pay of rates are laid down in Army Regulations, India, Volume I, paragraph I (*a*), (*d*), (*g*) and (*h*).

As we do not recommend an increase in the total emoluments of departmental officers, it will be necessary to reduce the rate of departmental staff pay, with reference to the facts that every officer in the Indian Army will, in future, draw Rs. 100 a month as Indian Army allowance, and that the pay of rank has in several cases been increased. We consider that departmental staff pay should in future be termed "departmental pay," if indeed it is not found possible hereafter to consolidate the rates of pay in these departments.

36. Next, the question of the effect of the foregoing proposals on the leave pay of officers requires consideration.

We have examined this question and find that in no single case will the leave allowances, out of India, of an officer of the British service or of the Indian Army be affected, except that those officers of the Indian Army whose emoluments we propose to raise (*vide* paragraph 24 *ante*) will of course benefit to that extent while on privilege leave.

37. There remains for consideration the case of the officer who acts for another officer, whether in staff or regimental employ, absent on leave.*

A.—Indian Army.

During the privilege leave portion, the officiating officer draws no extra pay. During the furlough portion he draws his Indian Army pay of rank, *plus* half the staff pay of his own appointment *plus* half the staff pay of the officiating appointment.

* Throughout this section we employ the term "furlough" to cover all forms of leave other than casual and privilege leave.

We recommend that this rule be altered and that the officiating officer should draw, during the furlough portion of the absentee's leave the full consolidated pay of the officiating appointment and that the full command pay of his own regimental [illegible] lable for the officer acting for him and so on all down the [illegible] The same principle should govern all kinds of command pay, that is the officer acting for an officer holding a higher regimental appointment should draw the full command pay of the latter's appointment

An examination of this question shows that our proposal would not add appreciably to [illegible] that the higher cost will be chiefly due to the inc[illegible] rtain classes of officers not to the effect of gra[illegible] officer absent on furlough the full consolidated or command pay of the appointment

B.—British Army

The extra cost to Government would be somewhat greater in the case of a British service officer officiating in a staff appointment the pay of which we propose to consolidate The following instances illustrate this point —

—	Present [Indian Army pay of rank *plus* half staff pay of officiating appointment]	Proposed
	Rs	Rs
Lieutenant Colonel acting for a G S O 1st grade	1 150 + 70[illegible] = 1 [illegible]0	1 [illegible]00
Major after 5 years acting for a G S O 2nd grade	95[illegible] + 400 = 1 150	1 300
Major acting for a Brigade Major	900 + 400 = 1 100	1 [illegible]00
Captain after 15 years service acting for a Brigade Major	[illegible]50 + 40[illegible] = [illegible]5[illegible]	1 [illegible]0
Captain of 9 years service acting for a G S O 3rd grade	[illegible]50 + [illegible] = [illegible]	1 00

38 The examination of these matters has however led us to investigate the necessity for granting furlough to an officer holding any of the above staff appointments during his tenure of them We have come to the conclusion that there is no reason why an officer in a staff appointment should subject to the exception noted below be allowed to absent himself on furlough while holding the appointment If he requires leave in excess of the privilege leave admissible to him we consider that he should vacate the staff appointment and revert to the scale of furlough allowances admissible under the rules governing his case

The exception referred to is that staff officers should we consider be permitted once during their tenure of the appointment to take two months privilege leave combined with one month's furlough the latter on the allowances admissible to officers of their rank

The increased cost to Government of the acting arrangements consequent on the absence on furlough of the permanent incumbent of a staff appointment would therefore be negligible

39 There are however, other officers of higher rank whose claims to combined leave are governed by Army Regulations, India Volume I paragraph 344 and Volume II paragraph 256 Typical examples are army, divisional and brigade commanders and all officers holding major general's appointments

There is a good deal to be said for the view that officers of and above the rank of major general, and brigade commanders of lower rank should not be altogether precluded from taking furlough during their tenure of command or staff appointments since they are men of considerable seniority who may require a period of rest and recuperation and change of climate We therefore recommend that they should be permitted to take furlough once during their tenure of a command or staff appointment but not at the end thereof that it should be permissible to combine privilege leave with this furlough, but that the total period of absence on furlough or combined leave

should not exceed eight months. If an officer holding one of these appointments finds it necessary to take leave for more than eight months at a time he should vacate his appointment.

The existing rule (paragraph 344, Army Regulations, India, Volume I), which regulates the allowances of such officers while on furlough, is inoperative under the revised scales of pay. In every case it gives a rate of allowance in excess of the maximum admissible (£1,000 a year). We recommend that a furlough rate of allowance out of India be fixed for the officers under consideration.

We also recommend that, as in the case of other staff appointments, the officer appointed to officiate for the absentee should draw, during the furlough portion of the latter's leave, the full pay of the appointment.

40. Finally, we recommend that all officers of the Indian Army below the rank of major-general should draw, while on furlough out of India, the British pay and allowances admissible to officers of the British service of corresponding rank while on furlough out of India. We see no reason why these rates should not be made applicable to officers of the Indian Army also, thus removing one more existing anomaly.

41. Our attention has been called to the rule in paragraph 358, Army Regulations, India, Volume I, which dates back to 1886, and which permits the grant to officers of the Indian Army of leave in India for one year at a time, extensible to two years, on full military pay and half staff pay of appointment. We do not consider it necessary to grant furlough in India in excess of six months (which might be combined with privilege leave to the amount due, but subject to a maximum limit of 8 months' absence); and we recommend that during such furlough officers should draw Indian Army pay of rank *plus* Indian Army allowance, but not half the staff pay of the appointment.

42. We recommend that in future leave be of three kinds only—

(1) Casual leave (or station leave).
(2) Privilege leave.
(3) Furlough, which may be granted either on private affairs or on medical certificate.

We also recommend that the right to accumulate privilege leave up to ninety days be abolished, and that such leave be limited to two months a year (instead of sixty days as at present); except that when an officer in regimental employ has been refused privilege leave on public grounds for two consecutive years, he may be granted three months' privilege leave in the third year, the grant of such leave being at the discretion of the divisional commander.

Summary.

43. The various recommendations made in this section are summarised below:—

(*a*) That the present system of fixing the pay of officers of the army in India in rupees be continued.

(*b*) That the pay of rank of officers of the Indian Army be assimilated in all cases to the consolidated pay of British service officers in India of corresponding rank and length of service.

(*c*) That all officers of the Indian Army be given, in addition to pay of rank, an Indian Army allowance of Rs. 100 a month, except when serving as departmental or staff officers on consolidated rates of pay.

(*d*) That all regimental officers of the Indian Army, both in the cavalry and in the infantry, should draw in addition "command pay" or "additional regimental pay" at the rates shown in paragraph 23.

(*e*). That the present "staff pay" of the Indian Army be abolished.

(*f*) That the consolidated pay of British service officers in India, and the pay of rank of British officers of the Indian Army, should be considered to include an element of "overseas or expatriation allowance," at the rates proposed in paragraph 28. This allowance to be drawn by all British officers while serving in India, and by Indian officers with the King's commission while serving out of India; and by British officers of the Indian Army serving temporarily with Indian troops or formations outside India (*e.g.*, in Mesopotamia or Palestine).

(*g*) That the pay of staff appointments be consolidated, and fixed at the rates proposed in paragraph 34.

(*h*) That the present rates of "departmental staff pay" be revised, with reference to the proposed increase in the pay of rank of certain officers of the Indian Army and

the proposed grant of Indian Army allowance, so as not to entail higher emoluments than are drawn by such officers at present

(i) That "departmental staff pay" be termed in future "departmental pay," but that the question of consolidating the pay of departmental officers be considered

(j) That the present rules governing the pay of officers officiating in furlough vacancies be rescinded and that in future the officiating officer should draw, during the furlough portion of the absentee's leave the full consolidated pay of the officiating appointment, or the full command pay of [illegible] the case may be, and so on all down the chain of offic[illegible]ee officer to be restricted, during the same period to [illegible] under rule

(k) That officers holding staff appointments should be ineligible for furlough during the tenure of their appointments subject to the exception stated in paragraph 38

(l) That certain officers of high rank should however be permitted to take furlough or combined privilege leave and furlough, not exceeding eight months once during (but not at the end of) their tenure of their commands or staff appointments

(m) That a rate of furlough allowance be fixed for the officers mentioned in clause (l)

(n) That all officers of the Indian Army, below the rank of major general should draw while on furlough out of India the British pay and allowances admissible to officers of the British service of corresponding rank while on furlough out of India

(o) That officers of the Indian Army be restricted to furlough in India not exceeding six months (which might be combined with privilege leave up to a total maximum of eight months) and that these officers draw during such furlough their Indian Army pay of rank *plus* Indian Army allowance

(p) That leave in future be of three kinds only —

(1) Casual (or station) leave
(2) Privilege leave
(3) Furlough either on private affairs or on medical certificate

(q) That subject to the exception stated in paragraph 42, privilege leave be limited to two months a year

44 We think that the proposals which we have outlined have the following advantages —

(1) The assimilation of the British service Indian pay with the pay of rank of the British officer of the Indian Army will result in closer relationship between the two services and will remove certain existing anomalies

(2) The slight increases in the total emoluments of certain officers of the Indian Army are desirable having regard to the slow rate of augmentation between ten years and twenty four years of service and to the very slight advantage which the Indian Army officer has under the new scales of pay over the British service officer

(3) The separation of the present staff pay of the Indian Army officer into the two elements of Indian Army allowance and command pay is in accordance with the object for which this additional pay is given and will remove the confusion resulting from the two being merged together as at present

(4) The introduction of the element of expatriation allowance into the Indian pay of British service officers and into the pay of rank of British officers of the Indian Army is necessary in view of the principle applied to other services and also affords a simple method of regulating the pay of Indian officers with King's commissions

(5) The proposal to grant to an officer, acting in a staff appointment in place of an officer on furlough the full consolidated pay of that appointment, and to a regimental officer acting as a commanding officer company commander or second in command, the full command pay of the appointment, will tend to a simplification in the calculation of pay admissible and will do away with the present cumbrous rule under which an officer draws *half* the staff pay of his substantive and officiating appointments

(6) The proposal to make furlough inadmissible (with one slight exception) during the tenure of staff appointments up to and including those of general staff officer, first grade and analogous appointments, is a corollary to the above, and will lead to a simplification of the leave rules

(7) The proposal to regulate the leave allowances of British officers of the Indian Army in the same way as those of officers of the British service will also lead to simplification of rules and reduction of clerical and accounts work, and will be a further step towards the establishment of closer relations between the two armies.

SECTION III.

British Troops.

We turn now to the question of improving the conditions of service of British troops.

Troopship Accommodation.

45. We would bring to notice the conspicuous difference that exists even nowadays between the accommodation on board troopships for officers and their families and for the non-commissioned ranks and their families. Troop decks are often below water line, crowded, and ill-ventilated. Meals are served in an uninviting way. Family quarters are cramped and afford little privacy. Latrine, lavatory and bath accommodation, especially for families, is often insufficient, and deck space for exercise is inadequate.

This sharp contrast with the comfort of the officers' accommodation is not in accordance with the spirit of the times, and is undesirable at such close quarters as obtain on a ship. War conditions have no doubt been responsible for much of the discomfort described above; but we consider that, when regular trooping arrangements can once more be made, it will be well to take steps to place the accommodation and comfort of the non-commissioned ranks on board ship on a considerably higher level.

Accommodation in Barracks.

46. We have visited the lines of British troops in several parts of India, and have made enquiries from a considerable number of witnesses as to the conditions under which British soldiers and their wives and families serve and live in India. As a result we express the opinion that, generally speaking, the standard of accommodation for single men is not as good as in England; and that the institutions for their general welfare and recreation are by no means so good as to compensate for the discomforts of life in barracks in India. Married soldiers and their families are worse off than in England in respect of comfort, as well as in pecuniary matters.

47. We make the following recommendations as regards barracks :—

(i) That it should be recognised that the British soldier in India must, especially in summer, spend a large portion of each day in his barracks, and that therefore the barracks cannot be regarded solely as dormitories. A portion of each barrack (or group of barracks close together) should be set apart and furnished as a reading and writing room, well lighted, and furnished with fans for the hot weather. At present a man can neither read nor write after dark anywhere in most barracks, and there is no inducement for him to stay there. We consider that in India, where the British soldier is cut off from the ordinary amenities of civil life, it is the duty of the Government which he serves to see that his immediate surroundings in and around barracks shall be on at least as high a level of comfort and efficiency as in England; and more, that the matter is, in our opinion, one which cannot be postponed without the risk of undesirable consequences.

(ii) The washing and bathing facilities in India are (as a rule) markedly inferior to those in England, and this is the more to be deplored in a country where good arrangements for such matters are an absolute necessity. The bathing arrangements as they existed in the British cavalry lines at Risalpur when first occupied appear to be exactly what is wanted.

Married Quarters.

48. In no cases seen by us do married quarters come up to the home standard; in most cases they fall much behind.

The number of rooms is inadequate, as a rule, even for a married couple without children. The bathroom accommodation is too small, and no storerooms or cupboards are provided. Quarters are often dark and gloomy. The kitchens which we have seen are either so far from the quarters that they cannot be used, or so small that the two families (for whom they are often meant) cannot cook in them at the same time.

The scale of furniture provided is far below the scale allowed in England As a result, married men either have to hire inferior furniture at exorbitant rates from local shops which they can ill afford to do or see their wives and children living in conditions not differing much except in the matter of fresh air from slum lodgings in London

Families in India do not draw rations and the allowance for a soldier's wife is Rs 8 (16s) a month with Rs 2 8 (5s) for each child

We strongly recommend that kitchens should be improved that wives and families of soldiers in India should receive free rations on a suitable scale, and that the planning and furnishing of married quarters should be brought up to a standard approaching as nearly as possible to that which obtains at home

Regimental Institutes.

49 The state of regimental *institutes in India is far from satisfactory The Army* Institute Fund has no money at present because the territorial units which garrisoned the country during the war would not subscribe to it The consequence is that the *furniture is decayed and inadequate and funds are not forthcoming* to meet the large capital expenditure that would be necessary to put matters on a satisfactory footing The institutes are often gloomy and unattractive the lighting allowance being inadequate The library allowance of Rs 176 a year is not sufficient to do much more than keep existing books in repair

There appears to be a consensus of opinion that the Royal Army Temperance Association is no longer necessary for the class of men who now fill the ranks of the British Army and that the space it takes up in barracks could be more usefully employed

At the same time the young soldiers of the present day are very dependent upon outside amusements and recreation It seems to be agreed that the kind of institution that appeals to them is something of the type of a Gymkhana Club having facilities for outdoor games attached to it and with a cinema theatre and dancing room as part of its internal attractions We venture to suggest that opportunity should be taken to apply to the army in India the system introduced at Aldershot to which His Majesty the King referred in the Royal Message to Lord Rawlinson on the 25th May 1920 His Majesty wrote —

> *I have been struck by the advance made in providing for the recreation* and amusement of the troops The Queen and I were especially pleased to find that steps are being taken to include the married families in these schemes The provision of clubs for the married woman and play grounds for the children is a new and admirable development

We recommend that there *should be a room for sergeants* and that a part of the club or perhaps a room in the regimental institute should be set apart for the married families It is very important that such an institution should be as central as possible *and entirely undenominational that there should be no religious meetings or* services in connection with it also that with proper safeguard it should be managed by soldiers for soldiers

General Remarks

50 We have had the advantage of seeing the proceedings of a committee held under the presidency of Major General J M Walter *in October 1919* to consider matters such as those referred to above and wish to record our complete agreement with the recommendations made therein

We consider however, that, while it is clearly the duty of Government to see that the soldiers and their families are comfortably housed properly fed and have in their own lines and quarters such means of recreation and employment (apart from work) as will assist them to get through the long Indian day, the provision of such elaborate and initially expensive institutions as *garrison clubs is more perhaps* than it can be called upon to undertake We suggest that the Government of India should make a loan sufficient to meet the initial expense of starting these institutions on a satisfactory footing and we urge that this be given It would then be the business of the local authorities with the aid of an Indian Canteen Board to keep them in good order

We should like to mention here that everyone with whom we have conversed on these subjects has represented that obligatory church parade service is a fruitful source of discontent This result may be due in some measure to the fact that the

chaplains who minister to the troops are not always selected with reference to their special qualifications for this duty, a matter which we deal with in Section IV of Part VIII of this Report. The general view, however, is that attendance at church should be voluntary.

We wish, in conclusion, to point out that the outlook of the present-day soldiers upon life is widely different from that of their predecessors of the old army. They have neither their deep-seated discipline nor their long-suffering patience. They and their wives look for a higher standard of comfort and a somewhat different class of recreation. Their reasonable aspirations must be met, and their idiosyncrasies must be sympathetically studied, if they are to be a contented army while serving in India.

SECTION IV.

Indian Officers.

General Remarks.

51. In common with others, Indian officers are feeling the effect of high prices. A large number have served in France and have paid visits to England, and in consequence their ideas of comfort have risen considerably. They also realise that, whatever may be the case as regards their sons, about whose education we make recommendations later in this Section, they themselves, as a class, can never rise higher in rank than risaldar major or subadar major. Their disabilities are due to the want of the education which is now one of the essentials of good leadership. Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that these men have displayed a devotion to duty which is beyond praise, and that it is largely due to them that the discipline and loyalty of the rank and file of the Indian Army have survived the test of the great war.

Pay.

52. We therefore make in Appendix I (Item 1)* recommendations as to an improvement in their pay, which we consider should meet the case, and should reassure them as to the value that is put upon their services by the State. We consider that the increases in pay should be incremental, should be granted at the discretion of commanding officers of units, and should be dependent upon efficiency.

We recommend that the rank of risaidar in the cavalry should be abolished, and that all risaldars should be on the same scale of pay.

Additional Regimental Pay.

53. We are of opinion that the extra duty pay now drawn by the Indian adjutant and Indian quartermaster of a unit, viz., Rs. 17.8 a month, is quite inadequate. They are the two hardest-worked Indian officers of their unit, and their responsibilities are heavy. They are usually the best educated and the smartest of the younger Indian officers, and therefore the two appointments should be better paid than they are now. We make a specific recommendation in Appendix I (Item 2),* which also includes the case of certain Indian non-commissioned officers.

Pensions.

54. As regards pensions of Indian officers, we understand that the Government of India are about to submit for the Secretary of State's approval an increased scale, based upon the rule in Article 474, Civil Service Regulations, as modified by Government of India Finance Department Resolution No. 1085 E.A., dated 15th November, 1919. We agree with the principle that the pension of Indian officers should follow the lines of the Civil Service Regulations, and be calculated on a proportion of the pay drawn previous to retirement.

The Government of India are also recommending an increase to the special invalid pension for Indian officers after 15 years' service. We concur.

Outfit Allowance.

55. It has been generally represented to us that an Indian non-commissioned officer, on promotion to jemadar, has to incur expenses for outfit which are estimated at about Rs. 250 and Rs. 400 in infantry and cavalry respectively, while the present pay is Rs. 60 and Rs. 70 a month respectively. This often results in indebtedness for years.

* Not printed.

We consider that sword, belt and tent should be a free issue and kept on regimental charge, but that an Indian officer should be permitted to keep his sword and belt, without payment on honourable retirement The first issue of uniform on promotion from the ranks should b free, and the uniform should be the property of the officer

Badges of Rank

56 We may mention here that the method of wearing badges of rank requires settlement At present it is impossible to say whether an Indian officer (*a*) has the King s commission and is therefore entitled to salutes from British as well as Indian soldiers or (*b*) is an Indian company officer, and therefore entitled to salutes only from Indian soldiers

We suggest that Indian officers with the King s commission should wear badges of rank exactly as worn by British officers, and that all others should wear them elsewhere

Soldier Servants

57 The Indian officer is not allowed a soldier servant by regulation We think that this should be permitted and regularised

Status and Allowances when Travelling

58 We think that the status and allowances of an Indian officer travelling by rail on duty require more consideration than they have received in the past and we make specific recommendations on the subject in Appendix I (Item 3)

Educational Facilities for Sons of Indian Officers

59 Our investigations have left us in no doubt that the education of their sons is a matter which is greatly troubling the minds of all Indian officers to day They see the sons of wealthy zemindars and others reaping the advantages of an education which costs more than they can afford, and which enables the former to go up for Sandhurst and a King s commission, or to compete for the many good civil appointments now open to Indians They represent with much force that, as Indians are now admitted to positions in the army which were not open to themselves they have a right to expect that Government will not overlook their services, and will make it possible for their sons to enter where the doors are shut to them We believe that it will be much to the benefit of their country if the sons of these brave and loyal gentlemen are given opportunities to fit themselves to compete on something approaching equal terms with the sons of the more wealthy classes

60 We therefore welcome the scheme for the establishment of the Kitchener College, which seems likely to meet the need We note with satisfaction that the sons of deceased or living Indian officers are to head the nomination list for the College and that the special terms offered to this class are such as to be within the means of all Indian officers

We hope that the College, in addition to being eventually the main channel for direct commissions to jemadar, will also be capable of educating up to the standard required for entry to Sandhurst as otherwise the earnest desire of the risaldars or subadars to see a road by which their sons can climb higher than their fathers will be doomed to disappointment If these efforts prove successful the proposed college will some day be found to be insufficient It will then be necessary either to increase its capacity or to found similar colleges at other centres Later in this part of our Report we deal with education as conducted in regimental schools If these schools are to provide primary education of a character to lead up to an institution such as the proposed college, and so possibly to Sandhurst a further argument is provided for putting them on to a sound basis

Our Indian colleagues have raised the question of the institution of an Indian Sandhurst, but they agree with us that the time is not yet ripe for the consideration of such a scheme

Family Pensions

61 We have given the subject of family pensions prolonged consideration, Indian officers have represented to us that the present pensions are not sufficient to enable the family of a deceased Indian officer to live nowadays in even tolerable comfort or to keep up anything like the position that it held during the officer s lifetime In the case of the non commissioned officer and sepoy, they assert that it is not

even sufficient to keep the widow from the borders of starvation. They all lay emphasis on the duty of Government in respect of the sons and daughters of men who have lost their lives in its service. On the other hand, we recognise the force of the argument that the pension is not, as in England, a pension to the widow, but is, as its name expresses, a contribution to the family generally by way of compensation for the loss of one of its breadwinners; and that any attempt to place it on the basis of a widow's pension, as known in England, fails to recognise the connection of the Indian family with the land, and its corporate organisation and system of mutual support. In reply, it may be argued that the recent flood of casualties from war and disease has swept away these props, and has, at all events in the Punjab, produced so many widows and orphans that old customs have failed to prevent a large number from coming perilously near to great poverty, and sometimes to actual hunger. The veil which hides Indian family life from outside intrusion is a bar to that perfect knowledge which should precede decision; but we feel strongly that any Government which sends a married soldier of any race to a war in which he loses his life should be actually responsible for providing a pension sufficient to keep his widow and children from want, and should not make its contribution dependent upon the intricacies of a family system into which it cannot penetrate.

As regards the Indian officer's family pension, we recommend that there should be only one rate, viz., the higher; for we can see no good reason for a variation in pensions, whether the officer (or soldier) died of disease contracted on service, or attributable to the effects of service, or was killed in action.

We also recommend a small pension for each child of the deceased officer till a boy is 18 years of age, and in the case of a girl till she marries.

We make a specific recommendation in Appendix I (Item 4).*

Our recommendations as to the family pensions of other ranks will be found in the next Section.

House Accommodation, &c.

62. It has been represented to us by several Indian officers that they are not consulted when standard plans for regimental lines are evolved or altered. We have no doubt that their predecessors were consulted when these plans were originally drawn up, but we agree that Indian officers should be kept in touch with any proposed improvements, and consulted as to local variations. We think that this might be done, as regards the men's lines as well as the Indian officers' houses, by means of a standing station committee of Indian officers, to be presided over by a staff officer in each cantonment. We recommend that lighting in all Indian officers' houses should be free, on an approved scale, and that the necessary furniture should be supplied free, and kept on Government charge. Where there is a piped water supply, it should be extended to Indian officers' houses. We have inspected the room allowed in the latest pattern of Indian lines as a meeting place for Indian officers, and we found it suitable. We recommend the addition to it of a kitchen, to enable Indian officers to dine together, or to extend hospitality to their friends. We desire to draw attention to a plan for an Indian officer's house, prepared by our colleague, Major Sir Umar Hayat Khan, and reproduced in Appendix II.*

Rewards for Languages.

63. We consider that it will be to the advantage of the army for Indian officers to be encouraged to learn English; and several have expressed the opinion that they should be treated in this matter somewhat on the same lines as British officers who learn oriental languages. We agree, and make specific recommendations as to rewards for passing examinations in English in Appendix I (Item 5).* In view of the large proportion of the Indian Army which is now, and will be for some time to come, serving overseas, it is for consideration by the Government of India whether this system of language rewards for Indian officers might not be profitably extended to other languages than English.

Indian Officers to be represented on Committees.

64. It seems to us desirable that Indian officers should be represented on committees which deal with administrative matters affecting them and other Indian ranks.

We have already recommended their serving on barrack committees. We consider that they also should be nominated to cantonment committees and to station hospital committees.

* Not printed.

Status of Pensioned Indian Officers

65 We have been impressed by the fact that every Indian officer who has appeared before us has expressed his opinion that the status of the *pensioned Indian* officer in his native district is no longer what it was, and that he now *often* meets with discourtesy from subordinate civil officials who are natives of his own country. Several officers have stated that, while British officials are too hard worked to give much time *to their requests their affairs and those of their men receive* but scant attention from subordinates.

In these days, when the Indian Army is taking a far larger share than hitherto in overseas military duty on behalf of the Empire, it is all the more necessary that the affairs of absent soldiers should be promptly and sympathetically dealt with. They should also be treated with courtesy in their own districts.

66 With these objects in view, we make the following recommendations —

(i) That in districts with a considerable military population the lists of registrars, honorary magistrates and honorary civil judges should include a liberal proportion of retired Indian military officers.

(ii) That in such districts if nomination to district boards obtains a pensioned military officer should be nominated to each board.

(iii) That the relative position of Indian military officers in civil or mixed durbars should be enhanced and regulated.

(iv) It is understood that, in the Punjab a military officer has been nominated to the Provincial Legislative Council to represent the army. It is suggested that this principle might be adopted in other Provinces which have an adequate military connection.

(v) We have made enquiries as to the vitality of the branches of the Indian Soldiers Board and their activities in rural districts. We are doubtful whether these branches generally are yet doing the good work which was expected of them. We consider that this board and its branches if the latter function properly, should do much to remove the feeling of Indian officers and soldiers that their interests are not well cared for by the civil authorities of their districts, both when they are absent on duty and after they retire.

67 We understand that it is proposed to reorganise the whole of the Indian Army on what will be, as far as practicable, a territorial basis. Under this scheme, units will be grouped much in the same manner as at home. The training or depot organization of each group will be permanently located in the territorial area from which the classes composing it are, in the main recruited. Should this scheme materialize these depot organizations, working in close co-operation with the local branches of the Indian *Soldiers Board, should be able materially to further the object which we have in view.*

Order of British India

68 *We conclude* this section by remarking that it seems to us that the close of the great war is a suitable time to increase the establishment of the Order of British India, to which it is the ambition of every Indian officer to belong. We recommend that this should be done, either by increasing the numbers in its two present classes or by creating a third class of the Order.

SECTION V

Indian Other Ranks

Pay

69 All witnesses belonging to the Indian Army, *British and Indian* whom we have seen urge that the pay of the Indian non-commissioned officers and men should be raised. The pay of the sepoy on enlistment is Rs 11 a month and has been at this rate since 1911. In addition to this sum he gets at present Rs 4 a month war bonus, making a total of Rs 15 a month. We understand that when serving overseas or on service on the *frontier* he draws in addition a field *batta* of Rs 5 a month, making a total of Rs 20. Before the war he got free rations only on service, but now receives them always.

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70. The Rs. 4 bonus is a temporary war allowance, specially extended beyond the period of the war. It may be taken to represent the increase in prices, or the fall in purchasing power, of the sepoy's basic rate of pay. It was given in April 1918, and so has been drawn for two years. We recommend that it be made permanent, and that it be incorporated in the pay of the sepoy. It remains to be considered whether any further increase is necessary. It is to be remembered that prior to 1917, while the sepoy's pay was Rs. 11, Rs. 3.8 of this sum was reckoned to be the cost of his food; and that to prevent his having to spend more than that sum on his food he received compensation (in cash) when the cost of the staple articles of his diet rose above Rs. 3.8. Thus Rs. 7.8 represented his actual nett pay in cash. On the universal grant of free rations the sepoy retained the Rs. 3.8, so that his pay in cash (with the Rs. 4 war bonus) became exactly double what it was in 1914. The value of the ration, at present prices, adds another sum of about Rs. 14 a month to the total cost to the State, making in all a minimum sum of Rs. 29 a month.

71. The Indian soldier has seen the world during the last six years in a way he never has before. His ideas of comfort have risen, and he has acquired certain tastes to which he was previously a stranger. He is well aware of what has been done for the British soldier in the way of amelioration of conditions of life and pay since the war began, and he is now apt to compare his own pay with that of his British comrades.

72. We have not found that recruiting generally is languishing, except as regards one or two classes, though it is doubtful whether the physique and social status of the men joining now are what they were before the war. But we have to reckon with the fact that Indians, especially Sikhs, are taking to work as mechanics in large numbers. Pay far beyond that which the army can offer is obtainable now by Indians with even a small knowledge of machinery. There are many well-paid openings in the Far East of which they are taking advantage; while India has before her a period of industrial and agricultural development which will attract many thousands of young men of the martial classes.

73. Our enquiries have made us aware that there was a general expectation that the end of the war would be made the occasion of a definite rise in actual pay over and above the war bonus, the inclusion of which in pay had been somewhat discounted. This expectation was, we think, a natural one, and should not be left out of consideration.

Times are changing rapidly in India, as elsewhere. At such a juncture it is well to have a contented army.

74. We regard this question as one of the most difficult with which we have to deal. We have indicated briefly some aspects of the problem. It is, however, of such importance that it is desirable to state briefly the principal considerations which we think may be urged against the grant of increased pay to Indian other ranks.

75. The arguments which may be used to show that no further increase is necessary are as follows:—

(a) That, with the addition of the war-bonus of Rs. 4 a month, which we recommend should form a permanent addition to pay, the sepoy will receive in cash just double the nett pay which he drew up to 1916, and that this is sufficient.

(b) That it would be unwise to grant a permanent increase of pay in order to meet a possibly transient increase in the cost of living.

(c) That in any case the serving sepoy is not himself much affected by a rise in prices, since he is fed and to a large extent clothed by the State; and that as regards his dependents, it has never been contemplated that the pay of a youth of 18 or 19 to 24 or 25 should suffice for the entire maintenance of a wife and family, who in practice usually rely for support largely upon their share in an agricultural holding, cultivated by other members of the family. It is not the case, again, that all sepoys are married; and it is probable that the proportion of unmarried sepoys will be higher in the future.

(d) That recrui[illegible] has not shown signs of falling off, in spite of the abno[illegible] d[illegible]e war. It must also be remembered that the [illegible] c[illegible]ite promise that the war-bonus

will be made permanent Those who are now enlisting do so therefore for Rs 11 a month *plus* a temporary addition of Rs 4 a month paid six-monthly in arrears

(c) That an increase to the pay of the sepoy would inevitably result in an increase to the pay of other employees of Government such as police and forest subordinates and the like thus imposing a further heavy burden on Indian revenues

76 We admit the force of these arguments but in order to present a complete picture we think it desirable, even at the risk of repetition to recapitulate briefly the main considerations which tell in favour of an increase of pay These are —

(a) That the Indian Army expects a substantial increase and that it would be impolitic to disappoint this expectation especially at a time like the present when political agitators aim at undermining the army's loyalty

(b) That the general rise in the cost of living renders the present scale of pay insufficient to enable the sepoy to support a wife and family or other dependents

(c) That the industrial and agricultural development of India offers other and more lucrative employment to youths of the martial classes and that this competition will adversely affect recruitment for the army unless better terms are offered

77 After the most earnest consideration we have formed the conclusion that it is necessary in order to secure the contentment of the Indian Army to improve the terms of service of Indian other ranks and our specific recommendations will be found in Appendix I (Item 6)

Good Service and Good Conduct Pay

78 We consider it desirable to quicken up the scales of good service and good conduct pay We make specific suggestions in Appendix I (Item 7) *

Family Pensions

79 Most of the considerations which we have stated in the preceding Section in connection with the family pensions of Indian officers apply to other ranks also We consider that the present rates of family pension for sepoys are inadequate We recommend the abolition of the lower rate and think that there should be one flat rate for all other ranks *plus* an allowance for each child on the same principles as for Indian officers Our complete recommendation will be found in Appendix I (Item 8)

Several Indian officers have pointed out the great inconvenience to holders of family pensions especially women and old folk who have to appear at the nearest treasury often a considerable distance from their homes in order to draw their pensions It is for consideration whether these pensions might not be everywhere paid through the agency of the Post Office under the supervision and with the assistance of the village authorities and the local branch of the Indian Soldiers Board

Railway Concessions

80 We support a request that has been put forward by several Indian officers that Indian non commissioned officers should be given intermediate class warrants instead of 3rd class when travelling alone on duty This follows the rule under which a British non commissioned officer under the same conditions travels on a 2nd class warrant in India

It has been brought to our notice that at present an Indian soldier is entitled under para 78 Volume X Army Regulations India as amended by Indian Army Order, October Appendix 1917 to free passage by rail to his home for his family if he is going on pension, but that this is not permitted to men who resign the service at their own request This bears hardly on men who are obliged to resign the service for urgent private reasons, and who may be and often are a very long way from their homes as for example the men of the Gurkha regiment stationed at Quetta In view of the necessity for providing strong reserves for the Indian Army, we think that this concession might be granted on two conditions—(i) after not less than 4 years' service, and (ii) to the families of those men only who undertake to join the reserve

* Not printed

Station Hospitals.

81. We find from the evidence given before us that the institution of the station hospital system is not generally popular with the Indian ranks of the Indian Army. The Indian soldier misses his old friends, the regimental doctor and his assistants, and dislikes being placed in a ward in the station hospital with men of other units and classes. He feels also that he has no one whom he knows and trusts and to whom he can apply for medical advice for his family. While these objections to the new system are natural, we consider that the advantages of the station hospital far outweigh its disadvantages. When the system was introduced into the British Army, a good many years ago, almost the same objections were raised. It has long survived its unpopularity in the British service, and we believe will do so in the Indian Army. In India it is still in its infancy, and station hospitals are not as yet fully equipped, so that the advantages are not as obvious as they will be later on. We recommend, however, that a medical officer, detailed from the station hospital, should be "attached" to each regiment, and changed as seldom as possible. We consider that all regimental lines should contain a dispensary, which should be visited daily by this medical officer or by a sub-assistant surgeon, that families should be treated from this dispensary, and that the "daily sick" should be seen there. We hope that, if these arrangements are made, the present dislike to the system will disappear.

Lines.

82. We have heard a great deal from witnesses as to the shortcomings of Indian lines, and we are aware that there are still many which are much below modern standards of living accommodation. On the other hand, we have inspected lines constructed on the latest sanctioned plans, and we do not find that these leave much to be reasonably desired. We recommend, however, that the reconstruction programme, initiated some ten years ago by General Sir O'Moore Creagh, should be vigorously pursued and completed as soon as possible. This is so important that we suggest that special financial arrangements should be made to carry it into effect.

83. The following improvements, which are not included in the latest standard plans, should be introduced, and we place them in what we consider to be their order of urgency :—

(i) A *charpoy* and kit box (or locker) to be provided for each man.
(ii) Free lighting, on an adequate scale, throughout the lines.
(iii) Increase in the number of family quarters, which is all the more necessary as the Indian Army now spends so much more time overseas than formerly. We recommend an increase up to 90 and 120 married quarters in cavalry and infantry respectively, and in other units in proportion.

Religious Teachers.

84. It has been generally represented to us that the status and emoluments of the religious teachers of units of the Indian Army are insufficient to ensure their possessing, and exercising, the requisite influence over the sepoy in moral and religious matters, as well as in the encouragement of a spirit of loyalty. We entirely agree, and make certain recommendations on the subject in Appendix I (Item 9).* In the past these teachers have been treated as "followers." We think that they should have relative rank with, but junior to, jemadars, and that there should be one for each class of the strength of a company or over.

Regimental Offices and Clerks.

85. The contract allowance system, under which regimental offices, &c., are administered, was never easy to manage, and has now become unworkable, owing chiefly to the higher rates of pay of skilled clerical labour, and the increased cost of all office material. As a result, the office fund is usually in debt, and has to be assisted by other funds which should be employed for the direct benefit of the men. We recommend that the contract allowance should be abolished, and that all clerks should be enlisted and given reasonable allowances in addition to their regimental pay; that actual office rent paid should be refunded by Government, in cases where no office is provided rent free; that hot and cold weather charges should be borne by Government, and that the necessary office furniture should be supplied and kept up by

* Not printed.

vernment Stationery should be provided free on a suitable scale, also type writers
ould be supplied and maintained free of charge in the proportion of two per regiment

We recommend a more extended installation of telephonic communication between
litary offices and between civil and military offices

We consider that the arrangements made for the training of Indian military clerks
or units during the war should be continued as a permanent measure

Regimental Schools

86 Indian Army schools are at present quite inefficient The reasons are not far to seek viz —

(i) The want of an educational policy
(ii) The absence of any system of training for teachers
(iii) The inadequate pay allowed for the teaching staff the head teacher is paid Rs 25 (£2 10s) a month
(iv) The insufficient allowance—Rs 30 (£3) a month—for text books prizes stationery and equipment
(v) The failure of the State to provide proper school accommodation library, lighting &c The present allowance for all these is only Rs 10 (£1) a month

We consider that this condition of affairs should be remedied as soon as possible
A badly paid and therefore discontented teacher can do infinite harm It is of great
importance to the State that the young soldier and the children of soldiers should be
educated on sound and loyal principles As things are there is little to prevent th
regimental school being a centre for discontent and even disloyalty

87 We recommend that the principle already laid down in the case of the Briti
soldier—that education is to be a part of military training—be accepted in the Indi
Army and that while the responsibility for this education as for other milita
training should be placed on the officer commanding he should be given the means
discharge it as recommended above It is also suggested that an Indian wing of
proposed Army Education Corps should be created the personnel of this wing
consist of Indian officers and non commissioned officers trained as teachers and po
to units, as at home Sons of soldiers preferably or other boys of martial races h
for the present be educated and trained as teachers at suitable schools and colleges
some of these should be posted to Army Headquarters and to commands and divi
for inspection duties

Eventually the proposed Kitchener College and similar institutions should p
most of these teachers The adoption of these proposals would provide *inter a*
the elementary education of the sons of Indian soldiers who would be sufficient
grounded to proceed with the help perhaps of military scholarships to higher
tional institutions

Canteens

88 It has been suggested to us that an Indian Army Canteen Bo rd
started for the Indian Army either as a branch of the Army Canteen Boa
separate institution We recommend experiment on a cautious scale

Grants of Land

89 We are aware that land hunger is no new thing but we have bee
by the intense desire to acquire land which now pervades all the Indian r
army, particularly in northern India We understand that 178 000 acres i
colonies of the Punjab are about to be distributed among those Indian offic
ranks who have rendered distinguished service during the late war In
grants are being made of 2 rectangles (1 rectangle = 25 acres) to Indian
1 rectangle to other ranks A certain amount of land is also being g
provinces and where land is not available *jangi inams* are substituted
ments are of the value of Rs 10 a month for officers and Rs 5 a month f
and continue for three lives We recommend that deserving cases from
which have not been included in the present distribution should be noted
in parts of the country to be opened up for cultivation by canal proj
t on or consideration We are of opinion that any such grants m
rvice terms We also recommend that the matter o

abroad to deserving Indian officers and soldiers should be kept in view by the Government of India; and that if, as seems possible, grants of land in British Guiana or East Africa are to be made to Indian settlers, any deputation sent to these, or other, countries to make enquiries should be accompanied by one or two selected Indian officers.

Clothing.

90. We have heard many complaints of the khaki clothing, which is now a free issue. It is alleged that in some cases it is of inferior material, that it is badly cut, and that the dye is not fast. We have made enquiries into the matter, and we are of opinion that, while the complaints are justified, the present inferior quality is due to the necessity, on grounds of economy, of using up war stocks of varied kinds. and we believe that, when these stocks are exhausted, the present grounds of complaint will disappear. We recommend, however, that the allowances for refitting clothing in regiments should be on a more liberal scale than at present. We also consider that a return to the pre-war system, under which units purchased and made up their own khaki against a cash allowance, would be a retrograde step and very undesirable.

Hindustani Clothing.

Before the war it was the custom in most regiments to have an order of dress, which was not recognised by regulation, for "walking out" and for hot weather drills and duties, except guard duties. This dress usually consisted of a white cotton coat and trousers, or *dhoti*, of the same material, with either a white cotton or khaki regimental pattern *pagri* and boots or Indian shoes. It has been represented to us by several Indian witnesses that this custom, if revived now, would, owing to high prices, involve a great expense to the Indian soldier.

It must be remembered that before the war the sepoy paid for all his khaki clothing, receiving a grant in aid, and therefore the then comparatively cheap cotton suits saved his khaki, and so his pocket. But now the khaki is a free issue, and the cotton suits would mean additional expense to him. We consider this very undesirable. We recommend that it should be forbidden to institute, or to cause to be worn upon any duty whatever, any unauthorised pattern of dress of this kind. As, however, a hot weather fatigue dress of some sort is required in order to save the more expensive and thicker khaki uniform, we suggest that it might well consist of what has been widely introduced during the war for this purpose—viz., thin khaki shirts and khaki drill shorts. The regimental *pagri* and regimental *putties*, with boots or Indian shoes, complete this "fatigue order" of dress. It should be issued and maintained by Government free of cost to the soldier.

Injury Pensions.

91. It has been represented to us that the regulations governing the grant of injury pensions produce discontent and in some cases actual hardship. A reference to Army Regulations, India, Volume I, paragraphs 1058, *et seq.*, will show, we think, that they are too limited in scope and lack elasticity. A comparison between these regulations and those contained in the Royal Warrant, dated 6th December, 1919, for the pensions of soldiers disabled in consequence of the great war, confirms this view. For example, we find that the schedule attached to this Warrant provides for no less than nine degrees of disablement, each degree in turn being sub-divided into many classes of "specific injuries." The Indian regulations provide for three degrees only, and these are so expressed as to afford little guidance to medical boards when classifying injuries. They do not take into consideration the effect of disablement on the dependents of the disabled men, by providing for compensatory allowances for his family.

92. We have discussed this question with a representative of the Ministry of Pensions, to whom we are indebted for certain valuable suggestions, and who has placed at our disposal the pension schemes devised to meet the needs of such special units as the King's African Rifles, certain West Indian corps, and the Maltese Active Service Battalion. It is true that the recent Royal Warrant and the above-mentioned schemes were framed to meet an exceptional situation caused by the late war, but the experience gained has been so wide that the principles evolved from them must be of value.

It does not, however, follow that it would be wise to apply to India in detail the Royal Warrant as it stands. For instance, in the Indian Army many of our men

are recruited from countries outside India e g, the Gurkhas from Nepal and to enforce attendance at periodical boards involving long and tedious journeys would be vexatious

Again it must be remembered that caste restrictions and not the physical capability of the individual govern the selection of a trade and that it would be unjust for instance to assume that because a man possessed two sound arms he could add to his livelihood by learning a trade requiring only the use of his arms

93 The following points should be considered when revising the existing regulations —

(a) The adoption of the percentage method of assessment This has been followed by all other countries and has proved easy of working
(b) The preparation of a schedule of specific disabilities to which definite assessments can be assigned
(c) For disabilities other than those specified assessment should be made according to a percentage based on comparison with the normally healthy man
(d) In cases where—
(1) the disability is scheduled or
(2) the disability is not scheduled but the condition is permanent and can never improve

a life pension should be awarded at the then appropriate rate In such cases if the condition gets much worse it would be open to the pensioner to apply for a higher rate on this ground
(e) In all other cases even though it is possible that the condition may subsequently improve a life pension should be given at the appropriate rate
(f) There should be a basic rate of disability pension in respect of each scheduled disability sufficient for a pensioner of the lowest rank to which should be added—
(1) an allowance for service graded according to length of service
(2) a graded allowance for higher rank

Corporal Punishment

94 Our two Indian colleagues would like to add a recommendation to abolish corporal punishment in the Indian Army on the ground that it was abolished many years ago in the British service We understand that it is a question which is now receiving the attention of Army Headquarters from which we are confident that it will receive sympathetic consideration

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PART VI

Possibility of establishing a Territorial or Second Line Force in India

This is one of the questions on which the Secretary of State laid special emphasis when he met the Committee on 9th October 1919 He then asked us to consider the alternative of developing from the existing Indian Defence Force (Indian section) established on a temporary basis during the war something comparable to a 'second line' or territorial army

2 We have had the matter under earnest consideration We have discussed it with H E the Viceroy and various heads of provinces with the military authorities with retired Indian officers with prominent Indian politicians and publicists with the chief organiser of the Bengali battalion which is drawn from classes not hitherto enlisted and with the commandant of the Calcutta University Corps admittedly the most successful of the Indian Defence Force units so far formed

3 Compulsion for the regular army was ruled out during the war in spite of the gravity of the case, and there is no question of introducing it as the basis of any territorial force There is however a strong feeling among educated Indians that they should be given greater opportunities of organizing themselves voluntarily for the defence of their country That feeling has been stimulated by the spectacle of the citizen armies raised in western countries during the war by the

recent facilities given for the grant of King's commissions to Indians, and by the increased control of large branches of the civil administration which the Reforms Scheme offers to Indians. It is, therefore, expedient to test the strength and endurance of that aspiration, which is an honourable and legitimate one, and if possible to utilise it for the gradual creation of a force, which would be of practical assistance to the regular army, both in maintaining internal order and in combating external aggression. Unless it can be made in time to serve one or both of those objects, it would be a useless and expensive experiment.

4. At this stage it may be well to examine the facilities hitherto given to the classes in question, both in the regular army and in the auxiliary forces. Up to and during the first half of the great war, the regular army was recruited almost exclusively from the rural agricultural population and mainly in northern India. Little effort was made to enlist the urban classes as combatants, because they showed no keenness to serve and were regarded as not likely to furnish good material. As the war progressed and the drain on the rural classes became more and more severe, the field of recruitment both in town and country was steadily extended; and in the last two years of the war, in northern India at least, practically everyone outside the lower menial classes was eligible for enlistment.

The following statement shows by provinces (*a*) the total population, (*b*) the number of combatant recruits raised during the war :—

	Population in millions.	Number of recruits raised.
Punjab	20	326,000
United Provinces	47	142,000
Madras	40	46,000
Bombay	20	36,000
North-West Frontier and Baluchistan...	3	33,000
Burma	12	13,000
Behar and Orissa	33	8,000
Bengal	45	7,000
Central Provinces	13	5,000
Assam	6	1.000
Ajmir	½	7,000
	240	624,000

Some of the new rural classes made good, others did not, and the experience gained will be most valuable for future guidance. The urban classes, though they supplied many men for auxiliary services, failed to produce any appreciable number of combatant recruits, and the military authorities were on the whole not satisfied with the few that came forward. This was not unexpected, for these classes had no military traditions, no previous connection with the army, and were as a rule reluctant to undertake a career novel to them and involving hardship and danger.

5. It was probably the expectation of such a result that led the Government of India to provide another means of helping in the defence of the Empire by the formation, early in 1917, of the Indian section of the Indian Defence Force. The conditions governing that force are set out in the Army Department communiqué of 27th March 1917.

The main conditions were :—

(*a*) Enrolment to be voluntary, for general service in India, age limit 18 to 30; physical standards, as in the Indian Army; the menial classes, and also, in order not to interfere with regular recruitment, the classes from which the Indian Army is ordinarily recruited, were excluded.

(*b*) Six units, each of 1,000 men, to be raised at Calcutta, Madras, Poona, Allahabad, Lahore and Rangoon.

(*c*) Recruitment to be open for 6 months, up to 28th August 1917; the recruits to undergo 90 days' continuous training, in companies of 250 at a time, under a British officer and an instructional staff from the Indian Army; to receive, while under training, pay and allowances, uniform and rations as in the Indian Army, and to be subject to the Indian Army Act and the rules and regulations under the Indian Defence Force Act.

H. E. the Viceroy, in referring to the scheme at the closing of the legislative session in March 1917, said :—

"The Act is confessedly a war measure and therefore temporary, but it will prove a most valuable experiment. We shall have to reorganize our Indian Army after this

war, and some form of second line will probably be required In the Indian Defence Force raised temporarily during the stress of war, there may be the germ of such new second line"

6 During the first two months from the passing of the Act only 300 men were enrolled The Government of India, in their Resolution of 21st May 1917, recorded their disappointment "that such a scheme should, in spite of its modest dimensions, prove a hopeless failure at such a time and in a country which, whatever its deficiencies, is not lacking in man power, and called on the leaders of public opinion to take all possible steps forthwith to make the recruitment worthy of the name and aspirations of India This appeal gave some stimulus to recruitment and by 28th August 1917, when the 6 months' period closed, the number enrolled had risen to 2,432, of whom, however, over 70 per cent came from Madras and Burma The six units already mentioned, and the Bengal Light Horse Squadron, were organized between August 1917 and January 1918, and commenced training To complete the strength of units, recruitment was reopened on 12th April 1918, at the gravest crisis of the war and when the King Emperor and the Premier appealed to India to arm itself against the Turco German menace from the west, the Government of India, Local Governments and many prominent Indians again appealed to patriotic sentiment The Government of India agreed to the strength being raised to 12,000, and explained that the primary duty of the force would be to support the civil power in the event of internal disorder but that, when the units attained their full strength and the requisite degree of efficiency, it was hoped that they would be able also to assist in securing internal communications in the event of general mobilisation The response was again disappointing, and up to June 15th 1919, the total applicants were 11,316, of whom only 3 699 were found fit for enrolment, or about half of the sanctioned establishment of 7,-32 (Madras having been raised to a strength of 2,000) Of the 3 694 enrolled, 1 621 were in Madras and 868 in Burma none of the other provinces having furnished more than a company The total number actually trained was 2 200

7 It must in fairness be said that the condition of three months *continuous* training created considerable difficulty for men with fixed occupations However the scheme cannot be regarded as other than a failure the main causes of which probably are those already mentioned at the close of paragraph 4 and in one case racial or sectional feeling, which made it necessary we are told to withdraw ammunition from a company under training lest the rival sections might open fire on one another The conclusion to be drawn from the experiment is that some at least of the more enthusiastic advocates of the territorial movement probably overrated the practical strength of the desire of the urban classes to share in the burden of defence, and underrated the difficulties of arousing a military spirit and creating a sense of discipline and sacrifice among those classes

8 The history of the Bengali regular battalion has a practical bearing on the general question It had long been the ambition of patriotic Bengalis to remove the reproach that Bengal was lacking in fighting qualities Accordingly during the war when the field of recruitment was extended, sanction was given in 1916 at the instance of many leading men of the Presidency, to the raising of a regular battalion in Bengal The task was one of great difficulty owing not only to the absence of military traditions but to the ignorance of military needs and conditions But a band of enthusiastic and high minded Bengali gentlemen set vigorously to work, and by June 1917 the battalion was raised and training began In all nearly 7 000 men were enrolled but owing to the inferior physique of many of the recruits their breakdown in training, resignations, etc it was not found possible to maintain more than a single battalion

To stimulate martial feeling the battalion was sent to Mesopotamia in August 1917, and every effort was made to render the experiment a success, by specially selecting the officers and enlisting the sympathy of the military authorities at the front Unfortunately, owing to internal jealousies (which led to the murder of two Bengali officers), the unfitness of many of the men for hard work in the field, susceptibility to disease and the difficulty of enforcing discipline the battalion was never fit to be sent to the front during the war

The question of disbanding the battalion is now under consideration and nearly all the men are anxious to be discharged

9 Another experiment, which so far promises better results, has been made since 1917, when sanction was given to the formation of six university corps varying in

strength from 1,125 in Calcutta to 125 in Patna, in the areas served by the universities of Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Allahabad, Lahore and Patna. The total sanctioned strength is 2,625; there were 2,916 applicants up to 15th June 1919 and 1,823 enrolments, viz.: Calcutta 533, Bombay 485, Allahabad 309, Lahore 496. A total of 980 men has been trained.

The Calcutta University Corps is the strongest in numbers and most forward in training. It appears that, even with an insufficiency of officers and instructors (now being made good), the corps has made healthy progress; the men have improved much in physique under the training, are quick to learn from European instructors (whom they prefer to Indian non-commissioned officers), are steadily overcoming the caste difficulties which stand in the way of training, are becoming more amenable to discipline, and turn out smartly on parade. We have not had information as to the progress of other university corps, but having regard to the failure of the non-university corps in Bengal, and the very meagre success of the Bengali battalion, we consider the success attained by the Calcutta University Corps a hopeful indication that these corps are likely to furnish the best material, as well as the surest foundation on which to build.

10. We have dwelt in some detail on the position in Bengal, because it is undoubtedly the province in which the martial spirit is regarded as most backward, and because it illustrates the difficulties of forming a force of any value in areas where the military spirit has never existed or has died away.

We found some differences of opinion on the question whether recruits should be given the option of enrolling for local service in their provinces or for service anywhere in India. It was stated, though with some hesitation, that territorial units might be employed in the last resort in helping to suppress local disorders, and even in repressing religious riots; and that, as they would be drawn from the well-to-do classes, they would have a strong interest in maintaining security and public order. We confess to some scepticism on this point at the present time. We have been informed that some students who were members of the Indian Defence Force took part in the Punjab disorders of last year; on the other hand, we were told that, during the similar riots in Calcutta, several of the students in the Calcutta University Corps offered their services, which it was not, however, necessary to accept. Obviously the attitude of the men will depend on the extent to which a sense of discipline and obedience has been instilled by training, on their confidence in their officers and on their *esprit de corps*; and we are here again drawn to the conclusion that those qualities will be more readily forthcoming, and more speedily developed, in university corps, than in the miscellaneous aggregation of individuals collected in a general territorial unit.

11. When the question was discussed with the heads of provinces, their general view was that the force would be of little or no practical utility, and might be a source of embarrassment; that one or two corps could be raised in each province, especially if they were not to be called on to serve outside the province; that for some years to come they would not be sufficiently disciplined to be relied on for internal security, and therefore could not relieve regular troops; that there would be difficulties in working the scheme in rural areas, where also it might prejudice regular recruiting; that the formation of university corps offered the greatest prospect of success; and that they would be willing to see the experiment tried of raising a few territorial units, including university corps, in urban areas, provided that they form part of the military organization, and are administered by the military authorities, and that no financial responsibility is thrown upon provincial governments.

As to the last point, we agree with the military authorities that the money to be spent on this experiment should not be regarded as money spent on the army from the standpoint of military efficiency, and that the military budget should therefore be increased proportionately.

12. In forming our conclusions, we have been impressed by the fact that the highest military authorities in India accept the principle of a national defence force and are of the opinion that it is one to be encouraged. They have told us, however, that we must not shut our eyes to the practical difficulties. They add:—"Not only have we to bear in mind the risks that we run in organizing a force that may be used against us in one way or another, but we have to create or revive the necessary military qualities in a collection of different races who are striving under-

our control to evolve a common nationality and with it the ideal of national participation in the defence of their country We do not want to run more risks than is necessary, we do not want to interfere unduly with religious or local customs and ideals, and we do not want the country generally to get tired of what is admittedly an experiment before the desired result is attained

13 After full consideration therefore we recommend the creation of a territorial force on cautious lines as a measure of education and we proceed to indicate the lines on which the experiment might be made having regard to the results of past experience and of our present enquiries —

(1) The proposed force must not impair the efficiency of the regular army or compete with it in recruiting among classes from which the army has hitherto been drawn While it will primarily be limited to the urban population and the universities other classes on which the army has hitherto not drawn will not be excluded

(2) The formation of the force should not be made a reason for reducing the strength of, or expenditure on, the regular army

(3) It should be co ordinated with the regular army and be under the control of the military authorities the establishment of a unit should be the same as that of a regular unit the organization and training should be carried out with a view not only to aiding the civil power in maintaining internal security but also to sharing eventually in the duty of defence against external aggression

(4) The co operation of provincial governments should as far as possible be secured and local advisory associations should be established to assist in recruiting and in providing funds and facilities for subsidiary purposes which cannot be met from the military grants

(5) Enlistment should be voluntary between the ages of 18 and 30 with liability for general service in India and for a period of 4 years which may be extended if recommended by the commanding officer

(6) Training of cadets in schools should be limited to physical training and drill without arms

(7) University companies should be encouraged but strictly limited to the students and staff, the men should take their discharge on completion of the university course but should be eligible for transfer to a non university unit Rural units or companies should be discouraged if likely to compete with regular recruiting

(8) Liability for general service in India should be insisted on from the start without it there is little prospect of this force ever becoming an asset of any military value

(9) Training should be arranged for all units by the military authorities in consultation with the advisory committees so as to interfere as little as possible with normal avocations or studies

(10) Pay and allowances should be at Indian Army rates during periods of annual training or embodiment in the case of university corps for the period of the annual camp only

(11) A limited number of specially selected British officers—*e g* commanding officer second in command and adjutant—with an instructional staff of non commissioned officers should be attached to each unit The commanding officer and second in command might be replaced by Indians as the latter become trained and in time Indian officers holding King's comm might also be employed with these units always be drawn from the regular army S, military authorities for the training of officers for appointment to and promotion in commissioned ranks on lines similar to the Indian Defence Force (British section)

(12) The force should be under the Commander in Chief general control being exercised through a Director of Auxiliary Forces at Army headquarters and the local military authorities it should take the place of the present Indian Defence Force (Indian section) which being only a temporary war organization disappears Local governments and associations should be consulted as regards the recommendations for commissions and promotions among officers

(13) The form of the commission to be granted in this force is a matter that will require careful consideration. Advanced political opinion, which in this respect is strongly supported by our colleague Sir Krishna Gupta, asks for the grant of King's commissions to the territorial officers; but Indian officers now holding the Viceroy's commission would undoubtedly resent the grant to these officers of a status which for good reasons is withheld from themselves. We feel that it would be premature to make any definite recommendation at this stage, as so much must depend on the manner in which the experiment develops.

14. The next question is, how many units should be raised? In this case, as in that of the selection of Indian cadets for King's commissions, it is most important that the first experiment should be on lines that promise success, and success will be undoubtedly endangered if the scheme is started on too ambitious lines. The representatives of educated opinion whom we have consulted generally recognise this danger, and do not ask for more than a few units in the larger provinces. It has also to be remembered that the cost of the regular forces is absorbing a rapidly growing share of the public revenues, and it would be unfair to the taxpayer to spend in addition large sums on what is admittedly an experiment undertaken mainly for its political or educational value. Moreover, the experience of the war goes to show that no great rush of applicants for enlistment is to be expected. From a consideration of all the circumstances we suggest that, to start with, some 12 units, mounted or dismounted, might be raised in the following areas—

Bombay, Madras, Bengal with Assam, United Provinces ...	2 each.
Punjab, Bihar, Burma and Central Provinces	1 each.

In each of the four large provinces, one of the units might be a university corps, and in the remaining provinces the single unit might be composed partly of university and partly of general companies. The force might be styled the "Indian Territorial Force."

15. We do not think that any new unit should be sanctioned till the first units have been reported adequate in numbers and efficiency for the immediate purpose in view, viz., assisting the civil power in maintaining internal security, and are also capable of helping the regular forces in a grave emergency by taking over some of the duties of furnishing guards, protecting communications, etc.

The principle laid down in the Reforms announcement of the 20th August 1917, and embodied in the new Government of India Act, is specially applicable here, viz., that the British Government, upon whom lies the responsibility for the welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples, must be the judge of the time and measure of each advance, and it must be guided "by the co-operation received from those on whom new opportunities of service will be conferred, and the extent to which it is found that confidence can be reposed in their sense of responsibility." If loyal and public-spirited Indians, whose active co-operation is essential to the success of the scheme, keep these principles steadily in view, then, in time, the force may develop into an asset of no small military value, and capable of playing a worthy part in the defence of the Indian Empire.

PART VII.

The Royal Indian Marine.

1 The Indian Marine Service Act of 1884 defines the purposes for which the Royal Indian Marine Service exists, viz, the transport of troops, the guarding of the convict settlements, the suppression of piracy, the survey of coasts and harbours, the visiting of lighthouses, the relief of distressed and wrecked vessels, and other local objects The suppression of piracy has, however, never been handed over to the service as a definite duty

2 As regards the transport of troops, the Royal Indian Marine is responsible for, and has always successfully performed what may be called the interior transportation work of the Indian Empire by sea, and in addition assists in trooping work as far as Suez The Indian Marine Service Act is not in force west of Suez, and this is a defect which should be remedied, since any disciplinary action taken by the commander or officers of a Royal Indian Marine ship west of Suez is *ultra vires*

Royal Indian Marine vessels are also used to convey political officers and other high officials to and from the Persian Gulf and islands off the Indian coast both when proceeding to take up appointments in such places and on inspection duty

3 The Royal Indian Marine manages the great dockyard at Bombay, and the smaller ones at Kidderpore and Mandalay The Bombay dockyard is largely used by the ships of the East Indies Squadron of the Royal Navy The Royal Indian Marine also builds customs and police launches and tugs for the Government of India and provincial Governments, and even when it does not undertake the building is always consulted as to plans and construction The Royal Indian Marine has charge of the marine survey of India, with headquarters at Bombay, and a survey ship with a ship's company of 110 The actual survey party consists of 10 officers and 4 men and is in charge of marine survey from the Persian Gulf to the Mergui Archipelago exclusive of Ceylon and Aden The service also keeps a vessel for police duty at Port Blair, the convict settlement on the Andamans The service is in charge of the lighthouses on 1,200 miles of the Madras coast on a portion of the Calcutta coast and on the whole of the Burmese coast, and is also responsible for the floating lights in the Persian Gulf The officers of the Royal Indian Marine are particularly well qualified to undertake this work on account of their knowledge of the coast and of Indian conditions It would probably be advantageous if the lighting of the whole coast were handed over to them

4 The service contains about 225 officers of all ranks, executive and engineering, recruited from training ships such as the "Conway" and "Worcester" and from the mercantile marine by nomination of the Secretary of State The officers of this service, as a result of their having been employed as naval officers during the late war have recently received the privilege of having their commissions signed by the King and recognised by the Admiralty Some took their part in front line combatant work with credit Officers of the service are normally employed in peace time as Port Officers and Assistant Port Officers at all the principal ports of India

The subordinate part of the service consists of about 2 000 Indians, who man the vessels belonging to the Royal Indian Marine This does not include dockyard hands at Bombay Kidderpore, or Mandalay

5 We have seen the scheme prepared by Lord Jellicoe as a result of his recent visit to India, in which he advocates the expansion of the present Royal Indian Marine into an Indian Navy This proposal is, we understand, under the consideration of the Government of India, and is, in any case, outside our terms of reference We have been informed, however, that the Government of India, while unable, at present to accept the scheme for an Indian Navy as put forward by Lord Jellicoe, recognise that the Royal Indian Marine should be expanded so as to enable it to undertake certain fresh responsibilities, the most important of which is the policing of the Persian Gulf

Whatever the decision on this point may be, we feel bound to consider the position of the Royal Indian Marine in the scheme of Indian government, and the administrative arrangements for its control

6. At present the executive head is the Director, who is usually a senior officer of the Royal Navy, nominated by the Admiralty with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for India. The Director has to submit his proposals to the Secretary in the Army Department, who is a soldier, and who takes his orders on marine questions from the Army Member. He resides at Army Headquarters (Delhi and Simla), while the Director lives at Bombay. The Admiralty have no responsibility for the training and efficiency of this Service, though by the Indian Marine Service Act of 1884, Section 6, they are authorised to take it over, if considered necessary, in time of war.

The budget of the Royal Indian Marine is controlled by the army authorities, as a separate section of the military budget.

7. It is clear that the Royal Indian Marine is, and must remain, an Indian service, so long as it is paid and maintained by the Government of India. But it would be much to its advantage that the Admiralty, who have furnished its head, and who took over its ships, and directed much of its work, in the great war, should view the service with favour and be ready to give it all the assistance in their power.

8. In Part II of this Report we have discussed two alternative proposals for the administration of the Royal Indian Marine. Whichever scheme is adopted, we recommend the following reorganisation :—

(i) The officer appointed to be Director, Royal Indian Marine, should be a rear-admiral on the active list. His headquarters and official residence should be at Bombay. He should have the status of a Secretary to the Government of India. He would thus be directly subordinate to the proposed civilian Member of Council for Munitions and Marine or to the Commander-in-Chief, as the case may be, and like other Secretaries would have the right of direct access to the Viceroy.

(ii) The office of the Director should be in Bombay, but there should be a Royal Indian Marine officer, holding the appointment of Deputy or Assistant Secretary to Government, with a small clerical establishment, at the headquarters of the Government of India.

(iii) The Director should have two Deputies, both officers of the Royal Indian Marine; one his second-in-command, the other the Superintendent of the Dockyard at Bombay.

It would be the duty of the Director, or one of his Deputies, to attend at the headquarters of Government, when any sufficiently important case was under consideration. In other cases the Director would depend for liaison, and for the transaction of ordinary business, upon his representative at headquarters.

We believe that this arrangement would satisfy both the Royal Indian Marine Service and the Admiralty, and would obtain for the former a much higher status in the Government of India than it has hitherto possessed, while it would ensure its constitutional subordination to that Government.

9. The pay of the officers of the Royal Indian Marine has recently been considerably improved. The rules for their leave and pensions require reconsideration.

10. It is evident that if this service is not only to maintain its past standard of usefulness, but is to develop in the future, the conditions of recruitment, training, service, pay, and pension of the Indian personnel must be radically altered and much improved. At present recruitment for both deck hands and engine room is without any system whatever. Crews and stokers are engaged haphazard in Bombay; or the *serang* (boatswain) of a ship is entrusted with the duty of collecting a crew, which is becoming more and more difficult. Both crews and stokers are discharged whenever a ship is laid up; the only training is picked up at sea; the pay is inferior to that of the merchant service; and though a certain percentage of the men are supposed to be pensionable, they never earn a pension in practice, as their service is broken up by periods between discharges and re-engagements. It is not surprising that it is becoming increasingly difficult to get men for both deck and engine room, and ships often have to be held up for want of hands, or go to sea short-handed.

We recommend that men should be regularly recruited by an agency for the purpose, as in the army. The headquarters of recruiting should be at Ratnagiri on the Bombay coast, but the agency should also investigate the possibility of finding new classes of men for sea-going service. As far as possible, lads should be taken on young to join a training ship and for training ashore; and later they should be drafted to ships by a Royal Indian Marine central agency at Bombay. Their pay, pension, and leave rules, (the

last being very important), should be thoroughly revised and the question of a reserve should be examined Good conduct pay and special qualification pay should be given The question of uniform and of its upkeep should also receive attention

Further, we consider that suitable Indians should be given opportunities for education in the higher branches of seamanship, marine engineering etc, with a view to qualifying themselves for admission to the superior ranks of the marine service It is only by methods such as those described above that Indians can become efficient sailors, and that a judgment can be formed as to how far they should ultimately rise in their profession

11 We think it desirable that the policing of the Persian Gulf should be taken over by the Royal Indian Marine The climate is enervating, and the nature of the duties is such as can be performed by Indians, thus setting free British sailors The Indian, trained and led by British officers will be a match for any enemy that he is likely to encounter there A few British naval ratings such as first class petty officers for gunnery and drill instructors supplied by the Admiralty, will be necessary for a few years

12 We consider that, if the status of the Royal Indian Marine were raised as suggested, and the conditions under which its Indian personnel is enlisted trained, paid, and pensioned were improved, the Government of India would have a service well suited to undertake all present requirements as regards marine work in peace time and well adapted for any development in the direction of becoming a fighting service, should this be found desirable hereafter

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PART VIII

MISCELLANEOUS

1 We were authorised, before the Committee proceeded to India, to report, without waiting till our return to England on such matters as required an early decision and could, in our opinion, be dealt with in India We therefore examined in India a number of questions which were referred for our advice and acquainted the Government of India with our views We propose to summarise briefly in this Part the recommendations which we made It is understood that Lord Esher and Lieut General Sir J Du Cane, who did not accompany the Committee to India have no responsibility for these recommendations

Section I

Future Conditions of Service in the Indian Army Reserve of Officers

2 At the outbreak of the war the Indian Army Reserve of Officers contained only some 40 officers During the war it was greatly expanded and at the time of the armistice with Germany numbered 4,470 This vast expansion represented India's contribution towards Imperial requirements in the matter of officers rather than a reserve limited to the needs of the Indian Army

3 The regulations under which these officers were commissioned were framed at a time when expansion to this extent was not contemplated They not only fail to provide for the systematic training of officers but are defective in many other respects They divide the Indian Army Reserve of Officers into only two branches—cavalry and infantry A long period of service in the reserve, with promotion on a time scale up to the rank of lieutenant colonel, irrespective of military training and efficiency, is open to serious objection The existing reserve would if the present regulations remain in force, consist, after a few years have elapsed, chiefly of field officers while the requirements of the army are limited mainly to junior officers

4 At the present time India contains a large number of officers who have relinquished temporary commissions in the regular army This number, for some years to come will continue to increase Such officers, owing to their training and experience, form a potential reserve of great value They retain the rank they held on

demobilisation, while officers of the Indian Army Reserve, under extant regulations. not only retain their commissions on release from army service, but are also automatically promoted in rank according to the Indian Army time scale. No valid reason can be adduced for the retention of this difference of treatment, and we accordingly advised that those who obtained temporary commissions in the United Kingdom, and those who received commissions in the Indian Army Reserve of Officers during the war, should be placed on an equal footing in this respect.

5. The matter has acquired prominence owing to the proposal of the Government of India to perpetuate the existing liability of all European British subjects in India under the Indian Defence Force Act. We accordingly recommended that the regulations relating to the Indian Army Reserve of Officers should be recast on the following lines, which follow closely proposals which were put before us by Army Headquarters :—

(1) All officers now holding commissions in the Indian Army Reserve of Officers should be required to relinquish their commissions on release from army service; and on such relinquishment should be permitted to retain their rank, on conditions similar to those laid down for ex-officers of the regular army who held temporary commissions during the war.

Officers of the Indian Army Reserve of Officers who are thus asked to relinquish their commissions should be clearly informed of the reasons for this course, and that those who are still within the age limit and otherwise qualified should be eligible for appointment in the new reserve of officers or other suitable formations. We recommended also that the Gazette notifying relinquishment of commissions should be followed with the least possible delay by the Gazette notifying admission to the new Indian Army Reserve of Officers.

(2) A new reserve of officers for the army in India should be formed, with a fixed establishment to be calculated for each arm and branch of the service on the basis of the probable requirements in the event of war, viz. :—

Staff.	Indian cavalry.	Ordnance Department.
British cavalry.	Indian infantry.	Army Remount Department.
Artillery.	Supply and Transport Corps.	Miscellaneous duties.
Engineers.	Medical services.	
British infantry.	Veterinary service.	

It will be seen that the new reserve of officers would be organised with reference to the needs of the army in India, whereas the existing reserve is for the Indian Army alone.

In advocating this change, we were influenced by the consideration that, as officer reinforcements have to be provided from some source or other for all units serving in India, British and Indian alike, it would be cheaper and more convenient to provide them from India, especially as, at present, a supply is likely to be available from amongst the large number of ex-officers now in India. The question of incidence of cost will be one for adjustment between the Home and Indian Governments.

(3) Selection should be made in the first instance from ex-officers who are of military age, as defined in the Indian Defence Force Act or in any enactment which may take its place, and are considered suitable for, and desire to serve in, the reserve. Establishments should be completed and maintained from ex-officers and others suitable for training as officers.

(4) The new reserve should consist of two categories, the first including only those who undertake to be available on mobilisation of the field army in India; and the second, those who are willing to undergo training as officers, but who cannot be regarded as available except in a grave emergency.

(5) All officers selected for the reserve should be appointed, so far as practicable, to units or formations, and should be required to undergo the periodical training prescribed for the arm or branch to which they are allotted. Training for the reserve should exempt an officer from liability to undergo the periodical training required under the Auxiliary Forces Bill, should this become law.

It was strongly represented to us that ex-officers should not be compelled, without their own consent, to serve in any rank below that of officer, except perhaps in the case of specially constituted units, *e.g.*, an Officers' Training Corps or a corps such as the Bihar Light Horse. We felt that there was much force in this contention, and we were glad to learn that the Government of India shared this view and were endeavouring to give effect to it.

(6) Officers should not ordinarily remain in the cavalry, field artillery or infantry reserve after the age of 31, since, although in some cases it may be advantageous to retain officers of merit and experience beyond that age, it is necessary to provide for the steady recruitment of younger men. An officer after the age of 31, if specially qualified, might be permitted to join the second class of the reserve, or to accept a commission in some local forces, if such be constituted, or to continue in the reserve, but undergo the training required for one of the administrative services.

(7) Officers now holding higher substantive or retired rank than that of lieutenant should be eligible for retention in their rank in the reserve, but, ordinarily, rank in the reserve should not be higher than that of captain, and this should be attained according to the time-scale in force for the Indian Army.

(8) Officers appointed to the reserve should receive the present outfit allowance, if not already received, and should, for each year in which training is undergone, receive either the pay and allowances of their rank or, preferably, a lump sum, which it has been suggested should be 750 rupees for a period of training, ordinarily of one month.

(9) Officers belonging to the cavalry, field artillery and infantry should be trained annually till 31, and thereafter, if retained every other year, officers of the garrison artillery, ordnance, remount, veterinary and supply and transport services should receive training every second year, and officers of the engineer and medical reserves should be trained every third year.

SECTION II

Conditions of Service of "Followers"

6. We had the advantage of seeing certain proposals on this subject, which were under the consideration of the military authorities and the Government of India. With these we were in general agreement. Our specific recommendations were that the term "follower" should disappear, and that the duties hitherto performed by them should be allotted as follows:—

(A.) *Regimental Followers.*

(1) Those individuals who have hitherto been termed "regimental followers" should become enlisted and attested men who should be borne on the establishment of the unit, and should be trained to arms sufficiently to be able to defend themselves, should wear uniform, and should serve under the same conditions as regards pay and furlough as the fighting men of the unit. Men of this class should not, however, be entitled to pension after so short a term of service as fifteen years, the minimum should be twenty-one years, and in some cases might be twenty five years. Provision should also be made for these classes to be passed into the reserve.

(2) The term 'sweeper' should be abolished. The necessary personnel for sanitary duties should be enlisted from low caste men, and trained as soldiers. Under this scheme, each unit would be self-contained in respect of its sanitary personnel, who would form an integral part of the unit establishment, and might be called the "sanitary squad."

An alternative proposal has been put forward for the formation of divisional sanitary companies, each consisting of four sections (one for headquarters and three for brigades). The cantonment authorities, under this proposal, would be responsible for the general sanitation of the area, while the brigade sections, each under a brigade sanitary officer, would be attached for duty to units. On mobilisation, the brigade sanitary sections would accompany the units into the field, and all cantonment sanitary work would fall on the cantonment authorities.

We expressed no opinion on this scheme, but suggested that the Government of India might consider it as an alternative to the arrangement mentioned above.

(3) With the introduction of piped water supply in certain stations, the necessity for *bhistis* (water-carriers) has, to some extent, disappeared; and we recommended that the Indian soldier should be trained, in the course of time, to draw his own water from the pipes and to convey it in *pakhals* (buckets). It is believed that the soldiers of all other armies perform these duties, and when once the *mussack* (waterskin) has been got rid of, there appears to be no reason why Indian soldiers should not draw water for themselves.

In stations where there is no piped water supply, and in the field, the water arrangements should, we considered, be superintended by the medical authorities, who should arrange for chlorinating tanks, &c., and should have, under their control,

enlisted drivers to drive the water carts, or to lead pack animals carrying water tanks. These drivers should be attached to units for duty.

(4) *Dhobis* (washermen) should be eliminated from unit establishments. If the men choose to employ them in peace time, it should be by private arrangement, and the *dhobi* should not be paid by the State. We considered, however, that it was necessary to retain barbers as part of the unit establishment.

(B.) *Departmental Followers.*

With reference to "departmental followers," we pointed out that the term "follower" is a misnomer, and that these men are, properly speaking, the subordinate Indian personnel of various departments and services. We were informed that various schemes were already under the consideration of Government in respect of the non-combatant personnel of the Ordnance, Remount, Veterinary and Mechanical Transport Departments and in Fort Armaments; also in respect of the tindals and lascars employed on coast defences, and the non-combatant personnel of artillery, British infantry and cavalry units. We recommended that the latter three classes should be treated, so far as possible, on the same lines as in Indian units. With regard to the remaining classes, the terms and conditions of service of the subordinate personnel of each department should be considered on their merits. All such personnel should be attested and paid at suitable rates, with reference to the nature of their duties. We expressed the opinion, however, that it is undesirable to increase the number of subordinate Indian ranks who receive free rations, and we suggested that the rates of pay of these classes should be consolidated, and that free rations should not be given, except to those classes which will be required on mobilisation to proceed on field service. For men of these classes, it is desirable to provide for the issue of free rations in peace time, since they must receive free rations on service. Suitable scales of clothing should be laid down where necessary, and clothing should be issued free, with reference to the nature of the duties to be performed. Finally, we advised that it is unnecessary to grant to the subordinate personnel of departments the same pensionary terms as are applicable to the combatant ranks in fighting units.

SECTION III.

Military Staff Clerks.

7. We found that a Committee had been appointed by the Commander-in-Chief to examine the existing clerical organizations and conditions of service, and variou cognate matters, and had recently submitted its report. We found ourselves in general agreement with its recommendations, which we do not think it necessary to reproduce.

We laid emphasis on the desirability of ensuring that British soldier clerks should be most sparingly used for clerical duties in the various military offices, in excess of the authorized establishments proposed in the report. We observed that the existing practice of engaging soldier clerks for temporary duty in these offices, in practically unlimited numbers, constitutes a grave danger to the fighting efficiency of the British Army in India.

With regard to Army Headquarters, we observed that if the clerks in the principal branches, such as that of the C.G.S., A.G., and Q.M.G., are to be paid at the same rates and enjoy the same status and privileges as the assistants and clerks in the Government of India's civil secretariat offices, it should be possible to effect, by degrees, a very considerable reduction in the numbers employed. A relatively small establishment of well-trained clerks, serving under favourable conditions, should be able to deal with work more efficiently and expeditiously than a much larger establishment of clerks who are for the most part untrained. We expressed a doubt, however, whether so high a grading or scale of pay is necessary in the case of the departmental offices subordinate to the principal staff officers, *e.g.*, that of the Director of Supply and Transport, the Director of Ordnance Inspection, &c.

We recommended that the Clerks' School of Instruction, which was established at Kasauli during the war, should be developed into a central school of training for military staff clerks. For the present, a fair knowledge of shorthand and typewriting should be an essential qualification for admittance to the school, and ultimately a first-class school certificate. No soldier should receive any clerical employment, other than temporary, until he has qualified by passing through the training school.

Section IV

Chaplains

8 During our stay in India we were asked for an expression of our opinion on a scheme for the formation of a Corps of Army Chaplains in India which had been prepared for the consideration of the Government of India We heard a good deal of evidence on the subject from chaplains of various denominations and from others well qualified to offer advice

9 It had been brought to our notice that the present arrangements for spiritual ministrations to British troops are in many cases defective, owing to the following facts firstly that the Anglican and Presbyterian chaplains ministering to troops are borne on the civil establishment and are but little amenable to military control, secondly, that chaplains who have to minister to the civil population as well as to the troops are apt in some cases to give insufficient attention to the latter and thirdly, that the more favourable treatment in the matter of pay pension &c extended to those two denominations as representing the established churches is a cause of some dissatisfaction to the chaplains of other denominations whose pay is undoubtedly inadequate for whole time servants of Government attached to troops and who enjoy no leave or pensionary rights

10 We expressed the view that the spiritual interests of the British Army as a whole would benefit from the adoption of the principles underlying the scheme submitted for our criticism namely—

(1) Equality of treatment for military chaplains of all denominations as now accepted by the War Office

(2) The provision of an adequate staff of army chaplains to meet the needs of the various denominations

(3) The organization of an Army Chaplains Department in India to administer the service so created

11 We considered a suggestion that this Chaplains Department should be placed under the Chaplain General at the War Office and also that the chaplains should be supplied as required from the home establishment We formed the conclusion that the first suggestion was quite inapplicable to Indian conditions since the instructions of the Chaplain General might conflict with the control of the Government of India over its own officers and would also probably lead to friction with the various ecclesiastical authorities in India

On the other hand we saw no reason why Government should not arrange with the War Office for the supply of a certain number of army chaplains of various denominations from the home establishment to fill up vacancies in the proposed Indian cadre Indeed we considered that in this way the Indian Government would be likely to secure for their enlarged cadre chaplains who are already in close touch with British troops and able to exercise a healthy influence over them and that the chaplains of the Royal Army Chaplains Department who now provide the personnel for all foreign military stations except India would welcome the opportunity of extending their sphere of duty to India

If this arrangement were approved chaplains would be detailed for tours of service in India for periods of five years as in the case of the Royal Army Medical Corps, Royal Engineers &c the extension of the term in individual cases being a matter for the home and Indian authorities While serving in India they would receive the same pay and allowances as members of the Indian Army Chaplains Department and they would also be eligible for permanent appointment to that department

12 The Army Chaplains Department in India constituted partly of men from the home establishment doing tours of duty in India, and partly of men already serving or to be selected by the Indian Government might we considered, be administered by Army Headquarters through a Principal Chaplain at headquarters as proposed in the scheme The Principal Chaplain should be selected from the 1st class chaplains, irrespective of denomination Questions of ecclesiastical discipline would be referred to the ecclesiastical heads of the diocese or district, whose spiritual authority would thus be maintained

13. We recommended that, wherever the number of troops is sufficient for the whole-time service of a chaplain of any denomination, a whole-time chaplain should be appointed for army work alone, and should be relieved of all duties to the civil population. In many of the smaller cantonments it would no doubt be possible, as at present, to combine both duties, and in that case the civil Governments might be required to pay a contribution.

14. The proposal to differentiate between the pay of married and unmarried chaplains appeared to us to be desirable. We laid stress upon the importance of securing chaplains of British nationality (including men from the Dominions) for British troops, especially for the Roman Catholics, who are now mainly served by priests of other nationalities. Priests of other nationalities, whose services may be necessary, should while employed be classified as temporary chaplains.

Section V.

Class Composition of Units.

15. On this subject we expressed the opinion that the class squadron or class company system is preferable to the class unit.

16. We recommended, however, that, so far as is consistent with the prospects of recruitment to meet the strain of a normal war, and with existing plans for the reorganization of the Indian Army, the cases of certain pre-war class regiments should be favourably considered.

17. We observed that, if recruitment of a particular class falls short of requirements, the best solution is to dilute existing class units, rather than to withdraw a class company or half company of the class in question from a class company regiment.

18. Finally, we expressed the hope that it might be found possible to arrange that some class unit or units should remain to each class which furnished class regiments before the war.

Section VI.

Silladar Cavalry.

19. While stating that we were in favour of the abolition of the silladar system in Indian cavalry, as proposed by the Government of India, we recommended that the change to "non-silladar" should not take place while the unit affected is absent from India; that *asamis* should be paid on conversion, unless the soldier concerned expresses a wish that his credit should be left with Government until his discharge, in which case he should receive a suitable rate of interest; and that the committees, which the Government of India proposed to set up to consider the details of the conversion scheme, should be thoroughly representative of the interests of all ranks concerned in the change.

Section VII.

The Burma and Assam Military Police.

20. A question on which we were asked for our advice related to the future of the Burma and Assam military police forces, with special reference to (1) the incidence of cost of their maintenance, and (2) their relation to the military authorities in connection with the defence of the north-east frontier.

We felt that it was outside our province to express an opinion on the incidence of cost as between the Government of India and the local Governments concerned With regard to the second point, we expressed our concurrence with the views of the General Staff in India, namely:—

(*a*) That the transfer to the army of responsibility for policing the north-east frontier, involving a large increase of expenditure, could not be justified on grounds of military necessity.

(*b*) That the circumstances of the case necessitated the location of the military police in a number of small posts, scattered all over the frontier. This dispersion is opposed to military principles and incompatible with a sound system of military defence, though doubtless suited to the purpose for which the force is primarily employed, namely, the policing of the frontier. For such duties it is desirable to employ local forces, which can be split up into detachments and moved about by the local civil authority without the delay involved by references to superior military officers.

(c) If regular troops co-operate with the military police it is essential that the operations should be conducted under military direction But this affords no justification for the suggestion that the military police should be brought permanently under military control On the contrary the present system under which the military police are controlled by the local Government suffices to meet all normal requirements and should not be changed

PART IX.

Conclusion

We have now completed the task assigned to us We have examined the conditions obtaining in the army in India at the close of a war of unprecedented magnitude Many changes are needed and they should not be postponed The army in India is not immune from the general unrest prevailing throughout the world Liberal and sympathetic treatment at the present time and the removal of such grievances as we have shown to exist should go far to secure contentment for the future

2 In our proposals relating to the higher command and to the organisation of Army Headquarters our main endeavour has been to relieve the Commander in Chief of work that can equally well be performed by his subordinates We have followed in ny respects the organisation of th ... the field since consider that the work of Army ... more nearly to conditions than is the case at ... ed so far as is tent with efficient working the number of officers with direct access to the ander in Chief

We have laid special stress on the necessity for decentralisation in India and inishing the detailed control exercised by the India Office We hope that if posals are agreed to there *will not only* be a considerable decrease in correce but that more rapid decisions will remove such discontent as is now caused y

Our principal aim has been to promote the efficiency and contentment of the in India and to secure that the Government of India will have at its disposal a trained and loyal army fit to take its share in the defence of the Empire

5 In submitting our recommendations we have borne in mind that many of them will entail increased expenditure We are aware that the present cost of the army in India (1920 1921) is already double the pre war cost We have therefore been actuated throughout by due regard for economy but we have not refrained from recommending relatively costly measures where we are satisfied that these are essential to the contentment and better administration of the army

6 Our proposals will further increase the annual cost of the army in India But although the immediate effect of adopting them will be to set up a higher standard of normal expenditure we do not contemplate the probability of this standard being increased at least for some years to come above what can be met from the normal growth of Indian revenues It is admitted that the first concern of any Government should be defence from external aggression and the maintenance of internal tranquillity With the prospect of industrial and agricultural development in India the revival of trade and the disappearance of freight difficulties it is hoped that the revenues of India may expand sufficiently to enable the needs of the army to be satisfied without detriment to other claims

7 Fresh standards have been set up existing services require reorganisation, and new services have ... There is much leeway too to be made up in improving ... with modern requirements. All these will involve heav ... venture to suggest that it might be

advantageous, from the point of view both of finance and of military administration, to adopt a system somewhat on the following lines:—

(*a*) The military authorities should first prepare a programme, showing the capital expenditure entailed by measures such as those indicated above.

(*b*) The Government of India would thus be in a position to gauge their liabilities, and to decide to what extent they could be met, and over what period the programme should be spread; and could proceed to obtain the Secretary of State's sanction, where necessary, to the expenditure involved.

(*c*) The Government of India might then arrange to give a definite allotment (over and above the sum required for the ordinary yearly upkeep of the army) towards the carrying out of this programme of special expenditure. This allotment should be expressed in terms of a total sum. to be spread over a fixed number of years. Lapses in the yearly allotment should be carried forward into the following year's budget, and remain at the disposal of the military authorities for the carrying out of this programme. Within the amount of the special provision, the military authorities should have a free hand in deciding to which of the measures in the programme priority should be given. The accounts relating to the expenditure on these measures should *pro formâ* be maintained separately.

(*d*) Subject to these conditions, the military authorities should be required to work strictly to the annual budget provision for the upkeep of the army, except in so far as this may prove impossible owing to unforeseen causes, such as military operations, or increases in the cost of food-stuffs, &c., occurring in the course of the financial year.

8. The Indian army is the instrument of the Government of India, by whom it paid and administered, subject to the general control of the Secretary of State for Indi We consider therefore that, subject to such control, the Government of India should the final authority in matters connected with the pay and allowances of officers and n of the Indian Army, wherever they may be serving. We find it necessary to state view, as we have been informed that the more liberal terms recommended by Government of India have been rejected in several cases on the ground that all cl on account of officers and men of the Indian Army, serving overseas, are borne Majesty's Treasury. This does not appear to us to be a valid reason why t service should be prescribed which are at variance with the express recommen of the Government of India, and which result in the creation of numerous ineq in the rates of pay of officers serving overseas with formations containing Indian or performing duties analogous to those of corresponding appointments in India.

The Government of India have no voice in deciding the rates of pay of officer other ranks of the British Army, though increases in these rates materially enh the cost of the army in India, which is entirely borne by Indian revenues. Just the security of India demands the presence of these British troops, so the fresh milita obligations devolving on the Empire as a result of the war necessitate the employment overseas of considerable numbers of Indian troops. We consider that the Government of India have the right to claim, as an essential condition of lending their troops for such duties, that they should be the final authority in all questions of pay and allowances, subject always to the control of the Secretary of State for India. This right needs to be explicitly safeguarded.

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22nd June, 1920.